Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/273/1 - 1918 - 1937 - Part 3

5
4 April. Last German effort agst 5 army. (Now 1 Fr & 4 Br.
Army). 14 Divs attd on 21 mile front from N of
Cantigny (4 m W.NW of Montdidier) to Somme at

Bouzencourt. Fr held 13½ m Brit 7½.
G. objve in hills E of the Noye, to gain obsn at close
range on Aix-Paris rly, & high grd at Cachy &
V/B to see Amiens.

[*Br XIX

Fr.

XXXVI

? Br

XXXVIIX*]

Gs pushed back Fr XXXVI 1-2 m. near Moreuil.
Didnt push back IX.
XIX Brit. advd 1-2 miles but didnt get high grd.
Rainy night, misty morning. Rain fell durg day &
clogged rifles.
Fr 3 & 6 Armies not attd.
Fr 1 Army. G. bombt at 5 am & att 8 am.
Rt Div of XXXVI (133 Div) ws driven back to

Bois de l'Arriere Cour where, w after C/a by 59 Div,
agst 2 Dismtd Cav Div. 2 Bav Div took Bois de 

Senecat but only held E edge.
cdnt take Rouvrel.
G. 54 Div (advg thro 243 Div) took Moreuil Wood & Castel.

but not Hailles & Thennes. 25 Div cdnt get into take
Rifle Wood (29 Fr Div)
At night Fr line ran behind Cantigny, in front of Grivesnes
& Bois de Mongival, thro Bois de l'Arriere Cour, in
front of Rouvrel, along W Edge of Bois de Sénécat, S of
Haille & Thennes & in front of Rifle Wood & Hangard.
At 6 pm. Gen Robillot of Fr II Cav. Corps took over
2 left divs of XXXVI Corps. (2 Dismtd Cav. Div, & 29 Div)
Bdy just N of Rouvel.
[*Brit.
Diagram - see original document*]
G prisrs tn on 3rd sd big att to be on 4th
5.15am. bombt by Gs. heavy on fl & Arty positns.
6.30am G. Inf advd. 18 Div. repulsed it everywhere.
1.  Gd Ers. Div tried to adv. 3 times but caught by so heavy
fire tt didnt get beyond J.O.1.
14 Div didnt repulse it - 228 G Div
N. of Warfusée too be with 218 Rifle Bde (41 Bde)
Turned fl. of other bde 7 Rifle Bde of tt Bde.  They fell back 500^x.
8 KRR ^Corps sent up held att. at Marcelcave Hamel Rd,
but at 10am whole 41 Bde retd to W of Bois de Vaire.
4 G.Gd Div sent one regt to follow fl. of 228 Div
& then turn N thro Bois Tailloux & B. d'Auroche which
2 others attd in front.  50x & Bucks L1 ws driven thro
Hamel to ridge W of Hamel. 9 Rifle Bde on ext. left had to retire

