Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/40/1 - February - March 1916 - Part 4

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than as a War-minister
Maxwell used to write straight
to him (& indeed I believe
he used to get one report
for himself & another
for the Cabinet because he
couldn't trust the Cabinet
to keep a secret from its
wives and daughters-so
he said tho' I dare say
it wasn't the whole reason -
he wanted freedom from
their interference also, no
doubt). He was not
a keenly quick man - tho'
he did realise the size of
the effort we shd have to
make much sooner than
anyone else did, that one knows
 

30
of; he was rather a slow man
& perhaps age had made him
undecided - Anyway, there
was dissatisfaction & they
brought Robertson in as
Chief of Staff. Robertson was
a private soldier once &
from the moment that he came
in a different order
came in force. He was Kitcheners
one and only military advisor,
If generals reported they
reported alone to him. No
more letters to K. K was the
Cabinet minister - there to
sway the cabinet on matters
of policy. But the direction
of the army & the fighting
 

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31
was in one man s hands
only, now - it stopped
with Sir William Robertson.
There the chain ended. What
it was good for K. to know
he knew thro' Robertson. If
generals had ideas or grievances
they put them before Robertson
& he decided who was & who
was not the right or wrong man.
From that time K has
become of comparatively
small influence. They say
(at least R.s camp at G.H.Q
here says) that you can feel
 

32
now quite a different
strong determined grasp
behind the conduct of the
war and the war office now.
That is a great them, if
true - & one would not
for anything have it otherwise.
But the change has had one
or two inconveniences
for us.
For one thing - little Birdwood
is a "K." man & when K's
star set his star paled also.
Mr Asquith sd to his name
ad be marked for distinction
by connection to the evacuation-
 

33
& he was the general of
all three army corps which
carried it out - & he was
at least to an extent
responsible for the plan.
And yet all the
"distinction" he has so far
got has been to be removed
from an Army command
& set back to command an
army corps. The man who
got the chief honour was Munro
-whose part consisted in
making up his mind before he
left England  that the evacuation
was necessary, & taking no
part whatever in it (even to the
Extent of being present) when
it was carried out in Gallipoli.
 

34
White - who conducted the
Anzac evacuation which in
many ways as even
more difficult that that at
Helles has got a C.B. out
of it. He shd have been a
Maj-General - but that is
the British Empire's loss &
Australia's more than his
if they fail to put him to his
full use before the war is over.
[I told them of the idea
wh ws universal in England
that the Turks had been paid to let
us go - it ws the first they had dreamed
of it out here - & of course
every body laughs except one
or two who are angry. Anyway
70 Turks & Germans(?) were sent
 

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to Constantinople for trial
or inquiry after it, so Butler
lets me and "probably was not such an
easy job for the Turk as it
looks." I sd to White
"Thats what I argued at
time," he sd. "He had to
know not merely that we
were going but when we
were going; I asked
myself - in spite of all
the trouble we took to find
out abt the Turks & watch
them, what did we ever
know abt the strength of their
in wh they held their
lines & their movements
behind them?
One cd imagine
 

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2
their difficulty in finding
anything about us.
Anyway it ws only for
the last day that I ws anxious.
that they didn't discover
before night fall on the
Sunday I knew we were
all right. It wd be too
late then - they cdnt
make a general attack
on the spur of the moment; by
the time they attacked we
shd have gone."]
But to return to
Robertson . He has turned
down our Army scheme
for an Australian army.
He didn't see that it served
a useful purpose - & the
 

37
fact to we were a nation +
wanted to fight & carve our
history as a nation
didn't go for anything w
him – He (wh the admiralty
has always done in naval
affairs in dealing w Australia)
sees the strategical side of
it only; "what's the use of a
separate staff for 120,000, men?"
Besides I daresay he thinks
the army command is too
big for Birdwood - Birdwood
is a "Kitchener man"" &
many of these soldiers think
he has come along too
fast. I dont know that they
want him "to climb any
 

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higher" as a friend of his
put it "on the shoulder of
Australians".
March 23rd. It was about a
fortnight ago that the news spread
that the 2nd Australian Division was ordered
at once to France. There has been
so much openness about it that
one was inclined to think it might
really be Salonica; but I fancy
this is a double barrelled ruse - 
they say (as it worked so well at
the Evacuation): the more we talk
abt it the less they'II believe it.
Anyway - the news as to the
[...] (being the whole one - & not
split up) was to leave  on the 12th or 13th;
the 1stt Divn after that, & the N.Z. Divn