Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/117/1 - September - December 1918 - Part 1

AWM38
Official History,
1914-18 War: Records of C E W Bean,
Official Historian.
Diaries and Notebooks
Item number: 3DRL606/117/1
Title: Diary, September - December 1918
Covers fighting of September - October 1918,
breaking up of battalions, W M Hughes in
England and France, the armistice and Bean in
England.
AWM38-3DRL606/117/1 
 

T.D

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL
ACCESS STATUS
OPEN
No 1 Copy Set
No 2 Copy
Diary No. 117.
Sept 27 1918. to Nov 12 29 1918 Dec. 3, 1918.
1st SET   DIARY. No 117.

AWM38    3DRL 606 ITEM 117 [1]
DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. E. W. BEAN
CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914-1918
THE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms 

of gift to the Australian War Memorial. But, apart from those terms, I wish the 

following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every 

reader and writer who may use them.
These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be 

true. The diaries were jotted down almost daily with the object of recording what 

was then in the writer's mind. Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep; 

also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so – but it does not 

follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when 

discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them.
These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what 

their author, at the time of writing, believed. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch 

for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But he 

did try to ensure such accuracy by consulting, as far as possible, those who had 

seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand 

evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed 

upon him by the second or third day of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that those who passed on such stories usually themselves believed them to be true. All second-hand evidence herein should be read with this in mind.
16 Sept. 1946.                          C. E. W. BEAN.
AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

ACCESS STATUS
OPEN

2nd Copy.
Diary
Sept. 27 1918
to Nov 16 29 1918.
 

1

SEPTEMBER 27th.      continued.      117
We spent last night in Boulogne and I came on tonight today 

to BARLEUX, where Murdoch and Gilmour had already arrived. 

a couple of days since. One of the first bits of news 

Murdoch told me was that there had been a regular 

epidemic of mutinies in the A.I.F. during the last few 

days. It was, I believe, the question of the disbandment 

of battalions, and arose first out of the case of 

the 37th battn., where STOREYm, the Colonel, some time ago 

made an unexpected disturbance over the proposed 

dissolving of his battalion.
 It is a long yarn. Storey was second in command at 

Messines, and there, in the confused recriminations which 

followed the putting down of a barrage on the 37th and 

its withdrawal from the objective, McNICHOLL and Storey 

came to loggerheads. Murdoch says the two had been old 

enemies in Australia, both being in the Education Dept. 

and having some quarrel over their military work. 

Whether this is so or not, there is no doubt they were 

pretty bitterly opposed after Messines. SMITH, the 

colonel of the battalion, who took Storey's xx side, had 

to go. McNicholl was supported by MONASH, whose pride 

was very much hurt by the fact that the left flank of his 

division had not kept in its place with the right flank 

when the 4th Div. retired. Lately Storey has been given 

the command of his battalion, and no doubt Storey thought 

that it was the enmity of McNicholl that caused the 37th 

to be picked out as the proper st battalion to be broken 

up. Storey first protested to McNicholl and afterwards 

wrote a couple of very wild letters to Gen. BIRDWOOD, 

over the head of his superior officers. He also made 

his opinion quite widely known to the battn., and I fancy 

said something to them on parade about the pity of their 

being broken up. Monash was very incensed xxxxxxxx 

Sto rey's action - which indeed was impossible for any 

commanding officer to put up with and disloyal to the 

interests of the A.I.F. as a whole - and Monash had 

decided to send Storey to England when the news came that 

the 37th had refused to be disbanded, and that the men, 

when ordered to march off to their new units, had stood 

fast. This happened a few days ago.
 It so happense that the War Council has been urging 

Birdwood to have the breaking up of the battalions carried 

out at once in order to keep up the strength of the 

divisions. Monash certainly did not want this, but if 

the divisions were to be kept up to full strength, 

something had to be done. Birdwood came down a few days 

ago and informed Monash that the disbandment of the units 

which were to be split up must take place. Accordingly 

a number of battalions which had been chosen as the ones 

to be disbanded were ordered to march their men off to 

other units of their brigade. The 54th, 60th, 42nd, 21st, 

37th and, I think, the 27th or 26th, were amongst these. 

