Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/277/1 - 1926-1939 - Part 10

AUSTRALIAN HONOUR
Another reader who had intimate and
prolonged acquaintance with the Australian
troops in France adds his voice to the Rev.
P. B. Clayton's repudiation of references
to these soldiers in "Retreat."
TO THE EDITOR OF "THE DAILY TELEGRAPH"
SIR - I have not read "Retreat" so am
therefore not acquainted with Mr. Benstead's
reference to the Australians' unchivalrous
conduct at Glisy. I am certain,
however, that all those Australians who
have read the Rev. P. B. Clayton's remarks

in his article in THE DAILY TELEGRAPH of
to-day's date will be deeply grateful for his
chivalry in defending their honour.
Although English-born, I served four
years in the field with the Australian troops,
and can honestly say that never once did I
see an ungallant act on their part towards
anybody weaker than themselves, let
alone an old woman who had been
mortally wounded. - Yours, &c.,
JOHN LYNCH.
Clapham, S.W. 12, March 1.
MR. BENSTEAD'S OBSERVATIONS
A letter from Mr. C. R. Benstead, the
author of the novel, which has been
received, deals with certain aspects of the
subject. At the time it was written Mr.
Benstead, who has been travelling abroad,
had not seen Mr. Clayton's article of Saturday,
and had in mind only the strictures in
his original article on Feb. 7.
This letter cannot therefore  be taken as
the author's reply to the latest revelations,
and in view of that fact we do not consider
publication of its full terms necessary.
As illustrating, however, his general position,
the following extracts may be given :
"'Retreat' asks the question: 'Can a
chaplain, a man whose life is dedicated to
preaching Christ's gospel of peace, fit into
a battlefield?' The Rev. P. B. Clayton,
M.C., surprisingly answers it with details of
the chaplain's organisation, which prove
nothing more than the failure of that
organisation within the limits of my own
experience, and with a protest against the
'language' (praised by other critics because
of its restraint), which merely demonstrates
that Mr. Clayton has led a happily
cloistered existence - a fact never challenged,
Sir Arthur Yapp counters with
the astounding assertion that the 'vast
majority' of soldiers crowded the voluntary
religious services. If that was so, why the

empty churches now? The war-time army
was only Britain in khaki. . . .
"To cascading irrelevance Mr. Clayton
added dogmatic denial. No chaplain ever
went mad, he declares. Yet another cleric,
also M.C., tells of one who, having come
straight out, went mad after three days'
duty in a dressing station.
"Such criticism is worthless and unworthy.
I suspect its origin in some dim
realisation that all the splendid welfare
work and heroic self-sacrifice of wartime

chaplains showed nothing more than the

man, as distinct from the minister, making

the best of a hideously impossible job. Its

remedy lies in an appreciation of the question
'Retreat' asks, and its urgent bearing
on the duty of the Church to-day. That
appreciation would quench for ever the
absurd notion that 'Elliot Warne' was
meant to typify the wartime chaplain, and
it would also still those hysterical denunciations
which, on one occasion, led Mr.
Clayton to upbraid me for not making a
character in 1918 know what happened in
1919. - Yours, &c.,
C. R. BENSTEAD."
By inadvertence on Saturday in the introduction
to the letters of the officers of the 14th
Brigade (Page Thirteen, Column Seven) the
statement, "There is no need to mourn
Elliot Warne, for Elliot Warne never lived,"
was attributed to Mr. Benstead. It was
actually made by Mr. Clayton. What Mr.
Benstead said was that he met during the
war two persons of the type depicted.

 REPUDIATION
OF
"RETREAT"
BRIGADE OF NOVEL
IDENTIFIED
SIGNED STATEMENTS
BY OFFICERS
INDIGNANT DENIAL
OF INCIDENTS
A new and serious aspect to the
storm of criticism with which the war

book "Retreat" has been received is
given by the action of officers who

claim to have served in the brigade of

which the author drew a picture.

The signed statements which THE

DAILY TELEGRAPH publishes below

identify as the mess of the book that

of the 14th Brigade Heavy Artillery.

It was the only British brigade

billeted at Glisy in 1918. Moreover,

Lieut.-Commander Benstead, the

author of the book, was Orderly

Officer of this brigade.

The suggestion that there was excessive

drinking in the mess is indignantly denied.

Even more fiercely is the picture of the

Padre repudiated.

