Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/38B/1 - Notebook - Part 4

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Open to contributions
Accession number:
RCDIG1066740
Difficulty:
5

Page 1 / 10

System 29 Inlro intentionally kept secret. These preparations are not any evidence that war has been deliberate planned or decided upon any move than the building of a warship or the making of a cannon. But they- like the secret service susten which, is always a ge aways claimed by both sides as showay -normal part of any prodent defences are always claimed by both sides as provingthe hostile intentions of the country making them. Everyone in his normal senses knows that spies must be employed, that plans for all sorts of eventualities must be in peace time; drawn upp, that if war looks omminent certain preparations must be made. But there is a tyse of mind which, the moment that a provisional plan is discovered, or a spy system unearthed, or certain preparations seen to be going on jumps to the conviction that these preparations, forabews which any prudent staff is bound to make in view of any possible war, are evidence that a government has made up its mind to whilst has often make that particular war, in the truth been tha that war is the one object which that foot is most anxious to avoid. Actual mobilisation, that is to say
30 Intro the patting of units of an army into fighting trim, with their ranks full ap to strength with reservests & this baggage & sapplies ready to move with them anywhere, is generally taken as an indication that war is imminent; & "concentration! which is the process which follows - the moving towns or depote of those scattered units from the where each they mobilise, down to the point (generally near a foreijn portier) where ty are gathered into an army, is naturally t tooked on as a threat sufficiently open to to justify the country threatened in making immediate war. But "mobilisation is a loose term which is applied to many quite different stages. Germary France, & even Britain to to a less extent, were all making preparations at the time when Russia was mobelising What particular degree of "mobilisation had been reached by any of them, or by Russia along the ferman border, can probably never be known. In each ase it was claimed by some of its revals voy to constitute mobilisation. Germany's whole plan of defence against Russia & France was based on the known fact that
Inlio 31 Russia could not mobilise & concentrate quickly whereas she herself could. Germans knew that if Russia & Germany started to mobilise on the same day t German army would be concentrated from four to Six weeks before the Rassian one. The whole german plan for defence was bosed on endeavouring to know a hugearmy France C to breake the French during four weeks & then being able to turn the man ferman strength against Russia. It may be deplorable buut that ferming every day at Bsi mositicatio continued Muasia may) not have inteded any "partial hRussias, mobilisation on the German ponties may not have been directed against fermany but every day's start that Russia gained was one day lost out of Germany's presious month tbl It may seem deplorable that the mackiieg of any countay's was plans may make war inevetable without any country may be forced into war to defend a war plan & But, that nation such as the taposition in which a co the
Intro. 32 fermang, which is sducated to tetiti to the belief that military considerations are the most important must come before all others, is hable to put itself in that position; & germany had done so -w possibly by reason of her position sex to a powerful land power like Russia she was forced to doso. What ever the reason the fact is that fermany could not allow Russia to mobilise on her pontier without pulting herseff into Rassia's hands. She denanded that Russia should cease mobiliiation. Russia replid that his was noo inpossible. Gernany at once declared war. France was bound by definite alleance to support Russia; but England was not board t Russia by any obligation nor was she bound to unconditionally to support France. The Entente meant nothing if it did not mean that British people relained its liberts in every case es u to the lattet moment in every case wheteer te gract the war was anavoidable, and iaacw
Intro. 33 a section of British opinion was whilet owcutie of Baitit opini stiongly doubtful whether this a case was not precisely one of those in which Britain was not called upon to istervene. Tere was, p stronger opinion in the ert a stream of opinion at least squally strong in the other direction. But, f haeen t quation had remained for many days in thi the difference in the nation & in the Cabinet was accte. In Australia & tanada as well as in Britsin it was well realised that the British in tore hn mante joot was undecided. Germany was invading France, & there was a painful apprehension that Britain might stand out & look on whilst her fiend was the Frenk see trade + colonies invaded raided & seized by the ferman Fleet. The Entente undoublidly left the way open for this if the quarrel were not one of which Britain approved, but the convistion began to pow amongst the hic crowds that hourly watched the bulletins in the Streets that if Britain did not stand by her friend in this crisis she would never be able to hold up her head again. Australian + canadian morality, which is founded on that of the miner & the bushman &
