Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/119/1 - Photostats - Part 3

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Awaiting approval
Accession number:
RCDIG1066758
Difficulty:
4

Page 1 / 11

ing Frers Ravntn istter n? Nooretarg Dofenoe relprurns evening pøpere serenin letter ds After Frioburt brenk) In ine Geran tren- gnes praak) A vnnderful søptem Drent) Austrulinn T.r Correspondent Eehn Dritich Heatguarters Tranoe July taotbrez) Yesteriay from the opomte slope of a gentle valley we aatoned Priogurt villace taxch (nræri fu l roint) This zorning we walzed domn through tie lonz russ acrozs (quote) old nonlan (unuote)into eren defences (full roint) The gruss has bega uncut for tao veurs on these slopes and that is hy teere syrings from them guch d grontu of flovers sIh ve warely seen (full oncc a roint) I think it s x tflald tnt we ere alk- ing trrouch (full ppint) 1t is a grruen of po-sies crrnflor iensturd glevurs nos !breux! Half zay domn the dlore wo noticet tuut e were erging a xline ghich secacd to have been strangel? rulod drryuen the zneptfleld full pint) vrn gruns hut thers rrrnz wns a line af b by arnle tresson ouch sids of it (full Point) It tyok ons ooge scconis to raa¬ ise thlt it was a poxd (bronz) ee umtro Dint) it the bottön of tne vuliy r stepzed over a trench: nich nadn ire entanglement in front of it (full reint) It ze ar tho old Britizn font lins Erærxr nni pint) Ens spice in front of it had vern Frndlizn tusel! of our nen Still lying fref dowæards here shrugnel or rafie fire na rne tie (ull point) ng the- run enocher old rond up the valley (full goint) Zeyend the roud the ruilway truoks were still standing as they hav stad for too zeurs in zaat onde was Pricourt zrxxxx zull roint) xE T bundations of riourt village ond ageinst the dars shadcs of Stood up little xxxxxx Bdinn Dutrrrrrnlur Friopurt wood full ypint) rrredintelz in front ofus in fpnt of tnin battored zz wnite mii nah neup ere the ræmun
ir nich nrd onoe bien tne raze in Tront oi tnn Germen line (Drrak) Tne Gerznn dekenoes (breär) 42 fbund frurrcntr of ühzt vdie in the bottøm of hes thonsolvos (erxrrl eriopjon) engen ofi sangst ene zhatterd buildings behind the lines t) Ins Dritizn shells ani kombs must have tosselit ould toss nay with n rase full roint) IxxxLEz he tumbled hrrrr ruins pehind the lincs gu dirrly ons oruter inth ansther (Ful! leint) xxxxxx kezge orrtera you couid have plsczd a fiirzized ) One lig chell und to uncxolosci bombs i ient Cinren bolls zyt lay there still half ooveral ith rub ich (brenk) Tauuch thas rubbich hesp xxscattered odde fregments of füring nachinery td ch) nere an old a eeer nn) tire a plouch ahnre or a portion of iaah) in apother place soge old ion rress of 4o mat zus the uge fuil Point) The rest of the vinl like a degertad briczfield or tre remding of some e Eining caup pau) I do not thinz there were thrre e of zall overtten fret high left in the rlace (full nd in and out 5ä zuis debris wundrred the derran front lire (breaz) e ninoe trencies where ome iie had brenen them in (full goint) Thay were dsep tremches rrow such as schr in Gulipoli (full roint) Dack them led xxxxxxn rrow deep winding cosrunication ee snich curiousiy enough in the arts here we sax xx thes seerel to have no zusrorts to their zalls sich as xx trenches in the wct country further north must havo fuu Pvint) Hrre zul tkdre spms anaul burgt, had broken or Guskon tha in and the bottom of tneh rus fuul of frugrents fxrx DptROACREETEEETEEEEFE IDEE) As they garg laft (brräs) As we rnde pur zay kong uhe front ling we 50 Eod re sa gad Frie erob. D5. r
