Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/274B/1 - 1918 - 1939 - Part 3

9

May 31, 1930.              The REVEILLE               

But General Murray, who took over the Egyptian 

command in 1916, got wind of Birdwood's "ambitions," 

and promptly told London that "I cannot 

spare a single man... The Anzacs are the 

keystone to the defence of Egypt."

As the army commanders were all so keen on 

having the Diggers under their command when 

the big "scrapping" was going on, it would have been 

a gracious act on their part to have take them on 

"a picnic parade" into Germany after the Armistice. 

-- "Romani."

"Headstrong."

General Hobbs, who had not read the "Reveille" 

article, but relied on incomplete quotations from it 

in the daily press, has not quite grasped the point

at issue.

For instance, the correspondent who first raised 

the question, and on whose behalf it was referred to 

Mr Hughes (war time Prime Minister) for answer, 

had never expressed disappointment that the 

Australian troops were not drafted 

to Germany. He simply asked 

if there was any particular reason 

why the Australian troops 

were not sent, and his refencece

naturally referred to the divisions, 

because it was well known that 

a section of the Australian Flying 

Corps had crossed into Germany.

Reading between the lines of 

Mr Hughes's article, there are 

some, able to speak authoritatively, 

who might see their earlier 

opinions confirmed that the 

Australians were not included because, as the 

records of the A.I.F. show, there were very many 

independent and boisterous spirits among them -- 

men who had been difficult of control in back areas.

This  was a fact fully appreciated by the British 

High Command, which was anxious to impress the 

German people with the docility and discipline of 

the British troops. To the British High Command, 

in a sense, the Australians were a paradox -- steady 

and staunch in time of crisis; but headstrong and 

aggressive in time of leisure.

Garrison duty in Germany for the British entailed 

grave responsibilities, which might have given 

rise to serious international complications if the 

garrison troops had not always been submissive to 

stern discipline -- necessary measures which would 

have irritated the Diggers and caused a "boil over."           

---"Investigator"

Liked the Frauleins.

The home-going of the Aussies would not have 

been delayed if they had spent a month or two 

with the British Army of Occupation. It's too 

silly to suggest that the Diggers were not anxious 

to have a spell in Germany. I was with a mob of 

them that skipped from camp around Charleroi and 

travelled to Cologne, only to be "pinched" by 

M.P.'s as we left the station. Still that did not 

deter us from having another try later -- a successful 

one, too, and the welcome the Frauleins gave us 

was worth any bother. Cologne was a "dinki-di berg". 

It gave more comforts to the troops than 

they got in the miserable, unwashed villages where 

the Aussies were dumped for months, after the 

Armistice, between La Cateau and Charleroi.          

---"Anzac"

"General Billy"

Mr M.W. Hughes will ever remain a politician, 

even though he did "command" the Australian 

Army Corps in the Field, as he states in "Reveille," 

and as Sir John Monash, brilliant leader of the 

A.I.F. failed to state in his war book, "Australian 

Victories in France in 1918."

Sir John did make passing reference to some of 

his generals who expected Corps H.Q. to provide 

the luxury of a first-class London Hotel. Mr.

Hughes' "chief of staff," Sir Joseph Cook, was a 

reputed growler in this respect.

"General" Billy Hughes is not consistent. If he 

insisted on his "command" being rested, away from 

the front -- as it actually was in October, 1918, why 

is he angry at the Australian corps not being 

allowed to head the march into Germany? Where 

would the rest come in?

The historian of the famous 29th (English) Division 

records its hurried entry into Germany:

After the Armistice, the 9th and 29th (English) Divisions 

were selected to head the march into Germany. It 

was probably the sternest test of sheer endurance as apart 

from bravery, that the Division ever encountered. Food 

and smokes were short all the way, the men were filthy 

and covered with lice, and utterly worn out. The marches 

were very severe, up to 20 miles a day, the roads bad, and 

the weather usually appalling. The food supplies for some 

20,000 men depended upon one pontoon bridge across the 

Scheldt.

From the foregoing, Diggers can smile and feel 

that the joke was really in their favour, as they 

were saved the hardships that the 29th and 9th 

endured. Leave into Germany was also not unknown 

to a goodly number of Australians before 

they returned to Australia, so "General" Billy is 

seeking to make a mountain out of a molehill.