6.
first thing back fl., then retd W. of Hamel where whole 42 Bde
reformed.  Bde stayed in Hamel & ws captd but k. by m.g. fire
Bde Major hid & escaped at night. (Bdr Gen GNB Forster, k)
41 & 42 Bdes.
Gs also wkd S & attd left of 35 Bn wh abt 9.30 fell back
fighting to positn 1500^x E of V.B.  Retiremt well covered.  L of 7
Buffs swung back too.  One Coy of 6 Lond sent up from V/B. to
ensure touch betw 7 Buffs & 35; 33 sent up from V/B to
extend left of 35 & close gap ^if any betw 18 & 14 Divs.
Summary:  14 Div had bn driven back 1½ m. & 18 Div w fl.
entirely turned had to conform.
Meanwhile 43 Bde sent up from Hamelet to high grd NE of V/B.
Dug in w one bn on W edge of Bois de Vaire.  This bn, 9 Scot Rifles,
sent one Coy to C/a thro Bois de Vaire.  It got 500^x farther E,
but 41 ^Bde wntd to retire & Coy had to fall back
43 Bde ws going to C/a & had actually began when Gs coming
on in Str. & it ws considd advisable to xxxx refce retiring yet
& form new line SW of Bois de Vaire
At 6.50 6 Cav Bde ordd to send its 3 regts
Diagram - see original document
10 Hussars arrd W of Hamel 9.30 am.
Cdnt get E Edge of Bois de Hamel.
So filled gap in inf. line on Vaire-V/B rd w 43 Bde on rt & pt of 41 on left.
Other 2 regts arrd N of V/B at 9.30 just in time to close
gap betw. 43 Bde & 9 AI Bde
All reserves of 14 Div thus used but XIX Corps ordd Corps Res (rest of
3 Cav Div) to send up 7 Bde to 1 mile N of V/B. to suppt 6 Cav Bde.
It arrd at 11 am & sent 17 Lancs to rfce Royals↘ & 7 DG to rfce 10_↗Hussars
Can. Cav. Bde at Bois de Boves ws ready to move but not wanted.
24 Div ws ordd to occupy Res line at Gentelles & extend left to N,
& 7 London (58 Div) at Boves ws gn it for this extension.
At Noon. Fr. French at Hangard & rt of 18 had repulsed att.
But from left Bdy of E Surrey, due W. of Marcelcave,
line bent back to rd from E End of V/B to Vaire.
Diagram - see original document
N of Peronne Rd this ws held for rest of day; Gs
tried to adv. from Bois de Vaire & Hamel but ^some guns of
177 & 180 Bdes (16 Div. Arty) tn to crest w open
sights stopped this.
S. of Rd at 3 pm shelling incrd & at 4 pm. 19 &
228 G. Divs attd. 55 Bde, ^18 Div. hampered by mud, gave way & retd.
7 RW Kent (53 Bde) ws turned on N by Gs in Lancer Wood &
fell back to Bois de Hangard & then to V/B- Bois de Hgd. Rd
8 R. Berkshire N of Bde H. also driven back to this rd, after a
time, & xxx 54 Bde also, to S. continⁿ of same rd B. de H-H.
(W end of Hangard). 53 & 54 held on here agst further atts.
Farther N. 55 Bde 2 f.l. bns of 55 Bde retired to & across the
V/B-Bois de H Rd. 35 Aust Bn ws still in Wg, but now
35 found tps on rt gone. For 2nd time it tried to fill gap.
but cdnt, & fell back on V/B tog. w rt of 33. L of 33 nr rd Le [[Don?]]
36 restored sitn. 6 Lond folld in second line.