34 Intro stockrider, attaches an immenss importance to a man"sticking by his mater, whatever their trouble; & a decision not to enter the war, ee even if Tustified at this stage, would probably have done immense harm to the imperial cause in Australia & Canada. Both countries were anxous & ready to sacrifice anything in standay byhe old country & she found herself involved in war through standing by her friends. But rightly or wrongly their respect for her would have suffered a most serious shock if she had stood out & allowed France to rafer. This saspence had continued for a few acale hours when Germany took the step which settled matters both on Bretain & France. The militaristic principles Basccan of Gernany - the philocophy of teds sideals interited from Bismarck - had abready made was almost unavoidable on several occasions. But what made it inevitable was when Germany tore up the treaty by which she, with Great Britain & other powers, guaranteed the mentrality of Belgium. Germany
Intro had pat her signature to a succession of documents promising to respect the territory & aphold independence of this small country. But it was a Belgiam happened to be flat & easy country to march an army through; t the French fontier there was practically undefended. It suited the ferman staff to plan the invasion of France by that goate. And th as military conciderations were tho nly ac as frmany held that no consideration should be allowed to interfere with military considerations the treaty was discarded without two thoughts. Belgium's indlesendence was ferm any offere to guarantee the independence of Relgiam of Belgum would allow her to march through her territory in order to attack a Belgrum nation which was on terms of close friendship Belgium,rep a refust whch whch though she was atterly at the mercy of her greatneighbour, refused ion adeci which will always remain one national erohiges of the most gloreous fin risiory; of the German army crossed her portier, 35
Intro. 36 That decided the British people cabmit & the British people. Ost had been known bat a Great Britain was one of the nations which guaranteed the neutrality of Belguim. The was tooked upon by In accordance wit to Beggians as their protectress obligation she had, at the outiil of the Franco- Trassian war of 1870,he had obtained from both France & Germany promises that they would respect the Belgian portier. in 1914 ow wa beoing immenent, she had obtained from France a proncet that renewal of the same promise She had given Belgum a similar promise herself. And she asked fermany to give the same assurance. Gern any first returned an evasive answer. Belgum sent an appeal to Britain coached in sitiful terms. The ferman troops crossed the portien & Britain declared war. The whole of these rapid charges in the situation - from the time when Rustria delivered her altimatio to the time when the British Enpire was definitely involved in the war – occupied only a few days. Until the British fleer
Intro. 37 anunknown destination 22 sailed from Portland about a week before the for an untrown clestiationnobody Britain affects realieed that was really i by any serious danger of war. Yet so clearly did each step develop, so swiftly was news of pustiatit each days position cabled to all the newopapers that the public there were able to folow the remarkebly crisis with a clear grasp of what the vituation & the issues from day today really were. I ferman chancellora seemed up to one point honey to be honestly tabouring for peace. But there was a pointen sion mititarium reached, during the excilement of these feverish days in fermany, when it appeared that Prassian militarium The fact probably was that at took charge. He re a certain stage the Raiser began to depend on the advice of the great Pussian War Staff. The danger had always been that someday a military class as powerful as that of Prussia would take the bit in its teeth or obtain, at some criiis, sapreme influence with the Emperor From the moment that this happened, was seemed inevitable. It was impossible for nilitaritiileals & democratio ideats
38 Intro piliteant deals of gumary to a nation, brought up deliberatily in ideals so different from those of the rest of the world as the ideals of fermany were, to continue indefinitely in the midst of modern international society without a breach coming sooner or tater. The ferman looked on the tearing up of the Belgian trealy as lightly as he hoked on the tearing up of could the triaty of Berlin - treaties were not for a moment be allowed to stand in the way of the super - nation. The german chancellor when informed that Brilain intended to stand by the guavantees she had given to Belgim swapped outh unfortunate exclamation asking of England was going to fight for the sake of "a scrap of paper. The words summed up everything that the military casls in Germany held in contempt & everything that other nations prized - The sanctity of treaties on which alone any towards reace pogress could be made in the world; the sanctily of treaties which alone secured the rights of little nations to Exist & make their own lives as they thought best without asking the leave of any super- -nation; the sanctity of treaties which was the sole

