Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/273/1 - 1918 - 1937 - Part 24

COPY.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE.
MILITARY BOARD.
(Adjutant-General.)
PERSONAL.

Army Head-Quarters.
Melbourne, 13th July, 1927.
My dear Watson,
Very many thanks for sending me the
wire from Caddy and also the letter regarding the
Chestnut Troop, R.H.A., and the 15th Brigade.
certainly think it is a unique case and I do hope that
all the regimental histories of the peace battalions will
mention it. I would also suggest to you that you write
to Bean as he is now engaged on the history of the A.I.F.
in France so that he could mention it. I think a proper
place would be after his description of Villers Bretonneux
but of course it is purely a matter for you to decide
but I think the association is too valuable and important
a fact to be omitted from the official history. Please
do not think I am butting in but you know I have a very
warm regard for the 15th Brigade, both in War and peace.
All good wishes,
Yours sincerely,
(Sgd.) J. H. Bruche.
 

Copy.
THE CHESTNUT TROOP R.H.A.
BORDEN
14th June, 1919.
Dear General Elliott,
At our annual dinner at which 25 officers who
have served in the Chestnut Troop were present I told them of our
close association with the Australian Corps and more especially with
your Brigade. I pointed out that as in the Peninsula War the 43rd
and 52nd Regiments and the Rifle Brigade were made Honorary Members
of our Mess, so I would ask them to extend a similar invitation to
yourself and the officers of the 57th, 58th, 59th and 60th Bns. of
Australian Infantry, of the 15th Infantry Brigade, as a permanent
record of the great admiration and regard we had for them.
This suggestion was enthusiastically received,
and I was asked to send you the enclosed invitation.
We will hope to keep in touch with you at least at
our yearly dinner and perhaps in the future opportunity may occur for
our renewing our friendships.
The Troop goes to Mesopotamia in the Autumn, and
I think it will be some years before we serve at home again. With
all good wishes to yourself and to any of your officers that we knew,
Believe me,
Yrs. very sincerely,
(Sgd.) A. W. van Strawbenzee.
 

COPY.
 THE CHESTNUT TROOP R.H.A.
Major van Strawbenzee and the undermentioned officers who
were present at the Annual Dinner of the Chestnut Troop R.H.A., hope
that
BRIGADIER GENERAL ELLIOTT
and the Officers of the 57th, 58th, 59th, and 60th Battalions of
Australian Infantry, of the 15th Australian Infantry Brigade, will
consider themselves Honorary Members of their Mess, - to establish
a permanent record of our admiration and regard for them at VILLERS
BRETONNEUX on 24th April, 1918, and on other occasions between April
and October, 1918.
Major Gen. Sir John HEADLAM K.C.B.
Major Gen. The Hon. Sir F. R. BRIGHAM K.C.M.G.
Major Gen. A. E. WARDROP C.B.
Surgeon Major Gen. Sir A. F. BRADSHAW K.C.B. (Retd.)
Lieut. Col. W. R. EDEN C.M.G.
Lieut. Col. A. DUDLEY
Lieut. Col. H. W. WYNTER D.S.O.
Major R. MAITLAND D.S.O.
Major G. C. RICHARDSON D.S.O.
Major J. L. C. WHITE M.C.
Major The Hon. I. M. TWISTLETON-WYKEHAM FIENNES D.S.O.
Major E. H. THURLOW (Retd.)
Major G. TA1BOT (Retd.)
Capt. R. STANLEY D.S.O.
Capt. B .O. COCHRANE (Retd.)
Capt. C. MCKAY M.C.
Lieut. A. CORBETT (Retd.)
Lieuts. L. P. HUGGINS M.C.
E. J. ORAM
D. A. HUNT
G. W. HAYLEY.
R.A. MESS BORDEN.
14th June, 1919.
 

2952.
22 February 1928.
Lieutenant-Colonel C. V. Watson, D.S.O.,
Commonwealth Patent Office,
581 Bourke Street,
Melbourne.
Dear Colonel Watson.
I have to thank you for your note about the
connection of the 15th Brigade with the Chestnut Troop, R.H.A.
I have noted it and am keeping it among my papers for a later
volume.
Yours sincerely.
 