min Bagw üe säret (nei ind) It ns smre ma üir ed zull roint) ptam wopden görra ied dszmjinto mrze Feiene nor für eioe ine Fraust rrgarra brez) e G l c z beral Den int) the first of theo pern (Auui eint) It ms nruæ eatait oognräests hnd left it (nuil Toint) On the flonr Eongst pore urbled plankcio zni odd rdeces of olötiing orma) oo for tue zost purt (oogma) were tying vix sontterd Gernn stich grenades line n groy jampöt withz sbrt h nuue zuu oint) Ihe blankets nnd orse frur a prries of buks snich fil cd üp the ehple dar gramper (Tull pint) ney ernde ruughly of wood (opmaa) in Fnirs ne overansther a wiuh aszuch ingemuity as tho bereus in an erigrant zhip (Tul oint) There -rr were I tin: wix of tucm in that fürnt duazber (Tul! Point) Euxumz Iniet inte the wail st turr gnd of one Bet 5f bunzs was a peden ppi Ling servic for2 curtoari mrrz Gruil reint) In it Hal a gart of u gas helmet and thred or four pottledof a Geran table Fater (full point) At least ore inese wus still full (full meint) So the garrionn of Fr- out wäurnt a.herr rut toit für wuplies sergof tr enionern wicn wurm : sroko the day before Tuil reine sater cpuld z nad Vold ne tnzt for thrg or fur o rpägit to tuuz p tueir orzmmic tion trendhes oring to n tue ny: tich boab rüscht r tod It hnd been I Eroch türt Gnn Grrrigen of etirelz in thoge uguts Chring tne bo (Jull ppint) Tne chazbars srrrou t3 havo rore in one entrmnos in zuzke aure cises and one suszoots that they led inte ene nrother Hrkxx xn underapynd (Durl roint) a I hars just describzi an underground benenth the Fariget zux to d 3n) zou quuig zro tue daylignt t tu ineine of It
enad rerrn f ovrediy to peer tnrougn unen iatfhra rich a Long in 3n it (fil oint) herr zas uue: nung m it spite nich i dpeen stuge int e int) dt lcrzci ou auricht zur etnwinur Hr weis eru tne h . ru no zieer: Wr Teint) Ie Hekis guut hut uiä f er dünge mot erun enurui oree it rre ruu mint M1s. hirz err dichtir omrrnnen tull pint) ie 12okgd About hin frr gruch zut mith rr orensrad firr guæs of a ild nimal nich hegref to lacg it o prehenndon ruil Teint) MIt za- ffantle u oint)e wur the ern) 85 in. .../ ehenn ätetn thnouen at 20
21 COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE AUSTRALIAN MILITARY OFFICE, .T./Mä. 130. HORSEFERRY ROAD, Tor dlbrarme dookeaz: WESTMINSTER. tonpow sw. gørausren we lowoom- frsenanse. 26r90 9860 June 77h. 1916. My dear Bban, It is needlese for me to sar how very gratsful I am to you for your good offices on my account. The bunch irom Cairo stick closely together. and it seemed hardly worth while battling against them. Captain Gollins wrote a letter to Sellheim a fer das ag asking whether he desired my serviees. In reply to that communication Sellheim replied as follows:- "With reference to your letter of 5/6/16. relative to the employment of Mr. Smart in these offices; I regret that, owing to re-organisation, it will not be necessary to continue Mr. Smart in this office and his services can be mado available to you from any date you wish. 2. I am aware of the excellent work done by Ey Smart, and his experience, and assistance has been of the greatest service to me and my Staff during the period he has been associated with us. 3. May I ask you to make known to him my appr ciation of his valuable services and convey to him my thanks and good wishes. (Sgd.) V.C.M. Sellheim." It will take me about a week to square up things Littrpelennr od- ictoria treet, where here. I will then go over to72, I suppose there will be work for me. Vaecke
Inde swrs uin be wues of somt ipbat mree herd, So Warg evidentle, Clnl f hrl Cauclersuen büht ot would he hert t heire wre out. I urälact dourd bül Stor gichr Zenernd Seilhen om br das if et tet see soe oe bie e me dvere zus. Audh so m suins. Worus Seicent. CSart
i Be Z..M.TLh: 77 Mnl. 121 1ip Sluale. Terns sh rrst Sin Sr Tiiggiche tiat nahnes tins isnnistel ies tilenesteliestnit h se titiet t. T tat Ih de nesht "/hrr liegni Se frrsande zrirume ! h. Mksaust inilhe lisstimst us tisfrichin uste de i tim! Stste K Ofietine i tr His toch Fichenin, Rast eeou Hanuit He Gunisy 1"ll.. . tn Ih ssunn tinne shi zitt pit . ih. Hitotse ta ht dfhstie f! Hinl RiitaRanst t sr... Hor kar fonstittid 31 ""4 1. 6 n 2.t Lnt. 6n . . fer des d.firste 26. 4. 6 " " t. Nid i- tindiene i t Srrng ti/, ter .Rget tie tiie t Tr. I Kite Shg nin si hilt trg adt ondt as inder iintretian Hiich, indt te luussmenentie, 5 de Sorbes Goumiing hist tnr.t. Tiehhes inl ke sgnshiomnen ed s) ans stren t jä att 1.. T./ Sinr KiMnst 2. N. hie wilten. A. K 57 3 Lathen Ar .11 in jero bre 10.30. 1 Tiicte Ban ke 1030 : wtillaw .3) 7 MT 1037 on( itte vur 1../. 33
