Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/40/1 - February - March 1916 - Part 4

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Open for review
Accession number:
RCDIG1066744
Difficulty:
5

Page 1 / 10

2 29 than as a War-iwester Maxwell used to write straght to him (& indeed I believe he used to get one report for himself & andthn for the Cabinet because he couldn't trust the Cabinet to keep a secret fom its wives and daughters-50 t to I daresay he sa it want the whole reason. he wanted freedom from their coterference also, no doubt). He was not a keenly quick man - to he did seatise the size of the effort we shd have to make much sooner than did Avyone else, t one knows
30 of; he as rather a slow man & perhaps age had made him undecided - Anyway, there was dissatisfaction & they brought Robertson in as Chief of Staf. Robertson was a private soldier once i& from I moment to he came in a diferent order came in force. He was Kitcheners one only military advess, If generals reported they reported alone to him. No more letters to K. Kws Cabinet minister - there to Sway I cabiet on matters of policy. But tl direction the army &01 fightin
31 ws in one man s handI onlys now - it stopped with Sir Welliam Robertson. There I chain ended. What it os good for K. to know he knew thro' Robertson. If ides or generals ha prevances they put them before Robertson & he decidet who was & who was not the right or corvey man From th time K has become of comparatively swall inflcull. They say (at least K.s camp at G.H.S here says) to you can fee
32 now quite a different strong determined grasp behind I conduct of War ooft wer office now That is a great them, y tie - & one ad not for anythen have it otherwise. But the change has had one or two in conseniends for us For one then - little Birdwa ts a Kman & when Ks stay set his star paled also Mr Asquith sd to his name ad be matked for distinction b comnection to I evacuation
33 & he was I general of all three arvy corps which carried it obt - & he was at least to an extent responsible for 1 plan. And get all 1 distinction he has so far got has bu to be removed from an Army command & set back to command an army corps. The man who co chief honour ws Munro -whose part consister in making up his mind before he A/c England t/evacuation ws necessary, & takeng ho part whatever in it (oven to Extent of being present) when it was carried out in fallepoli.
34 white - who conducted Huzac evacuation which an many ways as even more diffecult tran to at Helles has got a C.B. out of it. He shd have been a May-general - but th is 1Britich Empires. Coss & Austiahias mose than his if they fail to put him to his full are before (war is over. if I told them of (idea wh ws universal in England to Tarks had been paidttet is go - it ws (first they had drcamed of it out here - & of course every body laughs except one or two who are anyry. Anyway 70 harks & gerans()) were sent
2 to Constantinople for trial or inquary after it, so Butler obably lets me. It ws not such an easy job for 1 wrt as it looker, I sd to white Thats what I arqued at time, he sd."He had to know not werel to we were going but when we were I aske myself - in spite of all the touble we took to find out abb 1 warks & vatch them, what did we ever know abt (strengthf h in wh they held their lne & their movements behind them, One comagant 35
36 2 their difficulty in finding anything about as. Anywan it ws only for last day to I ws anxious. discover If tey didnt before night foll on the Sunday I knew we were all right. I wd be too Cate then - they cdnt make a general attack on spea o1moment; be time they attacked we shd have gone. But to return to Robertson . He has turned down our th scheme for an Australian army He didn't see to it served a useful purpose - +
37 fact to we were a nation + wante to fight & carve our history as a nation didn't go for anything w him – He (tks the admerill has always done in naval affairs in dealing to Anstralic s Istrategical side of whats (uee of a it only separate steff for $120,000, men Besides I daresay he think (Army Command is too by for Birdwood - Kirdwood 15 a "Kitchener man"" & many of these soldiers think he has come along too fast. I dont know to they want him to clmb any
ser.I.L. Dn 38 2 higher as a friend of his put it on I shoulder of Anstialians. March 23rd. It was about a the news fortnight ago that spread mt Division was that the Austialiang ordered at once to France. There has been so much openness about it that one was inclined to think it might really be Salonica; but I fancy thas is a double barrelled ruse they say worked so well as the Evacuation): the more we talk abt it the less tyII believe it. Anyway - the news as to BoWion (being the whole one - & not. on the 12th or 13th. split up) as to leave a the Bt Dwn after tt, & the N.G. Divon

2   29
than as a War-minister.
Maxwell used to write straight
to him (& indeed I believe
he used to get one report
for himself & another
for the Cabinet because he
couldn't trust the Cabinet
to keep a secret from its
wives and daughters-so
he said tho' I dare say
it xxx wsn't the whole reason -
he wanted freedom from
their interference also, no
doubt). He was not
a keenly quick man - tho'
he did realise the size of
the effort we shd have to
make much sooner than
anyone else ^did, tt one knows
 