H.N.

V/B 24/5 Ap 1918.

Capt Doutreband says Marshall

led the whole 15 Bde to the V/B attack &

ws responsible for the success of 15 Bde

at V/B. Doutrebands own

C. O. had fallen down on his job.

?? told him to stick to him. He

ws "here, there, & everywhere",

It ws he who managed successfully

to lead the flank round the village

on a semi-circle course - He

had got Doutreband to prepare

compass bearings beforehand.

Maj. Doyle says that Marshall got

the whole 15 Bde straightened

up & moving forwd on / right lines

when it lost direction in / night 

attack.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

THE SENATE.
FEDERAL MEMBERS ROOMS.
TEMPLE COURT.
422-428 COLLINS STREET.
HE/JF MELBOURNE.
27th May, 1930.
Captain C. E. Bean
Official Commonwealth Historian
Victoria Barracks
SYDNEY N.S.W.
Dear Captain Bean,
I have just read with great interest a Book written
by Brig-Genl. C. B. Baker-Carr C.M.G., D.S.O., late of the Tank Corps which
I advise you to get and from which I cull the following paragraph – p.88.
"As a matter of fact to say that the military mind thinks is a misleading

"statement. It does not think in the true sense of the word.
"All is does is to react along well defined stereotyped lines. This is
"not the fault of the individual; it is the fault of the system. Nothing
"is more discouraged in the army than a departure from the well worn –
"path of tradition. The "good soldier" is one who does what he is told
"without thinking."
After General Birdwood had raged at me for supposedly
issuing an order not to fire upon the Germans when in December 1916 we
were in line in front of Flers and had compelled me to cancel an informal
truce which had been brought about by the Guards Division who had preceded
us in the line and all of which (in view of the fact that in the circumstances a
 

Captain C. E. Bean.  -2-  27th May, 1930.
renewal of hostilities would find all the advantage with the enemy and
against us) was plain unvarnished stupidity, I must say that exactly the
same thoughts shaped themselves in my own mind, Birdwood's mind in my
opinion was pre-eminently the "military mind" as I fancy you have begun
to suspect.
Baker-Carr's remark (see page 165) on the "unforgiveable"
offence of criticising superior officers is very illuminating. That
apparently was my own particular offence (so far as I can get any trace
of an offence) which brought about my own supercession.
Again his remarks (see page 178) on the Anzacs who came
to him for a time is an effective counterblast to recent attacks. The
Sergeant Instructors reported that their "Aussies" were the best behaved
and the most intelligent men they had ever had to deal with. It was the
first of many Australian classes and not one single "crime" serious or
trifling, did they ever commit during the whole of their stay.
Attacks similar to those being put out in England which
are annoying Generals Hobbs and Monash now were current in France and
upon which this I have noticed a recent comment by myyourself in Smith's Weekly. I ---
wrote on this subject in my full report on Villers Brettonneux which I
committed directly to Treloar's hands at the time fearing its destruction
in view of what had happened to my Polygon Wood report.
The most illuminating passage of all in Baker-Carr's Book
(see pages 245 and 246) is the confirmation in connection with the 3rd
Battle of Ypres of what you have already noted at Pozieres that the --
higher formations had not the remotest conception of conditions in the
 

Captain C. E. Bean.  -3-  27th May, 1930.
front line: particularly the following passage :
"There is no doubt that G.H.Q.s was prone to live in a little --
"world of its own, far removed from the turmoil and filth of battle....I
"am absolutely convinced that the department responsible for the staging
"of the Ypres offensive had not the remotest conception of the State of
"affairs existing, and, accordingly formulated their plans on a hopelessly