Incidentally, "General" Billy's wondrous interest 

in the Digger of late 1918 was quite contrary to his 

arrogance before them in early 1916, when he commenced 

to run round the Western Front showing 

how the war should be won.

Eighty-seven officers and 2658 of the 1st Aust. 

Inf. Brigade, and 33 officers and 150 other ranks 

of other Australian units on June 1st, 1916, were 

paraded at 11a.m. in a field on the north side of 

the River Lys in Belgium for his inspection. 

Platoon parades were at 10; company parades 

about 10.15; battalion parades 10.30; and a march 

to the brigade parade before 11 -- when "General" 

Billy was due.

He came along at 12.40; the brigade remaining 

on parade waiting upon his pleasure. The 1st 

Brigade staff expecting "General" Billy in good 

time had prepared refreshments for him, and even 

on his late arrival, out of courtesy, asked if he 

would partake of refreshments before or after 

inspection. It is actually on record that "General" 

Billy "insisted" on having refreshments first.

Anyway, all good things must come to an end, 

and so did "General" Billy's banquet. The troops 

were eventually inspected and addressed by their 

"chief."  "General" Billy told them that Australia 

was getting along quite well. The sequel -- 

well, an enormously disgusted 1st Brigade got back

(Continued on Page 32.)

32              

The REVEILLE                 May 31, 1930

"AUSSIES BARRED." -- Continued from Page 9.

to billets and lunch at 2.30p.m. having spent four 

and a half hours upon the pleasure of Mr Hughes.

So even if the self same warrior-statesman does 

take credit unto himself for having got the Anzacs 

leave and the Australian Corps a rest in spite of 

General Monash's wishes that it fight on -- let him 

debit a little of such credit against that needless 

and thoughtless action of his in 1916, when he unreasonably inconvenienced the famous 1st Australian 

Brigade -- something Fritz was never allowed 

to do with impunity.--- Fred W. Taylor, 2nd Bn. (A.I.F.)

Race Towards Berlin

A cobber of mine, an original member of the 

10th Battalion, voluntarily relinquished his right to 

leave France with the 1914 furlough men for the 

reason that he had come away from Aussie with 

the determination to see Berlin, and did not intend 

to retire just at the time the Germans were leading 

the Diggers a great race towards Berlin.--- "3rd 

Bde." (Broken Hill).

"Often Wrong."

In the last month's "Reveille" Mr Hughes writes 

on the subject of the Army of Occupation in Germany, 

that "when the victory was won and 

soldiering became a holiday, the Australians were 

contemptuously ignored. . .  Among the Allied 

troops sent to Germany the Australians were not 

included."

Mr Hughes is often wrong when he comes to 

discuss the war in detail. Having heard him a number 

of times, I doubt whether even yet he can 

distinguish one battle at Villers Bret. from another. 

Someone else may be able to say definitely 

whether it was Mr. Hughes who decided that the 

Australian Corps should "go into decent winter 

quarters," and that this was decided in June, 1918. 

But the A.I.F. was represented in the limited number 

of troops selected for the British contingent of 

the Allied Army of Occupation. The British and 

Belgian area was Cologne and Dusseldorf, and the 

4th Squadron of the Australian Flying Corps was 

sent to Cologne to represent the A.I.F. Major Ellis, 

their O.C., could probably write you some 

interesting stories of their stay there.---"K."

Canadian View.

Mr W.M. Hughes' article makes one wonder if 

all ranks were so very annoyed at having been sent 

home instead to Germany. Notions of what 

constituted honour and dignity differed considerably 

according to one's nearness to or distance from 

the front line. Any "buck" private believed that he 

would be kept in France indefinitely if it was for 

the sake of allowing the Brass Hats "to lead him 

into a conquered enemy country." The Canadians 

were not at all keen about going on into Germany -- 

in fact, many considered the Australians had put 

one over us by getting out of it.

The Third Canadian Division captured Mons on 

the morning of the Armistice, and the town was 

filled with troops when the glorious moment 

arrived. Every available means of celebration was 

fully utilised, and all oratory bristled with the 

slogan "Home for Christmas." Days passed however, 

and it was learned that the First and Second 

Divisions were moving up behind the Germans 

and were going into occupation. The Third and 

Fourth Divisions were to relieve them in January. 

