Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/275/1 - 1918 - 1938 - Part 3

on the right, were to advance the front line
about 500 yds between the Bray Corbie Rd
& the River Somme.
Special D Coy 34^th plus 2 platoons A Coy
& 2 plations 33^rd Btn on the left and
C Coy plus 2 platoons A Coy 34^th and 2
platoons 33^rd Btn on the right, were
to advance, from the Bray Corbie Rd to
1200^x south, for a distance of 500 yds
Zero hour 11 pm
Artillery barrage, arranged.
On arrival at objectve. 1 Plat to be
used as wire carriers, 1 Plat to wire
& remainder to act as covering party
to wirers & Pioneers, who were to dig
4 posts on each Coy front.
At the time of receipt of orders the
following were the disposition of Picket
line; from Right to left.
Lt. Bateman 1 Plat D Coy
“  McMahon  1   “     C   “
“  Browne      1    “    C   “      
“  Collings      1    “    D Coy
"  Hubbard    1    “    C  “
”  Monfries    1    “    A Coy.

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the later being in the rear of Lt Hubbards
position.
None of the positions were approachable
during day light, the men had had no
food since midday on the 6th, & had been
engaged on a minor operation the night
before, whilst Lt Hubbards platoon had
had the attack at 2pm that day. They
had had little or no sleep for 4 days &
were practically exhausted.
On my receiving the Orders, each
Plat Cmdr had to be notified of the operation
verbally, as it was then dark, & written
orders could not have been read - The
time available did not allow of the Ptn
Cmdrs being called to Coy H.Q. for the
study of the Orders & Maps  - I therefore had
to depend on being able to explain the
operation to them, on their arrival at the
place of assembly.
I sent runners to my 3 platoons, to be
on the road just west of the Cemetary at
10.30 pm - The runners left at 9.50 pm.
I did not consider that the time
available was sufficient to make all

5
necessary arrangements, and both Capt
Beaver D Coy & myself approached Capt
Percy in the matter. He did not seem
inclined to take any action, & it therefore
only remained for us to do the best we
could.
At about this time the 4 Platoons from the
33rd arrived, & whilst the operation was being
explained to them, a message was received
from Capt Cains B Coy 34^th, (who was holding
the front north of the Bray Corbie road),
that the enemy were massing on his front,
& asking for re-inforcements. Capt Percy

then ordered the 2 platoons of the 33rd (which
were to assist me) to re-inforce B Coy 34th &
sent for another 2 ptns from this Btn. These
platoons under Lieut Reid, comprising 24
men arrived at 10.15 pm, leaving no time
for an explanation of the operation to
this Officer
At 10.25 pm the 2 platoons from A Coy for
for my use had not reported, & I asked
Capt Percy about them. He spoke to Capt
Beaver, who had temporary Command
of them, & he replied that he could not

6
supply them, as he required 2 platoons from
A Coy for himself, & one was in support of
B Coy & could not be withdrawn, & that there
were only 3 platoons in the Coy. Capt
Percy then told me, I would have to do
without them.
At 10.30 pm the runners I had sent to
Lieuts M^cMahon & Browne returned, having
delivered their messages. The one sent to
Lt Hubbard had not returned.
As there did not appear anything
else to do, I moved up to the place of
assembly, taking the 2 platoons 33rd with
me, & also Lieut Pell 34^th who had
reported at about 10.20pm.
When I left the Coy H.Q. in the re-entrant.
Capt Beaver had not sent messages to all
his platoons, & was still in the shelter.
doing so.
On arrival at the assembly point, I
found both Lieuts M^cMahon & Browne, with
their platoons, but Lt Hubbard had not
arrived. I sent patrols to the right &
left, to get touch with the 29th Btn & D Coy
34th & then explained the operation to the

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Officers, as well as I could, without the
aid of a map, which we could not see
owing to the darkness.
At just before 11 pm my patrols returned
& stated that they could not get touch with
anyone on my left or right. Lieut
Hubbard had still not arrived.
I therefore had a total of only 54 men
instead of 7 platoons (or about 210 men,)
to cover my front of 600 yds.
The barrage commenced, but as my
instructions had been, that the job had
to be done, no matter what the number
of men, I did not consider that there
was anything to be done, but go
forward - This we did, & reached our
object with about 16 casualties,
including Lieut Browne.
During the advance, our front was
never adequately covered, owing the
the lack of personnel, & the fact that it
was impossible to prevent the men
from bunching owing to the darkness
From time to time I sent patrols
to the flanks to try for touch, but they

