Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/185/1 - 1915 - 1918 - Part 1

AWM38
Official History,
1914-18 War: Records of C E W Bean,
Official Historian.
Diaries and Notebooks
Item number: 3DRL606/185/1
Title: Notebook, 1915 -1918
Includes references to the 7th, 48th and 52nd
Battalions, the 12th Infantry Brigade, Sgt S R
McDougall's VC, Dernancourt and the Turkish
guns at Gallipoli.

AWM38-3DRL606/185/1 

52 Bn:
48 Bn
47 Bn
DERNANCOURT
185
Original DIARY NO. 185.
AWM38
3 DRL 606 ITEM 185 [1]
DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. E. W. BEAN
CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914 – 1918
THE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms
of gift to the Australian War Memorial.  But, apart from those terms, I wish the
following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every
reader and writer who may use them.
These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be
true.  The diaries were jotted down almost daily with the object of recording what
was then in the writer's mind.  Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep;
also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so - but it does not
follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when
discovered.  Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them.
These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what
their author, at the time of writing, believed.  Further, he cannot, of course, vouch
for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded.  But he
did try to ensure such accuracy by consulting, as far as possible, those who had
seen or otherwise taken part in the events.  The constant falsity of second-hand
evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed
upon him by the second or third day of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that
those who passed on such stories usually themselves believed them to be true.  All
second-hand evidence herein should be read with this in mind.
16 Sept., 1946.  C. E. W. BEAN
AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL
ACCESS STATUS
OPEN

Treloar - Morrells films
some enlargements?
82
1
52 Bn:
48 Bn
47 Bn
DERNANCOURT
185

Diagram - see original document
82
 2
Diagram - see original document

ide
who
/ two
82
3
52nd Bn - Dernancourt.
The rly embankt starts W. of
Buire at abt 30 B 6.6. The S side
of / rd is also banked here as
far as abt 19 C 9.2 where /
rly embkt ends - & there is therefore
a depression between the rd &
rly - the rly embkt here is
pretty deep.
Diagram - see original document 
[*Parts marked by line at side
are from Lt Julin - Rest mostly from
Col Witham who is much more careful o / two*]
From D to E the road is also embanked
on its S. side & there is a big
depression between the Rd Embankt
& the rly embank. Between A & B
 

4
^※Under Lt Boase,  M.C. who
ws in/c of the left Pln of B Coy
wh included in its left the arch.
This post ws abt  E 20 B 6.4.  It
ws dug in on / rt o / rd & cd fire
pretty well to / Church, at Dernct.
The nearest house had bn smashed by shell or bomb.
82
5
the railway embankt. gradually
gets steeper, after the level Xing
at A ; but the N bank is 
a good deal deeper
than the S. bank.
Our outpost line was
dug into the rly bank for
shelter for living positions;
but the positn ws defended
by simply getting up on top
o / embankt & lying flat
there, shooting over the nearer
rail.
Under the arch at B
we had a sniping post w
a Lewis gun dug in about
50 or 60 yds down / road
on / right,^※ sniping into /
village. The companies of 52
ran
A near Buire, D central,
(in touch w 37 Bn)
B Coy on left up to & including rly

82
6
bridge & A Coy in Support
near HQ at 18 C 2.0 near
the nine trees.
The policy of the C.O. (Col
Witham) was to have the
rly line held sufficiently to
prevent / Germans getting
it by any except a strong
attack.  The Pioneers were
tunnelling it for m.g. positns
but these had not bn finished.
When finished, the ^rly line cd be
held by these & pickets sufficiently
to prevent enemy massing;
the Support line wd then have
bn / main line of resistance
in any heavy attack, & /
coys wd have bn kept in
garrison there. The Support line
consisted of a number of
lengths of trenches - platoon posts,
some 300 yds up / slope o / hill.

82
7
They were connected lft with
the rly & Buire Village on
their right by a trench dug
N & S by the 3rd Pioneers
of whom 3 Coys were the [[No. of?]]
Garrison Buire N of the Ancre.
The 37 Bn HQrs were in Buire
(Col. Knox Knight).
Witham - in order to
deny the space dead ground
behind / rly to / enemy -
decided to place / garrison
in the picket line on / rly;
& to give instrns tt if they
were forced back they were
to fall back on / Support
line as the main line of
resistance. This ws taking
a risk; & he spent / night
of Ap 3/4 in going personally
along / rly to the coys

82
8
telling them each personally
exactly what the policy was
- fight on / rly line; & if
you have to fall back -
fall back & make your
definite last resistance in
/ support trenches
He saw Col. Knox Knight in
Buire & had a yarn a him. Then
he visited A & D Coy.  At D Coy he
ws talking to Capt Williams- It
ws just midnight - when there
came a ring from Bde to say tt
the enemy was expected to attack
in the morning.  Witham wondered
a moment whether he ought to go back to
his HQrs directly but decided
to go on & see Fraser, the
ex. Staff Captain of 4th Bde who
was in/c of B Coy on his left
in touch w / 47 Bn at the rly

 9
"It leaves me perfectly calm -
I hope they come!"
 Witham lit his pipe on a cigarette
behind one o / tents of the C.C.S
& began a welcome smoke!
Julin ws w him.
82
10
Bridge. He stood talking to Fraser
for a time till 2 am.,-  explaining to him
what his Coy ws to do if 
driven back.  Fraser ws quite
sure there wd be no going back
- it ws not in his mind as a possibility -
but Witham told him - it ws.
seriously meant - if he went
back he ws to occupy the
reserve Support positn of
B Coy (by the C.C.S).  There ws
an intermediate advanced
post near the Cemetery
(L - Civilian Cemetery & military
Cemy. next to it.)
Witham went back
past the NE corner of the
C.C.S in order to satisfy
himself that the troops of
the reserve coy (wh he had
ordered up there at midnight)
were there (under Capt Kennedy);
and at 3xxa.m. arrived