Lieutenant-Commander Benstead has

described his book as a "novel," and he

represents accordingly that his characters

are not living persons. "There is no need

for people to mourn Elliot Warne" (the

padre of the book), he says, "for Elliot

Warne never lived." He, however, says

that he met during the war two persons

of the type depicted. Where and when he

met them he claims to be his own concern.

The Rev. J.G.Jarvis was the padre of

the 14th Brigade Heavy Artillery, and it

is unfortunate, having regard to the fact

that the padre is drawn as a somewhat

helpless person, that he should be able to

identify certain of the incidents in the

book. Mr. Jarvis asserts that these are

grossly distorted.

The novelist sends the padre to the observation

post at Villers-Bretonneux, and

there the sight of thousands of dead

Germans make him lose his head.

Mr. Jarvis, in the subjoined statement,

denies this version, and modestly tells the

story of how he, with pick and shovel,

went out alone to tumble the bodies into

shell-holes, and was afterwards taken to

task for undertaking so great a risk.

The signed statements given below have

been obtained by the Rev. P. B. Clayton,

who criticised "Retreat" in a recent article

in THE DAILY TELEGRAPH. With the fore-

'INTERESTS OF TRUTH'

MR. CLAYTON'S INQUIRY

The statements are as follow:

TO THE EDITOR OF 'THE DAILY TELEGRAPH.'

SIR-In a novel named "Retreat." now

being serialised, the author has seen fit to

draw upon real incidents and living characters

in the 14th Brigade H.A. To this

brigade he was Orderly Officer during 1918,

and no other British Brigade H.A. was 

billeted in Glisy, as the book describes.

In the interests of truth, I have therefore

got in touch with some survivors, whose

statements are attached. Their evidence

is indeed enlightening by contrast with the

spurious mirror which distorts decent

memories.—Yours faithfully,

P.B.Clayton.

Feb. 28, 1930.

I.-SIGNED STATEMENT BY THE DOCTOR.
As M.O. of the 14th Brigade H.A. during

the period of the retreat, 1918, I recognise

practically all the characters in C. R. Benstead's 

book, "Retreat".

He has taken the Mess of the 14th

Bridgade, slightly changed their names or

nicknames, and made them say or do things

they neither said nor did. The Mess was

the soberest Mess that I have ever been in,

and drunkenness or foul language was not

tolerated.

Padre Jarvis was neither incompetent

nor cowardly, as Benstead has drawn the

Rev. Elliot Warne.

I give full permission for this to be

published.

J. T. O'BOYLE

Feb. 26, 1930.

II.-SIGNED STATEMENT BY THE SIGNALS 

OFFICER.

As Signals Officer of the 14th Brigade

H.A. during the whole period referred

to in "Retreat," I can clearly recognise

practically all the characters in the book.

Moreover, most of the incidents described

actually took place at the time and date

mentioned in the book. The interpretation

put upon these incidents by the author is

in many cases quite untrue, and has been

distorted as something vile, whereas, in fact,

they were otherwise.

The Padre was not cowardly, nor the

Adjutant or the Doctor drunken. The mess

was, moreover, most abstemious.

The Padre, the Adjutant, and the Doctor

were all great friends of mine, and I consider

their conduct throughout the period

as worthy as the highest praise. In fact,

I regard the Colonel, the Adjutant, the

Doctor, and the Padre as very gallant

officers and British gentlemen.

HAROLD T. WALKER,

Late Signals Officer, 14th Brigade

H.A., B.E.F., France.

Feb. 27, 1930

III.-SIGNED STATEMENT BY THE PADRE.

I was the sole padre of the 14th

Brigade H.A. during the spring and summer 

of 1918. I recognise and identify

almost every character of the book called

"Retreat." It is a description of the 14th

Brigade Heavy Artillery. The method of

presentation is peculiar, Most incidents

and some conversations actually began as

recorded, but Mr. Benstead has throughout

persisted in a process as discreditable as it

is untrue. The brigade and battery messes

were most abstemious, and the average

mess bill was three francs per day. The

conduct and conversation of the officers

was neither filthy nor blasphemous. The

doctor was always a good friend to me. He

being a Roman Catholic never entered into

religious arguments of any kind with me.

The incident as Glisy is history made vile.

The Australians, in spite of their casualties,

rescued the old French woman and acted

with great chivalry and gentleness, as if

she were their mother. Having two years'

medical training, I assisted the doctor, and

said a prayer beside him. She never spat

at me.

