Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/273/1 - 1918 - 1937 - Part 9

40
"Weston"
Prince Street
Goulburn
17/6/35
[*24/6/18:
Starkey says: 1 m.g. only ws brought back - the
Two men Took back / prisoners & could only take one of
the guns. No confce before attack on post - they sent
away / prisoners & then went on to far edge of wood.*]
C. E. W Bean Esq
Official Historian
Victoria Barracks
Paddington
No 9250
Dear Mr Bean:
Acknowledging receipt of your letter of
the 4^th ult. in which you desire information regarding
the Hangard Wood episode.
Firstly  I do not remember meeting any
members of the 20^th Battalion in the Wood
Secondly  The story of the episode as far as my
memory serves me is as follows:-
The 19^th Battalion, in company with other
battalions of the 5^th Brigade, was hurried down from
around Messines to the Villers Brettonaux sector,
at the time the 5^th Army fell back from before the
German offensive;- we passed through the
villages of Blangy Tronville and Coisy, —
deserted by the villagers, but occupied by
large numbers of disorganised Tommies: —
eventually we came to an open field where
we were halted and orders given to dig in.
Some little distance in front of us
could be seen a wood - Hangard Wood -
and beyond it to the left. a Church spire,
marking the location of some town – probably
Villers Bretonnaux. We could see no
sign of the Germans, all was quiet
except for an occasional shell going well
over, and a steady drizzle had set in.
B. Coy of the 19^th. Battalion had just got well 

(2)     41
dug in when a runner came from Battalion Hdqrtrs
– which was located in a haystack some little distance
back –, with instructions for Company Commanders
to report to Major Harrison Walker who was the Acting
Colonel in charge of the Bn. Captain Wallach
was Company Commander of B. Coy. at the time:–
On his return he told us that we had to go ahead
through the wood. and dig in on the far side
under cover of darkness, and the following night
we would be consolidated by the other three Companies
Zero hour was 4. a.m.
We were to be assisted by an artillery barrage
preceding our advance and we were told
that aeroplanes had made a reconnaissance and
had reported that we would meet no opposition until
we got through the wood, but that the Germans were
thoroughly entrenched the other side.
At Zero hour we started off, but the
barrage did not eventuate, and when about
50 yds from the wood. we encountered heavy
machine gun fire from an outpost that was
established on the near edge of the wood and was
camouflaged by branches of trees, so that the
aeroplanes apparently did not notice it.
Our chaps fell like ninepins, in the face
of the machine gun fire, and I found myself
in the wood with 6 men, and shortly afterwards
came across Lieut Storkey with 4 men.
We then held a council of war, and
realising that it was useless to go on, we
decided the best thing to do was to try and
clean up the German outpost and get
back to our line. Storkey took one flank
of the 10 men and I the other and with
much shouting we dashed back at the outpost 

(3)       42
and got be getting in quickly with bombs, bayonet
and revolver, before they had time to realise just
how weak we were in numbers; - there were
more than 80 Germans in the post and we killed
about 30 and the remainder "Kameraded",
we quickly disarmed them and marched them 
back to battalion headquarters together with their
machine gun which to-day is mounted in the 
Australian War Museum.
Dawn was by then just breaking, and as
we returned with our prisoners, a party of
Germans from their front line beyond the wood
came through after us and began to fire,
consequently we were forced to leave most of
our own wounded. I picked up one
chap on the way. - a 20^th Bn sergeant - I
fancy his name is Ross, he was badly
wounded in the chest and although Fritz
fired at us several times I managed to get
him in with the assistance of one of B. Coy
Lew men, named Lewis. I heard
afterwards that the Sergeant had recovered
from his wounds.
This is the only occasion that I personally
came in contact with any member of the 20^th.
Bn.
After reporting to Bn Headquarters I
returned to the trench we had vacated a few
hours previously and finding Storkey already
there we spread out a waterproof sheet and
stretched out for a rest, with Signaller Barling
sitting on an ammunition box a couple of yards
away. I had just said to Storkey "Sweet
dreams Perc", when a shell burst on the
top of the shallow trench. above us, burying 