29

Intro

Intentionally kept secret. These preparations

are not any evidence that war has been deliberately

planned or decided upon, although but

both sides any more than the building of a

warship or the making of a cannon. But they -

are always claimed by both sides as showing

the has like the secret service system which

is always a normal part of any prudent defence x

system - are always claimed by both sides as show

proving the enemy's he hostile intentions of

the country making them. Everyone in his normal

senses knows that spies must be employed,

that plans for all sorts of eventualities must be

drawn up in peace time x; that if war looks imminent certain

preparations must be made. But there is

a type of mind which, the moment that a

provisional plan is discovered, or a spy system

unearthed, or certain preparations seem to be

going on jumps to the conviction these

preparations, for a possible war which any

prudent Staff is bound to make in view

of any possible war, are evidence that a

government has made up its mind to

make that particular war, whilst xxx the truth being has often

that been that war is the one object which that Govt

is most anxious to avoid.

Actual "mobilisation", that is to say

 

30

Intro

the putting of units of an army into fighting trim

with their ranks full up to strength with reserves to

& their baggage & supplies ready to move with

them anywhere, is generally taken as an

indication that war is imminent; & "concentration,"

which is the process which follows - the moving

of those scattered units from the stations towns or depots where

they each mobilise, down to the point (generally

near a foreign frontier) where they are xxxx 

gathered into an "army" as a division is to

is naturally often looked on as a threat sufficiently

open to xx justify the country threatened in

making immediate war. But "mobilisation"

is a loose term which is applied to many

quite different stages.

Germany Austria & France, & even

Britain x to a quite less extent, were all

making preparations at the same time when

Russia was mobilising. x What particular

degree of "mobilisation" had been reached by

any of them, or by Russai along the German

border, can probably never be known. In each

case it was claimed by some of its rivals

to constitute "mobilisation". Now Germany's

whole plan of defence against Russia

& France was based on the known fact that

 

Intro   31
Russia could not mobilise & concentrate quickly
whereas she herself could.  x Germans knew
that if Russia & Germany started to mobilise
on the same day the German army would be

concentrated from four to six weeks before the

Russian one. The whole German plan for

defence was based on endeavouring to throw a

huge army smack into France during those to smash

to break the French during [[????]] those four

weeks & then being able to turn [[????]]

the main German Strength against Russia.

It may be a deplorable fact that

Germany every day that Russian

mobilisation continued

Russia may not have intended any

harm to Germany Russias "partial" mobilisation

on the German frontier may not have been

directed against Germany but every day's

that start that Russia gained was one day

lost out of Germany's precious month.

It was impossible It may seem deplorable

that the machinery of any country's war

plans may make war inevitable without

any  any country may be forced into  

war to defend a war plan. But that

is a position in which a country like nation such as the

 

32

Intro 

Germany which is educated to attach

one to let noting to the belief that military

considerations are the most important

must come before all others, is liable to

put itself in that position; & Germany [[???]]

had done so - whether possibly by reason 

of her position next to a powerful land power

like Russia she was forced to do so. The

Whatever the reason the fact is that 

Germany could not allow Russia to 

mobilise on her frontier without putting 

herself into Russia's hands. She protests

demanded that Russia should cease

mobilisation. Russia replied that this 

was now impossible. Germany at once 

declared war.

France was found by definite

alliance to support Russia; but England

was not bound to Russia by any obligation

nor was she bound [[??]] unconditionally

to support France. The Entente meant nothing

if it did not mean that the British people

reserved the right retained its liberty to judge on even in every case up to

the latest moment in every case whether

the quarrel was one in which the war was

unavoidable; and this was a case in which

 

33

Intro 

which one section of British opinion a section of British opinion was strongly doubtful

whether this [[?]] case was not precisely one of those

in which Britain was not called upon to

intervene. There was an equally perhaps a stronger opinion

in the other a stream of opinion at least equally 

strong in the other direction. But if war 

had been ???? the question had remained

for many days in the the difference in the

nation & in the cabinet was acute. [[??]] In

Australia & Canada to as well as in Britain

it was it was well realised that the British

Govt was undecided. & there was ?  Meanwhile In those hours

Germany was invading France, & there was 

a painful apprehension that Britain might

stand out & look on whilst her friend was

invaded & her ??? coast, left the French sea -trade & colonies raided & seized

by the German Fleet. The Entente undoubtedly

left the way open for this if the quarrel were

not one of which Britain approved, but

the conviction began to flow amongst the

crowds that which hourly watched the bulletins

in the streets that if Britain did not stand 

by her friend in this crisis she would never

be able to hold up her head again. Australian

[[???]] & Canadian morality, which

is founded on that of the miner & the bushman &

 

34

Intro

stockrider, attaches an immense importance to

a man "sticking by his mates", whatever their

trouble; & a decision not to enter the war, 

even if it had been justified at this stage, would probably

have done immense harm to the imperial

cause in Australia & Canada. Both countries

were anxious & ready to sacrifice anything for the

in standing by the old country & she found 

herself involved in war through standing by her

friends. But rightly or wrongly their respect

for her would have suffered a most serious 

shock if she had stood out & allowed France to

suffer.