The visit to the Observation Post at

Villers-Bretonneux began as Mr. Benstead

records, and the actual conversation

between us is in the book. I did not, however, 

go mad with fright, denying God. As

Mr. Benstead knows quite well, I came back

Continued on Page Fourteen, Column One

[*D. Telegraph. -7 MAR.*]
LORRY DRIVER
IN "RETREAT"
ANOTHER LETTER OF
REPUDIATION
VINDICATED BRIGADE
PADRE
Striking additional refutation is

forthcoming to-day of incidents

described in Mr. C. R. Benstead's

war novel "Retreat."

In THE DAILY TELEGRAPH on Saturday, 

in which attention was first

drawn to obvious points of contact

and of equally obvious and glaring

points of dissimilarity in actual life in

France and as presented in the book,

there appeared signed statements by

the doctor, the signals officer, and the

padre of the 14th Brigade, Heavy

Artillery.

The 14th Brigade was the only British

brigade billeted at Glisy, as the book itself

relates, and each of these three members

of it affirmed that they were able clearly

to identify the characters in "Retreat."

Now a Bristol business man, Mr. Bernard 

Stanford, has also identified a highly

unfavourable "portrait" of himself, for,

as he states in a letter to the Editor, received 

last night, he was the lorry driver,

known in the book as Bass, who drove the

padre, the futile Rev. Elliot Warne.

Like his old war comrades, Mr. Stanford

has no doubt that this padre is grotesquely

based upon the Rev. J. G. Jarvis, the

actual padre of the brigade, and he agrees

with them that he was a far worthier

character than the one sketched by Mr.

Benstead.

Bass, the lorry driver in the book, is

described as being "saturnine in life and

saturnine in death," and as using language

"so vile" that, as the Rev. P. B. Clayton

noted in his article in THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, 

"it was prudently omitted from the

serialised story."

TALKS OF DRIVER AND PADRE

Whether the actual lorry driver was a 

man of this character those who study the

tone and contents of his letter, reproduced

below, will be able easily, it may be

suggested, to judge.

TO THE EDITOR OF 'THE DAILY TELEGRAPH.'

SIR-I have read Commander C. R. Benstead's

novel "Retreat."

I was attached to the 14th Brigade

R.G.A. at Glisy during the months May to

July, 1918, as a lorry driver, and during

that period I frequently drove the padre

(the Rev. J. G. Jarvis) on journeys connected 

with the brigade, as the driver

"Bass," referred to in Mr. Benstead's

novel, drove Warne.

I certainly, however, did not use the language 

ascribed to "Bass," and Mr. Jarvis

was not in the slightest degree the weak

and cowardly Warne.

Warne is described as a useless burden

on the brigade staff. I personally drove

Mr. Jarvis on various expeditions when he

was in search of green vegetables, canteen

stuff, and many other things badly needed

by the troops in the field, and I remember

on one occasion having a swim with him

in the River Somme.

Mr. Jarvis and I had many conversations

together, and I was present at several of

the services held at Glisy, which I much

enjoyed.

In my letters home there are many appreciative 

references to him, and I have also

stated in these letters my high admiration

for the Australians, who did such splendid

service in this sector.

I have the greatest esteem and respect

for Mr. Jarvis and admiration for all his

good work.--Yours, &c.,

BERNARD STANFORD.

Bristol, March 5

April 27. 1935  Smith's Weekly  3
WINSTON CHURCHILL'S INSULT TO MONASH
The late Sir John
Monash, revered
Commander of the
A.I.F., who, according
to Winston
Churchill's
War History,
might never have
existed.

Portrait - see original document
ATTEMPT TO ROB HIM OF HIS
SHARE IN ALLIED VICTORY
Australians'
Prowess Belittled
In English
War History
WHY the persistent and obviously
deliberate desire on the part of

British historians to rob a great Australian

– the late General Sir John

Monash—of his share in winning the

war?
Monash himself was moved to protest 

during the conflict of the failure

on the part of the Supreme Command 

to "post the scores" of his

Australian Imperial Force; but that

did not necessarily indicate on his

part any desire for personal glory.

He merely desired that his troops should receive the credit that was due to

them for their magnificent performances.

The greatest offender has been the Rt. Hon. Winston Chuchill, C.H., M.P.,

whose history of the was, published in popular fortnightly parts, is marred

in Australians eyes by this persistent refusal to give the A.I.F. and its General

their rightful places in the picture which he has otherwise truthfully painted.