This caused a great deal of unfavourable comment, 

and "Brass Hatdom" received much more than the 

usual amount of abuse. Then it was learned that 

the Australians were not to be in the Army of 

Occupation, and this caused a fresh outbreak, everybody 

demanding to know why the Aussies were 

being "favoured."  Cook-houses and other rumour 

centres were issuing "bulletins" daily. One story 

was that all available boats were to be used to take 

the Aussies home first, as they had the farthest to 

go. Another yarn was that Canada and Australia 

were to provide an Army of Occupation between 

them; Canada to do six months and then Australia 

six months. I remember one blithe spirit suggesting 

that a picked battalion of Canadians be matched 

against a picked battalion of Australian; the winners 

to have first use of the transports, and the 

one man that would be left of the two battalions 

to receive the V.C. and a life pension. Argument 

waxed hot until well on in December, when we 

started to move towards the coast.---H.W. Forrester (3rd Canadian Divis. Sigs), 38 Macleay St., Sydney.

[*SM Herald

7/6/30*]

[*Sydney Sun

11/6/30*]

NOTES FROM ^of a conversation with Mr. W.M. Hughes (1926)

(from C.E.W.B)

In 1916 the question of requisitioning ships was very urgent, there 

being a danger than Australia would be left with insufficient ships 

to remove her produce. Mr Hughes, who was in England, had been 

taking part in War Cabinet meetings and was impressed by the fact 

that members of the Cabinet seemed to have no settled war plan. 

Decisions were arrived at in a most casual fashion, or else a matter 

was left undecided without any steps apparently being taken for its 

ultimate determination. Seeing this he said to himself : "The only 

way to act seems to be to take a matter xxxxxxxx into one's own hands 

and act strongly." He accordingly determined to buy ships, and called 

upon Mr Balfour, the First Lord of the Admiralty, to tell him so. 

He found Balfour very distressed over another matter.  We're in 

dreadful trouble," he said. "Joffre has been over here with Cambon, 

and they have made us reverse the decision we had just arrived at to 

withdraw troops from Salonica."  (For the Salonica decision, see 

below.)

Hughes informed Balfour that he had bought fifteen ships, but

after some protest (which I have described more fully in my diaries)

Balfour later brought the matter before the War Cabinet, and it caused

rather heated discussions. Hughes said: "Very well, what are you

going to do about it?" Mr Runciman (at least, so far as Hughes's

memory goes, it was he) replied: "Oh, we'll simply requisition the

ships as soon as they come into port." However, after further

discussion, they said to Hughes: "Well, if we agree to let you have

these fifteen, will you undertake not to buy any more?" He thought it

reasonable to agree to that, and did so.

SALONICA.  While Mr Hughes was present in the War Cabinet the

question of the presence of British troops in Salonica came up.

Kitchener and Robertson were anxious to withdraw them; Mr Lloyd 

George was against it. Robertson explained that he had been in

that country as a young man twenty or thirty years before, and that

it was very mountainous, and that operations there would require more

2

mountain artillery than the British Army possessed. Kitchener

appeared to advance no arguments. Hughes asked: "What is the 

general plan?" Kitchener sad nothing; Asquith mopped his lips 

with a handkerchief. Eventually it was decided to withdraw all 

the divisions except one. It was shortly after this that 

Hughes saw Balfour and was told that Joffre had come over to get 

the decision reversed. On that occasion Joffre, upon meeting

the British Ministers, asked M. Cambon "May I thump the table?"

He had a very big square fist, and when Cambon said "Yes", he 

thumped with effect. He said that Britain's action would be 

taken in France as meaning the desertion of France by England 

Great Britain, and that, even if England left Salonica, France 

would go on there alone. The British Cabinet could only reverse 

the decision which had been come to. Hughes thinks that they 

should have known the attitude would be adopted by France, 

or at any rate should have been more thoroughly informed about it 

before.

1918.  Mr Hughes says that in 1918, some time before the 

Australian advance of August 8, he was in the War Cabinet when 

future plans were being discussed. Sir Henry Wilson brought 

forward a paper in which he explained that steps which might prove 

final - the final campaign - might be undertaken in 1919 or 1920. 

Wilson himself was evidently contemplating a campaign in 1920. 

