Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/38B/1 - Notebook - Part 4

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Intentionally kept secret. These preparations

are not any evidence that war has been deliberately

planned or decided upon, although but

both sides any more than the building of a

warship or the making of a cannon. But they -

are alway xxxxx by both sides as showing

the has like the secret service system which

is always or normal part of any prudent defence x

 - are always claimed by both sides as show

proving the enemy's he hostile intentions of

the country making them. Everyone in his normal

senses knows that spies must be employed,

that plans for all sorts of eventualities must be

drawn up in peace time x; that if war looks imminent certain

preparations must be made. But there is

a type of mind which, the moment that a

provisional plan is discovered, or a spy system

unearthed, or certain preparations seem to be

going on jumps to the conviction these

preparations, for a possible war which any

prudent Staff is bound to make in view

of any possible war, are evidence that a

government has made up its mind to

make that particular war, whilst xxx the truth being has often

that been that war is the one object which that Govt

is most anxious to avoid.

Actual "mobilisation", that is to say

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the putting of units of an army into fighting trim

with their ranks full up to strength with reserves to

& their baggage & supplies ready to move with

them anywhere, is generally taken as an

indication that war is imminent; & "concentration,"

which is the process which follows - the moving

of those scattered units from the stations towns or depots where

they each mobilise, down to the point (generally

near a foreign frontier) where they are xxxx 

gathered into an "army" as a division is to

is naturally often looked on as a threat sufficiently

open to xx justify the country threatened in

making immediate war. But "mobilisation"

is a loose term which is applied to many

quite different stages.

Germany Austria & France, & even

Britain x to a quite les, were all

making preparations at the extent same time when

Russia was mobilising x what particular

degree of "mobilisation" had been reached by

any of them, or by Russai along the German

border, can probably never be known. In each

case it was claimed by some of its rivals

to constitute "mobilisation" Now Germany's

whole plan of defence against Russia

& France was based on the known fact that

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Russia could not mobilise & concentrate quickly
whereas she herself could.  x Germans knew
that if Russia & Germany started to mobilise
on the same day the German army would be

concentrated from four to six weeks before the

Russian one, The whole German plan for

defence was based on endeavouring to throw a

hug army smack into France during those to smash

to break the French during [[????]] those four

weeks & then being able to turn [[????]]

the main German Strength against Russia.

It may be a deplorable fact that

Germany every day that Russian

mobilisation continued

Russia may not have intended any

harm to Germany Russias "partial" mobilisation

on the German frontier may not have been

directed against Germany but every day's

that start that Russia gained was one day

lost out of Germany's precious month.

It was impossible It may seem deplorable

that the machinery of any country's war

plans may make war inevitable without

any  any country may be forced into war 

to defend a war plan. But that

is a position in which a country like nation such as the

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Germany which is educated to attach

one to let noting to the belief that military

considerations are the most important

must come before all others, is liable to

put itself in that position; & Germany [[???]]

had done so - whether possibly by reason 

of her position next to a powerful land power

like Russia she was forced to do so. The

Whatever the reason the fact is that 

Germany could not allow Russia to 

mobilise on her frontier without putting 

herself into Russia's hands. She protests

demanded that Russia should cease

mobilisation. Russia replied that this 

was now impossible. Germany at once 

declared war.

France was found by definite

alliance to support Russia; but England

was not bound to Russia by any obligation

nor was she bound [[??]] unconditionally

to support France. The Entente meant nothing

if it did not mean that the British people

reserved the right retained its liberty to judge on even in every case up to

the latest moment in every case whether

the quarrel was one in which the war was

unavoidable; and this was a case in which

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which one section of British opinion a section of British opinion was strongly doubtful

whether this [[?]] case was not precisely one of those

in which Britain was not called upon to

intervene. There was an equally perhaps a stronger opinion

in the other a stream of opinion at least equally 

strong in the other direction. But if war 

had been ???? the question had remained

for many days in the the difference in the

nation & in the cabinet was acute. [[??]] In

Australia & Canada to as well as in Britain

it was it was well realised that the British

Govt was undecided. & there was ?  Meanwhile In those hours

Germany was invading France, & there was 

a painful apprehension that Britain might

stand out & look on whilst her friend was

invaded & her ??? coast, left the French sea -trade & colonies raided & seized

by the German Fleet. The Entente undoubtedly

left the way open for this if the quarrel were

not one of which Britain approved, but

the conviction began to flow amongst the

crowds that which hourly watched the bulletins

in the streets that if Britain did not stand 

by her friend in this crisis she would never

be able to hold up her head again. Australian

[[???]] & Canadian morality, which

is founded on that of the miner & the bushman &

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stockrider, attaches an immense importance to

a man "sticking by his mates", whatever their

trouble; & a decision not to enter the war, 

even if it had been justified at this stage, would probably

have done immense harm to the impirical

cause in Australia & Canada. Both countries

were anxious & ready to sacrifice anything for the

in standing by the old country & she found 

herself involved in war through standing by her

friends. But rightly or wrongly their respect

for her would have suffered a most serious 

shock if she had stood out & allowed France to

suffer.