Although Ripley, the American "Believe it or not" story-teller, has stated

in one of his weekly illustrated strips that Monash won the war, Australians

have not made any such claim. There were far too many in the business

for any one man to have done the job alone.

Even when Monash devised the scheme for the final push which smashed

the Hindenburg Line, there had to be many contributing and assisting factors,

carefully planned and faithfully carried out by the whole of the Allied Forces

before the scheme could be brought to success and the Germans put on the

run back to the Fatherland.

Even the most biased observers admit that, in those four years of war, the

Australians played a conspicuous part. Why, then, does Mr. Winston

Churchill deny them the recognition they won by their skill at arms?
To produce his work, all existing

Official Histories must have been

well studied by Mr. Churchill, whose

library surely possesses many references 

unavailable to any but the elite—

the great statesmen and soldiers who

played their illutrious parts in the

war.

Added to these sources of information.

Mr Churchill had extensive personal

opportunities to gather first-hand

knowledge of his subject, so that the

defects of his work are indeed inexcusable.

Has he a bias against the Australians? 

And is any of it due to one of

Dr. Bean's phrases? The Australian

historian, when prefacing his official

"Story of Anzac," accorded prominence 

to "through a Churchill's excess 

of imagination" as among the

reasons for the initiation of the tragic

enterprise. But it is hardly likely

that this alone would account for the

omissions.

It is not suggested for one moment

that the A.I.F. won the war, but it is

urged that our troops, on some notable

occasions, played a not inconsiderable

part in bringing about this result. For

the most part our men were used as

subsidiary components in the Allied

War Machine, and, as such, conformed

merely to the general movements. The

battles of Gallipoli, Pozieres, Bullecourt,

and Passchendaele were of this class,

and the fighting qualities of the Australians, 

whether poor or good, had

little bearing on the ultimate result:

but there were other engagements,

peculiarly Australian, which were of

vital import to the general issue, and it

is with these and with Mr. Churchill's

treatment of them that it is proposed

to deal.

The capture of Beersheba in the

Palestine campaign, the stemming of

the 1918 German advance, and the successful 

offensive of August 8 of the

same year, and the plans of the genius

responsible for the launching of this

last operation were very important factors 

which brought about the Allied victory, 

and, for this reason, were worthy

of more accurate handling than Mr.

Churchill has given them.

To-day an Australian Light Horseman

would be astounded to read, on pages

1052, that Beersheba was captured by "a

surprise attack of two infantry divisions

and a wide turning movement of cavalry

and camelry." The British Official History 

(Captain Cyril Falls) tells a different 

story. The two infantry divisions

(British) assaulted and captured some

Turkish defences to the south-west of

the town, and Beersheba itself was

taken by a charge of the Fourth Australian 

Light Horse Brigade. But Captain 

Falls' work is rarely seen, except

by military students, and, in fact, cannot 

be purchased in Sydney, while that

of Mr. Churchill, which so carefully disguises 

the nationality of the troops engaged 

in this important battle, is on

sale at all the usual bookstalls.

This charge has often been quoted

as the greatest of its kind in the

annals of war; but perhaps because 

the participants were Australians, 

it has been omitted from

Mr. Churchill's work.

The scene now changes to France,

where, in March of the following year,

came the great German offensive, and

the rout of the British Fifth Army. All

the ground, which had taken eight

months to win (Battle of the Somme),

was lost in as many days; but eventually, 

in front of Amiens, the onslaught

was stemmed. Mr Churchill's account

of this, the greatest crisis of the war,

is as follows:-

What a Travesty!

"The Cavalry Corps filled the gaps in

the line, and the Air Force, flying low

inflicted heavy losses on the endless

marching columns. Meanwhile reserves

drawn from other parts of the line, and

improvised from the schools and technical 

establishments, continually reached

the scene. At the same time, with every

day's advance, the strength and momentum 

of the German thrust abated. . . .

when the retreating British were sufficiently 

reinforced to come to a general

halt, their pursuers found themselves

not less exhausted, and far in front

of their artillery and supplies."

What a travesty of the truth! Does

Mr. Churchill wish us to believe that

aeroplanes could play any part in stopping 

an advance of this nature? Or

that improvised forces drawn from the

schools, etc., affected the operations?

Or that the Germans were too tired to

march farther?

Surely these factors cannot be meriously 

entertained! The real reason for

the German standstill was the "reserves 

drawn from other parts of the

line."