7
51 London put into gap on rt.
7 Queens led by Brig Gen Wood joined in on rt.
N. of rly 33 Bn went forwd again. Sqn of 17 Lcrs galloped
up & stopped G. adv on l of 33. & ^a Can. motor mg bty sent
up by 9 Corps did good wk agst G regs.
A gap on rt of 33 ws filled by 34. (first ordd to W of V/B)
6 London extended its rt & evently got touch w
8 R. Berks; 7 Queens were reld.
11 R. Fus. ^(54 Bde) brt up to fill gap on rt of 8 R. Berks -
& got back w 7 RW Kent on rt, (wh reld durg night
by 10 Essex).
Durg night whole 55 Bde colld at Gentelles &
53 Bde took over whole line betw 54 & 9 A I Bdes.
(incldg 11 R. Fusrs & 6 Lond).
34 & 35 Bns advd at 1 am. Ap 5 in dark to old
line of 35. (33 without cas., 34 had stiff fighting but both
succeeded).
14 Div ws reptd to be not in condn to hold line. Accdly at
5 pm XIX Corps ordd ^GOC 3 Cav Div to take over from 14 Div -
from Rd to Somme w 3 Cav Div, 15 A I Bde (from 3rd
Army) & any tps of 14 Div he wished to retain &
mgs of 1 Cav. Div. He decided to retain 43 Bde,
11 Kings (Res) & 14 mg Bn. 6 Cav Bde w altd tps of
7 Cav Bde to hold from Main rd to Fouilloy - Warfusée Rd,
& 15 Bde thence to Somme. 43 Bde reld by 6 Cav Bde
& x dug line 1000^x behind f.l.
58 came in & advd line xx at 3 am 5^th to 500^x W of Bouzenct.
At 12.45 pm. GHQ had infd 3 Army tt l. of XIX Corps had bn
pushed back & 5 Bde (2 Aust Div) due to arr. at Bussy les D.
at 4 pm ws to be made available to 4 Army if wanted.
Meanwhile Congreve (VII Corps) had recd appeal from 4 Army
for help & in response had ordd that 2 res. bns of 15 A I Bde
in Bonnay shd X Somme & rfce 4 Army.
At 3.30 pm 3 Army by order of GHQ put whole 5 Aust
Div under 4 Army. Rest of 15 Aust Bde then ordd to join Bde
S of river as soon as reld by Bde of 35 Div.
14 Bde arrd next day (Ap5) & 8 Bde at Auby Vecquemont durg
night - it ws sent to Bois de Gentelles as res. for XIX Corps.
(arrg. 9 am 5 April).
5 Bde reached Bussy in aftn & sent to Blangy Tronville
where at 7.30 it ws put under 14 Div to hold Reserve Line.
18 Bn took over this line N of Bois l Abbé between
24 & 14 Divs. 17Bn in Bois l Abbé.
In evg. 4 Bde RHA, 47, 330 & 331 Bdes RFA had to retire from near
V/B to rear Bois D'Aquenne & Cachy-Foulloy Rd.
250 Bde RFA maintained positn near Gentelles. 86 Bde RFA
from 1 m. .E of Cachy withdrew to Gentelles. On 14 Div front
field arty of 15 & 39 Divs didnt retire, & sent up some guns to crest.

8
H. Arty had to withdraw - 21 Bde RGA from S of Fouilloy
& 23 Bde RGA (advd bties) W of V/B. That night
21, 22, 68, 23 Bdes RGA ordered back or N. of Somme.
76 Bde RGA to stay where it was.
21 - to go N of Somme.
22 & 68 "  " W of Avre.
23 to main rd S of Bl. Tronville. If there ws further
retirement only 2 bdes of HA had still to cross rivers.
Gs had nt reached obsvtn position but so close as to give
much anxiety to allied commdrs. Also if Gs once
reached high grd a retirement over Avre-Somme
Diagram - see original document

wd be difficult.
But Fr rfts still coming up; & 4 fresh Austln
bdes had arrd or were arriving in Brit sector.
Ap. 5. G. att contd.
1 Fr. Army C/attd. 45 Div
127 & 166 Divs
17 Div & 2 Dismtd Div.
To be launched quickly - ∴ ^each as soon as poss., without
waiting for others.
IX Corps first at 11.30 w 166 Div, didnt keep
much but retook Bois de l'Arriere Cour.
2 pm 127 Divn, ^only slight gain in end
VI Corps 45 Div 3pm. no percent gain
17 Div. 4.30 pm. & Bn of 2 Dis. Cav. Div
gained some grd.
Gs gained a little grd at Hangard by
small att, but Fr & Brit c/a regained it
French claim tt moral effect gt.
On evg. of Ap 5 G. Commdrs ordd to hold grd won.
More Fr rfts arrg. 65 Div to XXXVI Corps.
& 60, 64 Divs & 4 & 5 Cav Divs now
in 1 Army res. Brit arty stlll covg. Fr.

Comments by Australian officers
on ^draft of British history.
1931.

COMMENTS BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL L.J. MORSHEAD, 33rd Battalion.
Counter-attack by 33rd Battalion, A.I.F., and 12th Lancers,
30th March 1918.

