Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/281/1 - 1918 - 1933 - Part 4

2.
6th Field Coy. Extract from war diary.
5th Oct. Lieuts. Elsum and Noone and Lance Corp. White spent most of night
in finding and guiding to Nauroy a lost American regt. which was to relieve
6th Bde. that night.
7th Field Coy.
(See unit history)
A.W.B.

2nd Div. Signal Coy. (F .U. J. Tinkler)
Extracts from war diary
3rd Oct.  Lines held well but were out at intervals owing to enemy shell
fire. Business transmitted with little delay. Traffic disposed of by
wireless, morse, telephone and motor despatch riders. Many messages were
dropped during the morning by contact aeroplanes.
4th Oct.  Orders received that art. btys. would move forward at dusk to
positions in front of Joncourt. Bde. signal sections established a forward
exchange at 15th Bty. position and lines were then laid back to the rear
positions, which were not complete until 2 a.m. on 5th owing to enemy
bombing and distance between stations.
5th Oct.  6th Bde. attack. Lines to bns. were repeatedly broken by enemy
shellfire but were promptly repaired by linesmen and were never out for more
than a few minutes at any one time.
Extracts from report 2nd/6th Oct.
5th Bde. group.
When 5th Bde. took over front line on night of 1st/2nd Oct.
the only existing communications were one overland line back to 5th Div.
advanced exchange and one earth return overland line to two bns. in the
line. At 9.30 p.m. on 1st Oct. party set out laying two pairs overland
from Bde. H.Q. to G.18.a.3.6. where Bde. forward exchange established 11 p.m.
17th and 18th Bns. connected here before midnight and one pair laid to
vicinity of 19th Bn. but this bn. was not connected till dawn as also were
the 20th and 23rd Bns. Shortly after zero hour party despatched to Joncourt
in readiness to establish forward station at B.27 central in event of bns.
moving - but none were made. Meanwhile bde. forward exchange established in
Estrees at H.2.c.2.6. to which 5th Bde. bns. connected as also were 22nd and
23rd Bns. by 6 p.m. and during this attack made by the two latter bns. at
6.30 p.m. these lines remained intact.
6th Bde. group.
Advanced Bde. report centre established at H.2.c.3.7. From
here lines laid to all bns. of bde. group. . . . . . . .During the latter stages
of the operations the Bde. was in telephone communication with 9 bns., three
of which occupied the same battle H.Q. in H.10.a.1.3. to which two
alternate routes were laid.
 

3.
Lateral Lines.
2nd Div. observed rule of laying lateral lines from right
to left, i.e. our formations were in constant contact with those on their
immediate left flank. In fact through these lines (as far as inter-div.
and inter-bde. lines are concerned) we handled all telephonic and
xxx telegraphic traffic for the 25th Div. on our left for a period of 48
hrs. The div. on our right was repeatedly requested to lay to us - an
earth return cable was laid to our advanced div. exchange which proved
useless and no attempt was made to improve the communications in that
direction.
Great difficulty experienced in keeping forward ground lines
through - breaks being caused through shellfire, xxxxxx cross country
transport and tanks. Despite this telephone communication/was kept almost
continuously throughout the operations, though speech was faint at times
owing to condition and length of lines.
Despatch Riders.
Motor cyclists carried out the usual duties allotted them
working on a set time-table - except by night. These runs were done by
horsemen attached from 13th L.H. Regt. Their services were particularly
useful at night when working between div. and bdes; their ability to get
through heavy traffic and over roads unsuitable for motor cyclists
rendered them of infinite value. The horsemen allotted to inf. bdes.
proved of the greatest value. . . . . . . .
 