These were Australians. So, once

more, is their nationality suppressed

All five divisions of the A.I.F. were

rushed from the Northern Sector to

the threatened points, and all, excepting 

the first, which was just as frantically 

returned to the scene of a fresh

break-through, were interposed between

Amiens and the German flood.

IT WAS THESE TROOPS WHO

STOOD FIRM IN ENGLAND'S

TIME OF NEED, AND THIS IS

HOW THEY ARE REPAID BY

ENGLAND'S DISTINGUISHED

STATESMAN!

It may be contended that Mr

Churchill's history is, perforce, a summary 

of the ancient features of the war,

and thus could not be expected to consider 

relatively small units for comment: 

but this argument is valueless,

as whole columns (pages 1124, 1126, and

1127) are devoted to the deeds of battalions, 

and even platoons, in the disaster of March 21, when the British

Fifth Army performed so badly. Yet

these unimportant actions received prominence, 

while the four divisions who

were instrumental in halting the German 

drive are not even mentioned.

It is, however, in the recording

of the August 8 offensive that Mr.

Churchill's work reaches its nadir

of evasion, and what appears to

be deliberate omission. The operations 

on this day were undertaken

by 10 divisions—four Australian,

four Canadian, and two British.

The British, held up at the outset,

made no progress, yet Mr.

Churchill describes the subsequent 

advance and capture of

thousands of prisoners as being

performed by British troops. Thus

he perpetuates the rather shabby

device of the English Press,

which, at this time, used the

word "British" to disguise the fact

that Dominion troops had made

another outstanding success.

Germany's Black Day

In this battle—Germany's Black Day

—the Canadian and Australian troops

advanced, with incredible speed, far

into enemy territory. So swift, particularly, 

was the Australian onslaught

that, fifteen minutes after zero an

armored car, commanded by a Welshman

—Lieutenant E. J. Rollings, M.C—

was enabled to shoot along the St.

Quentin road to Framerville, nine miles

from the scene of the break-through.

Here were captured German documents

which later were found to be complete

plans of the dreaded Hindenburg Line.

It was from the information contained

in these papers that the Allies were

able, six weeks later, to storm, with

comparitive ease, this once formidable

obstacle.

Most Australians thought at the time

that Generalissimo Foch was the

genius behind it all; but he never

claimed that honor, and now we are informed 

that in the brain of General Sir

John Monash—an Australian—was born

the plan of this decisive battle.

In his letters (recently published),

and in his "Australian Victories in

France, 1918," our General has clearly

indicated that he alone was responsible

for the plans of the whole scheme—

by devoting no fewer than 16 pages of

his history to them.

Monash claims that he tabled his

plans—during the third week of July—

before Field Marshal Haig, who, in turn,

submitted them to Generalissimo Foch.

It cannot be stressed too strongly

that this battle was, for the Allies, the

turning point in the long struggle, so

that the originator of the operations

deserves a very prominent position

among the Great Captains of War.

Lloyd George, the war-time Prime

Minister, knew of Monash's qualities, 

for now we learn that had the

war lasted much longer, Monash

would have superseded Douglas Haig

as Commander-in-Chief of the

British Army . . . and Mr. Churchill

gives all the credit to General Sir

Henry Rawlinson!! On page 1202 of

his history we read: "It was his"

(Rawlinson's) "victory, and that of

the Fourth Army which he directed.

He had put aside old-fashioned

ideas, he has used new weapons as

they should be used, he has reaped

swift and rich reward."

The letterpress of Mr. Churchill's

work may be searched in vain for

any reference to General Monash.

Indeed, but for his portrait being

included in the representation of Sir

J. S. Sargent's painting of a group

of 20 British generals, even the index 

of the history would not have

included Monash's name.

Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice

has, from Rawlinson's journal and letters, 

compiled a life of this soldier, and,

although his biographer has assumed

otherwise, a perusal of the work will

show that Rawlinson has made no

claim to be the originator of the plans,

for we read: "Not even to his own

diary did Rawlinson confide any details

of his scheme."

If we are to believe what we read,

it would appear that Monash, who

has devoted those 16 pages of his

work to them, was their sole creator.

Monash's headquarters was

thronged, on the third day of the

offensive, by crowds of distinguished 

visitors, anxious to express

their appreciation, and eager to

offer their congratulations. Clemenceau, 

Foch, Haig, Byng, Rawlinson,

Currie, and Godley, were among the

personages who, on that unforgettable day, 

paid homage to our

general . . . . and his first visitor,

"early in the forenoon," was Winston 

Churchill himself!!

