Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/40/1 - February - March 1916 - Part 3

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Open for review
Accession number:
RCDIG1066744
Difficulty:
5

Page 1 / 10

19 fellows pretty closely for 18 monts now. And at end of it I shdn't like to say whether New Zealam disapline ws better or Australion. That is to say if you give them an order - which ad be I best to carry it out I don't know th it ad be New Zealander! And I know what he means. Put tree men - a British coming, a N. Zealander & an Aushalion all to carr out, say, a difficult piece of tiresome sapping at Auzac, or give ti a night attack & tell them to they are only to
20 use I bayonet, not to fire not tocheer or tell them they are to collect & turn all rubbist & not Kow it in an insawldry manner down man gully; or to tey wasters empty their waterbottles before night fall & wh 01 three will obey you to I letter. I don't know - I too have seen them through I whole of time at Anzac, & I shdat like to answer to question, but if I did I would almost be inclined to back 1 Austiation. And if we who have watched them closely p and critically for
21 all this time dat give you a deprite opinion upon t point. Low can this British steff, wh has never seen I men at all except in (streets of Cairo & Somarlia give you one. Buhf Shortly after I got here I called on white & he asked me to dive with Gen. Godleny & himself Godley was them commanden 15t Hazac - Birdwood commander notheng in particular & white C. of Staff to Godley. At A demnenr no it ws a lench - in their fine H.Q. fratther lake the H.G. in rich woolbrokers houses aroum Lille) the question of Hamilton
We watanto 22 arose. Jodley was very ordignant with Mardock for the strictures & creticums made by him in his letter to Fisher (which became a British cabinet paper , 00 which they hoard attugac befor the exacuation to I disht know it Well, sd Godley, I always thought Hamilton bwa Tiong man did a very ame to thi stronghing when he a to we were to stay at Huzac. That was thursby's decision, t" said Brig.-Gen. Carrathers who was there. I remember when he saw
23 th 1 landing had made some headway at Anzac he was very much impressed with the importance of pushn in thll - bringing the troops round from Helles to it - & so was I. He couldn't put it before Hamelton himself but be put it though before the Admiral - they didn't do it though. well, I way be wrong'd pention white, but I think still to I gave Gen. Bridge then, when be asked me, was right that the sight thing to do we to withds aw the troops from Huzac. We knew noting about Helles landing but
24 2 we knew the Ana landin had failed - & as it had not succeeded the right thing was to get out of it & use I troops where they could be effective (This was quite a new view to me, but I daresay it really is the right one - Thinking it over Afnis one becomes rathes persuaded to it reall ws I right then) But if I remember ryht Thursby said they adnt have got the ships up in time to do it, said cter on Carruthers Oh yes they could
25 I know they sd they adat. but if wed twister their tails they ad have done it. s white I always take it I.sd, t Hamelton's real faslure was in not making up his mend after May 8th th it ws impossible to get from Heples by taking 7 Ache Baba two & for not then & there trying some other way. can see as clearly as day why Braitwaite wouldn't do that "White sd- I know exactly what hed say to himself. He'd say, any plan is better
26 than a changery of plans! when youve made up your mind to do a thing to way - go on doing it th way even if its a bad way! They hhad made up their minds to make the great pash by Helles- We knew th before landing. & I m sure Braithwaite woat depart from it and I expect to is I explanation of a good deal to has pazgled me too. Most people put down Braithwaites persistence to sheer jealouse
27 There is jealousy in Army two. When I wait to read of generals in (same country army being so jealous if one another to they ad scarcely act together I used to doubt whether such things wereat imaginati of histovious. At any rate, yf one believed that such a state of afairs existed in France in 170 it never entirwdones head to it edpossibl Exst in 1 British service. But here in Egypt we have been wetnessen what the army calls the Battle of the Ms - Murray versu Maxwell: and now
28 Marray has signally won & Manwell goes off to t England defeated withen a few days. It is really only a side fight of the much larger fight of Robertson v. Kitchener. Maxwell is aKitchener man T Murray is a Robertson man - & how that Robertson has defeated Kitchener ond go the Kitchener men along with K. I doresy its better for 1 country to Robertson should conduct I was rather - than Kitchener. Kelchener was rather acting as a commander-in. Chief

2
19
fellows pretty closely for
18 months now. And at /
end of it I shdn't like to
say whether / New Zealand
discipline ws better or /
Australian. That is to say -
if you give them an order - which
wd be / best to carry it out.
I don't know tt it wd be /
New Zealander!”
And I know what he
means. Put three men - a
British Tommy, a N. Zealander
& an Australian all to carry
out, say, a difficult piece of
tiresome sapping at Anzac;
or give them a night attack
& tell them tt they are only to

