Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/275/1 - 1918 - 1938 - Part 10










Chap 11
PnP1
Objects. steal prd. identificins
(A) Merris-Materen.
{(1) 15 & 14 Bdes Hamel-Vaire Wd.
Earlier {(2) 41 Bn - April Morlancourt.
(3) Refer to Prom. Rd & Mont.Wood (opns tighten as no cover)
(4) Ville - Morlancourt Advance May 2-9
(5) Morlanct. 2 Div. May 18.
Chap III
Ville - Morlancourt
O knowles
x 10/11 Vicy
?
To be read.
Strazcele:
for Keighley: 3 Bde & 11 Bn. }
for Cpl Lean ? 4 Bn. } 3 Bde
For May 10/11: & 11/12. 3 Bde. }
For May 15
May 16/17 Maddox } 2 Bde
May 18 - 5 Bn }
May 19: 5 Bn (being rell by 1 Bde)
Crops: May 22: Bruggy } 1 Bde
May 29/30. 10 Bn (centre Bn)}
May 30/1. Rt Bn 3 Bde } 3 Bde.
May 31. 4 Bn 3 Bde }
_____________________________________
Somme May 1/2 8 Bde Sol sec.
18 Bn 2/3 May. 5D encounter at Bouzenet . ?7 Bde.
3/4 May. 14 Bde. P.13 D7.9.
5.6 May. 14 Bde. P.13. D 7.9.
12/13 May 13 Bde. U5B.
17/18 May Lt Neville's patrol (55 Bn) P138.
20/1 May 12 Bde patrol gets ^Lt. mg.
13 Bde " " H.M.G.
Deranct: April 5 - May 2. 2 Divn
Morlanct: April 5- May 27: 10 Bde, 11 Bde.
Localities where P.P. new.
Deranct . ? only sniping
Merrisn Meterem May 5 onward
Ville- Morlancourt. ?Apr 13 on
Bouzenct - Hamel - Vaire Wd. Apr 5 on
(Marks & ditches)
Roman Rd & Mont. Wood May 2 on
Mont Wd Ap. 30
Ap. 5 on ptly in Vol V.
For beginning of P.P.
to read
Somme Diaries of 11 Bde Ap 7-20 }
Ap-May 10 " " " }
_______________
2 Div. } April
6 & 7 " " }
____________________
8 Bde " " Apr May }
13 & 4 Bdes 4 Div May 1 -22 V/B.
___________________________
14 Bde. Apr-May
__________________________
May 1/2 8 Bde.
5 Div April.
German G. Histories
15 May 1-14 June
Allt) 183 -243
______________________________
Dct. ) 54 R. D. 10-11 June
Mostat.) 50 R. Po. 199. 107 107
54R.
50R.
Somme R)18. 24R .........................
Hamel )1. 24R. 77 R.
Vaire WD) 9B. R 108. ..................
V/B.) J. 108. 109.
Marcelcave) 109........................
____________________________________
Hangard 208 - 14B - 225
Opp Austlns: 54R. 107. 50R. 18. 199. 24R. 1. 77R.
(on Somme Avon) 9RR. 108, J. 109.
Opp Engl. 183 -243
Opp Fr. 208 -14B - 225.
Strazeele Merris:
Opp Austlns:
11^RD. 156ZRV
V= read to June. 12D Have Read (at least to June 15)
12RD. Ap & June. Bd : 156IR.
?38D (Meteren & No) 217AR
48 RD (May?) 221RIR.
?81RD (May 7) 10RIR
? 11 RD (No. of Meterens) 62 IR
? 79RD. 263 RIR. (79RD)
13RD. (26 May) 3 B. Chev. Ryt.
44RD (on rt early June) 2 Bar- AR.
4BD. To 17 June
At this stage the British Government undertook to provide
additional transport for six divisions. The prospect of the
arrival of American divisions in France then was:
Arrived by Jan. 1918 - 5 divisions
To arrive in Feb.-March -3 divisions
To arrive April-Sept. - 10 divisions (by old programme)
6 divisions (by additional transport)
__________
Total by September 24 divisions, of which 18
would have been trained.
(?? Transfer The actual growth of the American force in France is shown
this to by the following list of arrivals there: (Note: The dates of commencement
a later of arrival are shown. Completion of arrival was often might be
chapter) considerably later).
