Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/274/1 - 1918 - 1941 - Part 3

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Open for review
Accession number:
RCDIG1066712
Difficulty:

Page 1 / 10

Notes. 7 Aug.1 918. Order of 85th Res. Inf.Bde (German) 200 marks to be paid to Cpl.Rademacher, L/Cpl Muller, and Grendr Sonderman 213rd RIR for bringing in 2 pr isoners of the 18th English Divn. 35th Batalion, BRAY. Col.White in his Hors at Etinhem on the day of the fight NE of Bray, on return from the line, told us:- The Germans put down at 3.45am a solid barrage on the whole area, f ortunately mostly behind the J.O.line. T he troops were lying out at the time, End only one platoon was wiped out on the xxxx J.O.line. One instantaneous fuse go t amongs t them and wiped out a sergeant and about 10 men. They got away very well. The German barrage slackened 5 to 10 mins before zero, but they got their barrage going again within 2 minutes of ours opning. The German shorte ned his barrage but didnt pick up our line till it halted, on the brown line. Abt 20 mins before they left the brown line the German was onto them again. From on top it is dead level to Bray. T he only incident on the way to the brown line was in a small copse in L14B1;4;. The German had a machine gun Hdars and telephone station and deep dugouts there. They fought there and our line was held for a time but the flanks got on and mopped it out. 5 0 to 60 prisoners came from these dugouts. 2 L.T. Ms were there - it had been the German support position. "It is the first occasion on which I have ever seen box latrines in a German position and real sanit- ation", said White, "and a dugout fit to live in without our having to have it thopoughly cleaned first. There were not many casualties in the 3ôth. In the copse there were several casualt¬ ies. None occurred after that till we got on to the ridge overlooking B ray. The Germans then assed the valley running from 14 A and B with tear and sneezing gas. They quickly shortend their barrage ( 5.9 all the time) and followed us very quickly. One battery could be seen on t he left but they ceased before we reached the green line. He searched the area very effect- ively. We had to have gas helmets on for half an hour. M.G fire began about then and livened up from Bray and the ridges N.E of Bray. It was not enough to be annoying and at fairly long range except from Bray. Xxx But as our artillery died away the German mgs livened up and made it difficult getting about. Lt Ades was too keen and got out too far(and was killed) We dug in on the railway - the military line in 9D- and patrolled out to where we could get a look round the back of BRAY. But M.Gs and Xx a L.T.M. which in 2 shots killed or wounded a whole L.G post, made it impossible to get round the far side. If we had been prepared to lose men we cd have got round but it wd have here must be a mg in some ofhhe required a special oper ation. bldgs in order to reach some of the country which their shots are reaching - possibly one in the church- you cannot reach the rig ht front company at present for this reason. Wewre in touch with the örd Pioneers on the right and the 33 rd on the left the whole of tle way. The pioneers did very well,x where they are on their objective in linkingnup. We got a lot of prisoners in a quarry . I was visiting our left company at the time and we had to go across beyond this quarry to them. As we did so a number of Germans there began to get away. 6 got away - but we got 30 (the colonel and his orderly apparently did this). The Germans fought with bombs abd rifles in the prisoners cage. But our men fired a smoke bomb onto it and the Germans went for their lives. They would probably be afraid of our men getting on top of them throut the smoke. The cavalry went through the Tommies, but there must have been a tremendous lot oi guns up on the ridge. 15
2. horses galloped out of Bray without riders - 5 went along the Bray Corbie road. I fancy these were led horses that had been stampeded. Probably they were the horses of dismounte cavalrymen. M.Gs burst out in the rear when the cavalry went throgu (I suppose this means towards the German r ear We got on to three of these mgs. One was in the cemetery. You could see the steam from his gun and we got a L.G onto them nnd kept them quiet. The gas took the dash out of the men.The smoke was very thick in that valley. The rate of barrage was 100 yds in 4 minutes. This was very slow for our men, and the hours halt much too long (-n.b the British had to move much further and we had to swing slowly with them). White only got the order to exploit at 12.30, ( midnight night of attack) The barrage was timed for 2.15. and as the comp anies had to be in position an hour before zero this left 45 mins - no time really to arrange the exploitation. White had asked specially about exploitation before, and was told No it wd not be allowed. It wd have meant a scrap, as it turned out; but had we organised for it he thinks Bray cd have been taken in our stride. We cd have rushed the guns which were firing on our objective. But as it was the men had been told they were for a certain objective and that they were to dig in there; And when you have once told them that, and they have got it thoroughly into their heads, it is hard to get them to move on the spur of the moment. One German mg was knoeked out by a L.G.bullet. there were abt 120 prisoners and 40 - say 200 probably for this battalion.Abt 6 0 Germans were ded in their old positions (take this with caution - may be true , may not).We are 100 to 150 yds ahead of our objve. 5 or 6 tanks were knocked out. White asked permis sion to establish his Hars forward - and was given it. But it had just been withdrawn when we saw him, and he had been ordered back to his old Hys above Etinhem. He said that the old Hors with its single sheet of iron overhead and well registered by the Germans was far more dangerous. But that nights C/attack showed that perhaps there was some reason in the order. T he attack was just beginning as we walked back from Whites hars.
HOW A BRAVE OFFICER FELL. Mr Hy. F. Dench, of Burke Road, Camberwell, has received a letter of sympathy from Brig: Gen: W. Ramsay McNicoll of the 10th Brigade, Victoria, and giving detail of how Captain Harold Dench, C.O. of the 38th Battalion (Bendigo) met his death. The following is an extract from the letter: "As a Company Commander he had a most responsible "position, and the manner in which he handled his Company "and behaved in most difficult circumstances, drew high "praise from his Commanding Officer, who was, unfortunately, "killed a few days later. Your son fell a few hours after "one of the most successful operations which has been under Grog "taken by this Brigade. An imprtant town on the SOMME had "just been captured, and he and his Company were given the "post of honour - the guarding of the left flank - to protect "the town. It was a difficult and dangerous position, but "largely owing to Harold's work and fine example the position "was consolidated and held under very heavy fire and against "determined counter-attacks. He was killed instantly by a sniper "whilst rallying men, not Australians, on his flank, who, having "lost their officers, were giving way. It was a most gallant "action on his part, for he had to stand and direct them in the "open under heavy fire, but he succeeded in rallying them before "he was hit, and this act alone was of the greatest service "to the Brigade - and indeed to the whole Australian Corps: "The Battalion Lt: Col: Hurrey also writes to say: "has been fighting continuously since August 8th, and up to "the time of his death your son was in no small degree respon¬ "sible for the splendid things that now stand to the credit of "the Battalion. Ho had no fear whatever, and the example of "gourage and resourcefulness that he set to his Company was "simply invaluable! P. T. 0.