I am certain of all but the 26th or 27th.
When the 37th struck the others did the same; the 

54th and 21st seemed to have been especially firm. Their 

officers and N.C.O.'s in each case, when the order came to 

the battalion on parade to join its new unit, left the 

battalion and went to their new homes; but the men of the 

battalion stood fast. The discipline of the battalions 

was rigorously kept up. The new officers and N.C.O.'s 

did not assume stars or stripes, but took charge of the 

battalion on parade, N.C.O.'s told off their platoons 

and handed them over to the platoon commander, who reported 

to the Company commander. The "Colonel" roared his men up 

in approved

3

ordered, to step forward, and those who refused to stand where 

they were. On the order "March" there was a sort of 

momentary hesitancy along the ranks, men looking to the left 

and right, the whole battalion took a pace forward, and the 

difficulty was solved. Personally I cannot help thinking that 

Elliott on this occasion was the one man in the whole force 

who really played the man, and despite all his idiosyncracies 

showed himself to be a commander worth following. His 60th 

battalion was thus split up into the other three battalions, 

and the 15th Brigade went in as a 3-battalion brigade. All 

the other brigades gave in to their men.

The position which this creates is obviously a very 

difficult and dangerous xxx one, and the results of it are too 

distant and important to be able accurately to judge at present; 

but of one thing I feel certain - that a man like John Monash 

is not the man to handle the A.I.F. at a critical moment like 

this. He was, of course, entirely opposed to Storey at the 

beginning, but he pretends to be on the side of the men now. 

Monash is not really a strong man though he is a very able one. 

Whatever happens he will try to save his own skin, and a man 

like that is just the man to make disaster out of a situation 

which a better man could possibly save.

A much more serious trouble, of quite a different sort, 

occurred in the case of the 1st Battn. The 1st Battn. was in 

the line before Hargicourt on the 19 September. On the 20th. 

it was coming out of the line. The relief had already arrived, 

the men had their packs done up and were about to move off. 

The Tommies on their left had failed on September 18 to reach 

a line which the 1st Bde. had reached in the Hindenburg outpost 

line. The 3rd Corps on our left was told that these trenches 

must be reached in order to get a jumping-off place for the 

attack on the Hindenburg line on September 29th. John Monash, 

in order to help xxxxxxxxxxxx this, undertook very readily, 

over the telephone or in conference with General Butler, to 

take over 500 yards of the Tommies' line and do this portion of 

the attack for them, they being responsible for the remainder 

of the front northwards. The divisions to the south of the 

3rd Corps are very tired and worn-out and the task was very 

difficult for them. On the 20th, just as the first 1st Battalion 

was going out, the order came for them to go in and do this 

attack. 120 of the men refused. They said they had so often 

had to go over the top to do jobs which the Tommies had failed 

to do, that they were not going to do it this time. The 

remainder of the battalion went over very short and carried out 

the attack with complete success, although they were, I believe, 

outflanked by the Germans driving in the Tommies and had to 

come back to the starting-point - although I am not certain. 

Anyway, 120 men who refused are under close arrest and what will 

be done in their case has not been settled. They are to be tried 

by court-martial, and the penalty for mutiny in the Australian 

Army is death.

It is the first time that this question has ever arisen, 

and this too is a crisis of the history of the force. I only 

wish to goodness there was somebody of a different type to John 

Monash in the saddle at the moment. The danger of the 

situation is that while the case is unquestionably one for swift 

and d rastic action, there is a certain amount of obvious 

provocation, and whether it is wise or expedient to make the 

first case of the infliction of the death penalty a case is in 

which the men had some sort of excuse, is a very difficult one 

to decide. Personally I think it would be a wrong decision. It 

will come t o that some day, no doubt; but the first one should 

be one xxx in which there can be no doubt and no element of 

provocation can be pleaded. Knowing John Monash, I don't think 

that he is in the least likely to make any decision which might 

contain the least danger to himself.

2

in approved fashion. The men whom they chose were, so 

Murdoch was told, the men who were calculated to make the 

best leaders and not at all of the Union Secretary type - 

i.e., they were not agitators amongst the men but were 

those who, in the main, were best fitted to lead them. 

They dined amongst the men and lived with them, but otherwise 

they carried on exactly as the regular officers. I believe 

that the 54th battn. went for a route march. Certainly 

orders were respected, sentries were posted, and the camp 

life and games went on exactly as usual by some means or 

other. Their rations came to them regularly, and how they 

managed to obtain or fill up ration wagons at dumps is a 

question. When one of their Generals going around his area 

visited a cricket match between two of the companies of one 

of these battalions, the whole of the men on the ground 

stood up to attention - which was a compliment that would 

never have been paid to him in ordinary circumstances. 