24 i Note, on inx conversation with German officers who were n the action of Fwiday . Saturday July 28/29. On offier of ihe jea na Rest vas in suport near the aunken road to Corcelatte. His company was hurried into the line O.da at about poin,/58 in R.34. d. He said that our 7th brigade were not seen at ghis point as they came out from the tramway into position. The first that was seen of the left battalion of the 7th Brigade vas as it was advancing to attack after the barrage. The wire at this point had been dut by our artillery; portions of it were still scat- tered about hanging to posts and on the ground but in the opinion of this officer it was possible to eross it. Then our infantry however reached Lkizuæmimt the front of the z German wire in this seetor three machine guns opened on them from there snd many others from boch left and right. The bombardment had not been sufficient to bury the machine guns. The impression of thes officer was that the heavy machine gun rifle and shrapnel fire opened on our men as i thev approached nhe broken wire of O.C.I drove the attacking battalions into the eraters . They thought our loss must be heavy. Some of our men had reached the German front trench at a point about 97 or 26 in 34D and 35 C. They were only a few and they were bombed and captured . It was known from the prisoners that the attack had been made by the 25th 26th and 28th battalions. The Cermans had known for two weeks (i.e. from about the date of our first attack on Pozieres) that the Australians were in front of them. An officer of the 84th jegiment,, who was about the Bapaume Road on the night of July 28/29 said that on his portion of the front the Australians were seen coming over the hill in X5a before the bombard- ment began. Fire was at once opened upon them with machine guns and rifles. This was a cross fire and came from a number of guns. The attack in this part never materialised. This officer also said that there was no wire left in frons of blown away his trench. It had been by artillery fire. He could not speak howe -ever of.the portion of line attacked by the 28th Battalion. His men had a
25 fins target in the Australians shom they enfiladed as they rushed the front of O.O.I, and many were seen ip fall. Khe second third and fourth waves of our troops came forward vell but took sholter in whatsver cover the oraters in front of o0 I afforded when they reached the front of it. There was a shallow trench in Nomansland some way in front of o G I chich was smashed with artil- lery fire and was not occupied by the Germans. This, trench they thoug might have been taken by some of our men for the Cerman front trench. After the first attack the British bombardment beeame heavy. They noticed that it was dangerous to show themselves in the Cerman trench even around the mouthe of the dugouts when a British aeroplane vas up. Our aeroplanes,they thoucht, signalled the position of any mer they saw back to the batteries and fire was ixxx brought to bear on those points. (These points may have been noted by aeroplanes strong points). All officers say that they knew an attack must be com ing but they did not know when. Our artillery puzzled them by bombard ing them at various times during the nights. No attack would follow these bombardments although at first they seem to have expeoted this. They were not expecting an attack after our final bombardment - they expected that if made at any time it would be nade at dawn. Many of the machine guns had been buried by this bombardment. They were buried in the dugouts to which they had been taken. Nearly all the machine guns seem to have been put out of action in this way. Only a few were left, some of which were brought against our troops in the second attack. (In the previous attack the two or three machine guns which had been buried were replaced), The company of the officer of the I62nd Regt had lost 84 men in four days by our bombardment. The regiment was to be relieved next morning by the Gath Regt. Tpey had plenty to eat and drink. Reliefs merskerknto, Stsve mnt grie süir, us te re unet