(2). (continued) Captain Peters, O.C. "C" Coy. writes conveying sympathy on bchalf of the men, N.C.O's, and Officers: "Harold was known for his cool courage, initiative, "and thoroughness. He was a grand leader, one who will be "a big loss to our dear old 38th. You would kike to hear the story of his death, I am sure, for it is a very noble story indeed. "On August the 24th "C" Coy was holding a line in front of "the BRAY MORLANCOURT ROAD, during the early stages of our "C" Coy's H.9. "Advance Guard operations near the SOMME. "were in a chalk pit off a sunken road. Some troops on cur flanks (not Australians) became disorganised and commenced to Captain Dench made heroic efforts to rally them, "come back. "and it was on his second trip to the flank that he was killed by a M.G. or sniper's bullet. At the same time Lieut: Barker who was with him was severely wounded! The Brigade captured an important Dieut: Martin writes:- "town, BRAY, on the morning of the 24th August, and then con¬ solidated a line on its eastern side, which was subjected to very "heavy shelling and some determined counter-attacks by the enemy. „Tho 3Sth was on the left, and Harold and his Company were "given the post of honour - the guarding of the left flank "for we were very doubtful of the troops on our left, who were not Australians. Every officer and man in the Battalion "says that from the moment the advance bagan Harold did "wonderful work, and that his disregard of danger and personal "example had much to do with the way the men kept to their "work of consolidation under very trying conditions. During "one of the enemy attacks the troops on the left broke, and "Harold rushed out in the open under extremely heavy fire and "succeeded in stopping the rot, and getting most of them in "with his own Company. It was a daring and fine action on "his part, but just as he had rallied them a sniper hit him "and he died instantly. ui ventiorieg m Bripatcher bde Donfug dtengg fri atenti medonnng
“TEDDY THE RAIDER TRIBUTE TO LIEJT. CRANSWICK Aug (q6o A MEMORY OF DREADFUL DAYS. Mr. J. Moore-Robinson, of Hobart, writes:- A tribute to the memory of a brave soldier, “Teddy the Raider," or, as Death of a War Hero announced, Lieut. T. G. Cranswick, M.C., D.C.M. The whole of the old LIEUT. T. G. CRANSWICK, MC, D.CM. 40th will mourn his loss. He was a Nue uae Lamnt. Drunmriaee reum da soldier to his finger-tips, bold if im¬ the Fortieth some weeks later was hailec A distinguished soldier, who by his in¬ petuous, brave almost to caralessness in the battalion with general satisfac domitable pluck had won the esteem of and ever concerned with two objects, tion, partly because of the steadying in lis associates in the face of death, two the first, victory, the second, welfare fluence his example afforded in particu decorations for valour, and his commis¬ of his mates. He carned his nickname larly dangerous “stunts." early because whenever a raid was or sion in the Australian Imperial Force, gainsed he was there, and if he was not passed away at Hornsey Hospital at For his excellent services in some stiff in one raid he was sure to be found in fighting at Berlin Wood, near the fam 2 o'clock yesterday morning, in the another one at the same time. No ous “Olery Copse," in August, 1918, the person of Lieut. Thurston George Crans¬ point of soldiering appealed to him wick, M.C., D.C.M. He had been un gallant soldier was awarded the Mili¬ more than prowling about in No der treatment for over two years for a tary Cross. It was with chagrin that Man's Land,” either by bimself or with severe wound received in action, neces¬ the men learned of his serious wound in a patrol or raiding party, shrouded by the left elbow in that “scrap.” Lieut sitating a serious operation a few dàys the darkness, of night, camouflaged so ogo, to which he succumbed. Ganswick was sent to hospital i far as sound was concerned by the "Blighty,” where he lingered for many The late Mr. Cranswick, whose par¬ shrieking of shells overhead, the burst¬ ents reside at Stanley, was educated monthà, slowly recovering. One night ing of “whiz-bangs” before and behind at the High School (before its amalga¬ he nearly lost his life through turning and the shrill whistle of machine guns mation with the Grammar School), after on to his injured arm in his sleep, the bullets sweeping parapets, alike of which be served on the staff of the Com¬ resultant loss of blood all but causin friend and foe. In these circumstances mercial Pank of Tasmania in the Zeehan his death. However, he bappily re¬ Cranswick was at home. He asked no branch. Erom this position he enlisted covered sufficiently to be sent home t man to dare what he dared not him¬ in the army, leaving Tasmania as a cor¬ Tasmania, and once on his native soil self. poral and original member of the For¬ made more rapid progress towards con¬ When Major Giblin, commanding D tieth Battalion, in company with his valescence. While at Hornsey Hospita Company, was wounded shortly after younger brother Jack, on July 2, 1916. he became so well that he assumed official the attack developed at Bray, Teddy the Raider” took command, and I re¬ His brother had served on Gallipoli in duties, but recently a serious operation the Twelfth Battalion, and was one of on is wound became necessary, result member him at daylight on the follow- ing morning, when Bray was ours, sur¬ the first batch of returned men, after¬ing in his lamented death. veying the flotsam and jetsam, human wards eing transferred to the Fortieth In both his boyhood and hisimilitary and inanimate, in our rear, and the ris¬ Battalion with the rank of company- career, during which the writer has had ing «ground before us, behind which sergeant-major. personal intimacy with bim, the late Mr. Fritz lay sheltered. Still in command, he On arrival on the battlefield the late Cranswick showed himself to have been took us through Hem, through an awfulMr. Crauswick lost no time in displaying a most desirable associate. His un¬ night in a stinking drain between Hem his manhood, volunteering in many selfishness and excellent character won and Clery, down the exposed old trench, raids, and fulfilling hie duties in a man-im many friende. He was also a rather from there towards Clery Copse, in ner which attracted the admiration o capable pianist, and was of service on which Jack Loone made his final sac¬ his superior officers. During a rai occasions in battalion concerts in France rifice, and on the following day, Aug¬ on the enemy at Houplines, a suburb of In Mr. Cranswick Taamania has lost one ust 30, 1918, in an attack on Clery Armentieres, where the “Wighting For¬ s heres, of whom it might well Copse. It was here he received the tieth" received their baptism of fire, his bave deen proud. wound which caused hie death, and of a brother, who that day received his com¬ The funeral will leave Hornsey Hos truth no words can describe the foolish¬ mission, was mortally wounded, and a pital at 3 p.m. to-day for Carr Villa ness of that attack. few days afterwards Thurston was pro-Cemetery, and it is understood that the An unknowu number of Germans, moted to sergeant. As platoon sergeant authorities are arranging a military one. subsequently found to total nearly in charge of No. 13 platoon he estab¬Bs- 1000, were well “dug in iu the Copse. lisbed his mastery over the tactice of sociation and the Returned Soldiers' and Company alone, 75 strong, under the enemy in the battle of Messines. Sailors' Imperial League will take part Cranswick and “Snowy Mahoney. His platoon were allotted the ticklish crept across the valley and up the Lieut.