The mutiny, or strike - it was more a strike than a 

mutiny - was, I believe, breaking down in the case of the 

42nd battn. The men had been persuaded that in the interests 

of the whole force they must xx join their new units; when 

the news came along that the case of the 37th battn. had been 

allowed. Monash had left it to the divisional commanders 

to settle, and the G.O.C. of the 3rd Division (Gellibrand) 

had decided to allow the 37th to remain. I suppose that he 

considered xxxxxxxxxx the battalion was really victimised 

by McNicholl, who was a commander who never had the confidence 

of his men and was a continual source of trouble to his 

colleagues and superi ors. Anyway, on the news of this 

[*This may be rather too strongly stated. McN was hated by many as being "school-mastery", and not trusted by all; but some good men thought highly of him. C. E. W. B.*] 

reaching the repentant battalion it immediately repented 

again in the opposite direction and went back on strike. 

The other divisional commanders followed Gelly's lead. The 

5th and 3rd Divisions had to go into action for the ensuing 

battle and it was urgent to get the battalions there in time. 

In every case the revolting battalions had offered to go in 

as battalions, and guaranteed to whatever they were called on 

to do, and they resented the imputation that they were in any 

way objecting to fight.

The 54th, 42nd, 37th and 21st were allowed to rejoin 

their brigades as units, all their officers and men going back 

to them. The men had always stated that they knew they were 

not deserting their officers because they realised that their 

officers were heartily in sympathy with them and, in a way, 

proud of their action, however it might be detrimental to the 

force and dangerous for the future. No man could help being 

so. But the one man who refused consent to this was ELLIOTT. 

Elliott from the first stood firm and said he could not 

continue in the command of a brigade in which the men did not 

implicitly obey him. One cannot help feeling that old 

Elliott took the stand which was in the best interests of the 

A.I.F. and most in accordance with the discipline which is 

necessary to hold this army together as the war begins to 

reach its fag-end. Anyway, Elliott stood absolutely firm. 

So did the 60th battn. When all the others stood out on 

strike the 60th stood with them. Elliott went down and 

addressed the men, and I believe they made no signs of giving 

in. Finally, before the show, Elliott went down intending 

to speak a last word to the men, offering them a chance of 

giving in, and I believe that when the word to disband was 

given, if they didn't act upon it, he would have shot whatever 

men refused to do so. Anyway, he told them that the brigade 

was going in in any case, and that if this battalion continued 

in its present attitude it could not be taken in, and the 

result would be the desertion by them of their comrades, and 

that they would throw upon the remaining three weak battalions 

the whole burden of a very hard fight. He called upon every 

man who was willing to join those three battalions, as

order
 

4

All this night at intervals we heard the tramp, tramp, 

tramp of infantry along the road outside past the waterpoint in 

xxxx Barleux: clearly they were going up for the fight. The 

3rd and 5th Divisions are to go over in support of the 

Americans and take the 3rd Hindenburg line, and the second 

Division to be next in support. I don't think John will use 

the 1st and 4th Divisions again. They are away back by 

Abbeville (Picquigny).

I started ahead of Joe Cook's party, with which I came 

over, leaving Boulogne at 7.30 and going to Rollencourt to find 

out if by any chance our troops had attacked this morning, as 

there was news of a biggish battle. At Rollencourt I found out 

that the Press had moved up temporarily to Amiens, where they 

were staying at the old Hotel de l'Univers, which was being 

fitted up again for visitors under the sanction of the Town 

Major. At Amiens Cadge told me that the attack on that day 

was going well. The Canadians xx had reached Bourlon Wood 

and had been seen by aeroplanes beyond it, and the New 

Zealanders had crossed the canal on a front of one brigade. 

This was extraordinarily fine news. The attack seems to have 

been made by the 1st and 3rd Armies. I like the way in which 

Cadge started his announcement with the fact that these two 

Dominions forces had made the main advance. At the same time 

he told me that the Americans had made a heavy attack together 

with the French armies of Generals Mangin and Gouroud down near 

the Argonne, and that the Americans had gone in 7 miles. This 

is certainly the main American attack. I bought a Paris 

edition of the "Daily Mail" and in it there was a short message 

from Bailey, the American correspondent for the English papers. 