They had not the slightest conception that the war could end in 

1918, and Hughes holds that the event which completely changed 

this outlook was the unexpected success of the Australian 

infantry, which, with the Canadians, formed the main force in 

the Battle of Amiens on August 8.

BRITISH LEADERSHIP.  In 1918, after the German offensive of

March 21, at a meeting of the War Cabinet Mr Lloyd George explained

the situation and informed the other members that, although

affairs seemed pretty gloomy, there was no doubt that they could 

hold until the Americans came in, and, if only they had the

3

courage and confidence, it was certain that they would win the war.

Mr. Borden, Prime Minister of Canada, afterwards rose and, after

speaking generally on the situation and on what Canada had done,

said that he was in possession of information which made it impossible

for him to feel confident that everything was being done for

the best, and that his obligations to the Canadian people rendered

it necessary for him to inform the War Cabinet of his misgivings.

He that Sir Archibald ARTHUR Currie, the commander of the Canadian

Corps, who was only a surveyor in private life in Canada, had

informed him that the British staff, even after three years of war,

was guilty of gross bungling. He had given Mr. Borden several

instances, which Mr. Borden proceeded to narrate to the War

Cabinet. One was the case of a British division which was employed 

on the flank of the Canadians at Passchendaele in 1917. Currie

said that he, the ex-surveyor, always ensured that his troops

should be in line at least 36 hours before they were xxxxxx

to deliver an attack from it. At Passchendaele, however, a 

British division came up on his flank, and its officers did not

even know where they were going or what they had to do. When the

attack took place the Canadians found themselves being fired into

from a position on their flank and rear, and, assuming that it was 

German fire, they shot back. It was discovered shortly afterwards

that it was the British division that was firing upon them, and

losses had been fairly heavy on both sides. Currie further said

that the Canadians had been ordered to take Passchendaele and had

eventually done so, but that it was his opinion that the taking of

this position was entirely useless, since, as soon as it was

captured, they went on the defensive. Nearly 300,000 men had

been lost in the Ypres offensive, and this loss greatly impressed

the Cabinet as it did the British people. (Although ^as I told Mr.
Hughes, xxxx the Somme offensive in 1916 was actually a far more

bloody and less well-conducted battle, and, I think, more disastrous

to the British Army and Empire in that it practically wiped out the

first flower of Kitchener's Army and disillusioned all those

splendid men and shattered their magnificent enthusiasm.)

In another instance, Mr. Borden state that at a conference

4

during the winter of 1917/18 corps commanders were asked how much 

wire they put down in front of their lines against the event of a

German attack. A British commander, who a regular soldier should

have by this time appreciated the elementary needs of warfare, said

said that he had 30,000 yards, another 33,000. Currie had put

down 350,000.

These were cited as instances of the failure of the class 

from which the British staff was drawn. Mr. Massey, to whom

everything that the British Great Britain did was right, except 

where it conflicted with anything that New Zealand had done, then

gave instances of a similar nature in connection with the New

Zealand attack at Passchendaele. Hughes did not say anything, as

as he did not see for the moment what there was he could usefully say.

Lloyd George simply finished the session by saying that they

must have time seriously to consider what they had heard. After

this session Lloyd George, meeting Hughes, I think, in the passage

said to him that he wish he (Hughes) had been there in 1917. "If 

you had," he added, "we should have had a different leadership now."

Hughes asked him what he meant. L.G., speaking with such sincerity

as to impress Hughes, replied that he himself was not a member of the 

class with which all positions in the British Army were staffed.

If he had made any move or taken any steps to remove Haig, the cry would 

at once have been raised throughoutthe country that politicians were 

interfering with the generals. If they had stopped the Passchendaele 

offensive, the generals would have turned around and said: "You

stopped us just when we would have got through. If it had not been for you we must should have broken through the enemy in that battle."
But if the action had been taken on the initiative of the Australians, 

or of any other Dominion, the people would probably have accepted it.

Mr. Hughes and the other three Prime Ministers met and 

consulted as to what could be done. They all felt that a change

should be made in the command of the British Army, and recognised that Lloyd George was looking to them, if anybody, to suggest it.

However, it was clear that at the moment, when matters were

critical, such a drastic proposal coming from them, and supported,