-Colonel Lord, DS.O., V.D., yester task of dislodging a desperate body of day telegraphed Captain J. D. W. Cbia¬ C.T. into the wood. It was bright the enemy from Sneitchel Farm, on tké hohn, V.D, requesting him to arrange daylight, early afternoon. No barrage Douve River, about a mile anda half for a wreath from the former associa¬ Of course, the iu¬ lent its assistance. from the demolished town of Messines. tion to be forwarded. evitable happeued. Fritz let us into his first position, and machine gunned For bis brilliant and courageous behavi¬ us almost to death. “Teddy the Raid¬ our on this occasion the young soldier er" got a machine guu burst in his was awarded the Distinguished Conduet right arm within 50 vards of the fur¬ Medal. these point we raided, and Firtz was While the battalion was undergoing using flat nosed bullets. I still have recreation training a few weeks later one of them. The guu I was on and at the Douve camp, which is situated at another oue were the furthest out in the foot of the famous Kemmel Hill, front of Cranswick. Mr. Hanswick received his commission, Of six men on my gun, I alone es a promotion which was noted with emin¬ caped unscathed. The others were killed, ent satisfaction by his platoon, and all excepting Pickett, who was given u of his other comrades, with whom he for dead. Mahoney came to where my alwaye remained a “cobber." gun was, and as he stood up got one During the months which followed through his tin hat fairly in the centre sanguinary and desperate fighting occur¬ of his forehead. Aud in trying to get red at intervals, and the gallant soldier his body out Kay Masterman was made continued to display his remarkable prisoner. A quarter of an hour after adaptability to the fighting game. Where wards Fritz rushed our position, and, the nerve of other brave fighters who having removed our wounded, the few had borne the brunt along with him remnants of D Company made the run began to grow "shaky,” his nerve seemed of their lives to behind our line held by the 38th. Next morning under a bar¬ to assume more of that iron quality rage, the whole 10th Birgade went which symbolises Australian grit. over. Somewhere in the vicinity ot A break in his immediate attachment 270 prisoners were captured from that to the Fortieth occurred when he was copse, hundreds lav dead about it after detailed off to an English brigade as our attack, and who can say how many instructor to the Imperial troops in escaped ! And against this force 75 scouting and raiding. His work under men of D Company were sent, some of the new conditions called forth the un¬ them to their death. And all this was stinted admiration of the English briga under the fire of Ger who specially commended him. The from that ec lish soldiers, too, learned to regard Fritz deemed impi nable famo him with the deepest respect, not only Mont St. Quenton king personality, but also the ei Such we or his actual association with, them in through some kind of want of diree heir precarious undertakings in No e pire lost tion, the 1 s Land sous, and which ope pth the cours of his instruc¬ twe measured not by niles, bu vrs nd two months down w day, tala of the Great Beyond Vale Raider.”
107. Infanterte Diviston. Div. St. Qu., den 24. VIII. 1918. Abt. Ib Nr. 4837. Besonder Anordnungon. . 1.) G.0. Die fruppenteile, Lager - und Ortskonnondanturen haben so- fort in den Unterkunftsorten und Biwakplätzen Gasalarngeräte in ausreichender Zchl anzubringen. Es dürfen nur Gerdte, die ge- schlagen verden, verwandt verden. Die Gasalarngeräte sind durch Schilder nit der Aufschrift „ Gasalarn " kenntlich zu nachen. 2.) G.0. Jn den Bereich jeder Lager- bezv. Ortskonnondantur tst ein Retrraun einzurichten, der durch ein Schild zu bezeichnen ist. 3.) IID. Oel und Fette pp. für M.G. können von den fruppen in klet- nen Mengen bein Unladekonnando der Division (Sgt.Grunert) in Peronne, Friedhofstr.22 enpfangen verden. Für die Richtigkett: Jhaster gex. Havenstein. Hauptnann u. 2. Genstbs.Offizier. Verteilungsplon sie bisher: 107. Jnfanterie Division. Div. St. Qu., den 24. VIII. 1918. Abt. ID Nr.4837. Besonder Anordnungen. B.. 1.) G.0. Die fruppenteile, Lager - und Ortskonnandanturen haben so- fort in den Unterkunftsorten und Bivakplätzen Gasalarngeräte in ausreichender Zahl anzubringen. Es dürfen nur Gerüte, die ge- schlagen verden, verwandt verden. Die Gasalarngerdte sind durch Schilder nit der Aufschrift "Gasalarn " kenntlich zu nachen. 2.) G.0. Jn den Bereich jeder Lager- bezv. Ortskonnendantur iet ein Reizraun einzurichten, der durch ein Schild zu bezeichnen ist. 3.) IIb. Oel und Fette pp. für M.G. können ven in klet- rra nen Mengen bein Unladekonnando der Division Sot.Grunert) in Peronne, Friedhofstr. 22 enpfangen verden. Für die Richtigkett: Fharte gez. Navenstein. Hauptnann u. 2. Genstbs.Offizier. Verteilungsplon ste bicher.
LGCOLG el LeL G IIO U CIO' 9 EB' EETASe EEIE CHVTE H' (Ho BSIIO) 7LG:- NOPNSI 12 REVEILLE September 1, 1933 ward to cross our front line half-an-hour after the zero Battle of Chuignes hour, and be guided by selected parties of infantry to (By Lieut.-Col. H. G. Viney, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.) the sites chosen for the battalion dumps in the captured positions. There they would be unloaded by the infantry PART II. accompanying them, who would then form the guards In consequence of this mishap the number of carry¬ in charge of such dumps. The tanks would return im¬ ing tanks available for the use of the 1st Div. in the mediately to the road near our front line, where another Battle of Chuignes was seven, whereas the infantry bri¬ load and loading party would be waiting for each of gade commanders were strongly of opinion that they them. They would then load up, guided by the second could not do with less than one per battalion. As all loading parties to fresh dumping sites, unload, and get three brigades were to be actively engaged in the fight, back to their lying-up place of the day before, where this meant that we would need at least 12. This was fresh supplies of petrol and oil would be awaiting them, pointed out to corps headquarters and a request made to enable them to be used as required or to return to for five more carrying tanks. The reply was that we their park. had been allotted all the corps had at its disposal, and The only “fly in the ointment” was that on apply- that no more could be obtained. A strong hint was ing to corps headquarters for permission to use sever also given us to be careful with those we had, as both lorries from the divisional supply column to carry up the Tanks Corps and the Fourth Army were a little the second loads for the tanks and dump them on the peeved at the loss of those allotted to the 4th and 5th cross-road in front of our lines, we met with a distinct Divs. for the attack on August 8. refusal; and nothing we could say or do could alter that We were thus faced with the problem of how to make decision. The reason was that general headquarters, in seven tanks do the work of twelve, and at the same view of the shortage of lorries and the difficulty of time deliver their loads to the troops within reasonable time of their having reached their objectives. The solu¬ replacing them, had issued strict orders that no lorries tion was comparatively simple (viewing the problen were to be taken within a mile (or some such distance) of the front line; and the administrative staff at corps purely theoretically)—make two trips with the tanks— headquarters was not prepared to ignore that instruc¬ but when one attempted to put it into practice it dic tion. In fact, corps headquarters went so far as to not appear quite so easy. In the first place, the carry¬ issue a definite order to us that we were not to use any ing tanks had not been specially built for the job, but lorries for such a purpose. were simply early model tanks from which the guns hac been removed. Although their engines had been over¬ Fortunately