He said that the Germans had left machinegun rearguards, and 

that the Americans were engaged in mopping these up. The 

official communique does not give any hint of the Germans having 

prepared for this attack, but this statement by Bailey gives 

one the idea that the German move anticipated the Franco-

American attack by withdrawing along that section of the front. 

I waited at the Hotel de la Paix for Joe Cook and his party. 

They arrived about 12 and had some wine and bread and cheese 

at the hotel. From there we went on through the battlefield 

of August 8th to the camp which has been prepared for them just 

north of Biaches, west of the Somme outside Peronne. On the 

way up I stopped the cars at about four different places to give 

the party a description of the battlefield from Villers 

Bretonneux onward. Conan Doyle and the others seemed to be 

very interested, but Joe Cook showed very little interest in the 

xxxxxxx story of the battles or in the places which had become 

famous in the course of then. On arrival at Biaches we found 

the new camp just co mpleted with the roof on the messroom not 

an hour before. The boys detailed as orderlies for the camp 

had not done this sort of thing before in their lives although 

they were willing to learn. One plate was provided for the 

frugal meal of bully beef and whatever pudding, bread and butter, 

cheese, or other course followed. Cups were provided for tea, 

but as no glasses appeared no wine was asked for. Afterwards 

one of the boys c onfessed to me that it was his first attempt 

at the job. There was plenty of cutlery, plates and wine 

glasses, but he did not know the rules for this sort of living. 

He said he was quite willing to learn, and from the type of boy 

they have provided I have no doubt they will learn quicker than 

most. However, the rest of us were afraid to suggest the 

bringing on of pudding or bread and cheese for fear that only one 

set of plates and knives existed, so Joe Cook for once lunched 

more or less off the same rations as a soldier. 

In the afternoon I took the over the ground of the late 

fighting at Peronne. Conan Doyle was wearing the uniform of a 

Lord Lieutenant of a County, the next most glorious uniform to 

which is that of a Field Marshal Commanding in Chief. This
 

5

drew salutes from everybody including colonels, and the old 

chap was so abashed, in spite of his experience in public 

life, that he hardly dared lift his eyes from the ground when 

any soldiers were passing - a fact which attracted me to him 

at once. He was absorbed in the story of the fighting north 

of Peronne, and when we came to the grave of a man of the 

53rd battn, who had been killed in the furthest advance of 

September 1st, he saluted it saying -xxxxxxxxxx 

"Poor boy!" "He at any rate deserves all the salutes one can 

give him."
We saw the quarry where Murray of the 53rd. had his 

Headquarters, and the railway line which the 53rd reached in 

their futile charge against the moat and battlements of 

Peronne. We came back past Anvil Wood, where the 9th Field 

Coy. Engrs. were just prepared to go up the line. They 

seemed to be under the impression that the fight was tomorrow. 

It was not until I saw Monash tonight that I knew it was on 

the 29th.

Joe Cook and Conan Doyle each spoke to these engineers. 

Joe Cook stood facing them trying to make cheaply witty 

remarks, not in the least the genial man that a number of our 

own Government from Australia might be expected to be. His 

face is curiously benevolent and fatherly, and this rather 

melts the men towards him - in fact they like him better than 

Hughes. But his speeches struck me as childish. Conan 

Doyle, on the other hand, told them that he was proud to be 

amongst them, and that he was proud, as all England was 

proud, of their fighting; that he was proud that the same 

blood ran in his veins. And the men cheered him to the echo. 

He is a great, square, bull-dog of a man with an exceedingly 

kindly face. He appears at present to be bent on a 

generous endeavour to save Gough and the 5th British army 

from blame and make of the retreat in the spring almost a 

second retreat from Mons.
We crossed about dusk one of the old wooden bridges 

leading across the moat north-west of Peronne. The moat is 

full of water and a most difficult obstacle for troops. I 

left them to dinner and came back to our camp at Barleux.