FROM SECOND AUSTRALIAN PIONEER BATTALION
TO 8TH. AUST. INFANTRY BRIGADE
APPENDIX 4.
165
On the night of 4th/5th October Battalion took over the line
H.18a.d.7. - H 12.d..2.5. -H.12.b.3.3. -H.6.c.4.3. -H.6.a.0.6. -B.2.9.d.0.5.
relieving the 1st. Monmouth Battalion and 4th. Leceister Battalion of the
136th. British Infantry Brigade. Relief was completed before midnight.
Battalion Headquarters of the 4th.Leicester Battalion being found very
unsuitable for Battle Battalion Headquarters. Battalion Headquarters moved
to H. 10.a.1.3.
After taking over the line had been completed touch was obtained with
23rd.Battalion on the left.
The O.C. of the Monmouth Company on the night stated that his flank
was in the air and there were no other troops within 500 or 600 yards but
patrols sent out from our right Coy located cyclists of the 9th.Corps about
500 yards away the posts being well placed to cover the interval between
their left and our right. All Coys patrolled the front and B.Coy secured
a prisoner as he was wounded in the leg they decided to guard him until
morning rather than carry him in to B.H.Q. but omitted to send in his
identification (they have been duly strafed for this omission).
All Coys moving out noted position in which J.O.T. line was being laid.
There was considerable bombing in the vicinity of RAMICOURT while the
Coys were moving out and desultory shelling and M.G.Fire during the night.
A considerable amount of gas was projected on to H.10.b. and S.E. of
WIENCOURT but there were no casualties prior to zero on the 5th. At
Zero minus 15 the line was withdrawn to rear of Infantry on the J.O.T.
line excepting the right half of right Coy.
The attack on MONTBREHAIN proceeded according to order (a copy) of
Battalion operation Order attached.
The left of right Coy. advanced about 250 yards and extended
somewhat to the left to about I.7.c.0.8. They consolidated on an
excellent line and placed five captured German Machine Guns in position
these guns could bring cross fire to bear on the valley in front of the
Coy Sector also that of the Coy on the left.
The centre Coy of our line that was advancing and swinging to the
South East encountered considerable opposition particularly from the
Sunken Roads Quarries and Railway Lines in H.12b. and I.7.a.,they had
very stiff fighting at many points and at times the position seemed
critical. Advancing somewhat impetuously S.E. of NEVILL CROSS the Coy got
in front of the General Line and beyond the line laid down for the final
objective. The enemy counter-attacked on both their flanks and for a time
the position was critical but Lt. W.L.MURRELL of B.Coy which started on
the Left of C.Coy and co noted the situation and led his platoon to the
right of C.Coy and covered the withdrawl of C.Coy's most dangerous flank.
During the episode the German Officer Commanding a post was killed and
complete garrison of 40 O.R. captured and taken back by an Officer and
One O.R. of C. Coy.
B.Coy which was the left Coy. on that part of our line which was
swinging to the right to form the Left of our defensive flank moved by
right incline gradually passing across the rear of the 21st.Battalion. The
left flank aiming to pass the British a little North of H.6.d.central.
Soon after passing the road running from H.12.b.7.5. N.E. through the
village this Coy came under heavy M.G.Fire from Cores Copse on the
Railway near I.7.a.4.2. these M.G's were soon silenced by the Coys fire and
the aid of two tanks which had been diverted to the south of the Village.
Averting back to LT. MURRELL'S movement to the right of C.Coy to
reinforce and cover the drawing back of their right flank a Sgt. and 28 O.R.
of an English Corps Cyclist Unit were seen moving up the valley in a
Northerly direction.LT.MURRELL signalled them into his line an incoperated
them with his own men. It appeared they were a part of two Coys that had
moved out of
 