King George the Fifth arrived

next day, and from him Monash received 

the accolade of knighthood.

In the face of all this, Monash's

name is accorded no place in Mr.

Churchill's narrative of the battle,

and so, by its omission, we are

asked to believe that our General's

work had no bearing on these

momentous events.

Monash is dead . . . but his

posthumously published letters

bespeak, like a voice from the

grave, a desire that his countrymen's 

deeds should receive

some recognition from the pens

of English historians.

"Put up the scores!" was his

impassioned appeal for fair

play when the English Press so

blandly credited their home

units with some particularly

brilliant Australian feat. But

little did he think his own name

would ever be divorced from the

events in which he figured with

such distinction.

MR. WINSTON

CHURCHILL'S

REPLY

"Admires Us!"

Photograph - see original document

[*Rt. Hon. Winston

Churchill, the forgetful 

War Historian.8]

WITH the object of discovering 

what Mr. Winston 

Churchill himself had to

say to this charge, "Smith's

Weekly" cabled its London

office, and its representative

approached the statesman-

historian and requested a

statement.

Mr. Churchill said :-

"I yield to no one in my admiration 

for the achievements of the

Australians and New Zealanders.

"According to German testimony, 

they were the most formidable 

fighters in the whole line of

battle, and they were certainly

unsurpassed, whether in attack

or defence.

"This work of mine could not

attempt to give an account of the

achievements of the particular

troops of the British Empire or

the British Army.

"It is a general account of the

larger issues of the war.

"There are, in fact, more references 

to the work of the Anzacs

and, later, to the work of the Australians, 

than there are to that of

the Canadians, and certainly more

than about any other British unit,

guards or line, English, Scottish

or Welsh."

There have been three

editions of Mr. Winston

Churchill's work. The first

was issued in five volumes in

1929, and the second, an

abridged edition, in 1932. The

last was run serially, in fortnightly 

parts, by the publishing 

house of Newnes.

In the abridged edition

General Monash's name does

not appear at all.

THE OLD TOAST

IN THE SAME

OLD WAY

Hotels Will be

Open on

Anzac Afternoon

A DREADFUL rumour had got around

that the hotels of Sydney would

be closed all day on Anzac Day, and

that city Diggers would not be able

to welcome in the time-honored way

the 26,000 country comrades who are

coming along to visit them.

How is got around nobody quite

knows, but it just spread like a bushfire 

once it got going.

IN the past it has been the custom of

hotel-keepers to close their premises

in the forenoon, during the time the

march and Domain service were in

progress. It was a purely voluntary

gesture on the part of the hoteliers,

done as the instigation of the United

Licensed Victuallers' Association.

Now, however, it is obligatory on the

hotel-keepers to close their premises in

the morning, so that the early morning

rum and milk before the hop-over will

not be available unless provided by the

affected persons the night before.

In order to make quite sure about

all this, "Smith's" secured a copy of

the Act, which, in military parlance,

is now promulgated for the information

of the troops.

Here it is:-

New South Wales, Anno Vicesimo

Qunito Georgii V. Regis. (Diggers can

work that out for themselves).

ACT. No. 5. 1935.

An Act to provide for the closing of

hotels for the sale of liquor on the

morning of Anzac Day; to amend section 

57 of the Liquor Act, 1912, and

for purposes connected therewith.

(Assented to. February 26, 1935.)

Be it enacted by the King's Most Excellent 

Majesty, by and with the advice

and consent of the Legislative Council

and Legislative Assembly of New South

Wales in Parliament assembled, and by

the authority of the same, as follows:--

1. This Act may be cited as the

"Liquor (Anzac Day) Amendment Act,

1935."

2. The Liquor Act, 1912, is amended

by inserting in sub-section one of section 

57 after the words "Christmas

Day" the words "or upon the morning

of the day upon which Anzac Day is

observed in each year."

All of which means, Diggers, that

the pubs will not open till noon on

Anzac Day! And the publicans have

had compulsion substituted for volition.

If they are caught serving you, up they

go!

