Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/275/1 - 1918 - 1938 - Part 2

(2) 

At 9.15 pm Beaver got a later order telling him tt after 9.15 as 

soon as xxxx light permitted "C" Coy and a battle patrol & garrn under Lt.

Monfries (A)^+ 13 pln were to move  xx xx to take up Covg posn ahead o /

line of pn. & deal w any German  S.Rs.

As this order reached Beaver so late it probly

reached McMinn late also.  Beaver does not know

what happened except that C Coy reached did not take

over the picket line but remained on his right in the

existing line & he held left of line.

May7/8.  McMinn & Beaver were stuck holding 

/ line thus when at 8p.m. 9.20pm there reached Beaver

Capt Percy, 2 in C., w an order from Bn H.Q. that 

they were to assemble as follows

Beaver                          McMinn

___________                  ___________

D v 2 plns A                  C v 2 plns A

___________                  ___________

2 plns C33                    2 plns C33

 

Beaver ws to capture trench in K N of K  el

McMinn "    "       "               "        "   "   S of K el

To move behind barrage at 10.30 11 p.m.

Beaver & McM. both told Percy tt / opn ws

impossible in the time.  None of the platoons had been 

warned.  All Beaver could do was to go about  send to 

the platoons telling them to advance at 11 pm &

stating the objective. There was no assembly 

nor any chance of one.  Beaver picked up one pln &

went forwd with it - all he cd do ws to follow

our barr until he judged that it was

stationary, & then stopped there.  He at once didn't

know where his objective was (as map

coordinate in the order) but he judged it 

must be behind / barrage.  He then 

(3)

set out to find / rest of his company. Having

found them he looked for McMinn.  So densely 

dark was it that he lost direction

& was going straight towards / enemy

when he heard / bark o / 18 pdrs

& recognised his mistake - knowing

it from ^that of the 77's. The rest o / night

he spent looking ^(together with his C.S.M.) for Capt. McMinn (amidst

plenty of ironmongery) - until 2.30 when he gave it up.  No

German post was left on or near / summit when Beaver was searching it - 

(He doesn't remember a German C.T.) He had to xxx bring back his posts xxxx on the 

(the incident of his losing his way may

right so as to extend them across the front of both companies to the 

old picket line - & so doubtless left the C.T. to the Germans. (They xxx xxx

have happened when he was looking for McMinn).  

Morlancourt 4-6/5/18    HN

44 Wrightson Ave,

Bar Beach,

Newcastle, 14.6.37

The Director

Australian War Memorial

CANBERRA.

C.E.W. Bean, Esq,

Historian,

Victoria Barracks, 

SYDNEY

Sir,

In reply to your letter of 6.5.37, wherein you invite me to 

supply any data within my recollection covering activities between 

5th and 8th May 1918, I would forward you, below, my recollection of 

such activities:

The whole par. under May 5/6 1918, as set out in copy forwarded me 

is substantially correct. The German trenches north of Bray-Corbie

road were continuous and well constructed.  The first and second 
waves of our attack met little opposition and reached the enemy 

second line without difficulty excepting with wire entanglements.

They had, however, missed an enemy machine gun post in the front

(first) line which had kept quiet until the second line was within 

a few yards of them.  With a party of 4 others I was within 15 yds

of the post when the enemy gunners decided to resume fire and to 

hurl stick bombs from the post.  A lucky mills bomb and rifle fire 

from our party silenced the gun, and the gun crew ^remainder immediately

surrendered to us.  Two had been killed and 3, including a sergeant,

were taken prisoner.

The enemy position south of Bray-Corbie road consisted of a series 

of potholes up to 10 yds apart confronted with a field of waving 
barley.

I was ordered to force my way, with a picked party, to the south east

and link up with another unit which was thought to have advanced

to a point 200 yds S.E. of Bray-Corbie road.  We succeeded in 

our advance but suffered 2 killed and several casualties.  After On 

reaching our destination we found that the supposed unit on our 

right flank was not in position and we were subjected to heavy

machine gun enfilading from the enemy position.  About 9.30pm the 

night of our advance S.E. we intercepted the pioneer party--possibly

Captain McMinn's party -- advancing practically right into the

enemy position on our right.  They were under the impression, and

had been advised by our HQ, that the unit we were to link up with 

on the SE flank were in position and holding the line directly in front

of the position the (the party) were ordered to wire and trench.

Before the party could reach safety the enemy opened machine-gun 
fire and the party suffered several casualties.

In par. commencing May 7 the attack referred to and naming Lieuts

Nicklin and Hubbard as having been successful was I think led by

Lieut T.B. Norman -- he certainly led one afternoon attack from the 

first pothole line running from Bray Corbie road southwards for

about 100 yds and succeeded in taking the enemy second line on

about 100 yds front immediately in front of the position established

by my party and inflicted heavy loss on the enemy.  For this 

conspicuous piece of gallantry he was awarded the Military Cross

-- I personally witnessed the attack in company with Lieutx Lilja

(and I think Captain Cains) and considered it an excellent piece

of work.  I believe that the attack was in the nature of a raid

and that we would were unable to hold the position taken by 

Norman's party.  I am not able to state the part played by Lieuts

Nicklin and Hubbard --- probably they were associated with Norman's 

attack or/a later attack.

The area covered by the abovementioned attacks was, as stated,

very difficult for locating of positions -- this fact and the 
extremely dark nights over the attack period probably were the

prime causes of the confusion mentioned above.