2e into 0.02 over the top and not throuch communication trenches. The por- immediately tion of Oc2/South of the Bapaume Road was too much battered to hold. „They could only crawl about in this part. One officer was surprised to find that we regarded it as occupied. The Windmill had been used as an observation post xbut it had been so battered by our artillery that it had not lately been occupied." Our men coming down K trench (West of Pozieres) are in full view of the enemy . When asked.why they were not sniped at the officer did not answer. The enemy had noticed that we vere digging a nev trench in front of their lines and xtook this as a sign that they were sure to be attacked. Ihrndirutrrrnxxkyzrinik The second attack. The second nttack as explained was unexpected. Our men were on the enemy very quickly, especially just south of the Bapaume Road. An officer in Torrs Trench (the new trench built from kunster Alley N.". into O.G.2 by the Cermans) found bimself cut off by our troops getting into his trench beyond him as well as on our side of him. On the left of our 7th Brigade one or two machine guns were brought to bear on the attack from about point 58 in R 34 D. The attack was held up a little in front of this;but our men flowed into the trench at about R 34 central and about R 34 point 97 and bombed their way up the trench from both sides. They also began to come into the trench from always arriving the rear. There were too many/for them to be stopped . The men getting in from the rear were some of those who had got in to the north and across in into 0 C 2 or who were bom bing their way from the North along the rear x of the trenhh. They were fine strong lada - this officer remarked. Both O C I and 6 c 2 were held in both of these attacks. On the night of the second attack the Cermans were just relieving. An officer of the 84th said that at about 10,30 he was marching into the trench near the Windmill at the head of about 50 men chen our bombard- Eot enmd -ndeihit aüike keod s üe fint nige ts anmdt we
2. 4 three i wounded Australians. He judged that ahe British must be making an attack and ordered his men to form to the richt and counterattack. In forming the richt lost touch with him going he thoucht too far to the North and he found himseld with three men. They went over 0 G 2 and dug in in a crater ixxxxxt between it and o0 Y. Hees they vore surrounded and captured. The first question which the officer of the 162nd asked xxx when he reached Brigade Headquarters was "Are you in Courcelette?" He was told -" No, I think not; but your batteries have been seen blowing up their ammunition", He asked at once "Were theythe heavy xxx batteries or the light ones;" One offioer of the Sath Regiment said that he thought neithe side would win the war, "Nobody will win it." He thought it would end in September. Another said that Germany would fight on until she could get a satisfastory peace. They had been informed that the British immediately after large the Jutland sea battle had recalled all their/Gruisers from the colonies and elsewhere oversea. Then asked if they considered the Australians rouch xxxxi soldiers they shook their heads strongly. They were quite satisfied with the way they had been treated. "We think that the Australian kills he meets everyone/shile he is fighting but he treats xxx his enemy well when the fighting is over". One officer said that our machine guns had beer turned upon their stretcher bearers on the Bapaume Road. (This would undoubtedly be indirect fire). Ne also said that he knew that the inmates of a "Hopital" had been killed. By this he meant the mõst advanced dressing station behind the front trench. The position he described as"near Courcelette". He did not know chat troops had done this.(It may refer to.the bombing of some dugout during an attack). This is at present known to the Germans as the worst part of the front, in this theatse, bat it is not thought tobe worse than Verdun. Vimy,Ypres, last year Champagne, Lorette are all considered bad parts.