they did not instruct the divisional supply hauled and were in good condition, they were still com¬ column that its lorries were not to be used. Conse¬ paratively slow, and one could not count on them averag¬ quently, when I went to Major Shierlaw, who commanded ing more than three miles an hour. Their radius of that unit, explained the whole position to him (including action, therefore, was limited, and the division was at the corps order to us), and asked him how he could hely the time a day's march from the front line, and as us out of our difficulty, he said that if I would instruct yet unaware of the exact date of the attack. him to detail seven lorries for detached duty at divi¬ There were, however, one or two things in our favour, sional headquarters for 24 hours on any specific date the chief of which was the presence of a fair metalled (without telling him why they were wanted), he would road running parallel to our front line between us and let me have them and not say anything to corps head¬ the Boche. Another was that a carrying tank could quarters about it. That got over that difficulty. carry approximately about three tons of supplies, the There were other technical matters that had to be same weight as the heavy lorries of the divisional sup¬ attended to, such as obtaining loading parties of an ply column. The third point in our favour was that, N.C.O. and eight men from each battalion and training although the 1st Aust. Div. Supply Column was in them in the loading and unloading of tanks, so that no reality a part of corps troops and under the direct time would be lost on the morning of the attack. We control of corps headquarters, it had been detached got these men several days before the fight took place with us during the time we had been in the Hazebrouck and billeted them with the tank crews with whom they area under the 15th Corps (from April to July, 1918), had to work, so that they would get to know one an- and there was consequently an excellent understanding other thoroughly. There were two infantry parties to between its officers and men and the Administrative Staff each tank, as each had to carry stores for two battalions Officers at divisional headquarters. Finally, the lieu¬ —for one unit on the first trip and for the other on tenant in charge of our carrying tanks was very “fed¬ the second. Each tank was given a different coloured up” regarding what had happened to the tanks allotted flag to fly, and the infantry parties attached to it wore armbands of the same colour to enable the tank crews to the 4th and 5th Divs., and was keen on making a success of the present operations. to recognise them easily. After due consideration, involving a number of time It was also arranged that the second infantry load¬ and space calculations, such as the distances the tanks ing party waiting on the cross-road with the second load would have to travel and the time available to them, it for the tank should mark its dump with a flag of the was decided that it would be possible for the tanks to same colour as its tank was flying. This would enable make two trips provided they had not have to come the tanks to find their second loads without waste of time. back further than our present front line to pick un their second load. The presence of the metalled road It was also necessary to ascertain by experiment the parallel to our front line made this possible, for that most useful load for a tank and how it should be car¬ road could quickly be repaired sufficiently to make it ried. The whole operation, once the general principles It could also be reached passable for motor lorries. to be followed had been agreed upon, was placed under from the main Peronne-Villers-Bretonneux road, provided the personal direction of the D.A.Q.M.G. of the divi¬ steps were taken to bridge the trenches running across sion (Major Kerr). He, in conjünction with the Tank the latter as soon as the attack opened. Corps lieutenant and the infantry N.C.O.’s, worked out It was our intention to load the tanks (two of which the loads for the tanks (taking care that everything the were allotted to each of the 1st and 2nd Bdes., and infantry battalions wanted was on each tank), and also three to the 3rd Bde.). and work them up to within a drill for loading and unloading them. Preparatory to two miles of the front line two nights before the attack loading a tank, the stores to be carried would be set was due to take place. It so happened that there was out on the ground in a special order in two rows, with a convenient valley in which -they could lie hidden room for the tank to come in between them. Then on during the day preceding the attack, provided they the word “Load,” four men would mount the tank, two were well scattered and properly camouflaged. Then on on each side, while the other four men, also two on the night preceding the attack they were to move for¬ each side, handed up the various articles to be loaded 0 LeG KIIISG IU SCPTC OEETASPe OHI (0 SS: IN ESPPIIC
M0 LGGOLG" KIIIOG IE GOTICV' I, CVEEAEICHI' PEuce-COLbOLSI EDMVED (M0 SPPSIIOU) 10 LGCOLI Drg O o Do CVELTEDGE' BLTASTe EDAIM VMEE (o' SSS: Jar Brousel BePrSIIOU) in the correct order. A similar procedure, except in the reverse order, was followed in unioading. ICU PUGI AVE- Once the correct load had been finally decided upon and the loading and unloading drill evolved, it was practised TqO (S)I0'IdId) continuously both by day and night, each battalion party vying with the others to see which could do the task CVKLEE in the shortest time. The result was that at the end ITO) of two or three days a tank could be correctly loaded in the dark in a surprisingly brief period. A couple of lorries were borrowed from the divisional supply column, and loading and unloading them was also practised. When we receiyed word on August 21 that the attack was to take place on the morning of August 23, we were fully prepared. That afternoon the tanks were all CVELEE loaded and provided with their identification flags and IOU) camouflage screens. The same night they moved to their place of assembly within a couple of miles of the front line, where they were camouflaged and lay “doggo” all I* next day. Accompanying them were the infantry par¬ ybh o ties from the battalions whose stores they were carrying I' SUG CIIGLEE on the first trip. Seven lorries were obtained from the divisional supply column on the afternoon of August 22 and loaded with the second load of stores for the tanks. CVEI N BEPPEIIOE) These were retained under divisional control. Accom¬ panying each lorry was the infantry party from the battalion whose stores it contained. Each such party carried with it ample supplies of thin rope for lashing the load on the tank, and a flag of its tank's distinguish¬ ing colour. On the morning of the attack everything went like clockwork. The first loads were delivered without any CVELEE T HOLe geETMene) hitch, and the tanks began to return to the cross-road for their second loads. On the way back one of the Ist Bde.’s tanks developed engine trouble and could not continue. This did not matter very much for the first O DCOETTOI three loads for the 3rd Bde. had been dumped close pe I nce O behind the 1st Bde.’s second objective, and would have 9 been made available for it if necessary. This had been arranged between the two brigades concerned. The three tanks containing the second loads for the 3rd Bde¬ CVELE BEPPSITOU) had the worst job, because they had to wait around be hind the second objective until the 3rd Bde. advanced to carry out the third phase. As this necessitated them lying hidden in the Chuignes Valley for two or three U PU A - hours, the lieutenant in charge of the section accom¬ panied them on that trip. G Meanwhile two companies of the 1st Aust. Pnr. Bn. had gone over shortly after the attacking