"incorrect basis."
I noticed in the last Volume your own remarks upon this
subject. I told White the same thing many times.
Baker-Carr apparently thought that the 3rd Ypres was
waged throughout as an independent effort but I think that my conversation

with Haig in Belgium after the War to which I alluded in previous
letters shows that the latter was not entirely a free agent and that as
at the Battles of Loos and the Somme the idea of continuing a useless
slaughter was not perhaps so much due to "British stubbornness and stupidity"

as to the situation on the French front.
Baker-Carr, about page 164, mentioned getting himself
into trouble for an adverse report made by him on the siting of a trench
line and the machine gun positions thereon.
Curiously enough I got into exactly the same trouble
for a report I made on the "Aubigny line". Unfortunately I cannot find
a copy of the report but I enclose a copy of the reply which I sent to
General Hobbs in response to a charge that I had "attacked the competence

of certain officers of his staff" in connection with this

report.
This may enable you to trace the file dealing with --
 

Captain C. E. Bean.  -4-  27th May, 1930.
this subject. As a matter of fact I had no knowledge at the time what
officers had been siting the line but it was very badly done and the
correspondence should interest you.
In my opinion a new War in India formented by Russia
and in its later stages directly aided by her forces may be expected to
commence at any moment and I am concerned to think that General Birdwood
with whose mental reactions I am only too familiar may be entrusted with
the Supreme Command.
I am looking forward with great interest to your next
volume.
With best wishes.
Yours faithfully,
H. E. Elliott
Enclosure: 1.
 

CONFIDENTIAL

[* April 1918.

H/N

From Brig Gen. H. E. Elliott *]

Headquarters,
15th Australian Inf. Brigade
30 April 1918.
G.O.C.
5th Australian Division
With reference to the attached report and comments thereon by yourself

and Officers of your staff, I desire to most emphatically repudiate
any intention whatever of criticising any member of your Staff.
I was certainly unaware that you were responsible for the system.
I imagined that it was of general application throughout the British Army
and wished to point out that it was unsound.
I have had the very slightest acquaintance with your C.R.E. but
Col. PECK, Major WOOTTON and Major Marsden are all well known to me, and I
can say without hesitation, that I would most certainly, were I to occupy
your own position tomorrow, be only too glad to have these Officers on my
Staff.
Please reassure all these Officers on this behalf and if anything
in the original report would to an impartial judgement bear such a construction

I shall be only too pleased to modify its expression in such a
way as to make this perfectly clear.
But I would like it made perfectly clear also, that under present
orders of General RAWLINSON, there is to be no retirement from our present
line. I have accordingly given orders that when their last reserves are
thrown in every Battalion Commander and every member of of his staff shall
be armed with rifles and take their place in the firing line. The personnel
of my Headquarters here are also organised in echelon to serve as final --
reinforcements, and finally, by my orders, myself and Staff Officers, when
no other reinforcements are forthcoming from Division, proceed to the firing
line to fight, (as I hope) to the end. This has been fully explained to
Battalion Commanders and naturally they and myself are keenly alert that
in no circumstances is a "leak" left to develop, in this line, which may be
thus desperately defended.
That must be my justification for my interference in the matter.
Otherwise I had been perfectly content to rest in ease in my Headquarters
and turn my Brigade into a Fatigue Party.
My criticism was directed purely against the system (as such) however

sanctified by use or custom in the army. The fact that VAUBAN or
TODLEBEN may have been great Tacticians and Generals as well as great engineers

certainly does not prove that every engineer, even of the rank of
C.R.E., must necessarily be a great Tactician or have the time to site
correctly in a very limited time an unlimited number of lines. My instance
of Lieut.Col. in Egypt was merely to give point to this observation.
On the other hand, every Infantry Brigadier, unless there has been gross
favoritism in his promotion, must necessarily have a fair knowledge of
Tactics, and he can reasonably be held responsible for at least one of the
systems of Defence. The fact that the present C.R.E. may be and probably
is, the equal or the superior of any Australian Brigadier is beside the
point, and entirely outside the scope of the criticism on that point. There
are, at the present time, undergoing construction in the Divisional Area at
least 5 or 6 entirely separate and ditinct lines of fortification. It would,
in my opinion, tax the utmost skill of the Angel Michael, let alone that of
an ordinary mortal man, whether C.R.E. or C. in C., to oversee the simultaneous

construction, of all of these lines in detail.
So much for the general question of responsibility.
As for details:
(a) In regard to comments of the C.R.E. orn complaint (1):
With all respect I beg to differ very materially and emphatically.
The object of tactical wiring is to delay the enemy under Machine Gun
fire. It is sufficiently obvious that the bullets go in a direct line
and if there is a kink then one portion of the wire or another must at