Despite the 9th Brigade report the only instructions given
me, and these were verbal, were to capture a line from the copse
immediately south of the first C in Marcelcave to Aubercourt, to
capture Aubercourt then held by the enemy, and if possible to
extend to Demuin. When I asked for support the 34th Battalion was
made available to be used only if absolutely necessary. No
artillery support was available. While giving verbal orders to my
company commanders at Bois D'Aquenne where the battalion was in
readiness, Captain Barron of the 12th Lancers reported to me and
stated that he was to be Liaison officer. This was the first and
only intimation I had that the Lancers were to co-operate with us.
Nothing definite could be told me of the disposition of the troops
holding the line. This lack of orders and of information aptly
illustrates the state of affairs then existing.
Although the force engaged was a small one the attack was
really important from the point of view of morale. It was a
particularly fine effort of which we are very proud, and I do
think that it merits a much fuller story than is given in the
draft.
The approach march was an unusual sight. There we were,
headed by the 12th Lancers mounted, our advance guard, marching
across the open, in daylight and in full view of the enemy - a lone
body going into the blue, and meeting and passing large numbers of
stragglers gave us small prospects of support. Yet we attacked as
if everything was favourable.
The situation map for 30th March seems to me to show our line
east of Lancer Wood too advanced. I realised though that the time
was dawn, so that likely there was some falling back between that
time and when we made our attack. The enemy however made no
advance during that day. Again the situation map of 31st March
appears incorrect to me. We were further ahead than is shown.
The 33rd was held up 200 yards east of Lancer Wood but later at nig
night with the 34th we advanced a further 250 yards. A map was
attached to my report and I suggest that this be referred to.
We were relieved by the 10th Essex and the Royal West
Surreys on the morning of 31st March, and during that day they
lost the ground taken by us.
The British account rather suggests that the 34th was
employed at the outset. This was not so, as the first company
called on did not move to reinforce our left flank until 8 p.m.
The remaining three companies were employed three to four hours
later.
An important point is that we were well forward of any one
else, and were thus uncomfortably isolated. On our left the
nearest troops were 600^x in rear and to the left, and the gap on
our right was even greater - from memory, 1,000 yards.
We were much impressed with the Lancers and I would refer you
to the remarks in my report, which will also give you the necessary
data for a fuller story of the action. It is interesting to see
that the name Lancer Wood given by us out of compliment to the
12th Lancers has been retained. Our maps showed this wood unnamed,
but in later maps it was shown as Bois de Morguemont.

COMMENTS BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL L.J. MORSHEAD, 33rd Battalion.
Villers-Bretonneux, 4th April 1918.
If information were available that the enemy intended attacking
on 4th April, it is somewhat surprising that this was not passed on
to the line units. We certainly were in blissful ignorance.

The interesting point about the bombardment was the sparing
of the chateaux along the Villers-Bretonneux--Amiens road, the
idea doubtless being to have good accommodation for themselves when
they occupied the town, as the chateaux would have been marked on
their maps. Villers-Bretonneux was more severely bombarded than
the front line.
The 14th Division fell back in the morning and the 18th
Division in the afternoon. Any retrograde movement by the 9th
Australian Brigade was forced on them as a result of these two
considerable xxxxxxxxxx retirements.
The cavalry, to whom greater credit than is given is due, took
over the area vacated by the 14th Division with remarkable promptness.
The British xxxxxxxxxx report gives an impression of glossing
over the 14th and 18th Divisions’ withdrawals, and the credit xxxxxxxx
merited by the cavalry is consequently belittled. These withdrawals
were much more rapid and much less orderly than described.
In my opinion the 9th Brigade's report is very fair and gives
the true story.