troops, and CVELE! Be PCSJTOU) immediately started work—one on the cross-road and the other on the main road—to make them passable for lorries. At zero hour the lorries left their park at Corbie and proceeded up the Villers-Bretonneux-Peronne road, and by the time they arrived at our old front line found a clear road ahead of them. They swung left along the cross-road and dumped their loads and infantry parties in previously arranged spots where guides were waiting for them. That done, they returned to the CVELEB PPSIIOL) divisional supply column, none of them, fortunately, having been hit, although there was a fair amount of long-distance- shelling of roads being done by the Boche. The six tanks still in action picked up and delivered their second loads without any further accident, and B' DLOCXSI then two of them towed their disabled comrade back to their place of assembly. The whole stunt proved highly successful, but we had not put all our eggs into one CVELEB IICI) basket. Each brigade had received instructions from divisional headquarters that it was not to rely entirely upon the tanks doing the job, but was to organise a pack-horse train with a duplicate set of supplies, so that if the tanks failed the units would still get their XOXEXX stores. Fortunately the success of the tanks rendered the use of the pack trains unnecessary, although I believe that one brigade did get additional stores up by that means. L'N' BSPPOLA) Jea: POSA LOCH' OPPEI E EIOLCIGG V' CGLTGL KTIIG E SOPTOD' SAATS CVEIEE BLTASTe EEME2L OHM (Ho* 1204. 32 BereSIICI)
RI jo- May 30, 1931 REV Lost: A Digger’s Escapade It was after dark when we occupied advanced posts near Hereville Woods for the first time, and so hopelessly lost were we all that we had our backs to the enemy, instead of our fronts. On the third night we set out t. take over posts. Major was in the lead. Major took a turn to the left. I knew he was wrong, so I told my platoon officer. “Go ahead and tell the Major, he commanded. “Get back to your place, and when I want directions l’Il ask for them,” was how the Major greeted my attempt to set him right. Another 10 minutes floundering about in the dark, and the Major sent for me. He appointed me guide, and we retraced our steps to the fork, then branched slightly to the right, and found our posts. The penalty for my cleverness was that I had to escort the Major back to Herleville Woods. I did this easily, but in returning I reckoned 1 would take a short cut, proving that I wasn’t so clever after all. Had I gone back to my own H.Q. I could have picked up the track without diffculty. But in my short-cut I miscalculated a lot, und hit a chalk pit instead of the old front line. To make matters worse, a Fritz bomber dropped about ten grass cutters in and around the pit. This rattled me for a while, but when pushed on again I still reckoned I could find e of the four posts by the short-cut. At last. when I considered that I was near one o. d posts, I whistled softly, "Pretty Joey there was no answer. Another 50 yards on whistled again : still no answer. The clouds had now blotted out the stars, and I was absolutely lost and nervy. I came to a trench. I knew there were several unoccupled trenches about, but when one's eyes, ears, and nerves are magnifying LONELY BUT FOR things it is not safe to trust them. Somc¬ THE SHELLS! thing moved in the trench! I got into a hell-hole and whistled again ; no answer. en sneaked off in the opposite direction, and found a road. It led me to a village. I saw a cigarette glow, and was glad, but my heart missed about five beats when someone spoke in German. I beat a quick retreat, mbled into another small trench, and saw something ead of me. was too close to sneak off, so I promptly bayonetted -a sheet of iron ! stayed in that trench for a time, trying to collect my scattered oughts. There was no firing from either side, so I had no means of picking up my bearings. I drew my bayonet across the corrugations on a sheet of iron to attract attention, and though no one fired, a cold shiver ran along my back when I thought that someone might come t to investigate. I got windy, and beat it. Then something moved ain a few yards ahead of me. It was crawling off as I sprang at it and ripped at it with my bayonet— It was a bush! ay there exhausted and bewildered, praying for a shell to put me cut of my misery. Then drizzling rain started to fall. I moved off, and slipped into a big shell-hole, and now thoroughly tired out, dropped off to sleep. It was broad daylight when I awoke. I poked up my head, had a quick look round, but had to bob down quickly as stream of Lewis gun bullets buzzed about my ears. I held my tin hat on the t of my bayonet, hoping that the machine gunner would recognise it, but both Lewis gunner and Fritz blazed at it. I sat tight after that until dark, and sneaked round the post, and got in all right. I was too pleased even to roar the Lewis gunner up for being such a fool as to shoot at me. The sergeant, an M.M. and Bar, told me cowardice was a bad thing in the army. Had it not been that the officer was a good sort, would have been hauled up for I told him I won V.C.’s by the my little piece of oratory to Mr. S. bucket—I baypnetted one Fritz and choked the life out of another, whereas he got his M.M.'s for being good-looking. Anyway, what I told the sgt. about myself would have been right had the iron and the bush been Germans.—“2ND BN. 113 zoze e ? 101- a 1-
REVEILLE October 1, 1932 Largest Trophy: Aussie Capture Referring to the 3rd Bn’s capture in Arcy Wood, on the Somme, in August, 1918, of the 15-inch naval gun¬ “the largest single trophy secured during the war”—a writer in “The Rising Sun,” of Adelaide, mentions that the then Prime Minister (Mr. Hughes) was anxious to have the gun taken to Australia. Before he abandoned the gun, the enemy had blown off the barrel, which was 70 feet long. The gun, with its carriage, platform, and con¬ crete foundations, weighed more than 500 tons. It had a range of more than 24 miles, and its shell weighed nearly a ton. A double line of railway several miles in length had been specially built to the site in order to instal the gun, and for the transport of its ammunition. The gun was electrically trained and elevated, and the machinery for handling its shells and for loading it was electrically operated. The gun was ready for firing the first week in June, 1918. and fired continuously for about three weeks, its maximum firing capacity being about 30 rounds a day. Towards the end of June the original gun was worn out and it was replaced by the evening of August 7—the night before our attack. It started firing again on the early morning of August 8 and fired 35 shells in all. Early next morning, as the gun was then within range of our heavy artillery, the crew removed everything that could be removed, and about 9 o’clock the gun was blown up. As to the wish of Mr. Hughes to have the gun taken to Australia as a trophy of war, it was reported by experts that it would be necessary to have special railway cranes brought from England to lift it. and special trucks to carry it. The cost of transport was estimated at some thousands of pounds, and the corps commander (General Hobbs) would not accept the responsibility for this expenditure. While Mr. Hughes was emphatic that the gun must be sent to Australia he would not put his demand in writing or authorise the necessary expenditure. Eventually, on the sug- gestion of Capt. Kemsley,. of the administrative branch of corps h'qrs., the gun was fenced in, and the site presented to the City of Amiens as a monument to the part the Australian Corps had played in the defence. ground was of a very rough nature, and the work was often delayed be- se of obstructions in the form of large boulders. It happened he se boulders wae .