Officers Others Divisions (commencement
of arrival)
1917
To June 30 523 13,836 1
July 726 16,022
Aug. 1,616 35,042
Sept. 4,046 57,125 26
Oct. 6,064 80,969
Nov. 7,969 118,254 42
Dec. 9,804 165,080 2 (?)
1918
Jan. 12,785 203,003 41xx(?)
Feb. 16,547 235,342 32
Mar. 18,966 288,655 3, 5
Apr. 23,548 406,111 77
May 32,642 618,642 4, 6, 27, 28, 30, 33, 35, 90, 82
June 40,847 833,204 29, 37, 78, 83, 89, 90, 92
July 64,224 1,114,838 36, 76, 79, 91
Aug. 61,061 1,354,067 7, 39 40, 81, 85, 88
Sept. 71,172 1,634,220 34, 84, 86, 87
Oct. 76,800 1,790,823 8, 31, 38
The "combat strength" of the A.E.F .on 23 Oct. 1918 is given by
General Pershing as 1,256,478, of which 592,300 was included
in the First American Army.
______________________________________________________________
V of VI.
21
Pershing states (My Experiences in the World War, p. 556):
"Our experience with the British had shown that, due to differences
in national characteristics and military systems, the
instruction and training of our troops by them retarded our
military progress." his statement would probably be less
applicable to the divisions when fighting, as for a time two
of them did, as part of the Australian Corps.
The American Forces (A.E.F.)
These quiet months, however, are of importance in
a history of the Australian part in the Great War owing to the
fact that during thus period, while most of the British
line was passive, two the two sectors of it ^held by Australian infantry were hardly ever still. Since their detached brigades had been returned to them after the crisis passed, the Australians now held were responsible for less than a tenth of the British front;1 but a study These were the two sectors held by Australian infantry
__________________________________________________________
(Check by 1The British now held 85 miles of front (28 miles less than
French off. before the German offensive), and the French, including 4
histy - end American divisions, 362 miles more than before).
of Vol. V, The Belgians held 21.
Tome 1)___________________________________________________________________
of the communiques will show that - even more than during the
fighting at Bullecourt in 1917 - for weeks together the
activity recorded was almost certainly continuously that of the Australian
front. The extent to which this was so/^was unknown to newspaper
readers in England or Australia, ^ and even to most of the troops in France
because in many cases the
communiques indicated only the sector and gave no hint of the
identity of the troops engaged. It would have been detrimental
to the Allied cause to do so, since German propaganda, in the
hope of creating the dissension in the Empire, was continually
stressing the prominence of the role played by the British and
French oversea colonial troops. Nevertheless the reader, if he cares
to do so, by a careful study of checking the daily communiques, will ^with the
recor ^events narrated in this volume with, find that, whereas the British
public - and the British Army ^army and public
were under the genuine impression that the sections of the
oversea troops were mush overstressed, during this period, at
any rate (as during the Battle of Arras) the precise opposite
was the case - namely, that ^a large proportion of the successes which newspaper
readers week after week assumed to be those of British troops
actually occurred in sectors held by oversea troops and
particularly on the front of the Australians.
Just note
[2 For example, see extracts from
the diary of General
Plumer quoted in
Plumer of Messines
by Sir G Harrington
pp. 178-9]
This condition which was well known to the British
commanders and staff ^staff actually concerned, nut not to others,
continued during most of the time occupied ^covered by this volume.
One of the reasons for it, especially in the early months, was
that the Australian divisions - and, indeed, all the oversea
ones ^those from the dominions - had been much less severely tried
by the German offensive
than had ^most of the British ones; they possessed other admitted
Vol VI
Chap 11
(The beginning of "Peaceful Penetration".)
The activity ^with which the Australian troops
deferently from all other along the front, even the
during this time of general quiet now began to pester.
their opponents falls into two division ^categories - first, that
which was initiated by the troops themselves, & second, that
operations devised ^devised by their commanders - of which the
first was, in its results, probably the more important.
The Australian "digger" & his officers,
finding that the Germans now opposed
to them ^him possessed nothing to match his own
powers & spirit, would.
not let their opponents alone. Always confident ^The Australian
division had not of victory, the Not so severely tried in the German
offensive as most of the British division, th and
elated by their success in checking ^stopping ^throwing back the final
thrusts wherever they had met them, on all five
Australian division were now at the height
of their confidence. The "diggers" had always ^never
really wavered in their confidence ^certainty of the ^ultimate victory, of the mind
and they now felt that they could beat the
enemy wherever they struck him. There resulted -
partly on the initiative of the troops themselves -

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