It was at this This suspense had 

continued for a few acute hours when Germany

took the step which settled matters both in

Britain & France. The militaristic principles

of Germany - the Russian philosophy of Triesetke & 

Nietseke & methods & ideals inherited from

Bismarck - had already made war

almost unavoidable on several occasions.

& when the treaty of Berlin was

But what made it inevitable was

when Germany tore up the treaty by

which she, with Great Britain & other powers,

guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. Germany

 

35

Intro

had put her signature to a succession of

documents promising to respect the Belgian

the territory & uphold Belgian the independence of

this small country. But because it was a

Belgium happened to be flat & easy country

to march an army through; & the French

frontier there was practically undefended.

And It suited the German staff to plan the

invasion of France by that route. And

therefore ?? as military considerations were the

only ones to as Germany held that no

consideration should be allowed to 

interfere with military considerations

the treaty was discarded without two thoughts.

Belguim's independence was Germany offered

to guarantee the independence of Belgium if 

Belgium would allow her to march 

through her territory in order to attack a

nation with which Belgium was on terms of close friendship.

Belgium, refused - a refusal which

which is though she was utterly at the

mercy of her great neighbour, refused - 

an action a decision which will always remain one 

of the most glorious national sacrifices in history; & the

German army crossed her frontier.

 

36

Intro

That decided the British people cabinet &

the British people. ?? It had been known that

Germany might possibly Great Britain was

one of the nations which guaranteed the neutrality

of Belgium. She had an was looked upon by

the Belgians as their protectress. In the Franco In accordance with

this obligation she had, at the outset of the Franco-

Prussian war of 1870, she had obtained from

both France & Germany promises that they 

would [[??]] respect the Belgian frontier.

She had And Now in 1914 on war becoming

imminent, she had obtained from France a

promise that renewal of the same promise.

She had t win Belgium a similar promise

herself. And she ends asked Germany to

give the same [[???]]] assurance. Germany

troops first returned an evasive appeal

answer. Belgium sent an appeal to

Britain couched in pitiful terms.

[[?]] The German troops crossed the frontier;

& Britain declared war.

The whole of these rapid changes in

the situation - from the time when

Austria delivered her ultimatum to the

time when the British Empire was

definitely involved in the war - occupied

only a few days. [[??]] Until the British fleet

 

37

Intro

sailed from Portland for an unknown destination, about a week before war was declared,

war, for an uknown destination. nobody

realised that Britain was really involved affected by any

serious danger of war. Yet so clearly did this

each step develop, so exc swiftly was news of

each days position cabled to all the Australian newspapers,

that the public there were able to follow the

crisis with a very remarkably clear grasp of what

the situation & the issues from day to day

really were. The German chancellor was seemed

up to tone point honsetly to be honestly labouring

for peace. But there was a point where

Prussian militarism reached, during the

excitement of these feverish days in Germany,

when it appeared that Prussian militarism

took charge. The impression was The fact probably was that at

a certain stage the Kaiser began to depend on 

the advice of the great Prussian War Staff.

From that mome The danger had always

been that someday the a military class

as powerful as that of Prussia would

take the bit in its teeth or obtain, at some

crisis, supreme influence with the Emperor.

From the moment that this happened, war 

seemed inevitable. It was impossible for

militaristic ideals & democratic ideals ??

 

38

Intro

the militaristic the peace of the ideals of Germany to 

a nation, brought up deliberately in ideals

so different from those of the rest of the world

as the ideals of Germany were, to 

continue indefinitely in the midst of modern

international society without an a

breach coming sooner or later. The German

looked on the tearing up of the Belgian treaty

as lightly as he looked on the tearing up of

the treaty of Berlin - treaties were could not

for a moment be allowed to stand in the

way of the super-nation. The German

chancellor in fact when informed that Britain

intended to stand by the guarantees she had

given to Belgium snapped out the an unfortunate

question whether exclamation asking if England was going to fight for the

sake of "a scrap of paper". The words summed

up everything that the military casts in Germany

held in contempt & everything that other nations

prized - the sanctity of treaties on which alone any

progress towards peace could be made in the world; the sanctity

of treaties which alone secured the rights of little

nations to exist & to make their own lives as they

thought best without asking the leave of any super - 

nation; the sanctity of treaties which was the sole

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