Notes.
7 Aug. 1918. Order of 85th Res. Inf.Bde (German) 200 marks to
be paid to Cpl.Rademacher, L/Cpl Muller, and Grendr Sonderman
213rd RIR for bringing in 2 pr isoners of the 18th English Divn.
35th Batalion, BRAY.
Col.White in his Hqrs at Etinhem on the day of the
fight NE of Bray, on return from the line, told us:-
The Germans put down at 3.45am a solid barrage
on the whole area, f ortunately mostly behind the J.O.line.
T he troops were lying out at the time, End only one platoon
was wiped out on the xxxxxxxxx J.O.line.
One instantaneous fuse got amongst them and wiped out a
sergeant and about 10 men.
They got away very well. The German barrage
slackened 5 to 10 mins before zero, but they got their barrage
going again within 2 minutes of ours opning. The German
shortened his barrage but didnt pick up our line till
it halted, on the brown line. Abt 20 mins before they left the
brown line the German was onto them again. From on top it is
dead level to Bray. The only incident on the way to the brown
line was in a small copse in L14B1;4;. The German had a machine
gun Hdqrs and telephone station and deep dugouts there. They
fought there and our line was held for a time but the flanks
got on and mopped it out. 50 to 60 prisoners came from these
dugouts. 2 L.T. Ms were there - it had been the German
support position. "It is the first occasion on which I have
ever seen box latrines in a German position and real sanitation", 