SEPTEMBER 28. Murdoch, Gilmour and I were to see John Monash at six 

o'clock tonight in order to get from him the plan of the 

next day's battle. It looks as though there is a fortnight's 

fighting ahead, and consequently I decided to go up to the 

5th Army H.Q. and try to push through the staff appointments 

for controlling and distributing the A.I.F. photographs and 

publications, which will otherwise be certainly hung up until 

I can do so. Body made a splendid run to xxxxxxxx 

Therouanne and back, leaving there at 2.30 and reaching 

Australian Corps H.Q. near Barleux in time to find Wilkins, 

Murdoch and Gilmour just going into John Monash at a few 

minutes past six. John gave us, as usual, an absorbingly 

interesting account of the fight. He was very insistent on 

the fact that he doubted whether the Americans would succeed 

in carrying their objectives. It was a longer job than any 

the Australian Corps had undertaken, and his experience of the 

Americans during the last day or two showed him that they were 

very unprepared and untrained. He made a great point of one 

brigade having gone into the startingpoint without its bombs 

for mopping up. The brigadier had said that they could always 

get the bombs later. As usual we found that this statement 

of John's to be inaccurate. Whilst we were with him Ross, of 

the 1st Division, who was attached to the Americans as liaison 

officer, rang up to say that the starting arrangements seemed 

to be all right, and McLagan who came in said that only one 

battalion had gone in without bombs, and that as it was a 

support battalion it could easily get them. It struck all of 

us that John was hedging against a possible defeat, in which 

case he would be able to throw the blame on to the Americans.

6

The Australian troops will not go over until 11 7o'clock 

tomorrow, leaving their starting point and reaching the 

American objective, where they will pass through the American 

troops, at 11 o'clock. This gives four clear hours for 

roadmaking. We shall go up to the battlefield in time to 

see the Australians go over. The Meteor says that the weather 

is going to be fine.
Joe Cook has been chafing like an impatient child to-day. 

He knew that Hughes when he was over here addressed the troops 

several times, and I had told him that the men had received 

Hughes particularly well on several occasions. Joe evidently 

wanted to do the same: "Conan Doyle here wants to see 

battlefields, but I want to see the men", he said. "They told 

me I could see men and I have not seen men. What I want to 

know is when I can see some of the men."

Plunkett, a genial old farmer, who is a captain in the 3rd. 

Battn. and is acting as one of the conducting officers, arranged 

with great trouble to take Cook off to Abbeville and Picquigny 

to see the 1st and 4th Divisions in the back area. Joe went 

off with him in an aggressive frame of mind, and as they 

went through xxxxx Longueau the car completelybroke down. 

Being a war-time car it had inferior metal in the engines 

and something snapped. Plunkett, by using all his sense and 

push, managed to get the loan of a small runabout car to take 

Cook on into Amiens, and there tried to persuade him 

to have lunch while he himself hurried around to raise another motor 

car. Cook said he didn't want to have lunch - he wanted to 

see the troops. As the troops were 20 miles away and there 

was no means of getting there except by finding a motorcar, 

which Plunkett was trying to do, this was not very helpful. 

Eventually Plunkett raised a car from the 1st Division, 

and they arrived there to find that Cook's son, whom Cook 

wanted specially to visit, was away back acting as liaison 

officer with the Americans who were attacking next day. The 

result of this was that Cook began worrying about his son. 

"I know old Cook of the 2nd. Battn., and I knew damned well 

there was nothing to worry about - he'd never hop over the 

top with the Americans", said Plunkett; but it took a long 

time to convince Joe Cook that his s on was not going into 

immediate and sudden death. However, by the time they had 

arrived back at the camp he had managed to allay Cook's fears 

on this point. As they, came in the first thing that young 

Lowden, the other conducting officer, said was - "Well, Mr. 

Cook, I hear your boy is going over the top with the 

Americans tomorrow. It was just after this that Murdoch, 

Wilkins, Dyson and myself walked in to their messroom, We 

noticed that the table didn't appear to be a cheerful one -

in fact nobody seemed to be speaking. Cook disappeared to 

bed at once and Lowden and Plunkett each took me out and 

explained for 10 minutes that if Billy Hughes was a handful 

Joe Cook was a "Bastard, and a damned sight worse!" 