APPENDIX 
D4
105
(2)
the Corps on the our Right and got lost.
The two Vickers Guns under Lt. Wilkinson took up positions in C.Coy's
sector dominating the valley in I.7.c. and d. and I. 13.a. and b.
B.Coy continued to advance towards Sunken Road running from
I.1.d.3.1. to I.7.b.7.6. not much opposition was met between the
Railway in I.7.a. and this line but immediately beyond the Sunken Road
approaching the crest of the hill heavy M.G.Fire was encountered from the
direction of Doon-Hill and the Sunken Road in front of same.
The advance was continued to final objective on crest facing DOON HILL
and line running approx. I.8.a.5.7 to I.2.c. central where our left
flank joined up with right of 21st. Battalion. On this line the
depleted Coy was subjected to withering fire from DOON HILL and vicinity
and from each flank and the line was withdrawn about 50 yards and the men
started digging in just behind the crest.
There was an extensive gap on the right of the coy and the ground
hid the Centre Coy. from view.
It was seen that the enemy had a light field gun at DOON HILL and
gunners were soon working it. They fired regularly at B.Coy's position
but the shells broke harmlessly on the crest in front or the rising
ground in rear.
The O.C. B.Coy got a Sgt. of 21st. Battalion to mount a Lewis Gun at
I.7.b.8.9. these considerably relieved the tenxion in respect to the
gap between B.& C. Coys.
Our A.Coy which held the line on our left had been ordered firstly
to follow the infantry generally along the Sunken Road in H.6.a.andb.
and with the assistance of the Tanks allotted to the Battalion to
complete the mopping up of the village and then go into support of our
Battalion line at ab/out H.12.b.8.8. During the early part of the
attack as they approached the village theyycame under heavy M.G.Fire
from a strong enemy position on the left. Several casualties were
sustained in a spirited attempt to capture this position. The Platoon O
Officer of the left platoon having been seriously wounded the Platoon
Sgt. took command and with the assistance of a tank which then came up
attacked the enemy post captured 8 M.G's and one 4.2 Howitzer with the
survivors of the crews. Parties of the enemy were pursued further to the
left and the platoon then resumed the mopping of the village.
The Coy moved right  through the village and after having got to the
outer edge were returning according to orders to take xxx up their
position in support of the rest of the battalion when the enemy
commenced very heavy shelling of the village and some casualties were
sustained.
Following this shelling of the village the enemy strongly counter-
attacked and drove back men of the 21st.Battalion and 24th.Battalion.well
through the village. Noting this Capt. ROTH. of A.Coy gathered his men
and some of the 24th. Battalion and formed a defensive flank running
from approx. H.6.d.3.5. to B.3.0.c.9.3.
The 18th. Battalion having been placed at my disposal I sent
LT. BRYDEN with 50 ofxx the 90 available men to reinforce my C.Coy
(the centre Coy of our right defensive flank) with instructions should
he find that Coy's position stable consult with O.C. of our left Coy.
and if necessary use his men in strengthening the line between our left and
right of 21st. Battalion.
I had been informed that a M.G. the 21st Battalion had in a house
at about I.2.a.5.3. was driven out and the enemy had placed a gun there
which was firing on the rear of my B.Coy.
The 26th.Battalion reinforced our posts and also established a post
at I.2.a.4.3. About 3.35 p.m. they reported that at that post they had

two L.G's and plenty of S.A.A. that there was another L.G. post 100 yards
on their left but no other in sight up to I.1.b.7.9. They could see the
enemy occupying line at about I.3.a. and b.
 