I regret that I cannot give fuller details.

Yours faithfully,

J.J. Monfries
J.J. Monfries

Lieut 34th Bn A.I.F.  

H.N.

Morlanct.

5/5/18

Box 7296

G.P.O. Sydney.

24.5.37.

C.E.W.Bean Esq.

Historian.

Dear Sir /

reference 10255 22/5/37.

I hasten to reply to your letter, for fear
you may be expecting further information
from me as to what happened on the left

flank at Morlancourt on the  night of
May 5/6. 1918.

I regret I can tell you little x
that you do not know already, because
I was shot down just on reaching the

German first line - I was shot through the

chest and lay where I fell for some
hours until 'B' Coy stretchers bearers carried
me back to the R.A.P. and that was the
commencement of some twelve months hospital
for me.
I do remember that Lieutenant
de-Vere was the platoon commander on my
immediate left and was ( I am almost
certain the left flank of the Brigade attack).
I also remember that deVere's platoon
lost touch with my platoon - the reason I
do not know - I've never met deVere since 

2.
but I believe he lives in Newcastle. I heard
devere was the only officer in 'D' Coy. who was
not hit - so I do hope you can
communicate with him - his account of the 

operations on the left flank should enable
you to tell the whole story.
Believe me it was a hectic
night - the barrage in front of me was
gave the impression of a wall of flame -
and it lifted cleanly.
We were told before the stunt and I heard
subsequently that seldom had so much
artillery concentrated on so small a front.
You must receive a lot of
accounts ( the truthful or imagined) and I
gather from reading what you do know that
what you would especially like to learn
is what happened on the left flank and
as I said before Lt de. Vere was the officer
in charge of the Platoon.  I understand
he got an M.C. for the stunt.
Wishing you luck in the
completion of your famous undertaking.

Yours faithfully

SMcConaghy.

Dave, Lt. Col 54^th 55^th Batt. 

decd. was my brother. 

H.N.

Morlanct.

4-9/5/18

24/5/37

[*Lieut. W.G. Mason
26 O'Connell Street
Sydney.
(B4396)
and 6 Cheltenham Avenue
Beecroft
(Epping. 1295)*]

C. E. W. Bean Esq

Historian

Victoria Barracks

Paddington

Dear Bean
Further to mine of 10th inst; the incident of the Bosch
Patrol wandering down the Bray-Corbie Road, this would want checking
with Lt Mason, his address is Gill Mason, Beecroft , Sydney.  He is
a building contractor at present . As far as I remember that was the
patrol was accosted by a machine gunner from a post near the road
with 'hey Dig give us a match"; he was promptly grabed & taken alog
& was with them when they came on Mason & his gunner. This post 
was well back in support, to sweep the road.

Yours sincerely

Harold  F. White 

H.N.

Stuart St.
Lorn

W. Maitland.
13/10/37

C.E.W Bean Esq.

Official Historian

Dear Sir.
I am in receipt of yours of the
20^th May last, asking for information
regarding the operations of the 6^th & 7^th of
May 1918.

I regret the delay in supplying these;

my excuse being, the temporary loss of
my diary, containing these particulars.

Unfortunately my memory of the events

was not sufficiently clear, for me to 
supply the information, with any degree

of accuracy, and I have therefore had

to wait until I could find the diary.
This has now come to light, & I
forward herewith a verbatim copy of
the entries.
I also cover the events of the 7^th/8^th
of May, as the sample given in your
extract does not seem to me to be

anything like complete.
I trust the information will be of
some use to you

Yours faithfully

H.H. McMinn.

late Capt. 34^th Btn A.I.F. 

(1)

Extract from Diary of Capt H.H. McMinn.

34^th Btn A.I.F, covering the period 6^th to 8^th

May 1918

Disposition of Btn at 6^th May.

Picket line D Coy

Main     "    B & C Coy

Support     A Coy.

May 6^th   Ordered to advance the Picket line
500 yds on a 1000 yd front, South
of the Bray-Corbie Rd.

Operation to commence at 9.30 pm.
Raining heavily  & very dark.
Operation was found impossible.
owing to Lieut Monfries failing to 
clear a portion of the Pot Hole
trench, which was in the hands of 
the Germans.

One of my platoons ran into a
German post too strong to displace, &
although the two platoons South
of it reached the Germans were but They
were ^so dangerously into isolated x that they
were withdrawn by their Platoon
Commanders. 

(2)

May 7^th  Have take over the Picket line with
my Coy.  3 Platoons of C Coy, 2 Platoons

D Coy & 1 Platoon A Coy.

At 6am I discovered that Lieut
Monfries ^A Coy had vacated his position
without being first relieved by Lieut
Hubbard (C Coy).
Reported this to C.O & ordered by
him to arrange with B Coy for 1 Plat

B Coy and 1 Plat C Coy (Lieut Hubbard) to
attack & retake this Trench after a

bombardment by Trench mortars. This
was to take place at 9 am, but the
time for preparation was found to 
be too short, & the attack was 
carried out at 2pm with entire 
success.
At about 9.20 pm Capt Percy (2nd in
Command of 34^th Btn) arrived at my
Coy Hd Qtrs, with an Operation Order
for an attack on the Germans that
night.

The Order (General) was as follows:-

The 34^th Btn on the left & the 29^th Btn