4  Smith's Weekly  April 27, 1935
Hopeless Position of Digger Settlers in New South Wales

AFTER 15 YEARS OF EFFORT
THEY OWE MORE TO-DAY
THAN WHEN THEY
STARTED TO
FARM
THE plight of soldier settlers in New South Wales has
become more than the settlers themselves can bear, and
arrangements for concerted action to secure redress of
their very real grievances are being made.
The Premier, Mr. Stevens, during a recent visit to the
Riverina, was met by a big deputation of soldier settlers,
who placed their case before him at great length.
They showed him that, although they had been paying
off their indebtedness on the farms for thirteen or fourteen
years, THEY OWED TO-DAY MORE THAN THE
AMOUNT AT WHICH THE CAPITAL VALUE OF THE
BLOCKS WAS SHOWN IN THE GOVERNMENT BOOKS.
Unless they got some relief, they hadn't an earthly
chance of ever paying off the blocks and, upon their deaths
—which are now occurring all too frequently—their wives
and children were thrown off the properties with nothing.
There was a sharp exchange at Corowa between the Premier 

and the representative who was putting the soldiers'
case—Mr. C. B. Lethbridge, a Corowa solicitor, who had
the settlers solidly behind him. The Premier must have
been aware of how solidly they were welded in their extremity.
THE deputation represented 500

settlers in the Riverina, and Mr.

Lethbridge had marshalled all his facts

and placed them before the Premier in

the form of a statement, with suggested

remedies, some two or three weeks before 

the deputation waited upon Mr.

Stevens.

The president of the local sub-branch

of the Returned Sailors and Soldiers'

League, Mr. T. H. Wade stated that

soldier settlers in the district were in

an impossible position, and they were

asking for the right to live, and for

some future hope for their wives and

families.

The statement set out that most of

the settlers have areas which, even in

the peak period, were far below home

maintenance areas, and that position is

accentuated now when low prices for

commodities are the order of the day,

with no prospect of improvement for

many years to come. Following the report 

of Mr. Justice Pike, Royal Commissioner 

on soldier settlements, the

Government, instead of carrying out

His Honor's suggestion and purchasing 

further lands, and, where necessary, 

removing settlers from one area

to another, definitely advised the

settlers to purchase land from adjoining 

holders. This advice was carried

out in a number of instances with

disastrous results to the settlers. In

order to finance the purchase the

settlers, in many instances, borrowed

money from the Rural Bank at high

rates of interest, and thus, on the

advice of the department, tied impossible 

burdens of debt around their

shoulders.

It was suggested to Mr. Stevens that

he should, in his policy speech, give a

definite undertaking that legislation

will be introduced immediately, giving

soldier settlers the right to a further

reappraisement, in which the question

of area will be definitely taken into

account. Settlers were being charged

an exorbitant rate of interest on their

indebtedness. Ordinary civilian settlers

has their land on terms infinitely better

than those granted to soldier settlers.

No reduction of interest had been made

to these men other than those ordinary

reductions which were applicable to

interest all over Australia. They are

asked by the department to pay to-day

a date of interest which is in excess of

that being charged by many private

vendors and mortgagees of broad-acre

lands in this State.

In addition, the charging of interest

on interest, where it was impossible

for yearly commitments to be met, as

it was in most cases, so added to the

burden of debt that it is quite impossible 

for the settler to meet his

commitments, and year by year the

financial position of the settler is

going from bad to worse.

The State, having undertaken to

settle returned soldiers on the land,

attempted to do so on an impossible

basis, in that the settler was asked to

pay interest at an exorbitant rate, not

only on the full capital value of his

holding, but also on his advance of £650,

and also, in most cases, on money

which he had to borrow to effect

improvements. It was suggested that

interest should be reduced to 2½ per

cent., as from commencement of title,

and that no interest should be charged

upon overdue interest.

As an alternative, so far as land

indebtedness is concerned, it was asked

that the soldier settler be given the

option of the right to convert his

tenure into a lease in perpetuity at a

low rate of interest-not exceeding 2½

per cent.—based on a capital value to

be determined by a competent authority.

In his reply, the Premier said that

the best he could say was that the

Government would intensify the method

of treating with every individual; and

this would apply not only to solider

settlers, but also to civilians. He believed 

that the soldier, as a Crown

settler, should have some claim to consideration, 

as the Crown put him there;

but every case would have to be considered 

on its individual merits.

With regard to the interest charged,

Mr. Stevens said reductions had already

been made, until, at the present time, a

maximum of 4 per cent. was provided

for. In many cases the rate was below 

that figure. But to ask the State to

reduce the interest rate below the

market rates would not be fair to the

soldier settler himself. It would not

bring him any real advantage.