APPENDIX 
D 4
105
(3)
At about 11 a.m. enemy artillery became activevon right of our
line and a smoke barrage wasput down along the valley in H. 18.b.
under cover of which the enemy attempted an advance in skirmishing order
was easily dispersed with M.G.Fire . About  12 noon some movement was
noticed about 200 yards in front of our Right flank Coy and suspecting it
might be an enemy M.G.Post a patrol went out to investigate and attack
but found only a badly wounded member of the Tank Corps.
Artillery Fire having dispersed enemy concentrations in M I.13.
and about DOON HILL enemy was seen at about 1340 to withdraw and
commence digging a line approx.N&S from about I.8.c.1.0. to I.8.a.0.0.
Artillery was brought  to bear on this and on ground in rear.
In the meantime A. Coy on left of Village had extended their left
flank in B.30.c and linked up with 23rd. Battalion. xxx That Coy having
reported heavy enemy concentrations in Sunken Road in B.30.d. and  b.
and the valley in C.25.b. Artillery fire was brought to bear on those
localities.
The 20th. Battalion had been placed at my disposal by G.O.C. 5th.Bde.
but seeing that the position was becoming stable so far as this Battn.
lines were concerned and that a measure of uncertainty in the respect
to the position on North end of the Village might render their
employment more valuable later on I kept them in hand. COL. FORBES
remaining at Battle Battalion H.Qrs. The Battalion was not employed
at all in the attack.
Reserves of ammunition and water were brought up to 50 yards east of
Station H.6.c.5.3.and the 18th. Battalion in moving up to reinforce
our C.Coy took up supplies of ammunition.
R.A.P.was established at SWISS COTTAGE at H.7.b.5.8.
Communications.
It had been intended to establish an O.P. at about H.12.c.3.1
and run a line from there back to B.H.Q.but a general shortage of wire
induced one to cooperate with 20th. Battalion and run a line via
Swiss Cottage Station to Quarry in H.12.b.8.8.from which we ran two
branch lines.
Battle Casualties were20 O.R. Killed in action 2 O.R. Died of Wounds
One Officer and One O.R. Wounded and missing believed prisoner of war.
One O.R. Missing believed Killed,6 Officers 81 O.R.wounded .One O.R.
accidentally wounded .Total 7 Off. 106 O.Rs.
Prisoners Captured as per receipts obtained were 8 Officers and
327 O.Rs.
Estimated enemy casualties 450.
Battalion was relieved by 118th.Infantry Regiment of the 30 th.
Amercian Division,relief being completed by 0200 on 6th. Enemy M.G.'s
which had been placed in position and all trench stores in hand were
handed over to relieving Coys.
Battalion moved back to bivouacs south of NAUROY, last party
arriving there about 0330.
No count was made of captured material but it included one 4.2
howitzer and several M.G's.
(Signed) F.W.C. Annand.
Lieut-Colonel
C.O. 2nd. Australian Pioneer Battalion.
 

3 Div Sig Coy
War diary 19/8/18
Since the Divn moved out of the line to Bussy on 13 Aug
and the Bdes remained in reserve, the lines to each bde have been of such
a length as to make good speaking impossible. The length of the
buried cable system is approx 12000 yds and the Bdes have field
cable lines extended from the head of the cable bury varying from 3000
to 7000 yds in extent. These cables being on the ground
are liable to mutilation by traffic. The total length of the cable
lines render it imposs to use poles.
21/8/18  D.R.L.S. between Div Arty HQ and the respective groups
was a serious diffy on a/c of the number of tactical orders
and amendments necessitating special runs.
The bad condition of the roads would not permit of motor cyclists
using them at night. Mtd horse orderlies were therefore
introduced and used with good results.
22/8/18 967 telegrams handled at HQ Signal Office today. Clear^ed
expeditiously, No congestion. Total is record last 12 months.
Heavy enemy shelling cut all forward lines of 9 Inf Bde at 4.35 a.m.
Quickly repaired & despite diffy at no time touch lost betw. Bde & Bns.
All alternative means resorted to ^as occasion necessitated - power buzzer, and amplifiers,
pigeons, message rockets & runners all successfully used. Visual
imposs on a/c of thick mist.
During the days operns a captured German sig. lamp was used to good
advantage from 10 MGCoy in L19b to 3 M.G. Bn command post at K 24 c 84.
23/8/18  Failure of AUst. Corps to make provision for a lateral line from 3rd Aust Div to 3rd British
Div. resulted in all traffic being xxxxx desseminated through 3rd British and Aust 
Corps. On 20 Aug ^O.C. 3 Div SigCoy ^(Major R G Hamilton) directed attention of ADAS Corps to existing
unsatisfactory means of circulation which was calculated to lead to  congestion. On
22 Aug. ADAS xxxx requested Hamilton to establish lateral commun.
with this flank divn & to cease diverting traffic through Corps office altho the
construction of the line was a corps matter. Work taken in hand by 3 Div SigCoy &
circuit was working satisfactorily this morning.
27/8/18  When all bty lines of 8 FA Bde failed at 1.30 a.m. captured German
signal lamp used to maintain commun. & worked admirably.
 