said White, "and a dugout fit to live in without our
having to have it thoroughly cleaned first. There were not many
casualties in the 35th. In the copse there were several casualties. 

None occurred after that till we got on to the ridge
overlooking Bray. The Germans then xgassed the valley running
from 14 A and B with tear and sneezing gas. They quickly shortend
their barrage (5.9 all the time) and followed us very quickly.
One battery could be seen on the left but they ceased before
we reached the green line. He searched the area very effectively. 

We had to have gas helmets on for half an hour.
M.G fire began about then and livened up from
Bray and the ridges N.E of Bray. It was not enough to be annoying
and at fairly long range except from Bray. Xxxxxxxxxx
But as our artillery died away the German mgs livened up and
made it difficult getting about. Lt Ades was too keen and got
out too far (and was killed) We dug in on the railway - the
military line in 9D- and patrolled out to where we could get
a look round the back of BRAY. But M.Gs and Xxxxxxxxx
a L.T.M. which in 2 shots killed or wounded a whole L.G post,
made it impossible to get round the far side. If we had been
prepared to lose men we cd have got round but it wd have
required a special operation. There must be a mg in some ofhhe
bldgs in order to reach some of the country which their shots
are reaching - possibly one in the church- you cannot reach the
right front company at present for this reason.
We were in touch with the 3rd Pioneers on the right and
the 33 rd on the left the whole of the way. The pioneers did
very well, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx where they are on
their objective in linkingnup.
We got a lot of prisoners in a quarry. I was visiting
our left company at the time and we had to go across beyond
this quarry to them. As we did so a number of Germans there
began to get away. 6 got away - but we got 30 (the colonel and
his orderly apparently did this). The Germans fought with
bombs abd rifles in the prisoners cage. But our men fired
a smoke bomb onto it and the Germans went for their lives. They
would probably be afraid of our men getting on top of them throuh
the smoke.
The cavalry went through the Tommies, but there
must have been a tremendous lot oi guns up on the ridge. 15

 

2
horses galloped out of Bray without riders - 5 went along the
Bray Corbie road. I fancy these were led horses that had
been stampeded. Probably they were the horses of dismounted
cavalrymen. M.Gs burst out in the rear when the cavalry went
throgu (I suppose this means towards the German rear).
We got on to three of these mgs. One was in the cemetery. You
could see the steam from his gun and we got a L.G onto them and
kept them quiet.
The gas took the dash out of the men.The smoke was
very thick in that valley. The rate of barrage was 100 yds in
4 minutes. This was very slow for our men, and the hours halt
much too long (-n.b the British had to move much further and
we had to swing slowly with them). White only got the order to
exploit at 12.30, (midnight night of attack) The barrage was
timed for 2.15. and as the companies had to be in position an
hour before zero this left 45 mins - no time really to arrange
the exploitation. White had asked specially about exploitation
before, and was told No - it wd not be allowed. It wd have meant
a scrap, as it turned out; but had we organised for it he
thinks Bray cd have been taken in our stride. We cd have rushed
the guns which were firing on our objective. But as it was the
men had been told they were for a certain objective and that
they were to dig in there; And when you have once told them
that, and they have got it thoroughly into their heads, it is
hard to get them to move on the spur of the moment.
One German mg was knocked out by a L.G. bullet.
there were abt 120 prisoners and 40 - say 200 probably for
this battalion. Abt 60 Germans were ded in their old positions
(take this with caution - may be true , may not). We are 100
to 150 yds ahead of our objve. 5 or 6 tanks were knocked out.
White asked permission to establish his Hqrs forward - and was
given it. But it had just been withdrawn when we saw him, and
he had been ordered back to his old Hqs above Etinhem. He said
that the old Hqrs with its single sheet of iron overhead and
well registered by the Germans was far more dangerous. But
that nights C/attack showed that perhaps there was some reason
in the order. The attack was just beginning as we walked back
from Whites hqrs.

