Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/274B/1 - 1918 - 1939 - Part 2

7.
national strength/ for the final decisive stroke to be and for the xxxxxxxxxx
delivered in conjunction with the Americans. Actually the
[*? was this so? I think this was my inference and a wrong one.
100,000 men were to be allotted from A1 manpower.*]
reinforcement originally allotted by the British War Cabinet
for the whole of the British Army in France during 1918 was
only 100,000 fit men - little more than were being asked from
Australia for the maintenance of the A.I.F. during the same xx
year. x/x The quota of reinforcements expected from Australia
was 7000 per month, or 84,000 for the year. The actual numbers
forthcoming from Australia at that time were, however,
[* (? a third) *] less than half this amount./
At this time the most prominent role on the whole of the
western fron was being played by the Australian Corps. It had
not been involved in the xxxxxxx ^heavy fighting and immense losses
of the German offensive, but it had played the leading part
ever since, and it was certain that the British command
would use it for a shock force as soon as heavy fighting

8.
recurred. With ^less than half the required reinforcement coming recruiting in Australia
from Australia, and ^fighting of the heaviest heavy tasks xxxxxin nature certainly
ahead, Mr Hughes put to himself the same question that was
troubling his colleagues of Great Britain and France: Would If
[* Australiaxx *] took no steps to conserve it, would there be any an Australian
army left when it came to the end of the war? What The memories
of statesmen are short - what figure would Australia then
cut in the peace negotiations?
Mr Hughes's presence in Europe had already enabled him
to influence the conditions under which Australian troops served
His request made to Haig in 1916, that the ^Australian divisions should be
combined in a simple army, had, lately been after further pressur
from Australia, lately been satisfied by their inclusion in a
single corps. He now pressed for further concessions for which,

9
the troops longed; first, leave for the original "Anzacs" to
return on two months furlough to Australia; second, a rest for
the corps, to commence in October; and third, an arrangement by
which the Australian infantry should winter in the south of xxx
France or in Italy. The first of these concessions was granted
but though ^this approval was easier to secure the finding of the ships xxx than the ships,
the latter were eventually found and /6000 of (?) the troops with longest
service returned to left France for Australia in September.
By direct pressure on General Monash, the Australian commander
in France, Hughes, ^after two months of tremendous fighting, obtained the second - by October 3rd /,  the last
of the Australian infantry was being taken out of the line for
a month's clear rest, it being understood that the Australian
Government must be consulted before it was use again in
major operations. At the end of thatthe month it was marched

10
again towards the front. It was understood that the Australian
Prime Minister should have no objection to its employment in
fighting then contemplated in order to force an early decision.
When, however, it was just reaching the front, hostilities
ended with the signing of the armistice.

COPY. Commonwealth of Australia.
Prime Minister.
Oct. 22/18.
My dear General Monash,
I have your letter referring to proposed use
of 1st and 4th Divisions of A.I.F. in the immediate future
and shall be glad to talk over the matter with you.
In the meantime you will of course do nothing
inconsistent with the policy I laid down which you and which
you approved, i.e., that the troops should have a long and
unbroken rest before being called upon to go into the line.
I am, Yours truly,
(sgd) W.M. HUGHES.
P.S. I can see you to-morrow, Wednesday afternoon, at say
3 p.m. at Australia House.    WMH.
-------------
Note in Gen. Monash's handwriting: "Called on Mr. Hughes,
23/10/18."

COPY. SECRET AND URGENT
S/5223.
AUSTRALIAN CORPS
Corps Headquarters,
30th October 1918.
Maj.Gen. Sir J.J.TALBOT HOBBS, KCB., VD.,
Commanding 5th Aust. Division.
Maj.Gen. E.G. SINCALIR-MACLAGAN, CB., DSO.,
Commanding, 4th Aust. Division.
Maj.Gen. J. GELLIBRAND, CB., DSO.,
Commanding 3rd Aust. Division.
Brig.Gen. J.C. ROBERTSON, CMG., DSO.,
T/Commanding 2nd Aust. Division.
Brig.Gen. H. GXXXXX. BENNETT, CB., CMG., DSO.,
(For Maj.Gen. T.W. GLASGOW, CB., CMG., DSO.,
Commanding 1st Aust. Division)
1.- The question of the further employment of the Australian
Corps in the near future has been the subject of lengthy discussion
between the Honorable the Prime Minister, the War Office, the
Commander-in-Chief, the Army Commander, and myself. As the result
of these discussions, and for reasons which will be explained in
due course, it appears inevitable that, in the event of the enemy
not immediately accepting the armistice terms which are to be
propounded this week, the services of the Corps will be required in
the very near future, to take up a portion of the front now held by
the Fourth Army.
2.- The date and nature of employment cannot be definitely
foreshadowed as it is contingent upon the results of an operation
on a very large scale which will take place in the course of the
next few days. It is quite possible, however, that 2 of the
Divisions of the Corps may receive orders to move forward by train
early in the coming week.
3.- After careful consideration of the relative strengths of
our Brigades, and of the periods of rest which the several Divisions
have enjoyed, I have come to the conclusion that the only criterion,
to determine the order of employment of the Divisions in future, is
the period of rest which the troops have enjoyed. I propose,
therefore, to adhere strictly to the order of employment of the
Divisions according to their recent periods of service and rest.
The order of employment will therefore be as follows:-
1st, 4th, 3rd, 5th, 2nd Divisions.
4.- The Army Commander foreshadows that the nature of the
employment is likely to be very much less arduous than was hitherto
the case, and the approach of winter makes it reasonably certain that
no lengthy offensive period need be contemplated. It is probable,
therefore, that the 2 Divisions first employed will not be required
for longer than about a week or ten days, when they will be relieved
by vthe next xx 2 in order of choice.
5.- The Army Commander feels that he ought to explain personally
to senior officers of the Corps the military aspects of the present
situation, and he is therefore desirous of meeting senior officers
for a short talk with him.
6.- In pursuance of this, I shall be glad if Divisional
Commanders, with the G.S. their G.S.O's (1) and, if available, their
brigade commanders and C's.R.A., will assemble at the Headquarters
of the 2nd Australian Division at BELLOY on the afternoon of Friday,
1st November. The Army Commander, who is travelling up from
VERSAILLES, expects to reach this location at 4 p.m.
7.- In order to enable me to get in touch with Divisional 

2.
Commanders on Corps questions of Organisation, Appointments, and
Training, I shall be glad if you will arrange to be in attendance
at 3 o'clock on that afternoon. This will allow me an hour to
deal with matters of routine before the arrival of the Army
Commander.
8.- Please acknowledge safe receipt of this letter by wire.
Lieut.-General,
Commanding Australian Corps. 

8 The REVEILLE April 30, 1930

AUSSIES BARRED

Wanted 

in 

War

Printed Photo of Soldiers: see original document.

Excluded             

in 

Peace

Why were not Australians included in the British Army of Occupation in Germany, after the Armistice?

The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes, P.C., K.C., M.P., who was Prime Minister of Australia during practically the

whole of the war insists in this article that the Australian troops were placed first when there was fighting to be
done, "but when the victory for which they had fought so magnificently was won, and soldiering became a holiday

jaunt, they were contemptuously ignored."

The editor of "Reveille" has invited me to
answer a question put to him by a correspondent,

who wants to know why Australian troops did not
move into Germany after the Armistice.  

No official information has been published on the 

matter. I doubt whether a search of the War
Office files would disclose any. Many of those who

controlled and were responsible for the disposition

of troops at that time are dead.  As for me, I can

only set out some facts and leave my fellow citizens
to draw their own deductions.

I must take my readers back to the spring of

1918 and ask them to conjure up in their minds the

dust and din of the awful conflict then raging in

all its appalling fury. The world was a charnel

house; millions of men been killed.

The year 1917, with its terrible holocausts on the

Somme had seared "Cartoon" captioned "Billy" tells the Diggers about it.': see original document

deeply into the very

soul of mankind.
Paschendaele, the most 

prolonged, the most 

bloody, and senseless,

battle in history, had 

drained the life blood        

of the Allies, and in 

the early spring of 

1918 they found
themselves panting and
almost exhausted
confronting the mighty 

legions of Germany,

who had been
reinforced by millions of
fresh men from the
Russian front. The position was not only critical,

but drenched with menace of disaster.

Our troops had suffered severely on the Somme;

reinforcements were urgently needed, but the
numbers coming forward were pitifully inadequate to

replace the great gaps in their ranks. The
Australian divisions badly needed rest, but for them

rest was impossible. It was known that the
Germans were preparing for a crushing offensive. On 

March 21, 1918, the long-expected blow fell. The

full force of the German Army was hurled against

the Fifth British Army, and, as everybody knows,
after a desperate struggle, the triumphant German

legions broke through, inflicting terrible losses upon

the British.

Passage inserted between text

*Mr Hughes reveals that despite "chilling

disapproval," he notified the authorities,

after a visit to France in June, 1918, that

he proposed to arrange for home leave for

1914 enlisted Diggers, and for the withdrawal
of the Aussie divisions, which were

worn out through incessant fighting, "into

winter quarters in a good climate for a long

rest."*

The situation was acute. If the victorious enemy

could capture Amiens they could drive a wedge

between the British and French forces, and compel

the Allies to evacuate the Channel ports.

A supreme effort alone could save the situation.

This was made. Troops were rushed across the

Channel in great numbers, along with vast
quantities of guns and munitions, and the Australians

were hurriedly withdrawn from the northern sector

of the line and dispatched to hold back the
victorious German armies.

Round the little village of Villers Bretonneux

there raged for weeks the most desperate and
sanguinary conflict. Within sight of Amiens the
Germans struggled furiously, but in vain, to push
towards their fateful goal. Fighting was incessant,

and the casualties very heavy, but the Australians

held the enemy at bay. Amiens was saved. Disaster
had been averted. The Allies breathed again.

When I arrived in London in May, the position,

though still critical, was no longer desperate. But

week by week the war went on. Victory for the

Allies seemed as remote as ever. Every day took

its bloody toll; the losses of the Australians were

grievously heavy—they had been fighting without

cessation for months; the men were worn out; their

turn for relief was long overdue, but for them no

respite was possible. Every man was urgently

needed if Germany was to be held at bay. And 

summer, when the campaign would gather fresh

fury, was yet to come.

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April 30, 1930 The REVEILLE 9

No thought of victory in 1918 entered the heads 

of the Allied High Command. The Imperial
Cabinet, of which I was a member, called upon to face

the situation, was advised by the Chief of Staff,

who, of course, was in daily touch with the British

Commander in Chief and with Marshal Foch, that

an Allied victory could not be hoped for before

1919, and that probably the wiser course would be

to make plans for the supreme effort in 1920,

when the American forces would be available.

The plans for the 1919 and 1920 campaigns were

submitted to Cabinet and considered in detail. Over

these we laboured long and anxiously. The shortage
of man-power was our great trouble. It was

evident to all that if the war was to continue for

another two years it was imperative that the
Empire must husband its resources. And, of course,

this applied with double force to Australia. Our

divisions were already very much below strength;

they were the only army dependant for reinforcements
upon voluntary recruiting—and these from

a country 12,000 miles distant from the seat of war.

It was only too obvious that unless our available

forces were most carefully conserved it would be

impossible to maintain five divisions, or even four,

in the field in 1919 and 1920. And yet, if victory

was to be won, it was imperative that the five
Australian divisions should be maintained at their

present strength.

VISITS AUSTRALIAN HEADQUARTERS.

In June, I visited the Australian Headquarters in 

France, and saw something of the conditions
under which the troops were living, and heard at

first hand the opinions of all ranks, from generals

to privates, and I came to the conclusion that if

these splendid men, who had been fighting
incessantly for months, and for whom there was no 

hope of rest or relief for many months more, were

to have a chance to fight, and not merely stumble,

utterly worn out, into the arms of death, it was

imperative that the whole Australian Army should

go into decent winter quarters.

This was the policy I resolved to adopt subject

to the approval of my colleague, Sir Joseph Cook, 

who was with me in London, and the Government

in Melbourne entirely agreeing with me. I took an

early opportunity  to discuss the matter with the 

Minister for War. I told him exactly what was

the position; that our divisions were much below

strength;  that every day casualties were taking

heavy toll of their depleted ranks; that reinforcements
were falling off; and, in short, if the
Australian forces were to be something more than an

ever-dwindling band of tired, worn-out men, they

[*(1)*] must go into winter quarters in a good climate for

a long rest. I added that I proposed to arrange for 

[*(2)*] home leave for the Anzacs—men of the First
Division who had been away from home for nearly

four years—and that the other four divisions should

[*(3)*] leave the line for winter quarters on October 3.

I cannot, for many reasons, do more than refer

in a very general way to the conversations and
correspondence that passed between the Minister for

War, the Chief of the General Staff, and myself.

It is enough to say that my proposal was received 

in all these quarters with chilling disapproval. It

was urged very strongly that the Australian troops

could not be spared; but, I accepted this as

Reciprocate. Sup
the highest tribute that could be paid to our men.

I pointed out that shock troops—or, indeed, any

first line forces—are useless unless comparatively

fresh and fit.

The matter was referred to the Commander-In-

Chief—not by me, of course—and I was informed

that he was unable to agree to my proposal. I

doubt if the position had been clearly explained

to him, but, as I saw it, the need for getting our

troops into decent winter quarters so that they

might be fit for what might prove to be Armageddon
was imperative. I thereforce notified the

authorities that I proposed to make arrangements

for home leave for the Anzacs and to withdraw to

winter quarters all other divisions on October 3.

And these things I did.

Passage inserted between text.

*"..............The Armistice provided

for the occupation of certain regions of

Germany by Allied troops. A zone was

allotted to contingents from the Armies of

the British Empire, but when the disposition
of troops was made, the Australians

were not included. Britain and the other 

Dominions were represented. Australia

alone was ignored.........."*

The weeks passed. The war went on; the enemy

was held, but the dawn of the day of victory

seemed as far off as ever. And then came the

greatest offensive of August the 8th, which rent the

curtains of gloom in twain and brought the warm

beams of the sun of peace, with victory almost 

within touch. August 8, and the great days that

followed, each bringing its heartening tale of
victory, changed everything. No more was there—

except in a few quarters—any talk of the 1919 and

1920 campaigns!

Back and back the legions of Germany were

driven—back behind their Hindenburg Line,
regarded by them—and by many others, too—as
impregnable. And when this impregnable line bent

and broke before the resistless Allied armies, the

greatest war the world had ever known was all

over bar the shouting.

The rest is known to all men. The Armistice

provided for the occupation of certain regions of

Germany by Allied troops. A zone was allotted

to contingents from the armies of the British
Empire, but, when the disposition of troops was made,

the Australians were not included. Britain and 

the other Dominions were duly represented.
Australia alone was ignored. Naturally, I sought an

explanation for this extraordinary discrimination.

The Chief of the General Staff wrote me a personal

note, in which he gave the reason for the exclusion 

of the Australians.  [[*?Garrison?*]] in [[*?Germany?*]]

Unfortunately, I cannot make this note—nor my

reply—public. But, from what I have said, the

public can draw their own conclusions. And it 

will help them to do this if they remember that

in the August 8 campaign, which brought the

war to a victorious end, the five Australian
divisions played a conspicuous part—that they, along 

with the Canadian divisions, made up the great

bulk of the victorious forces. That the Australians

had held the German legions at bay when, flushed

with their victory over the Fifth British Army,

they came rushing headlong towards Amiens—

that the Australians held them at bay for five

months—that the Australians had fought without

cessation for seven months, and, in the end. were

responsible, with the Canadians, for rolling back

the German Juggernaut.

When there was fighting to be done, the
Australian troops were first on the list; but when the

victory for which they  had fought so magnificently

was won, and soldiering became a holiday jaunt,

they were contemptuously ignored.

8 The REVEILLE May 31, 1930.

WERE AUSSIES BARRED?

What 

Monash

Maintains

Printed Photo of Soldiers: see original document.

Hughes's

Pressure

Criticised

In the subjoined reply, General Sir John Monash, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., V.D., Commander of the Australian
Army Corps in France, challenges several of the issues raised by the Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes,

P.C., K.C., M.P., in the article in April "Reveille," dealing with the final phases of Australian
participation in the Great War:-

There is no question that the then Prime
Minister (Mr. W. M. Hughes) used the strongest
possible pressure upon the War Council to secure the

earliest possible return to Australia of the Field

Army in France and the depots in England.
Indeed, he went so far—without the knowledge of

the fighting commanders—as to arrange for the

return, in a special ship, which the Ministry of 

Shipping had alloted for the purpose, of all men of

the Army Corps who had formed a portion of the 

first two convoys of troops which left Australia in

1914.

As a matter of fact, this came

as a great surprise to the
Commander and Staff of the
Australian Army Corps, and caused 

considerable  embarrassment         Photo of Sir John Monash: see 

as many hundreds of the men        original document.

concerned were actually
engaged in the last-hour preparations
for the capture of the 

Hindenburg outpost line.

The order to withdraw these

men from the battle and order

them to proceed to England

for embarkation to Australia

came when the battle was
already joined, and a great deal of confusion was

thereby caused, seriously imperilling the success of

the operation.

Immediately after the battle, a large body of

men from the First and Fourth Divisions were sent

via England, back to Australia, rendering these

two Divisions no longer available for serious battle

operations.

On the day of the Armistice, November 11, 1918,

the Australian Corps Headquarters had moved
forward into the battle zone and established itself at

Le Cateau, the identical headquarters from which

French had commanded the retreat from Mons.

I immediately received orders from Lord
Rawlinson to make preparations to send detachments

from the Corps into Germany to form portion of

the Army of Occupation, and was engaged in this 

work when, on November 14, I received a personal

summons from Mr. Hughes to see him in London.

With the permission of the Field-Marshal I went 

to London and interviewed Mr Hughes at his

house on Monday, November 18.

As a result, he telegraphed for Generals Birdwood
and White to come to London, which they did,

and we had long conferences on November 20 and

21, during which Mr. Hughes insisted that it was

the wish of the Commonwealth Government to get

everybody back to Australia as quickly as  possible.

He requested me to assume office as Director-General
of Demobilisation and Repatriation, a course in

which General Birdwood concurred.

Mr. Hughes urged me to wind up my affairs in

France as quickly as possible, and come back to
London at the earliest possible date in order to

initiate and organise the steady withdrawal of all

the A.I.F. from France and Belgium, and to
arrange for shipping to take them back to Australia.

With very great regret I relinquished command

of the Australian Army Corps on November 27,

after having conducted a great conference at Le

Cateau with all my Divisional and Brigade
Commanders, laying down the broad principles which

would guide my work of demobilisation.

I opened my main headquarters in London at 54

Victoria Street on November 30, and the work of

embarking troops for Australia commenced forthwith.
In point of fact, under Mr. Hughes' authority,
I had withdrawn over 30,000 men from the

Continent to England, en route for embarkation

ports, before I received permission from the War

Office to move a single man from France.

Your readers will be able to judge from the above

statement of facts to what extent it is now
justifiable to accuse the War Office of refusing to allow

Australian troops to form part of the Army of
Occupation.

Whether or not Mr. Hughes had, by November

14, already received an intimation that Australian

troops would not be permitted to enter Germany.

I cannot, of course say, but it seems to me, at the

very least, to be extremely doubtful that any
decision to that effect, if reached, could have been

come to within so few hours after the signing of the

Armistice.—Yours faithfully, John Monash.

Birdwood's Ambitions.

In their own hearts, though they rarely admitted

it in public, the British Army Commanders looked

upon the Aussies as the acme of what fighting

troops should be; and there was always a "tussle"

going on among them for "possession" of the
Australian divisions.

If Birdwood had had his way, Egypt and Palestine
would have been largely denuded of Anzac

mounted men, his idea having been to convert

them into reinforcements for the infantry in France.

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