 

2
20
use / bayonet, not to fire
& not to cheer; or tell
them they are to collect & burn
all rubbish & not throw it in
an insanitary manner down
/ main gully; or tt they
mustn’t empty their
waterbottles before night fall
- & wh o / three will
obey you to / letter? I don't
know - I too have seen them
through / whole o / time at
Anzac, & I shdn’t like
to answer tt question; but
if I did I would almost
be inclined to back /
Australian. And if we
who have watched them
closely x and critically for

 

2
21
all this time cdn’t give
you a definite opinion
upon tt point, how can this
British staff, wh has never
seen / men at all except
in / streets of Cairo & Ismailia,
give you one?
The British off
Shortly after I got here I
called on White & he asked me to
dine with Gen. Godley & himself
- Godley was then commanding
1st Anzac - Birdwood commanding
nothing in particular & White
C. of Staff to Godley. At tt dinner 
- no it ws a lunch - in their
fine H.Q. (rather like the H.Qs in
rich woolbrokers houses around
Lille) the question of Hamilton

 

We work an to
2
22
arose. Godley was very indignant 
with Murdoch for the strictures
& criticisms made by him in
his letter to Fisher (which became
a British cabinet paper, & x of
which they heard at Anzac before
the evacuation tho’ I didn’t 
know it).
“Well”, sd Godley, "I always
thought Hamilton must have
bn a strong man did a very
strong thing when he decided came to the decision
tt we were to stay at
Anzac.”
“That was Thursby’s
decision, Sir“ said Brig.Gen.
Carruthers who was there- 
“I remember when he saw

 

2
23
tt / landing had made
some headway at Anzac
he was very much impressed
with the importance of pushing 
in there - bringing the
troops round from Helles
to it - & so was I. He couldn't
put it before Hamilton himself
but he put it strongly
before the Admiral - they
didn't do it though.”
“Well, I may be wrong”, sd 
White, “but I think still tt / advice opinion
I gave Gen. Bridges then, when,
he asked me, was right -
that the right thing to do ws
to withdraw the troops from
Anzac. We knew nothing
about / Helles landing but

 

2
24
we knew the Anzac landing
had failed - & as it had not
succeeded the right thing was
to get out of it & use / troops
where they could be effective.”
(This was quite a
new view to me, but I
daresay it really is the
right one - Thinking it over
in fact it is) one becomes
rather persuaded tt it really
ws / right thing).
"But if I remember right 
Thursby said they cdnt have
got the ships up in time
to do it,” said either Godley
or Carruthers.
“Oh yes they could - 

 

2
25
I know they sd they cdn’t
but if we’d twisted their
tails they ad have done it” 
sd White.
“I always take it,” I sd,
tt Hamilton's real failure
was in not making up his
mind after May 8th tt
it ws impossible to get
thro’ ^from Helles by taking by Achi Baba -
& for not then & there
trying some other way -"
“I can see as clearly
as day why Braithwaite
wouldn't do that,“ White
sd - I know exactly what
he’d say to himself. He'd
say: ‘Any plan is better
 

 

2
26
than a changing of plans’-
‘when you’ve made up your
mind to do a thing tt
way - go on doing it
tt way even if it’s a bad
way! They had made up
their minds to make the
great push by Helles -
we knew tt before landing -
& I’m sure Braithwaite wdn’t
depart from it.”
- and I expect tt is 
/ explanation of a good deal
tt has puzzled me too. Most
people put down Braithwaites
persistence to sheer jealousy,

 

2
27
There is jealousy in / Army
too. When I used to read of
generals being in / same country’s
army being so jealous of one
another tt they cd scarcely
act together I used to
doubt whether such things
weren’t / imaginatn of
historians. At any rate, if 
one believed that such a state
of affairs existed in France in
1870 it never entered ones
head tt it cd possibly 
exist in / British service.
But here in Egypt we
have been witnessing what
the Army calls the Battle of
the Ms - Murray versus
Maxwell: and now

 

2
28
Murray has signally won
& Maxwell goes off to England
defeated within a few days.
It is really only a side
fight of the much larger
fight of Robertson v. Kitchener.
Maxwell is a “Kitchener
man” & Murray is a
“Robertson man” - & now
that Robertson has defeated
Kitchener out go the
Kitchener men along with
K. I daresay its better
for / country tt Robertson
should conduct / war
rather than Kitchener.
Kitchener was rather acting
as a Commander-in-Chief

 
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Ray WilsonRay Wilson
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