 

[*H.N*]

HOW A BRAVE OFFICER FELL.
Mr Hy. F. Dench, of Burke Road, Camberwell, has
received a letter of sympathy from Brig: Gen: W. Ramsay
McNicoll of the 10th Brigade, Victoria, and giving details
of how Captain Harold Dench, C.O. of the 38th Battalion
(Bendigo) met his death. The following is an extract
from the letter:-
"As a Company Commander he had a most responsible
"position, and the manner in which he handled his Company
"and behaved in most difficult circumstances, drew high
"praise from his Commanding Officer, who was, unfortunately,
"killed a few days later. Your son fell a few hours after
"one of the most successful operations which has been undertaken
"by this Brigade. An imprtant town on the SOMME had [*Bray*]
"just been captured, and he and his Company were given the
"post of honour - the guarding of the left flank - to protect
"the town. It was a difficult and dangerous position, but
"largely owing to Harold's work and fine example the position
"was consolidated and held under very heavy fire and against
"determined counter-attacks. He was killed instantly by a sniper
"whilst rallying men, not Australians, on his flank, who, having
"lost their officers, were giving way. It was a most gallant
"action on his part, for he had to stand and direct them in the
"open under heavy fire, but he succeeded in rallying them before
"he was hit, and this act alone was of the greatest service
"to the Brigade - and indeed to the whole Australian Corps."
Lt: Col: Hurrey also writes to say: "The Battalion
"has been fighting continuously since August 8th, and up to
"the time of his death your son was in no small degree 
"responsible for the splendid things that now stand to the credit of
"the Battalion. He had no fear whatever, and the example of
"courage and resourcefulness that he set to his Company was
"simply invaluable."
P. T. O.

 

2
(continued)
Captain Peters, O.C. "C" Coy., writes conveying
sympathy on behalf of the men, N.C.O's, and Officers:-
"Harold was known for his cool courage, initiative,
"and thoroughness. He was a grand leader, one who will be
"a big loss to our dear old 38th. You would kike to hear the
story of his death, I am sure, for it is a very noble story indeed.
"On August the 24th "C" Coy was holding a line in front of
"the BRAY MORLANCOURT ROAD, during the early stages of our
"Advance Guard operations near the SOMME. "C" Coy's H.Q.
"were in a chalk pit off a sunken road. Some troops on our
flanks (not Australians) became disorganised and commenced to
"come back. Captain Dench made heroic efforts to rally them,
"and it was on his second trip to the flank that he was killed
by a M.G. or sniper's bullet. At the same time Lieut: Barker
who was with him was severely wounded."
Lieut: Martin writes:- "The Brigade captured an important
"town, BRAY, on the morning of the 24th August, and then 
"consolidated a line on its eastern side, which was subjected to very
"heavy shelling and some determined counter-attacks by the enemy.
"The 38th was on the left, and Harold and his Company were
"given the post of honour - the guarding of the left flank -
"for we were very doubtful of the troops on our left, who were
not Australians. Every officer and man in the Battalion
"says that from the moment the advance bagan Harold did
"wonderful work, and that his disregard of danger and personal
"example had much to do with the way the men kept to their
"work of consolidation under very trying conditions. During
"one of the enemy attacks the troops on the left broke, and
"Harold rushed out in the open under extremely heavy fire and
"succeeded in stopping the rot, and getting most of them in
"with his own Company. It was a daring and fine action on
"his part, but just as he had rallied them a sniper hit him
"and he died instantly.
[*Twice mentioned in Dispatches by Sir

Douglas Haig for "Gallant & Meritorious 

Services"*]

 

[*30 Aug 1940*]

Newspaper cuttings - see original document

“TEDDY THE RAIDER"
TRIBUTE TO LIEUT. CRANSWICK
A MEMORY OF DREADFUL DAYS.

Death of a War Hero
LIEUT. T. G. CRANSWICK, M.C., D.CM.

 

107. Infanterie Division.
Div. St. Qu., den 24. VIII. 1918.
Abt. Ib Nr. 4837.
Besondere Anordnungen.
1.) G.O. Die Truppenteile, Lager - und Ortskommandanturen haben sofort 

in den Unterkunftsorten und Biwakplätzen Gasalarmgeräte in
ausreichender Zahl anzubringen. Es dürfen nur Geräte, die 
geschlagen werden, verwandt werden.
Die Gasalarmgeräte sind durch Schilder mit der Aufschrift
"Gasalarm" kenntlich zu machen.
2.) G.0. In dem Bereich jeder Lager- bezw. Ortskommandantur tst ein
Reizraun einzurichten, der durch ein Schild zu bezeichnen ist.
3.) IIb. Oel und Fette pp. für M.G. können von den Truppen in kletnen 

Mengen bein Unladekommando der Division (Sgt. Grunert) in
Peronne, Friedhofstr.22 empfangen werden.
Für die Richtigkett:
[J Shaefer?]    gex. Havenstein.
Hauptmann u. 2. Genstbs. Offizier.
Verteilungsplan wie bisher.
107. Infanterie Division.
Div. St. Qu., den 24. VIII. 1918.
Abt. Ib Nr. 4837.
Besondere Anordnungen.
1.) G.O. Die Truppenteile, Lager - und Ortskommandanturen haben sofort 

in den Unterkunftsorten und Biwakplätzen Gasalarmgeräte in
ausreichender Zahl anzubringen. Es dürfen nur Geräte, die 
geschlagen werden, verwandt werden.
Die Gasalarmgeräte sind durch Schilder mit der Aufschrift
"Gasalarm" kenntlich zu machen.
2.) G.0. In dem Bereich jeder Lager- bezw. Ortskommandantur tst ein
Reizraun einzurichten, der durch ein Schild zu bezeichnen ist.
3.) IIb. Oel und Fette pp. für M.G. können von den Truppen in kletnen 

Mengen bein Unladekommando der Division (Sgt. Grunert) in
Peronne, Friedhofstr.22 empfangen werden.
Für die Richtigkett:
[J Shaefer?]    gex. Havenstein.
Hauptmann u. 2. Genstbs. Offizier.
Verteilungsplan wie bisher.

 

12
REVEILLE
September 1, 1933
Battle of Chuignes
(By Lieut.-Col. H. G. Viney, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.)

 

 

Newspaper cutting - see original document

 

[*Reveille*]

May 30, 1931 REV
Lost: A Digger’s Escapade

 

[*H.N.]
REVEILLE     October 1, 1932
Largest Trophy: Aussie Capture

 
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