It was at this This suspense had 

continued for a few acute hours when Germany

took the step which settled matters both in

Britain & France. The militaristic principles

of Germany - the Russian philosophy of Triesetke & 

Nietseke & methods & ideals inherited from

Bismark - had already made war

almost unavoidable on several occasions.

& when the treaty of Berlin was

But what made it inevitable was

when Germany tore up the treaty by

which she, with Great Britain & other powers,

guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. Germany

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had put her signature to a succession of

documents promising to respect the Belgian

the territory & uphold Belgian the independence

of this small country. But because it was a

Belgium happened to be flat & easy country

to march an army through; & the French

frontier there was practically undefended.

And It suits the German staff to plan the

invasion of France by that route. And

therefore ?? as military considerations were the

only ones to as Germany held that no

consideration should be allowed to 

interfere with military considerations

the treaty was discarded without two thoughts.

Belguim's independence was Germany offered

to guarantee the independence of Belgium if 

Belgium would allow her to march 

through her territory in order to attack a

nation with which Belgium was on terms of close friendship.

Belgium, refused - a refusal which

which is though she was utterly at the

mercy of her great neighbour, refused - 

an action a decision which will always remain one 

of the most glorious national sacrifices in history; & the

German army crossed her frontier.

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That decided the British people cabinet &

the British people. ?? It had been known that

Germany might possibly Great Britain was

one of the nations which guaranteed the neutrality

of Belgium. She had an was looked upon by

the Belgians as their protectress. In the Franco In accordance with

this obligation she had, at the outset of the Franco-

Prussian war of 1870, she had obtained from

both France & Germany promises that they 

would [[??]] respect the Belgian frontier.

She had And Now in 1914 on war becoming

imminent, she had obtained from France a

promise that renewal of the same promise.

She had t win Belgium a similar promise

herself. And she ends asked Germany to

give the same [[???]]] assurance. Germany

troops first returned an evasive appeal

answer. Belgium sent an appeal to

Britain couched in pitiful terms.

[[?]] The German troops crossed the frontier;

& Britain declared war.

The whole of these rapid changes in

the situation - from the time when

Austria delivered her ultimatum to the

time when the British Empire was

definitely involved in the war - occupied

only a few days. [[??]] Until the British fleet

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sailed from Portland for an unknown destination, about a week before war was declared,

war, for an uknown destination. nobody

realised that Britain was really involved affected by any

serious danger of war. Yet so clearly did this

each step develop, so exc swiftly was news of

each days position cabled to all the Australian newspapers,

that the public there were able to follow the

crisis with a very remarkably clear grasp of what

the situation & the issues from day to day

really were. The German chancellor was seemed

up to tone point honsetly to be honestly labouring

for peace. But there was a point where

Prussian militarism reached, during the

excitement of these feverish days in Germany,

when it appeared that Prussian militarism

took charge. The impression was The fact probably was that at

a certain stage the Kaiser began to depend on 

the advice of the great Prussian War Staff.

From that mome The danger had always

been that someday the a military class

as powerful as that of Prussia would

take the bit in its teeth or obtain, at some

crisis, supreme influence with the Emperor.

From the moment that this happened, war 

seemed inevitable. It was impossible for

militaristic ideals & democratic ideals ??

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the militaristic the peace of the ideals of Germany to 

a nation, brought up deliberately in ideals

so different from those of the rest of the world

as the ideals of Germany were, to 

continue indefinitely in the midst of modern

international society without an a

breach coming sooner or later. The German

looked on the tearing up of the Belgian treaty

as lightly as he looked on the tearing up of

the treaty of Berlin - treaties were could not

for a moment be allowed to stand in the

way of the super-nation. The German

chancellor in fact when informed that Britain

intended to stand by the guarantees she had

given to Belgium snapped out the an unfortunate

question whether exclamation asking if England was going to fight for the

sake of "a scrap of paper". The words summed

up everything that the military casts in Germany

held in contempt & everything that other nations

prized - the sanctity of treaties on which alone any

progress towards peace could be made in the world; the sanctity

of treaties which alone secured the rights of little

nations to exist & to make their own lives as they

thought best without asking the leave of any super - 

nation; the sanctity of treaties which was the sole