SEPTEMBER 29th.        For the first time in the last 12 months we have come 

back from a battle that went wrong. The last one was 

on October 12th at Paschendaale, and this went almost as wrong as 

that. We started late this morning. We were going up to see 

the Australian infantry start at 9 near Gillement farm 2 miles 

east of Ronssoy. Gillement Farm was the farthest point that 

Wilkins had reconnoitred, and we calculated that from there 

we should be able to look down the valley towards Le Catelet, 

and by crossing over into the next ridge to the east side of 

the railway ridge just beyond the line of the canal tunnel, 

we ought to be able to see up the line towards Beaurevoir 

which our troops would then be attacking. By winding up the 

high lands which lie eastward from this point we could, if the 

shelling were in any way moderate, keep in touch with the 

battle as it advanced.

The party of visitors was in trouble to-day, having only 

one car for the whole seven. My car had broken down with a 

weak spring- also
 

7

weak spring - also a result of wartime metal, - and Murdoch's 

car was already full. Accordingly it was suggested that Smart 

who was interested in seeing how the official photographs were 

taken, should go up with Casserley, the Press photographer, and 

take one of the party with him. Dyson offered to go with 

Wilkins to Gillement Farm where he might wait for us. Murdoch, 

Gilmour and myself proposed to go through Ronssoy to a point near 

Gillement Farm and work out from there. We mistook our turning 

in Templeux and reached Hargicourt by mistake at about 10 a.m. 

We turned back and passed through Ronssoy towards Gillement Farm, 

leaving the car just beyond the first crossroad past Ronssoy. 

The crest of the hill is only a few hundred yards ahead.

On our way up we called in at the 3rd Division, which was 

very well advanced between Templeux and Ronssoy. They told us 

there that the Americans were said to have reached the green 

line - which was their objective - and the 2nd Hindenburg trench 

system, but that they had left any number of German machine gun 
posts, and that our brigades as they started to go forward after 

the Americans had been held up at once by machine gun fire. The 

right, so far as was known, had gone a good deal better, and
Bellicourt had been taken; but on the left in front of the 3rd 

Division, although Bony had been passed and possibly taken by the 

Americans, it was quite unapproachable at present owing to the 

German machine guns in it. At 3rd. Div. H.Q. we found Smart 

and Berry (the editor of the "Sunday Times") with Casserley, 

the Press Photographer. As Casserley was new to it I advised 

them all to come along with me. The crest of the hill 

was about 300 or 400 yards away. As we walked along the road 

towards Gillemont Farm we noticed at least 20 American dead 

who must have been killed by shell bursts - possibly in some 

cases by machine gun fire - before they had even reached their 

starting point. In the hollow on our right were a number of 

guns and a line of tanks. On our left on the flat surface of 

the hill was a disabled tank and a number of men in shell holes -

largely belonging to the 3rd. Div. M.G. Battn. Men occasionally 

crossed the hill-crest on our left front. As occasional shells 

burst up the road I thought I thought we would make towards 

our front left for the hilltop where from the crest we ought to 

be able to get a v iew of what was happening towards the northern 

mouth of the t unnel and Bony. We went over, Murdo ch and I in 

front and Smart and Bury following, and had not gone 100 yards 

when the Germans burst several shells not far away on the left. 

I altered the course a little to the right past these, and the 

next salvo fell right amongst us - one whizzbang shell burst 

about 10 yards behind between Murdoch and myself and about 10 yards 

ahead of Smart. I signed to them to get down into shell-holes, 

and we sat there while four or five salvoes came over, when the 

shelling ceased.

Clearly things were too hot for us to take the party in that 

direction. There was also a fairly constant crackle of machine 

gun fire in that direction. Accordingly we turned back and walked 

towards the valley intending to go around to the right where the 

5th Division were and where the attack had succeeded. On 

reaching the line of tanks we found that these tanks had each 

been blown up by a mine which was placed under the wire. Men 

who had seen them told us that the mines had heaved the tanks
slightly and burst their travellers. The men inside were in some 

cases killed. Later on Gellibrand told us that these were 

American tanks and that the mines which had blown them up were 

old British mines which had been planted in the wire before the 

German attack on March 21st last year and remained in it still. 

There were, he said, two notices of "Danger" and the 3rd Div. 

were aware of this and guided their tanks another way or laid 

down routes to avoid them. It looked as if the Americans had not
been warned and had been allowed to blunder on to the British 

mines by s ome terrible mistake. Anyway a line of eight of them 

were there lying along the wire, and we who saw them at first 

thought the Germans had successfully solved the problem of dealing 

with tanks. How these mines would stand a heavy bombardment I 

don't know. They seem to have consisted of the old plumpudding