3 Div Sig Coy  2
28/8/18  ADAS. Aust Corps. advised that issue of
pigeons will be discontinued forthwith owing to
rapidity of our advance.
4/9/18  Wireless message in German intercepted by wireless
operator attached 10 Inf bde today. message handed over
to bde staff & on being interpreted was found to contain
information of a highly important technical nature.
5/9/18  11 Inf Bde moved to I 9 d 8. 3.
Owing to bns being constantly on move, communication fwd
was by runner, DRLS, and mounted orderlies. The mtd orderlies
(attached from 13 LH Regt) proved extremely useful in quickly
locating units and did good service. Easily outdistanced
the runners
 

5 Div Sig Coy
Extracts from general notes for Aug 1918.
Communications had to be established with "alacrity" owing to rapidity of movement.
Rapd advance ^also necessitated cables of abnormal length, espec. between
Div. & Bdes. Bde HQ often compelled to move fwd at very short notice.
For example, on 30 Aug direct line to 15 Bde on 30 Aug was 2300 yds in advance of Div, xx
The task of establishing commun between Div & Bdes, & in some cases
beyond Bde HQ to Bde forward stations, fell entirely on the Cable
detachments, "whose cable waggons have been used more extensively than ever
before." Maintenance of lines not been an easy matter, and has kept
men hard & continuously at work night & day. There have
been no buried routes. All lines have in the first instance
been ground lines. Whenever possible they have improved by
being poled or raised off ground onto trees etc. Apart from
damage due to shell fire, lines have been subject to injury by traffic of
tanks, gums, & transport.
Throughout month wireless estab between all units [shorthand] Bdes.
Generally a directing station with Wilson set has been estab forward
Div. with a trench set at Div & ^each Bde H.Q. This was necy on a/c of the distance
which often existed bet. Div & Bdes. Useful means of commun
when cables had been cut and also to relieve lines when traffic heavy.
Visual signalling more extensively used than usual
espec in fwd areas. Undulating nature of countryside have in
many cases rendered visual imposs.
In the line pigeons were issued daily to arty & infy
units until 26 Aug. When owing to rapidity of advance
Corps discontinued distributing them. They were not used to
any extent for "service messages."
Air contact was another means of commun it was used more
extensively than previously. Messages with valble and import, information
daily recd at Div by this means.
Motor cyclist had heavy work. Weather generally fine &
helpful & roads in captured territory in fair order.
 

1st Div. Engrs.
Memo to F Coys 28/8/18.
In view of probability of Aust Corps carrying out advance which may include
crossing Somme the follg provision for bridging the river have been made by 
CE, Aust Corps
Footbridges have been made and dumped in Advanced Corps Park at K 32 d 88
H.T bridges Each div. carrying its own pontooning gear will be
suffic. material for two bridges, with 2 spare trestles.
C.E. will hold near Corps HQ for each div one FHD lorry
with 2 trailers loaded with 2 pontoons complete, ready to be sent
forward at the call of any CRE
In addition CREs can draw direct from the Corps Advanced Park
at K 32 d 88.
M.T. Bridges.  In the event of M.T bridges being reqd sooner
than permanent structures can be erected, two C type
pontoon bridges to carry loads up to and including heavy
commercial lorries can be drawn at once from the 4th Army
Bridging Park at Longueau
 

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