8
were not successful. - I also paid particular
attention for sounds of rifle or M.G. fire on
the flanks, which would have indicated
the positions of D Coy & the 29^th Btn. We
were meeting a good deal of resistance
& I am certain that if the 29^th Btn & D Coy
had been up on my flanks to time, they
would have met with as much or more
& I should have heard it.
I am convinced:-
(a) The D Coy did not get up for the following
reasons:-
(1) At the time I left the dug-out, Capt
Beaver was still there, & had not
completed sending instructions to his
platoons
(2) He had a great deal further than I
to go to get to his assembly point
could not have got there, before the
barrage started.
(3) Patrols could not gain touch with
him.
(4) Lieut M^cMahon states that at the time
he left his post, Lieut Bateman had
had no orders to move, & he did

9
not pass us, as he would have to do,
before we left the jumping off place, to go
forward.
(5) No rifle or M.G. fire was heard on his front
during or after the advance
B) I am also satisfied that the 29th Btn did not
get up for the following reasons:-
(1) Just before Lieut M^cMahon left his post, &
Scout from this Btn came to him to know
the time he was going to move forward.
This Scout would not have had time to
get back & the troops move up before
Zero.
(2)  Patrols both before & during the advance
were unable to get touch with them.
(3) No rifle or M.G. fire was heard on their
front either during or after the advance.
Just after reaching our objective, which
we did at 11.45 pm, the Enemy counter-
attacked in force, but we were successful
in beating them off, & were trying again
for touch on our flanks, when I
discovered that strong parties of the

10

Enemy were working round our flanks.
I had not sufficient troops to protect
the flanks & therefore ordered the men
to fall back. As soon as this
commenced the enemy again attacked,
in front, but were again beaten off.
8th May  From then until 12.30 am on the 8^th, we
continued to fall back (as we thought)
but after some time, discovered that we
were on unfamilar ground & completely
lost - Had the officers of the A.I.F been
issued with reliable compasses, this
would not have occured
(Note) (1)  Our further adventures up to our
being taken prisoner, would not beha
material for the Official history of the A.l.F.
(2) In your summary you refer to Capt
M^cMinn's Company. I think a note should
be made that the troops available to me
for the job, did not actually comprise
one platoon.
H.H. McMinn

34 Bn. May 5/6. A patrol on rt covered wiring of ^right ps. & withdrew 3.15 am.
No sign of Gs.
34 Bn Report Message (Extra Precis of)  May 6. 8.55 am.
Handed over to 35^th 1½ coys & pln wh as holding 3 ps. N of rd.
J18D60. This pln at 2nd of opn was to have tn over ps.
dug by Ps.
After attack CO 35 didn't release any of these tps, but
is holding S. 500^x of his line w them.
34 is holdin 1500^x of picket line S of rd with 2½ coys - 
& none to c/a. One coy holding whole suppt line w LG  teams
cut down to 2 per gun. All 3 coy HQ's are manning 1 line
Asks for 1 Coy back.

[*H.N.*]
Captain Beaver, D Coy, 34 Bn. Morlancourt May 4-9, 1918.
May 4/5
The first night's advance, fom picket line E of
sunken road, went admirably. Beaver's Coy was
covering the Bn - Lilja of Cain's Coy supplied one
patrol. After the ps. had been dug Beaver's Coy
fell back on them and occupied them as
picket line.
May 5/6 The posts were advanced again -
they went forward & dug in. The German
line S. of road was not taken, though reported
to, and this was why the Bn was ordered
to go for it again.
May 6/7 During the Afternoon B. got message F21 from Fry
for Monfries' attack at 7.
At 9.15 be got the necess order for McMinn's attack
"as soon as poss after 9.15 as the light allows." McM. was
to hold the outp. line after this, but actually he fell
back & held the right of the ^old outpost line, and
Beaver held the left
May 7/8. At 9.15 Beaver was visited by Capt. Percy, the