17
D9
Pge 47
9
Evening Papers seventh letter E7 

Secretary Defence Melbourne evening papers seventh letter 

words After Fricourt (break) in the German trenches
(break) A wonderful system (break) Australian War

Correspondent Bean British Headquarters France July two (break)

 

Yesterday from the opposite slope of a gentle

valley we watched Fricourt village taken (break) full point) 

This morning we walked down through the long grass across 

what two days ago was (quote) nomansland (unquote) into the ∧old German 
defences (full point) The grass has been uncut for two 

years on these slopes and this is why there springs from 

them such a growth of flowers as I have rarely seen (full

point) I think it was ∧ once a xxxxxxx wheatfield that we were walking 
through (full point) It is a garden of poppies cornflowers 

∧and mustard flowers now (break)


Half way down the slope we noticed that we were 
crossing a strange line which seemed to have been strangely 

ruled through the wheat field (full point) It was covered with 

grass but there xxxxxx was a line of baby apple trees on
each side of it (full point) It took one some seconds to realise 

that it was a road (break)


We jumped across trench after trench from our own

(full point) At the bottom of the valley we xxxxxxxxxxx 

stepped over a trench which had a wire entanglement in 
front of it (full point) It was xx the old British front
line xxxxxx full point). The space in front of it had been 

Nomansland (break)


Some of our men still lying face downwards where 

shrapnel or rifle fire had xxxxxxx ∧caught them (full point) By them
ran another old road up the valley (full point) Beyond the 

road the railway trucks were still standing as they have 

stood for two years in what once was Fricourt xxxxxxx ∧siding (full
point) In front of us The foundations of Fricourt village 

stood up a little ∧beyond against the dark shades of xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Fricourt wood (full point) Immediately in front of us in

front of this battered xx white xxx ash heap were the remains

 

18
6/47
10
(2)
of the rusted wire which had once been the maze in front of 

the German line (break) The German defences (break)

 

We found fragments of that wire in the bottom of 

the trenches themselves (xxxxxxx semicolon) Lengths of it
were lying amongst the shattered buildings behind the lines 

(full point) The British shells and bombs must have tossed it 

about as you would toss hay with a rake (full point) xxxxxxxx
In the tumbled bricks ruins behind the lines you simply 

stepped from one crater into another (full point) xxxxxxxxx 

Into many of those craters you could have placed a fairsized 

room (full point) One big shell and two unexploded bombs x
like huge ancient cannon balls xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 

lay there still half covered with rubbish (break) 

 

Through this rubbish heap xxxxxxxxxxx ∧were scattered
odd fragments of farming machinery (dash) here an old 

waggon wheel (dash) there a plough share or a xxxx portion of 

a harrow (dash) in another place some old iron press of 

which I do not know the use (full point) The rest of the village 

was like a deserted brickfield or the remains of some 

ancient mining camp (dash) I do not think there were three

fragments of wall over ten feet high left in the place (full 

point) And in and out of this debris wandered the German 

front line (break) 

 

We jumped down into those trenches where some 

shell had broken them in (full point) They were deep trenches 

and narrow such as we had in Gallipoli (full point) Back
from them led xxxxxxx narrow deep winding communication
trenches which curiously enough in the parts here we saw xxx 
them seemed to have no supports to their walls such as xxxxxx 

all trenches in the wet country further north must have (full 

point) Here and there some shell burst had broken or shaken 

them in and the bottom of them was full of fragments
xxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx (break) 

 

As they were left (break) 

As we made our way along the front line we found xxxxxx 

(comma) every ten yards or so (comma) a low square timbered

 

19
6/47
11
(3)
opening below the parapet (full point) It was square and timbered
(full point) A dozen wooden steps led down ∧and forwards into some
dark interior far below the parapet (xxxxxx (break) 

 

We clambered down into the first of these 

chambers (full point) It was xxxxxx exactly as its xxxxxx 

occupants had left it (full point) On the floor amongst some 

tumbled blankets and odd pieces of clothing (comma) socks
for the most part (comma) were lying xxx scattered German 

stick grenades like a grey jampot with a short handle (full 

point) The blankets had come from a series of bunks which 

almost filled up the whole dark chamber (full point) They 

were made roughly of wood (comma) in pairs one over another
(comma) and packed into every corner of the narrow space 

with as much ingenuity as the berths in an emigrant ship 

(full point) There xxxxxx were I think six of them in that 

first chamber (full point) xxxxxx  Inlet into the wall at 

the end of one set of bunks was a wooden box doing service 

for a cupboard xxxx (full point) In it was a penny novel 

(comma) a part of a gas helmet and three or four bottles of 

xxxxx a German table water (full point) At least one
of these was still full (full point) So the garrison of Fricourt 

was not as hard put to it for supplies as some of the 

German prisoners with whom I spoke the day before (full point)

They had told me that for three of four days no water could 

be brought to them up their communication trenches owing to a
the British bombardment (break) 

 

Where they waited (break) 

I expect that the garrison of Fricourt had been 

almost entirely in those dugouts during the bombardment 

(full point) The chambers seemed to have more than one 

entrance in xxxxxx some cases and one suspects that they 

led into one another xxxxx also underground (full point) 

From the one which I have just described an underground 

passage led forward beneath the parapet xxx to a door opening 

into Nomansland (dash) you could see the daylight at the 

end of it xxxxxxxxx (break)

 

20
6/47
12
(4)
The fire trench was battered in places out of 

recognition (full point) But here and there we came across 

a bay of it which the bombardment had left more or less untouched
(full point) There were the slings of cartridges 

still hanging up against the wall of the trench (full point) 

There were the two steel xxxxxx ∧plates through which they peered
out into Nomansland (comma) the slits in them half covered by 

the flap so is just to give a man room to peep through them 

(full point) There was the machine gun platform with a long 

empty belt still lying on it (full point) There was the xxx 

periscope xxxxx standing on its spike which had been stuck 

into the trench wall (full point) It looked out straight xxxx 

across Nomansland but both mirrors were gone (break) 

 

As we xxxxxxxx picked our way through the 

brick heaps there came towards us a British soldier with 

a fixed bayonet (comma) and an elderly bareheaded man (full 

point) The elderly mans hair was cut short and was grizzled 

(full point) He had not shaved for three days (full point) 

He was stout but his face had a curious grey xxxx tinge shot 

through the natural complection as it were (full point) His x 

lips were tightly compressed (full point) He looked about him

firmly enough but with xx the openeyed xxxx gaze of a wild animal

which seemed to lack all comprehension (full point) x It was 

the face of a man who was witless (full point) He wore the
uniform of a German captain (break)

 

xxxx ∧He was one of the men who had been through that
bombardment BEAN

 

6/110      

21

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

ST./MM.

Private

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS:

MILAUSTRA. VIC., LONDON"

TELEPHONE: VICTORIA 8860.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY OFFICE,

130, HORSEFERRY ROAD.

WESTMINSTER.

LONDON, S.W.

 

June 7th., 1916,

My dear Bean,

It is needless for me to say how very grateful 

I am to you for your good offices on my account. 

 

The bunch from Cairo stick closely together, 

and it seemed hardly worth while battling against them. 

Captain Collins wrote a letter to Sellheim a few days ago 

asking whether he desired my services. In reply to that
communication Sellheim replied as follows:- 
 

 "With reference to your letter of 5/6/16, 

relative to the employment of Mr. Smart in these 

offices; I regret that, owing to re-organisation, 

it will not be necessary to continue Mr. Smart in 

this office and his services can be made available 

to you from any date you wish. 

2. I am aware of the excellent work done by Mr. 

Smart, and his experience and assistance has been 

of the greatest service to me and my Staff during 

the period he has been associated with us. 

3. May I ask you to make known to him my appreciation

of his valuable services and convey to him 

my thanks and good wishes. 

(Sgd.) V.C.M.Sellheim." 
 

 It will take me about a week to square up things

here. I will then go over to ^the High Commission at 72, Victoria Street, where 

I suppose there will be work for me.

I Scuther

 D9/110

D9/110     

Page 22

think I was in the way of some of the

men here, so they evidently came to the

 conclusion that it would be best to 

move me out. I walked around the 

show with General Sellheim on the day of 

his arrival, since when he has not looked 

upon me.  [[Around 50 -- times?]]

Yours sincerely

1-1. C. Smart

 

9/181      

23

Secret

 

4th Australian Infantry Brigade Order No 33

Map Reference. Farm du Mouquet /5000

  1. The Brigade has again been successful in unchanged objective

and now holds the line R35 & 41; R 34 d 60; R34 6. 24; B34 6

24 R 34 a.86; 65.34.13; R 33.b.61; R 33 d 28; 26 linking

up with the 12th Div at 26.