(40      43
the three of us:- when we were dug out we found
Storkey was shaken up but unwounded. The
Signaller was killed and I was wounded in
the knee & thigh. I was carried out and
after passing through hospitals at Rouen and
Wandsworth returned to Australia on the Hospital
Ship "Malta" in October 1918.
Lieut Storkey was 2nd in command of
B. Coy. at the time. He was awarded
the Victoria Cross and I the Military Cross under
Army Orders of General Sir H.S. Rawlinson
commanding the Fourth Army. dated June 3^rd 1918.
We lost some very fine men in that stunt
including Capt. "Doss" Wallach.
The following is ^copy of a letter from General Birdwood
which may be of some use to you in writing up
the episode.
Headquarters
A.I.F
France.
22/6/18
"Dear Lipscomb.
I write to convey to you my hearty congratulations
on the award of the Military Cross, which you have
thoroughly well earned by your good and gallant
service. During your our attack at Bois de Hangard,
You displayed marked courage and initiative when
with Lieut Storkey and ten other ranks, you attacked
an enemy party of about 80 to 100 strong. and
dislodged them from their position. killing about
30 and capturing the remainder of them and a
machine gun. Thank you so much for
your fine conduct, and with good wishes"
Yours sincerely
W. R Birdwood
I trust the foregoing details may be of some
help to you.
Yours sincerely
F.N. Lipscomb 

"Weston"
Prince Street
Goulburn
20/6/35
C.E W Bean Esq.
Victoria Barracks
Sydney
Dear Mr Bean:
Further to my letter of the 17^th inst.
giving details of the Hangard Wood episode.
I find I looking over copy of the letter that
I have made a mistake in the name of the officer
who was commanding the battalion at the time:-
it was Major Walker, not Major Harrison.x
Yours faithfully
F.N. Lipscomb 

89            75/H
Headquarters,
58th Division.
April 19thx 1918.
Dear Smythe,
The 5th Australian Brigade are leaving us today. I want to
tell how very much we appreciated having them. All the fighting
and work they did here was splendid; one and all from their
Brigadier Gen. Smith downwards were all out to help and we found
them all first class to work with. I am afraid they had a none too
good a time in this bad weather but they were all wonderfully cheery
and willing. I have never had the good luck to be with the
Australians this war, but I think I can safely say they are quite
one of the best fighting units I have come across.
Will you please convey to Brigadier Genl. Smith and the 5th
Australian Brigade our very deep appreciation of their services
whilst they were with us.
Yours very sincerely,
(SGD) A.B.E. CATOR. 