 

2  30
of; he ws rather a slow man
& perhaps age had made him
undecided - Anyway, there
was dissatisfaction & they
brought Robertson in as
Chief of Staff. Robertson was
a private soldier once; &
from / moment tt he came
in a different order
came in force. He was Kitcheners
one & only military advisor,
If generals reported they
reported alone to him. No
more letters to K. K ws /
Cabinet minister - there to
sway / cabinet on matters
of policy. But the direction
of the army & o / fighting
 

 

2  31
ws in one man's hands
only, now - it stopped
with Sir William Robertson.
There / chain ended. What
it ws good for K. to know
he knew thro' Robertson. If
generals had ^ideas or grievances
they put them before Robertson,
& he decided who was & who
was not the right or wrong man.
From tt time K has
become of comparatively
small influence. They say
(at least R.'s camp at G.H.Q
here says) tt you can feel
 

 

2  32
now quite a different
strong determined grasp
behind / conduct o /
war & of / war office now.
That is a great thing, if
true - & one wd not
for anything have it otherwise.
But the change has had one
or two inconveniences
for us -
For one thing - little Birdwood
is a "K." man & when K's
star set his star paled also.
Mr Asquith sd tt his name
wd be marked for distinction
by connection w / evacuation -
 

 

2  33
& he was / general of
all three army corps which
carried it out - & he was
at least to an extent
responsible for / plan.
xxxx And yet all / 
"distinction" he has so far
got has bn to be removed
from an Army command
& set back to command an
army corps. The man who
got / chief honour ws Munro
- whose part consisted in
making up his mind before he
left England  tt / evacuation
ws necessary, & taking no
part whatever in it (even to /
extent of being present) when
it was carried out in Gallipoli.
 

 

2  34
White - who conducted /
Anzac evacuation which in
many ways ws even
more difficult that tt at
Helles has got a C.B. out
of it. He shd have been a
Maj-General - but tt is
/ British Empires loss &
Australias more than his
if they fail to put him to his
full use before / war is over.
[I told them of / idea
wh ws universal in England
xxx tt / Turks had been paid to let
us go - it ws / first they had dreamed
of it out here - & of course
every body laughs except one
or two who are angry. Anyway
70 Turks & Germans(?) were sent
 

 

2  35
to Constantinople for trial
or inquiry after it, so Butler
tells me and ^"probably & ws not such an
easy job for / Turk as it
looked". I sd to White x
"That's what I argued at
/ time," he sd. "He had to
know not merely tt we
were going but when we
were going; & I asked
myself - in spite of all
the trouble we took to find
out abt / Turks & watch
them, what did we ever
know abt / strength of their
xx in wh they held their
lines & their movements
behind them? xxxxx
xxx One cd imagine
 

 

2  36
their difficulty in finding
anything about us.
Anyway it ws only for
/ last day tt I ws anxious.
If they didn't discover realise attack
before night fall on the
Sunday I knew we were
all right. It wd be too
late then - they cdnt
make a general attack
on / spur o / moment; by
/ time they attacked we
shd have gone."]
But to return to
Robertson - He has turned
down our Army scheme
for an Australian army.
He didn't see tt it served
a useful purpose - & /
 

 

2  37
fact tt we were a nation &
wanted to fight & carve our
history as a nation
didn't go for anything w
him – He (As the admiralty
has always done in naval
affairs in dealing w Australia)
sees / strategical side of
it only; "what's / use of a
separate staff for 120,000, men?"
Besides I daresay he thinks
/ army command is too
big for Birdwood - Birdwood
is a "Kitchener man" &
many of these soldiers think
he has come along too
fast. I dont know tt they
want him "to climb any
 

 

2  38
higher" as a friend of his
put it "on the shoulder o /
Australians".

March 23rd. It was about a
fortnight ago that xxxx the news spread
that the ^2nd Australian ^Division were was ordered
at once to France. There has been
so much openness about it that
one was inclined to think it might
really be Salonica; but I fancy
this is a double barrelled ruse - 
they say for once (as it worked so well at
the evacuation): the more we talk
abt it the less they'II believe it.
Anyway - the news was tt /
2nd Divn (being the whole one - & not
split up) ws to leave at once on the 12th; or 13th;
the 1st Divn after tt, & the N.Z. Divn
 

 
Last edited by:
Lulu BLulu B
Last edited on:

Last updated: