Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/274B/1 - 1918 - 1939 - Part 1

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Awaiting approval
Accession number:
RCDIG1066714
Difficulty:
1

Page 1 / 10

AVM138 Offichal History, 1914-18 War: Records of CWBean, Officha! Mistorian. Diares and Notebooks Hem number: 3D606/2748/1 Tille: Folder, 1918 - 1939 Covers demobiizaton and the W MHughes Si John Monash contoversy relating to mutnies and the reles of Austalan units; incudes Beansnotes, utings, extacsof ofcarea conversatons with WM Hughes in 1926. AVM38-3DRL606/2748/1
Tonastezeahge Pant 2743 Hogenyyggd Stev däse lt.oeedebandeat;Repat. DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. B. W. BEAN Dendele SSE CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914-1918 HE sse of these diaries and notes is subject to condiions laid down im the terms of gift to the Australan War Memorial. But, apart from those terms, I wish the following circumstances and considerauons to be brought to the nouce of every reader and whiter who may use them. These writings represent only what at the moment of making them 1 believed to be true. The diaries were joted dowa almost daly wih the object of recording what was then in the writers mind. Often he wrote them when very üred and half asleep; also, not infrequenty, what he believed to be true was not so –but i does not follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them. These records should, therefore, be used with great cauton, as relaung only what their author, at the tme of wriing, beleved. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch (or the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But he did ty to ensure such accuracy by consulting, as (ar as possible, those who had seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand evidence (on which a large proporuon of war stories are founded) was impressed upon him by the second or third day of ihe Gallipoli campaign, notwichstanding that those who passed on such stories usually themselvee beleved them so ben tru second-hand evidence herein should be read wich this in mind. Trs o N 16 Sept, 1946. odt o a4 eerennrermmmnrmmnnnnrnmnrrrrennrrrrenrrr....nnrren
5911. 10 June 1930. Dear Mr. Treloar, In connection with the controversy between Mr. Hughes and Sir John Monash as to the relief in 1918 of the original Anzacs and of the reasons for the non- inclusion in the Army of Occupation of infantry from the Australian Corps, I expect you will get for the (June 4 or 5) A.W.M. library the issue of the London 'Daily Eelegraph containing the comments by its military correspondent? Would you let us see the cutting when it comes to hand, or better still send us a photostat copy of it? Yours sincerely, Mr. J.L. Treloar, Australian War Memorial, Box 214 D, C.P.O., Melbourne.
TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS TELEPHONE Nos. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. 'AUsWARMUSE." F 259 2se8. COMMUNICATIONS TO sE ADORZEssO vo 'TNE DIREcTos." AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL. They gave thei lives. For that publie gitt they RELV PlEARGUOI ost ofFlca sox zie D. veceived a praise which neves acee and s tomb mos g'onious --not so mauch the tomb is 12 149. EXHIBITION BUILDINGS, MELSOURNE. . which hey He, but that in which ther fame survives, toberemembered (or eves whenoccasion comes tos word ox deed .. . . 19th June, 1930. Dear Mr. Bazley, Anzac relief controversy. Thank you for your letter, 5911 of the 10th June. We are arranging to obtain a copy of the "Daily Telegraph" containing the comments of its military correspondent in regard to the relief in 1918 of the original Anzacs and of the reasons for the non-inclusion in the Army of Occupation of infantry from the Australian Corps. A photostat copy of same will be sent to you immediately the paper is received. Yours sincerely, A 3. Mr. A. W. Bazley, c/o Official Historian, Victoria Barracks, PADDINGTON, NSW.
0 Restriction on use of A.I.F.1918 From ".M.Hughes. o Quik ur (935o0) The Australian Prime Minister on reaching England in 1918 found the British Government deeply concerned with two anxieties of which little cvidence had leaked through to the Dominion Governments oversea. The first was as to the effic¬ especially ioncy of British hilitary leadership/in France and Flanders; the second as to the sufficiency of British man-power to last till the and of the war. As to the first of these Mr Lloyd George immediately took Mr Hughes into his confidence. The Passchendaele offensive, ho said, had been a tragic disaster which he and the War Cabinet had tried to prevent; but they had been powerloss against the determination of their military advisers. Mxxg Tho British army,he said, was not,like these of the Dominions, a field for the ofthe best talent the nation held; promotion general was almost all command in it,above the rank or iadee
preserved for members of the old regular army, most of whom - especially the cavalry branch, from which most of the army com manders had been choson - balonged to a limited and powerful hat class' cass said the British Prime Minister," and,if I had stepped in and stopped their offensive, they would have said that I had held them up on the brink of a great military success." If the protest/ had come from the Dominions, however, it would have carried results which it could not have effected if made by himself. He depbored the fact that the Dominion ministors had not been there in the nevious autumn, when their action might have brought about a changs in the command. Both Mr Hughes and Mr Borden, the Prime Minister of Canada, though strongly impressed by these representations,
3. wero loth to become catspaws for the removal of Sir Douglas Haig, the British commander-in-chief in France, without direct evidence that their own national forces were detrimentally Dritkrk affected by defective/leadership.on his part. They were, howev ar, deeply concerned through the notion that their troops might have to continue fighting, as was then expected, for possibly mors two/years, under a dull and blundering command. As a sequel Ludendorff' to the critical situation that arose when thaxg offensive of March Sist 1918 almost sepprated the British army from the French, the Imperial War Cabinet referred to a committee of Prime Ministers the question of investigating the causes which led up to that disaster, with a view to determining the proper relatlonships between those in control of the fighting forces and the several Governments of the Empire. Mr Borden laid
strongly adverso before this committee a/report from Lieutenant General Currie, comanding the Canadian forces in France, himself / ae ci vilian, tish command upon aspacts of the conduct of the thore. The conmitte was largely advised by Sir Henry Wilson, then chief of the Imperial Gencral Staff, was informed that probably could/not be assured until the Americans had 100 vict divisions in the field, which would not be before is80. It Great Britain found ascertained that thkaxzz great difficulty in providing even reinforcement half the that had been available in 1917, man-power XSN8X and that any continuance of auch xpnditure of as had been incurred in i917 would leave the British armies exhausted and depleted. nxi Ministers therefore came to a number of decisions intended to govern the future conduct of the war so far as the
5. British and Dominion forces were concerned. One was that very post should be held by the best man avail- Army Ahakan-2K ablo, irrespective of whether he is a professional or civilian soldier". /ASee "The Splendid Adventure" by the Rt.Hon..M.Hugh es.p.66/ Another was that it was the right and duty of the Government to assure itself that cperations which might involve heavy casu alties were not undertaken unless there was a fair chance that they woud produce conmensurate results on the final issue of the war./Ibid.p.87/ It had therefore a right that, the gener al lines of major operations, involving possibly a heavy casualty list should be submitted for its approval. These decisions had little offect upon the conduct of the wur since the final offensive which led to its favour- able termination began shortly after they were hade. But had
the struggle lasted, as every military adviser of the Allied Governments - Haig, Wilson, and Foch -/then believed it would. to 19ip or 1920, and had dissatisfaction with the comsand become again as acute as it was the and of ip17, thrre is no boubt that the commander-in-chief would have been changed through the influonce of the Dominions. The second anxiety which beset the Imperial War Cabinet concerned the question of man-power. It was ppparent that Great Britain had reached the stage at which the end of her reserves was in sight, and her Prine Minister foresaw the danger that the end of the war would find her forces so depleted thit she would count for little in the settlement of the terms of peace. Ever since the Battle of Passchendaele the British cabinet had been folbowing the policy, adopted six months before bv the Government of France, of deliberately conserving the narkzx

AVM138
Official History,
1914-18 War: Records of C E W Bean,
Official Historian.
Diaries and Notebooks
Item number: 3DRL606/274B/1
Title: Folder, 1918 - 1939
Covers demobilization and the W M Hughes
Sir John Monash controversy relating to
mutinies and the relief of Australian units;
includes Bean's notes, cuttings, extracts of
official records and records of Bean's
conversations with W M Hughes in 1926.
AVM38-3DRL606/274B/1
 

 

Monash & Hughes - Controversy re - No. 274B

Relief of Australians.

AIF [[continues]] over disbandments; Repat. & [[unknown]]

1st SET
DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. E. W. BEAN
CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914 - 1918
THE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms
of gift to the Australian War Memorial. But, apart from those terms, I wish the
following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every
reader and writer who may use them.
These writings represent only what at the moment of making them 1 believed to be
true. The diaries were joted down almost daily with the object of recording what
was then in the writer's mind. Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep;
also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so – but it does not
follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when
discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them.
These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what
their author, at the time of writing, believed. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch
for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But he
did try to ensure such accuracy by consulting, as far as possible, those who had
seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand
evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed
upon him by the second or third day of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that
those who passed on such stories usually themselves believed them to be true. All
second-hand evidence herein should be read with this in mind.
AWM38
16 Sept., 1946.
3DRL 606 ITEM 274B
AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL
ACCESS STATUS

OPEN 

 

 

5911.
10 June 1930.
Dear Mr. Treloar,
In connection with the controversy between
Mr. Hughes and Sir John Monash as to the relief in 1918
of the original Anzacs and of the reasons for the non-
inclusion in the Army of Occupation of infantry from
the Australian Corps, I expect you will get for the
(June 4 or 5)
A.W.M. library the issue of the London "Daily Telegraph"
containing the comments by its military correspondent?
Would you let us see the cutting when it comes to hand,
or better still send us a photostat copy of it?
Yours sincerely,

CEW Bean
Mr. J.L. Treloar,
Australian War Memorial,
Box 214 D, G.P.O.,
Melbourne.
 

 

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS
TELEPHONE Nos.
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.
"AUSWARMUSE."
F 2597
F 2598.
COMMUNICATIONS TO BE ADDRESSED TO
"THE DIRECTOR"
AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL.
They gave their lives. For that public gift they
REPLY PLEASE QUOTE
POST OFFICE BOX 214 D.
received a praise which never ages and a
tomb most glorious - not so much the tomb in
12/3/49.
EXHIBITION BUILDINGS, MELBOURNE.
which they lie, but that in which their fame
survives, to be remembered for ever when occasion
comes for word or deed .. . .
19th June, 1930.
Dear Mr. Bazley,
Anzac relief controversy.
Thank you for your letter, 5911 of the 10th June. We
are arranging to obtain a copy of the "Daily Telegraph"
containing the comments of its military correspondent in regard
to the relief in 1918 of the original Anzacs and of the reasons
for the non-inclusion in the Army of Occupation of infantry
from the Australian Corps. A photostat copy of same will be
sent to you immediately the paper is received.
Yours sincerely,
[[Signature]]


Mr. A. W. Bazley,
c/o Official Historian,
Victoria Barracks,
PADDINGTON, NSW.
 

 

I&N
From W.M.Hughes Restriction on use of A.I.F.1918
Notes on conversation
(I think in 1935 or 36)
[[?]] Vol XI
The Australian Prime Minister on reaching England
in 1918
found the British Government deeply concerned with two
anxieties of which little evidence had leaked through to the
Dominion Governments oversea. The first was xxx as to the effic-
, especially 

iency of British military leadership/in France and Flanders; the
second as to the sufficiency of British man-power to last till
the end of the war. As to the first of these Mr Lloyd George
immediately took Mr Hughes into his confidence. The Passchendaele
offensive, he said, had been a tragic disaster which he and the
War Cabinet had tried to prevent; but they had been powerless
against the determination of their military advisers. XxxX The
British army, he said, was not,like those of the Dominions, a

promotion
field for the xxxxxxxxxxx of the best talent the nation held;
brigadier-
almost all command in it, above the rank of xxxxx general was
 

 

2

preserved for members of the old regular army, most of whom
- especially the cavalry branch, from which most of the army com-
manders had been chosen - belonged to a limited and powerful
"I do not belong to that class",
class. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx said the British Prime
Minister," and,if I had stepped in and stopped their offensive,
they would have said that I had held them up on the brink of a
great military success." If the protest/ had come from the
Dominions, however, it would have carried results which it
could not have effected if made by himself. He deplored the
fact that the Dominion ministers had not been there in the
previous autumn, when their action might have brought about a
change in the command.
Both Mr Hughes and Mr Borden, the Prime Minister of
Canada, though strongly impressed by these representations,
 

 

3.
were loth to become catspaws for the removal of Sir Douglas
Haig, the British commander-in-chief in France, without direct
evidence that their own national forces were detrimentally
xxxxxxx
affected by defective/leadership.on his part. They were, howev
er, deeply concerned through the notion that their troops might
have to continue fighting, as was then expected, for possibly
more
two/years, under a dull and blundering command. As a sequel
Ludendorff's
to the critical situation that arose when xxxxxxxxxx offensive
of March 21st 1918 almost separated the British army from the
French, the Imperial War Cabinet referred to a committee of
Prime Ministers the question of investigating the causes which
led up to that disaster, with a view to determining the proper
relationships between those in control of the fighting forces
and the several Governments of the Empire. Mr Borden laid
 

 

4
strongly adverse
before this committee a/report from Lieutenant General Currie,
formerly
comanding the Canadian forces in France, himself /a civilian,
some                                                                                British command
upon xxxxxxxxxxx aspects of the conduct of the xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
, which
there. The committee/was largely advised by Sir Henry Wilson,
then chief of the Imperial General Staff, was informed that
probably
victory could/not be assured until the Americans had 100
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
divisions in the field, which would not be before 1920. It
Great Britain found
ascertained that xxxxxxxxx great difficulty in providing even
reinforcement
half the xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx that had been available in 1917,
xxxxx                  man-power
and that any/continuance of such expenditure of xxxx/ as had
been incurred in 1917 would leave the British armies exhausted
and depleted. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx The Prim Ministers
xxxxxxxxx therefore came to a number of decisions xxxxxx
intended to govern the future conduct of the war so far as the
 

 

5.
British and Dominion forces were concerned. One was that
in the army every post should be held by the best man avail-
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
able, irrespective of whether he is a professional or civilian
soldier". x/x See "The Splendid Adventure" by the Rt.Hon. W.M.Hugh
es.p.66/
Another was that it was the right and duty of the Government
to assure itself that operations which might involve heavy casu
alties were not undertaken unless there was a fair chance that
they woud produce commensurate results on the final issue of
the war. x/xIbid.p.87/ It had therefore a right that, the gener
al lines of xxxxx major operations, involving possibly a heavy
casualty list should be submitted for its approval.
These decisions had little effect upon the conduct
of the war since the final offensive which led to its favour-
able termination began shortly after they were made. But had
 

 

6

the struggle lasted, as every military adviser of the Allied

even
Governments - Haig, Wilson, and Foch -/then believed it would,
to 1919 or 1920, and had dissatisfaction with the
command become again as acute as it in was the end of 1917, there
is no doubt that the commander-in-chief would have been changed
through the influence of the Dominions.
The second anxiety which beset the Imperial War
Cabinet concerned the question of man-power. It was apparent that
Great Britain had reached the stage at which the end
of her reserves was in sight, and her Prime Minister foresaw the
danger that the end of the war would find her forces so depleted
that she would count for little in the settlement of the terms
of peace. Ever since the Battle of Passchendaele the British
cabinet had been following the policy, adopted six months before
by the Government of France, of deliberately conserving the xxxxxx
 

 
Last edited by:
Sam scottSam scott
Last edited on:

Last updated: