Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/273/1 - 1918 - 1937 - Part 25

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intervals be free from fire. Therefore if an attack be made in mist

or darkness it may thus be possible for a portion of the enemy to cut

the wire without interference from the Machine Guns. If on further

consideration you are of opinion that the reason mentioned by the C.R.E. which I admit are sound in themselves, outweigh the reasons I have mentioned, I am perfectly agreeable to modify my views in accordance with your directions, but in that case, I would certainly like to have my views recorded as of possible future interest, should the enemy get through at the sports referred to.

 

Re Reply to Complaint (2):

I would^nt like to directly contradict this statement but the

plan of the wire and Machine Gun Posts as they exist - and this plan

was prepared by the 8th Field Company Engineers - certainly suggest

this possibility to me.

 

Re Reply to Complaint (3):

I will only remark that the siting of Machine Guns in the main

trench line is contrary to all the teaching of the recent books on the

subject and for the reason that the enemy naturally puts a heavy barrage on the main trenchline and an extra special barrage on forward -- traverses and other spots that look likely to hold Machine Guns. Thus

I could expect in defending this line to have the majority of the guns

knocked out before the Infantry attack develops. The further reply

that such positions were selected in conjunction with the Divisional

Machine Gun Officer, Battalion Commanders and Brigade Major only goes to prove the correctness of my original proposition for, when I pointed out to my Brigade Major and Battalion Commanders that they were -- obvious defects in the sisting according to the book and in the light of reason, they all with one accord began to make excuse "It was the C.R.E. and the Divisional Machine Gun Officer" that thou gavest us that led us astray.

 

My power of criticism was thus short circuited and the difficulties 

of the present system brought home to me. It is the hopelessness

of making anyone at all responsible for any error that forced from

me the criticism that its very continuance appears to me to be courting

disaster.

 

Re Complaint 4.

I regret that by an undetected typographical error the word

"West" was substituted for the word "East" in my report. Consequently 

I have nothing to say to this reply. My original criticism was directed

to the "amended" line East or rather South of the Village.

In regard to the remark that this latter line was sited in

consultation with the Brigade Major and Battalion Commander on the

spot, I can only say that when I criticised them for certain defects

they put it on the C.R.E. and pointed out to me the paragraph in your

orders which said he alone was responsible for siting the line and

that they had to follow his direction, although they admitted he had

consulted them.

 

Regarding Complaint 5.

I have nothing further to add.

 

Regarding Complaint 6.

I have nothing further to add to my previous comments. I would

say that I am by no means sure that the reply of the C.R.E. does dispose

of my difficulties in this matter. Judging by what has happened

on occasions in the past, even the few minutes required for its destruction might not be available at the critical moment. The fact that

construction of a Bri^dgade in a place which could not be criticised

would cause additional labour is beside the point. If it was absolutely

impossible to construct a bridge in a less exposed place, then, I

submit, I should have been at once requested to place a special permanent guard to protect it. 

I don't think that the remark of the C.R.E. that my report condemns

my staff more than Divisional Staff for reasons he mentions

affects the matter one way or the other. I am not concerned with the

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condemnation of anyone at all, least of all the Divisional Staff, but I

do say that a system which allows each in turn to disclaim responsibility

is wrong and its continuance "appears to me to be courting disaster".

I again assert that I had no intention of making any comparison

between the present C.R.E. and Lieut.Col.     or any other C.R.E.

but merely gave that as an instance when the present system had more -- clearly condemned itself than any I could call to mind. The fact that

by good fortune one may chance to find a genius as C.R.E. cannot in my

opinion alter the radical unsoundness of the policy.

 

In regard to remarks of the C.O. of the 5th Machine Gun

Battalion I disclaim all idea of criticising him personally, but I do

not agree that Machine Guns cannot be sited in rear of a continuous --

trench line and in rear of this line in particular. If arrangements

are made to protect our men in the trench I see no difficulty, If, on

consideration, you agree with Major MARSDEN'S  contention I am perfectly willing to modify my views on the subject, but again I should like my view placed on record.

 

In regard to the remarks of the C.S.O. LL. I would again deny

all intention of personal criticism. In this case I can claim definite

evidence to the country. When Major WOOTTEN was a very junior Officer indeed I sought to get him as he knows transferred to my Brigade as 2nd in command of a Battalion. Had I any doubts of his capacity that would hardly have been to my advantage. I have had no reason since to change my opinion of his capacity unless to add to my admiration for it.

In point of fact I had no idea he was in any way concerned.

My reference to "Junior Staff Officers" arose as follows"

I told Col. Peck on the telephone that I was not satisfied with

the line. He said that he and the C.R.E. had sited it. I said it was

impossible for him to do that satisfactorily unless he was there every

day to check the work, which of course he could not do. He replied that

he had juniors whom he sent there to have a look at it.

I had not seen any of the G.S.O.'s there at all in fact and was

until then quite unaware that any of them had a hand in the matter at all. 

I think this will make it quite clear that there was no personal

reference to Major WOOTTEN at all.

 

I would also express my regret that the report was not made

"Confidential". I can only say that no thought that the matter in it

could possibly be regarded as offensive or injurious to anyone at anytime entered my mind.

 

H.G.Elliott

Brig. General.

Commanding 15th Australian Infantry Brigade.

"Unmarried"

HN

Lt Col G.E.M. Hill

2nd Bn East Lancs Regt

 

GOOD-A-MEAVY HOUSE,

ROBOROUGH, S.DEVON.

 

16th Oct. 1935

 

Dear Sir

I received your letter of the 11th Sept 1935

yesterday and will with pleasure give

you such information as I can.

I was born at Javistoch 21.2.1876.

Where my Father, who had been an Officer

in the 5th Fusiliers, then lived. This

property, now mine, belonged to my Father's

Uncle and came to my Father on the death

of his first cousin.

I was educated at Dulwich College  and

abroad in Switzerland and Germany,

and went through Sandhurst obtaining

a commission in the East Lancashire Regt.

2.

GOOD-A-MEAVY HOUSE,

ROBOROUGH, S.DEVON.

 

Sept 5th 1896. I served throughout the

S.African War in the 1st Mounted

Infantry being Adjutant of that Batt.

during the latter part of the war.

Later was Adjutant of the 2nd Bn. The

East Lancashire Regt. at the outbreak

of the war I was a Captain and employed

as a Staff Capt. at the Hd Qrs of the Southern

Command Salisbury. I managed from

there to rejoin the 2nd Bn E.Lancashire

Regt. and went to France with them in the

8th Division on 4th Nov. 1914. I served

in France with the 2nd Bn for 3 years

altogether, during which period I

commanded the Bn for 2 years.

3.

GOOD-A-MEAVY HOUSE,

ROBOROUGH, S.DEVON.

 

I was twice wounded officially but

very slightly on each occasion. I was

captured at Berry-au-Bae at the end

of May 1918.

I commanded the 2nd Bn for four years

after the war giving up command in

April 1925, was selected for further

promotion but retired voluntarily

in 1926.

I remember well the fight at Villers-Bretonneux

in April 1918. The German tanks

out ran our line and my Bn was

driven in to Bn Hd Qrs where

4

GOOD-A-MEAVY HOUSE,

ROBOROUGH, S.DEVON.

 

I had considerable difficulty in holding

a line, there were no trenches of any sort,

and unfortunately the unit on my

right gave way and the Germans

got round my right flank and fired

into us from behind with a machine

gun. Just as things were looking rather

blue a very cheery subaltern (or Captain?)

of your people turned up with a patrol

his name was Christian, - he and his men

helped to stop the Germans who attempted

to rush us just as the C. turned up.

5.

GOOD-A-MEAVY HOUSE,

ROBOROUGH, S.DEVON.

 

I was entirely without communication

with my division, wireless and

telephone had been smashed and the

runners failed to get through - however

Christian got back and I had later a

note from him say "Hold on help is

coming". I was very grateful to him for

what he did and also to his men.

I heard from him only this summer

and was glad to know he was going

strong.

Yours truly

J.E.Hill

20 Parkstone Avenue,

Parkstone,

DORSET.  12/12/1935.

 

Dear Sir,

Your letter of the 25th September reached

me two days ago.

 

I regret I cannot furnish you with the

addresses of the Officers you named, only one,

Capt Hunniken came into Villers-Bretonneux on the

day following. My Tank was the only one that

took part in this actual engagement.

 

I enclose particulars of the part I took

in this affair, details of which I have in my diary

in respect of this incident.

 

The first Battalion, Tank Corps was

practically the only one that brought their Tanks out

of the Retreat in this Sector, and took up positions

on the South side of the Somme and were with the

A.I.F. for some considerably time, at Maricourt,

Bray, Bonnay etc.

 

I hope the enclosed particulars will

arrive it time to be of use, and I shall be pleased

to know where I can obtain the Official History when

completed.

Yours faithfully

J Butler

[Send to Trebar.]

 

C.E.W. Bean Esq,

Historian,

Victoria Barracks,

Paddington, N.S.Wales.

I first received instructions for the Villers-Bretonneux

affair at midnight on Thursday 25th April, with orders to set

out immediately on a given Map Reference.

 

My Tank was an old Mark IV six pounder, one, of our Battalion

that survived the Retreat in March where we were stationed in front

of Peronne a few weeks previous. We had trekked continuously for

six days and night and had no time to recondition, which our Tanks

sadly needed.

 

I arrived late in the afternoon on the out-skirts of

Villers-Bretonneux. My Tank was severely tested by this

continuous trek and to make matters worse it was necessary to

take my Tank up the Railway Embankment and over the metals to

take up my position on the Map Reference.

 

When I eventually stopped my Tank we had been on the go

without a stop for 15 to 16 hours.

 

I found the troops in the vicinity of this spot were a

fresh detachment of Yorkshire Boys just arrived, and I was

immediately called upon to "put them wise" to the workings of a

Bosch Minniwerfer Machine Gun they had captured, with stacks of

ammunition. Shortly afterwards an Officer from the A.I.F.

Brigade Headquarters came for me with a spare mount, and we

made our way to the C.O. by way of the Tunnel under the Railway,

to his dug-out.

 

He explained the position briefly, that the Bosch were

still in the Village and that a machine gun nest was still hanging

on in the Cemetery, and would not be dislodged. My orders were

to go into V-B and clear them up.

 

On returning to my Tank I immediately got her going again,

after having ^had only something under an hour to cool down. The best

way into the Village from this spot was to go along the Road

running almost parallel with the Railway. It was lucky for me

and my crew that I decided on the Road route, because soon after I

started the Bosch put over a Barrage on the alternative route, and  but

by great good fortune the road was not shelled.

 

Travelling on hard road surfaces ^ always was a strain on the tanks,

and, after the gruelling test of long hours travel this last bit

of road proved almost too much. I managed to gain the entrance

to the Village at 8 p.m. and manoeuvred the Tank to give me an

opportunity to enfilade the two main streets, and by this

time she literally "Petered out"

 

Realising it was quite impossible to move further, I decided

to use my two six-pounders on the buildings from where the Bosch were still sniping. Unfortunately the extraordinary heat that had been

generated in the Tank by this continuous trek, had actually affected

the ammunition to such an extent that it was found impossible to

fire a shot. The Breachs of the two six-pounders could not be closed

and the cartridges could not be forced into the Hotchkiss guns.

 

At this stage I left my Sergeant in charge of the Tank, and

taking a Runner I set out to report to the C.O. at his dug-out where

I had previously seen him.

 

By this time the Bosch wrer were shelling heavily and also sending

over Gas shells.

 

I returned to my Tank and remained inside during the night

where we were forced to wear our gas masks the whole time.

 

The next day a fresh magneto was brought up and we were able to

withdraw, the Bosch by that time having cleared off.