COMMENTS BY BRIGADIER-CENERAL H.A. Goddard, then commanding 35 Bn.
Fifth Army, 30th March 1918.
Page 20. - XIX Corps orders. The actual orders received by
35th Battalion were to relieve 61st Division, which went into
reserve at Gentilles.
Page 20 - dispositions north of the Luce on morning of 31st.
The 33rd and 34th Battalions were relieved by the 18th Division.
See attached copy of 9th Aust. Infantry Brigade order, which was
received by 35th Battalion about 10 p.m. 30 March.
Fourth Army, 4th April 1918.
Page 17. lines 12 to end of paragraph. The subaltern in charge
of right flank company finding this flank open and the enemy
advancing on it detached part of his company in an endeavour to
hold them. Unfortunately some men of the 35th mixed with some of
the 33rd seeing these move to their rear took it for a retirement
and came back on the town. These with the exception of a few
xxx were rallied and went forward again. The 35th Battalion less
291 battle casualties remained in line throughout operations until
relieved on 5 April.
Page 20, 4th line - should read 33rd, 34th, and 35th Battalions.
Page 18, 2nd paragraph, line 2 - after "33rd Battalion" read
"35th Battalion".
Cavalry. I am sure every Australian engaged in these operations
would appreciate special mention being made of the very fine work
of the British cavalry. Their opportune arrival on our left on
the morning of the 4th relieved us of a great anxiety regarding
that flank.
6th Londons. The eagerness to co-operate from all ranks
and particularly their C.O. was most helpful. Their exchange of
clean Lewis guns for our mud-choked weapons was greatly
appreciated.

FOURTH ARMY, 6th to 23rd April 1918.
Comment by Major W.J.R. Scott, 20th Battalion.
Page 2, Line 4. -"43 prisoners". Was not the number captured
nearer 60? Two machine-guns were also taken.
Comments by Captain P.V. Storkey, V.C., 19th Battalion.
Page 2. As regards the figures dealing with prisoners, I am
speaking entirely from an unaided recollection, but I fancy the
approximate strength of the German party was computed to be between
80 and 100. Of these it was computed that about 30 were killed or
wounded, and the prisoners taken were 3 officers, 50 men, and a
machine-gun. This comment affects the figure "43" in the fourth line,
and may in consequence necessarily affect the figure "56" in the fourth
line from the bottom of the same page.
Before the "hop-over" on 7th April the official information
received was to the effect that the "wood" was lightly held, and that
when we reached the objective at the eastern edge of the wood we
would find a clear field of fire of about 400 yards. Instead of this
latter, the saplings were chest high. The "wood" was anything but
lightly held, and the space between ^?beyond the eastern edge ran down hill
in a gentle slope to the foot of a spur along which the Hun was well
entrenched.

COMMENTS BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR TALBOT HOBBS, 5th Australian Division.
So far as my memory serves me and with the aid of the copy of the
war diary and other documents in my possession, the events as recorded
are correct, at all events as far as the troops under my command at
the time are concerned, with the following exceptions in connection
with the events dealing with the period 24th-27th April 1918 -
Page 19, Line 9.- "The 5th Australian Division had at that time
only the two reserve battalions of the 14th Australian Brigade
immediately available." As a matter of fact in addition to the two
battalions mentioned I had at my disposal the 15th Australian Infantry
Brigade in reserve near Aubigny. They had been warned by Div HQ very
early in the morning of the 24th that an attack by the enemy was very
probable and to hold themselves in readiness to move at very short
notice. As soon as I became aware of the seriousness of the attack
I got in touch with 8th Div. H.Q. and offered to assist in restoring
the situation - that would have been before 10 a.m. on the morning of
the 24th. After that I repeated my readiness and desire to render
assistance, but understood from 8th D.H.Q. that the division was quite
able to deal with the situation themselves.
Brigadier-General H.E. Elliott received his orders and had made
his plans so far as it was possible very early in the day, and was
very upset because he was not allowed to take part in the fighting.
No mention is made of the enemy attack against the 8th Aust.
Infantry Brigade north of the Somme in J.35.C (on the left of the
14th Brigade). At 4.33 a.m. the enemy, three to four hundred strong,
attacked the right post of the 29th Battalion. The attack was
repulsed by machine-gun and rifle fire, the enemy re-formed and
repeated the attempt, but was so badly repulsed that he withdrew in
disorder - his casualties were known to be very xxxxx severe. No
doubt this attack was intended for a diversion.
On page 27, line 4, "200 prisoners". xxxxxxxx Nearly 400 were
taken, according to my records.