THE ROYAL TANK CORPS JOURNAL
69
The climax is, perhaps, the saddest part of this grim
drama. The surgeon involved, who was both young and
ambitious, wrote an enthusiastic account for the Lancet,
under a heading of "Remarkable Tonsillar Catastrophe."
The account was featured and subsequently referred to in
all medical records as the R.T.C. Case.
There seems to be no limit, does there? The point
is that there are many people in the world called Robinson,
who can only be inter-distinguished by adding prefixes
to their surname, e.g., Jack, Swiss Family, Revolving, etc.
In the same way, if we persist, will we soon become known
under some such redundant soubriquet as the "Tanks
R.T.C.?"
Sir, I have said enough; I feel your support, and
that of your public, is already won.
When my blood has cooled I hope again to use your
columns to inveigh against the slack and anachronistic
habit of some of my colleagues, who, when asked their
Regiment, say they are in the "Tank Corps". Well,
words fail me (as they fail them). Was it for nothing that
. . . . . But, I digress; some other time perhaps, when
you're not too busy.
With pride, I have the honour to be,
Sir, Your obedient servant,
R. D. AYCHE,
Lieut., R. Tanks.
ANOTHER PROTEST
The Editor, The Royal Tank Corps Journal.
Sir,
You have asked me to protest against (sorry! I
should have said "reply to") the protest of Mr. R. D.
Ache (again I must apologise—the word should read
"Ayche"). But there does seem to be an ache somewhere!
In fact, an "R.T.C." "ache."
I understand that the Editorial staff wish to ask pardon
for their and their contributors' sins of omission (the
omissions of these controversial letters "oyal ank orps")
in the past. They, the Editorial staff, admit they have on
all too numerous (apparently) occasions used that
(seemingly) most reprehensible abbreviation "R.T.C."
But they say they laboured under the delusion (as it now
appears to be) that by "R.T.C." was meant "The Royal
Tank Corps," and not any other or more obscure collection
of words, as, for instance, the Rural Transport Company.
You will realise how difficult a situation it is. These
letters "R.T.C." will flow so easily from the pen.
Yet—what about, say, the abbreviation "R.A."?
Do these two simple and easily written letters really mean
"The Royal Artillery"? When we read that Major
Z.Y.Z. has been appointed to the staff of the R.A., what
are we to understand? There, indeed, is an obscure
association—one might even say a rare association—of
letters. Are we to hasten to the nearest post office and
telegraph our congratulations to X.Y.Z. upon his appointment
as a Royal Academician? Truly a difficult situation!
Again, in time of war, say in the middle of an advance
when bullets, shells, bombs, aerial darts, gas, liquid fire—
aye, even Tanks—are whizzing round one's head, are
we to stay our progress and consider the question of how we
should address the Company or Battalion commander on
our flank? We may have been told, in Battle Orders,
that we are to maintain touch with "B" Coy., 2nd Bn.
A.B.C.L.I. (for Mr. Ayche's sake we had better explain
that the last two letters, "L.I.", actually mean "Light
Infantry," and not, for example, "Liberal Imbibers" or
any other combination whatsoever) on our left flank.
Now we have an important message to send to O.C. "B"
Coy., A.B.C.L.I. Are we to sit down and consult with our
Company or platoon commanders as to the proper method
of addressing the commander of "B" Coy., A.B.C.L.I.?
And in the meantime, do not let us forget these bullets,
shells, bombs, aerial darts, gas, liquid fire— and Tanks.
They make such pleasant companions! To "B"
(A.B.C.L.I.), or not to "B" (A.B.C.L.I.)—that is the
question.
Was there ever devised such a problem? (Don't
forget those bullets, shells, bombs, aerial darts, gas, liquid
fire— and tanks!)
Are we to sit down and indite some message similar to
the following:—
"From: (here follows our (probably very incorrectly
written) designation).
To: The Officer Commanding "Bee" Company,
First Battalion, The Absolutely Bored County Light
Infantry.
I have to inform you that SHELL FIRE and
MACHINE GUN FIRE is becoming VERY MUCH
HEAVIER on our RIGHT FLANK ack ack ack Will
you please inform me how many FULL tins of JAM
(Pickler's ALUM AND PAPPLE for preference) you
have in your COMPANY ack ack ack
Z.Y.X. Cholmondeley-Snorter,
Captain,
Commanding ACK COMPANY,
Second Battalion THE BLANKSHIRE AND
DASHIRE REGIMENT.
(DUKE OF PLAZATORO'S OWN).
Now, Mr. Editor, have we said enough? Have we
most amply and humbly apologised for your past sins?
We do not particularly care for the job of apologising
for other people's sins—but we have done our best in the
trying circumstances.
Remember, remember—no, not the Fifth of November
—but that too utterly utter abbreviation—"R.T.C."
(May I mention, in confidence, that my fee for this
contribution to your columns is Fifty Guineas—and I
hope I get 'em!).
Yours, more in sorrow than anger,
ARR TEE CEE.

70
THE ROYAL TANK CORPS JOURNAL
[*July 1935*]
THE GERMAN TANK ATTACK
April 24th, 1918
By MAJOR-GENERAL J. F. C. FULLER, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.
Some time ago there was published an account of the
action of British tanks on April 24th, 1918. Since
writing it I have obtained what appears to be a
fairly accurate summary of what the German tanks
accomplished on that day. And as this was the first
occasion on which tank met tank, I think it may be of
interest to readers of the Royal Tank Corps Journal.
On the evening of 21st April a detachment of thirteen
German tanks was detrained at Guillaucourt, where one,
due to a cracked cylinder head was left, and the remaining
twelve moved to Wiencourt, their second line transport
remaining at the detraining station. Whilst they were
being detrained they were bombed by aircraft but suffered
no inconvenience, neither did the hostile aircraft discover
the nature of their target.
On the 22nd the detachment was organised into three
groups and their leaders were given their instructions;
the situation and objectives were explained and detailed
descriptions were given of the routes to be taken to the
starting line. Touch was also obtained with the infantry
to be supported by the tanks, and the plans and execution
of the attack was discussed with them. Further, a munition
and fuel depot was established at Guillaucourt. If the
attack proved successful each group was to be supplied
by two lorries, one with ammunition and the other with
petrol, which were to advance at first as far as Wiencourt,
and later as far as Marcelcave. Any further advance
of these supply lorries was to be left to the discretion of the
group leaders.
On the 23rd April the tasks for the "Scopnik" group
(attached 228th Infantry Division) and for the Uihlein
group (attached 4th Guards Infantry Division) were
outlined as follows:—
(1) The "Scopnik" group, after the penetration
of Villers-Bretonneux by the infantry, was to support
the advance north of this village, and to return to the
rendezvous as soon as the 228th Infantry Division reached
its first day's objective north of Villers-Bretonneux.
(2) The Uihlein group was to support the advance
of the infantry into Bois d'Aquenne after Villers-
Bretonneux had been taken, and to return to the rendezvous
after the infantry had penetrated the wood.
Besides these orders, instructions were given to all
groups to hold themselves ready to act on their own
initiative in the case of enemy counter-attacks.
At 4.45 a.m. on the 24th April all the tanks began the
advance to their starting lines, which were reached
punctually. As these positions were close behind the
German front line the advance began after the preliminary
bombardment opened, in order to prevent the enemy from
hearing the noise of the engines.
The early stages of the attack took place in thick fog,
which began to clear at about 11 a.m. The condition of the
ground was extremely favourable for the tanks, because the
country to be traversed consisted mainly of dry cultivated
land and grass and was almost entirely free from obstacles
such as trenches and shell holes.
The "Scopnik" group left its starting line at 6.50 a.m.,
crossed the German front line at 7 a.m., and the enemy
front line shortly afterwards. The enemy front-line troops,
we are informed, defended their position obstinately, the
concealed machine-gun nests being difficult to recognise
in the thick fog. A heavy fire was open on the tanks.
After a short but violent fight, the enemy infantry occupying
the front-line trench and the garrisons of the machine-
gun nests surrendered. The prisoners were driven into the
arms of the German infantry who were following the tanks.
Tank No. 3 (Overleutnant Skopnik) proceeded under
heavy enemy rifle and artillery fire parallel to the railway
to within a hundred metres or so from the eastern outskirts
of Villers-Bretonneux. As the infantry did not follow,
and because by this time they had entirely lost touch with
them, the tank proceeded to return, destroyed four machine
-gun nests which had attacked it in the rear, and then
accompanied the infantry, who by this time had caught
it up, to the eastern outskirts of Villers-Bretonneux close
by the railway embankment. Here it was brought under
heavy machine-gun fire. The tank then proceeded along
the edge of Villers-Bretonneux and cleaned up the machine-
gun nests in that quarter, and in spite of an obstinate
defence. It then was pushed forward with the infantry into 
the village and proceeded as far as the railway crossing,
close to the Roman road on the western outskirts. In the
course of this manœuvre considerable enemy resistance
was broken. Tanks Nos. 1 and 2 (Lieuts. Vietze and
Volkheim), in the course of their advance, succeeded in
cleaning up the strongly entrenched gun nests which had been
holding up the advance of the German infantry, and, at
8.45 a.m., it joined tank No. 3 in front of the brick works.
It was only then that the visibility became good enough
to enable touch to be kept between the three tanks.
The brick works, which were strongly held by machine
guns, were attacked by the three tanks together and
paralysed by their fire. Those of the garrison who were
still alive surrendered. The prisoners were driven towards

the German infantry. Whilst infantry occupied the brick
works, tanks Nos. 1 and 2 advanced on the hangars which
were situated on the eastern outskirts of Villers-
Bretonneux, and which were defended by numerous
machine-gun nests. The hangars were destroyed by fire.
The tanks then proceeded along the eastern outskirts of
the village and reached the Roman road, after having
silenced several machine guns placed in houses.
At mid-day the tanks returned to their starting line
position, having performed their allotted task.
Losses: One officer severely wounded; two men
killed; 15 men wounded (including four of the accompanying
troops).
Shortly after 7 a.m. the Uihlein group crossed their
own front line. Tanks Nos. 1 and 2 (Lieuts. Hennecke
and Burmann) advanced along the railway embankment
towards Villers-Bretonneux, attacked a well-fortified
strong point in front and flank and finally in rear; caused
the garrison to evacuate it, and thus enabled the infantry
to advance. Tank No. 2 then cleared a trench running in
a westerly direction as far as the chapel. and killed a 

71

THE ROYAL TANK CORPS JOURNAL
number of the enemy and took 13 prisoners. Then, in
company with Tank No. 1, it proceeded in a westerly
direction through the railway station. Tank No. 2, in
the course of this advance, engaged with success a number
of enemy reinforcements which had been hastily brought
up, and at 10 a.m. reached the Roman road below the
railway crossing. In the meantime tank No.*1, in spite of
a defect in its gun mounting due to continual rolling
and rocking, destroyed several strong points and joined
tank No. 2. Both tanks then opened a heavy fire in the
Bois d'Aquenne and on the enemy reserves which had just
arrived west of this wood, which the German infantry
were thus enabled to enter. Tank No. 3 (Lieut. Theunissen) [*Capt*?]
was only intended to deal with the enemy resistance in
the early stages of the battle, and then join tanks Nos. 1
and 2. It advanced, however, over the enemy front line
and cleared the enemy trenches from the flank and rear, in
the course of which operation 30 prisoners were taken.
It then moved towards a fortified farm, the garden of
which was reached when engine trouble set in. En route
it had dealt with several machine gun nests. In spite of a
defective engine it succeeded in breaking down enemy
resistance south of the railway station where it captured
one officer and 174 men. When the tank was put entirely
out of action, owing to blockages in the valves and in the
induction pipe, Lieut. Theunissen advanced with his men
on foot; but as repairs were completed shortly afterwards,
he returned to it. A few minutes later he ran into a shell
hole immediately in front of the tank, where the machine
stuck and partially capsized. During the night two
attempts were made to salve the tank, but proved
unsuccessful. It was left lying in the farm near the German
[*3^X*] front line and was prepared for demolition. The gun and
machine guns could not be salved on account of the
suddenness and violence of the enemy's counter attacks,
which the German infantry failed to repulse.
Tanks Nos. 4 and 5 (Lieuts. Block and Bartens) were
to advance against the fortified farmhouse south of
Villers-Bretonneux. Tank No. 6 (Lieut. Lappe) was to
advance on the farm from the south, in order to support
tanks Nos. 4 and 5 by fire from the flank. Tank No. 4
reached the enemy front line at 7.10 a.m., cleared a section
of trench, broke down the strong resistance offered at the
farm, and thus paved the way for the infantry. This tank

then joined tanks Nos. 1 and 2, and advanced with them
towards the Bois d'Aquenne. In connection with these
two tanks, it was successful in repulsing an enemy
counter- attack.
Tank No. 5, on account of the thick fog, proceeded
rather too far to the north, and was met by heavy machine
gun fire. The driver was wounded, and, as the brakes
jammed, Lieut. Bartens, together with all available
members of the crew, joined the infantry, but a little later
on, the repairs having been completed, he returned to the
tank which advanced on the hill in front of the Bois
d'Aquenne, where it cleaned up a number of the enemy
holding sections of a trench and some machine gun nests.
[*6⇣*] Tank No. 6 (Lieut. Lappe) advanced in accordance
with orders. The German infantry, however, did not
follow. The tank was engaged with heavy fire by the
enemy. At a distance of 30 metres in front of the enemy
both engines became over-heated and broke down. The
driver was wounded, and no second driver was available,
because the three second drivers of the detachment were
still being trained with the "Rohr Sturmbattalion." After
some time, however, Lieut. Lappe succeeded in starting
the engine and then returned slowly to his original position.
Losses: One man killed; two officers and 22 men
wounded (including 13 of the accompanying infantry).
The Steinhardt group (attached to the 77th Reserve
Division) reached its starting line at 6.40 a.m.
Tank No. 1 (Lieut. Stein) advanced with the first
infantry wave, silenced a number of machine guns and
cleared up several sections of trench. At 9.45 a.m.,
however, the tank ran on to a patch of undermined ground,
turned over on its right side and was thus out of action.
The crew, under the orders of the commander, left the tank
and took part in the infantry battle as "Sturmtruppen,"
with three machine guns. The tank was blown up* by a
[*?Capt'd by French*]
pioneer officer when our infantry retired. It could not
be slaved on account of enemy counter-attacks.
Tank No. 2 (Lieut. Biltz) advanced in the direction of
Cachy, cleared up several macine gun nests, including one
which had held up a German infantry battalion for over
an hour. The tank then advanced to within 700 metres
of Cachy, effectively bombarding the enemy position there.
Next it was engaged by eight enemy tanks which suddenly
appeared. It put out of action one of these machines and
compelled another to retire. Almost immediately after
this, however, it received a direct hit from the enemy
artillery and the armour was pierced by a projectile of
about 5.7 cm. calibre. Another direct hit was made on the
[*From our tank,*]
right front of the tank and a third was received in the oil
tank. In spite of this, however, the tank was successfully
brought back as far as the first infantry position, a distance
of roughly two kilometres. It was so badly damaged that
it was prepared for blowing up. No further attempts to
salve the tank could be made because shortly afterwards
[*?Capt'd by Fr*]
the enemy recaptured the ground taken.
Tank No. 3 (Lieut. Muller-Albert) was ordered to
support the infantry attack in the direction of Gentelles.
The attack in this sector, however, was soon held up. The
tank, therefore, assisted tank No. 4 in attacking Cachy with
gun fire on the eastern edge of this village. As the infantry
did not assault Cachy the tank returned to its rendezvous.
Tank No. 4 (Lieut. Bitter) in the course of its advance
on Cachy destroyed several machine gun nests. The
garrison of a trench about 200 metres long was attacked
from the flank and was partially destroyed and partly put to
flight. At about 12.30 p.m. the commander of the tank
observed the retirement of our infantry in front of Cachy.
He immediately turned northwards, halted the infantry,
and then advanced himself on Cachy. At about 800 metres
distance from this village seven enemy tanks suddenly
appeared. Two of these were set on fire by Lieut. Bitter
and the third was put out of action. The remaining four
were bombarded by him and fled. In the meantime the
gun, as a result of the breaking of two springs, was out of
action. The retreating enemy tanks were pursued with
machine gun fire to within 200 metres of Cachy. Fire was
then brought to bear on the north-eastern outskirts of this
village. The infantry had meanwhile advanced once more
on Cachy, but the village was not assaulted. At 3.45 p.m.
the tank returned to its rendezvous, having fought continuously
since 7 a.m.
Losses: One officer killed; five N.C.O's and men
killed; one man missing; 13 N.C.O's and men wounded.
(*) This tank must have been the "Elfriede," and, if so, it
was not blown up.

72
THE ROYAL TANK CORPS JOURNAL
A TANK VISION OF 1833
In 1833 the Editor of the United Service Journal received
two independent letters advocating the then growing
use of steam to the uses of war. The first letter came
from Bombay and appeared in the January number. The
author in his letter suggests:—
" . . . Mr. Perkins, I believe, some years ago, exhibited
the imposing effects of steam applied to the projection of
small iron balls or bullets, in vast numbers, and with such considerable
impetus, from a stationary engine, such as might
be used in the defence of a fortress; but I do not recollect
to have seen any proposal for the employment of this
powerful agent in the field of battle. . . . . We all know
that in former times chariots of war were highly esteemed
for their destructive operation, yet they were found
objectionable, and ultimately they were disused on one
account, viz.: the great difficulty of managing the horses
when frightened or wounded, and the impossibility of
impelling them on the pikes of a formidable phalanx.
This objection would have a double weight with the
modern use of firearms. . . . The great forte of stem
is its passiveness. Secure the boiler and the machinery
from the stroke of a cannon-ball, and you might drive a
steam-chariot triumphantly through a regiment. Imagine
three or four of these machines driven at galloping speed
through a square of infantry; the director might be seated
in perfect safety in the rear of the engine, and a body of
cavalry, about fifty yards in rear, would enter the furrows
ploughed by these formidable chariots, and give the coup-
de-grace to the unfortunate infantry. The chariots might
be armed with scythes, both in front and flank; and, if
the first shock were avoided by the men opening their
ranks, they might easily be made sufficiently manageable
to wheel round and return on any part of the square which
stood firm. . . . ."
The second letter came out in the May issue:—
"Let us consider the effect of a platoon of locomotives
moving along a road against the close-cemented column
of the enemy. Its united muscular strength, if it could be
applied, would not stop them. The column must be
scattered or crushed; and if either work should be left
unfinished, it is only necessary to turn the steam and back
they will come with equal force, to the utter destruction
of everything that may attempt to oppose them. It is
perfectly true that cannon could destroy the machinery,
and so it will the wheels and limbers of guns, but this is
deemed no valid reason against the employment of
artillery. Consider again, the effect of their astounding
noises upon cavalry—the power they could afford of
advancing or retiring a range of armed blockhouses (if we
may so term that which is made of proof iron plates) for
the protection of any weak parts of the line, or to cover
an attack, and many other purposes. . . . . "
SOLDIERS' FAMILIES HOME,
SOUTHAMPTON
The following particulars regarding the Soldiers'
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are published for the information of all concerned.
The Soldiers' Families Homes, Bugle Street, Southampton,
is available as a holiday quarter for the families of
married soldiers during the non-trooping season, i.e.,
from May until the end of August.
The Home, which is well furnished, contains seven
bedrooms, a bathroom (with hot water), a dining room
and a sitting room. Bedding is provided. The charges
are: Adults, 1s. a night; children, 6d. a night. The
caretaker of the Home supplies meals as required on very
reasonable terms; alternatively, cooking facilities and
utensils are provided in the event of families wishing to
cook for themselves. The Home is situated in a quiet
street near the sea and is within easy reach of the New
Forest and other Hampshire beauty spots.
Applications for accommodation should be addressed
to the Staff Captain, Movements, Brazil Road, The Docks,
Southampton, stating number of adults and children, and
the period for which accommodation is required.