2. On the night 12/13th August the forward movement to Mouquet Farm

will be continued in co-operation with the 12 Divison on our left

Objective 13th Bn R 30 a 86; R 34 a 38; R 33 b. 9. 6 ½ (inclusive)

Objective 14th Bn R 33 b 9.6½ (exclusive) R 33 b. 55 on Mouquet Road

Quarry R 33 a 81 (inclusive)

3. In the meantime as much ground as possible will be made good

towards that objective the 13th Bn. forming a defensive flank on the line

R34 b 24, R 34 a 86. 67-38 As soon as the defensive flank

has been consolidated it will be held with Lewis Guns with as

few men as possible.

4. The attack will be timed in accordance with Barrage map attached

Zero time will be night 13 August.

5. The 4th L I M Bty and 4th MG Coy will act as under instruction

which will be communicated to the Officers commanding these

Units.

6. Watches will be synchronised at 6pm and 9pm on 12th August

7. Green flares will be shown by the front line at 7.30 am and 10.30am

tomorrow 13th and [[?]] aeroplanes will fly without any lights.

8. The [[?]] for tonight will be - British, [[Eastern?]] - Australian troops - Queensland

 

J M A Durrant

Major

Brigade Major

4th Aus Inf Bde

Issue at

Copy No 1 War Diary

                 2 4th Au. Div

                 3 Labour Div

                  4 13th Bn

                  5 14th

                  6 16th

                  7 4th LTM Bty

                  8 4th MG Coy

                  9  35 Inf Bde

                  10 12th Inf Bde

                  11  13th do

                  12 15th Bn

                  13 

 

Zero time 10.30

Barrage 10.30-33

10.33-5

10.35-7

10.37 on (Mouquet

Farm line.)

 

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Note: ^by CEWB on xxx conversation with German Officers who were

in the action of Friday _ Saturday July 28/29.

 

One officer of the 162nd Regt was in support near the sunken

road to Courcelette. His company was hurried into the line O.G2 at

about point 58 in R.34 d. He said that our 7th brigade were not

seen at this point as they came out from the tramway into position.

The first that was seen of the left battalion of the 7th Brigade

was as it was advancing to attach after the barrage. The wire at this

point had been cut by our artillery; portions of if were still scattered

about hanging to posts and on the ground but in the opinion of this

officer it was possible to cross it.

 

When our infantry however reached thispoint the front of the 

German wire in this sector three machine guns opened on them from there

and many others from both left and right. The bombardment had not been

sufficient to bury the machine guns. The impression of this officer was

that the heavy machine gun rifle and shrapnel fire opened on our men as 

they approached the broken wire of O.G.1 drove the attacking battalions

into the craters. They thought our loss must be heavy.

 

Some of our men reached the German front trench at a point

about 97 or 26 in 34D and 35C. They were only a few and they were

bombed and captured. It was known from the prisoners that the attack

had been made by the 25th 26th and 28th battalions. The Germans had

known for two weeks (i.e. from about the date of our first attack on

Pozieres) that the Australians were in front of them.

 

An officer of the 84th Regiment, who was about the Bapaume

Road on the night of July 28/29 said that on his portion of the front

the Australians were seen coming over the hill in X5a before the 

bombardment began. Fire was at once opened upon them with machine guns and rifles. This was a cross fire and came from a number of guns. The attack in this

part never materialised.

 

This officer also said that there was no wire left in front of

his trench. It had been xxxxxxxxx blown away by artillery fire. He could not speak howee-ever of the portion of line attacked by the 28th Battalion. His men had a 

 

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2.

fine target in the Australians whom they enfiladed as they rushed

the front of O.G.1, and many were seen to fall.

 

The second third and fourth waves of our troops came forward

well but took shelter in whatever cover the craters in front of OG1

afforded when they reached the front of it. There was a shallow trench

in Nomansland some way in front of O G 1 which was smashed with

artillery fire and was not occupied by the Germans. This trench they thought

might have been taken by some of our men for the German front trench.


After the first attack the British bombardment became heavy.

They noticed that it was dangerous to show themselves in the German

trench even around the mouths of the dugouts when a British aeroplane

was up. Our aeroplanes, they thought, signalled the position of any men

they saw back to the batteries and fire was immediately brought to

bear on those points. (These points may have been noted by aeroplanes

strong points). All officers say that they knew an attack must be

coming but they did not know when. Our artillery puzzled them by 

bombarding them at various times during the nights. No attack would follow

these bombardments although at first they seem to have expected this.

They were not expecting an attack after our final bombardment -

they expected that if made at any time it would be made at dawn.

 

Many of the machines guns had been buried by this bombardment.

They were buried in the dugouts to which they had been taken. Nearly

all the machine guns seem to have been put out of action in this way.

Only a few were left, some of which were brought against our troops

xxx in the second attack. (In the previous attack the two or three

machine guns which had been buried were replaced).

 

The company of the officer of the 162nd Regt had lost 84 men

in four days by our bombardment. The regiment was to be relieved next

morning by the 84th Regt. They had plenty to eat and drink. Reliefs

and reinforcements, at any rate during action, used to be brought

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3.

into O.G2 over the top and not through communication trenches. The portion 

of OG2^immediately South of the Bapaume Road was too much battered to hold.

They could only crawl about in this part. One officer was xxxxxxxx

surprised to find that we regarded it as occupied. The Windmill had been

used as an observation post xxxxxx but it had been so battered by our

artillery that it had not lately been occupied.

 

Our men coming down K trench (West of Pozieres) are in full

view of the enemy xxx.  When asked why they were not sniped at the officer 

did not answer.

 

The enemy had noticed that we were digging a new trench in

front of their lines and xxxxxx took this as a sign that they were sure

to be attacked.

 

The first xxxxxxxxxxxxxby

The second attack.

The second attack as explained was unexpected. Our men were on

the enemy very quickly, especially just south of the Bapaume Road. An

officer in Torrs Trench (the new trench built from Munster Alley N.W

into O.G.2 by the Germans) found himself cut off by our troops getting

into his trench beyond him as well as on our side of him.

 

On the left of our 7th Brigade one or two machine guns were

brought to bear on the attack from about point 58 in R 34 D. The attack

was held up a little in front of this; but our men flowed into the trench

at about R 34 central and about R 34 point 97 and bombed their way up

the trench from both sides. They also began to come into the trench from

the rear. There were too many ^always arriving for them to be stopped. The men getting in

from the rear were some of those who had got in to the north and across in

into O G 2 or who were bombing their way from the North along the rear 

of the trench.

 

They were fine strong lads - this officer remarked.

Both O G 1 and O G 2 were held in both of these attacks.

On the night of the second attack the Germans were just relieving. An

officer of the 84th said that at about 10.30 he was marching into the

trench near the Windmill at the head of about 50 men when our bombardment opened suddenly on him. In O.G 2 the first thing he found was

 

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5 4.

xxx three wounded Australians. He judged that the British must be making an

attack and ordered his men to form to the right and counterattack. In

forming the right lost touch with him going he thought too far to the

North and he found himself with three men. They went over O G 2 and

dug in in a crater infrontofit between it and O G 1. Here they were

surrounded and captured.

 

The first question which the officer of the 162nd asked xxx

when he reached Brigade Headquarters was "Are you in Courcelette?"

He was told -"No, I think not; but your batteries have been seen

blowing up their ammunition". He asked at once "Were they the heavy xxx

batteries or the light ones?"

 

One officer of the 84th Regiment said that he thought neither

side would win the war. "Nobody will win it." He thought it would end in

September. Another said that Germany would fight on until she could get

a satisfactory peace.

 

They had been informed that the British immediately after

the Jutland sea battle had recalled all their ^large cruisers from the colonies

and elsewhere oversea.

 

When asked if they considered the Australians rough xxxxx

soldiers they shook their heads strongly. They were quite satisfied

with the way they had been treated. "We think that the Australian kills

everyone ^he meets while he is fighting but he treats xxxx his enemy well when

the fighting is over". One officer said that our machine guns had been

turned upon their stretcher bearers on the Bapaume Road. (This would

undoubtedly be indirect fire). He also said that he knew that the

inmates of a "Hospital" had been killed. By this he meant the most

advanced dressing station behind the front trench. The position he

described as "near Courcelette". He did not know what troops had done

this. (It may refer to the bombing of some dugout during an attack).

 

This is at present known to the Germans as the worst part

of the front in this theatre, but it is not thought to be worse than

Verdun. Vimy, Ypres, last year Champagne, Lorette are all considered

bad parts.

 

 

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