They had had one reduction, but he

asked them not to expect something

that would be accepted as a general

principle for the whole State, and

which would destroy the whole fabric

of commerce.

The problem would be tackled as

soon as possible. Small committees

would be set up, whose job it would be

to deal with every settler individually

They would study the case of the individual 

for his own benefit. He asked

them to take an interest in their jobs,

and not sit back and expect the State

to find out all about it.

After this reply, Mr. Lethbridge was

asked to propose a vote of thanks. He

did so by telling Mr. Stevens of their

great disappointment at the outcome of

the deputation. Soldier settlers, he

said, had been living on promises ever

since they took up their blocks, and

many of them were in a worse position

to-day than they had ever been. They

had no outlook on life and no prospects

of success. They were tenants of the

Crown, and, when they crossed the

Great Divide, their wives and families

would be turned out on to the streets.

"That is not so," interjected the

Premier, but Mr. Lethbridge went on

to state that it was so, and he could

quote cases where it had happened. The

high charges and compound interest

were strangling the soldier settler. Mr.

Stevens again interjected to the effect

that the interest was not compounded,

but Mr. Lethbridge asserted that

figures would show that it was. No

Government, so far, seemed to have

been capable of facing up to the job,

and unless the soldier settler was

given some relief he might as well

walk off his holding, for, if he stayed

there, he had no prospect of success.

He went on to quote instances of

Government procrastination, and concluded 

by stating that he was sure Mr.

Stevens and other members of the

Government did not realise the position,

or they would get on with the job of

bringing relief to these men at once.

After a mild reproof by the Premier

about refraining from passionate outbursts, 

the deputation withdrew—bitterly 

disappointed, but not utterly

confounded.

Like good generals, they had

organised for a reverse as well as

for a success. The settlers from

other parts of the State were

anxiously awaiting the outcome of

the Corowa deputation. So much

depended upon it for all of them.

The north, and particularly the

Dyraaba area, near Casino, and

most of the other areas, are in touch

with Corowa, and they have organised 

a monster meeting to be held

in Sydney Town Hall on Anzac

Day at 2.30 p.m., notice of which

has been sent to "Smith's" by the

Dyraaba sub-branch of the R.S.

and S.I.L.A.

There seems to be no doubt that

the matter of soldier settlements

has been one of the most outstanding 

examples of colossal blundering 

in the history of New South

Wales. It was not Mr. Stevens' fault.

He inherited the blunder from predecessors. 

But the Diggers have

been the sufferers, the victims of

Government bungling and ineptitude, 

and have arrived at a stage

where they are determined that

the unsatisfactory position shall not

be allowed to continue.

What they intend to do to

achieve that end is their own

business; but recent intimations to

"Smith's" indicate that they

reckon, by sticking together, they

can win.

RE-VALUTION OF FARMS

REQUESTED WITH

REDUCTION OF

INTEREST TO

2½ P.C.

WHAT HOPE IS THERE FOR THESE MEN?

The following particulars show the hopeless position of certain Diggers on the

Urangeline Soldiers' Settlement.

	Area.	Original Cap. Value.	Re-appraised Cap. Value.	Yearly Installment.	Bal. Purchase Money&Arrears.	Paid on Land A/c.
(A)	847	£3706	£3177	£158  17   0	£3551  15   3	Paid   £1424
(B)	500	2875	2450	122  10   0	2783  19  4	"         1126
(C)	580	2088	1850	92  10   0	2062   8  6	"          798
(D)	1008   3   0	2875	2400	120   0    0	2140    1  4	"         1627
(E)	630	2173	1970	98  10   0	1848  11  4	"          1170
(F)	957    3    0	2729	1900	95   0    0	1827   7  2	"        1085
(G)	611     2    0	2599	2220	110   0    0	2692  17  4	"         727
(H)	1439	3166	2400	120   0    0	2430  2   2	"       1405
(I)	901    1     0	2825	2100	105   0    0	2405  2   1	"         938
(J)	539    3    0    500	2834   2825	2700  2600	135   0    0   130   0   0	2748   9  10   2951    14  9	"       1448     "        1131
(K)	500   530    1    0	2600  3102	2700 2600	120   0    0  140   0    0	2361     1   11  2859     7   4	"      1248   "       1861
(L)	600	2520	2300	115    0    0	2289    5    1	"       1210
(M)	1193   1     0	3087	2100	105    0   0	2182    5    7	"       1236
(N)	846    2    0	3630	3000	151    5   0	3150    2    2	"       1463