Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/272/1 - 1917 - 1932 - Part 2

(2)
BATTALION OPERATION ORDER No 138 (continued)
7. At ZERO plus 8 hours 30 minutes Companies will move forward in
Artillery formation, using same frontage as will be maintained in attack,
towards black line and will deploy into position ready for assault at
about 200 Yards East by ZERO plus 9 hours 30 minutes.
"B" Company under Capt.J.W.MILLAR on right,
"C"      "              "          Capt.E.O. WILLIAMS on left,
with 'D" Coy     "         Capt.F.L.DAVY on right    ) at distance of
and "A" Coy     "           Lieut.D.F.SALMON on left) 125 yards.
The dividing line between right and left Coys, at this point runs
approx. true 45° from ZAREEBA.
8. At ZERO plus 9 hours 30 minutes, barrage will come down on line approx.
150 Yards East of line of Posts established by New Zealand Division
as near as possible to which attacking Coys., will move.
9. At ZERO plus 10 hours the barrage will begin to creep forward towards
green line at rate of xx 100 Yards in 3 minutes and attacking lines
will follow close behind towards objectives.
The barrage will reach support line at ZERO plus 10 hours 20 minutes
and will rest on Green line until ZERO plus 10 hours 35 minutes when
it will lift to enable final objectives to be carried.
10. "B" Coy under Capt.J.W.MILLAR will attack and clean up Unbearable Trench
working in co-operation with Trench Mortars which will be established at
a point about U 3 b 6"8, to assist when called on by Signals mutually
arranged.
This Coy will then attack OWL Trench and connect with "C" Coy of left
and after capture will consolidate and to point U 4 a 6.9 on "C” Coy's
right.
"D" Coy will follow at 150 yards distance.
11. "D" Coy under Capt.F.L.DAVY will follow 'B" Coy at distance of about
150 Yards lending support where necessary and capturing Green line when
barrage lifts, connecting with "A” Coy on left and 37th Battalion on
right, consolidating as front line and throwing out strong posts,
concerting with Coy on right for joint protective measures.
Trench Mortars will be placed in position approx. U 4 a 32.1s in
Uncanny Angle and near U 4 a 90.70., on HUNS Walk.
12. "C' Coy under Capt.E.O.WILLIAMS will move in liaison with "A" Coy.
45th BattN, and "B" Coy. 47th Battn on left, and "B" Coy 47th Battn on
right, towards Green line and will capture and consolidate OWL Trench
within boundaries defined.
"A" Coy will follow at 100 Yards distance in liaison with 45th Battn.
13. "A" Coy., under Lieut.D.F.SALMON will follow "C" Coy at distance of
100 Yards and in liaison with 45th Battn, advancing through "C" Coy
when OWL Trench is captured and when barrage lifts at ZERO plus 10 hours
35 minutes capturing Green line, connecting right and left and
consolidating according to special instructions issued.
14. Barrage will rest 300 Yards in front of this line to til ZERO plus 11 hours
5 minutes when it will stop to allow Mounted Troops to go forward.
15. Tanks will co-operate in this Movement in accordance with special
instructions issued.
16. These positions must be taken and held at all costs in order to form
a continuous line.
17. No man is to leave the line without permission of Officer in Command of
Sector, unless wounded when he will be taken to R.A.P. by Stretcher Bearers
or men specially detailed by an Officer.
18. R.A.P. positions will be notified later.
19. Battn.Hqrs., will move forward about ZERO plus 10 hours to a position
about U 3 b 1.9.

(3)
BATTALION OPERATION ORDER No 138 (continued)
20. Position of xxx Battalion Dump will be notified, later.
21. Contact Aeroplanes will work in connection with this attack and will
call for Flares by a succession of A's on Klaxon Horn or by firing
a WHITE VERY LIGHT, at about ZERO plus 10 hours 40 minutes when
GREEN FLARES will be shown in groups of three.
22. BATTALION FORWARD COMMAND POST will be established by Lieut.C.D.SCOTT
and party in suitable position after 1st Objective is taken and
relay posts established if required.
23. (a) Lieut.H.G.SMITH will act as Liaison Officer at Bde. Hqrs, and,
(b) Lieut.G.V.O'CONNOR will act as Liaison Officer with 37th Battn
Headquarters.
24. (a) Carrying Party of 50 Other Ranks under Lieut BRITTAIN 46th Battn
will make arrangements for supplies from Battalion Dump to front
line.
(b) R.S.M.H.LINDSAY will be in charge of Battalion Dump and be
responsible for despatch of water, rations and ammunition as
required.
C.Q.M.S. will assist for respective Company's.
c) R.M.P. will police Route and form Battalion Stragglers Post.
25 (a) Messages will be sent in CLEAR for six hours after GREEN Line
is taken; after that in special Code which will be supplied,
(b) Situation reports to be sent in half hourly and will bear number
of Company or Section or Platoon and Location.
26. These orders to be read in xxxjunction conjunction with :
(a) S.S. 135.
(b) Normal formation of Attack.
(c) Platoon in offensive Action.
(d) Special instructions issued.
27. ACKNOWLEDGE.
Issued at ........
Copy No. 1. 12th AUST.INF.BDE.
" "2 & 3 WAR DIARY.
" "4 C.O. 37th BATTALION.
" "5. C.O. 45th BATTALION.
" "6. 12th A.L.T.M.B.
" "7. 12th M.G. COMPANY.
" "8. O.C. A. COMPANY.
" "9. O.C. B. "
" "10. O.C. C. "
" "11. O.C. D. "
" "19. & 13. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.
" "14 & 15 LIAISON OFFICERS.
" "16. ADJUTANT.
" "17. COMMANDING OFFICER.
" "18. FILED
" "19, 20, 21, 22. SPARE.

[[?]]
CAPTAIN,
ADJUTANT 47th BATTALION, 

Messines. 12 Bde [[?]] to Messines.
GS in Oxygen trench surrounded
"Their saviour increased the moral of our tps"
"The article is at Ts during / recent operations, materially
& morally, as could be.
"The cleared tracks thro' weret over came obstacles
We wd otherwise have impeded / infy.
Ts appearing.
"52Bn say ret tt / Ts were of more material than moral support"

TELEPHONE: FL. 4151.
Commonwealth of Australia.
No. 6691.
[*Corrections
made in TS.

C.E.W.B.*]
HISTORIAN,
VICTORIA BARRACKS,
PADDINGTON, N.S.W.
22 May 1931.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Dear Glasgow,
In my narrative of Messines I have to refer to the
reconnaissance made by an officer of the 13th Brigade staff on
the evening and night of June 7. It was his report, received
about 10 p.m., which informed you of the failure of the 49th
Battalion, and caused you to send them two companies of the 51st.
Do you remember what officer this was?
I shall shortly be sending you, if you would kindly
look through it, the British historian's account of the fighting
at Villers-Bretonneux on 24-25 April 1918. It seems to me to
require a good deal of addition and correction. I am, however,
enclosing a separate letter about this.
Yours sincerely,
C.E.W. Bean
Major-General Sir T.W. Glasgow, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
The Senate
Canberra, F.C.T. 

"FOR QUICK SERVICE USE THE TELEGRAPH."
T.G. No. 43.
OFFICE DATE STAMP
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.- POSTMASTER-GENERALS DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED TELEGRAM
OFFICE DATE STAMP
Sent at 
C'et No. 
By
TELEGRAPHS CANBERRA ACT
27 MAY 31
The first line of this Telegram contains the following particulars in the order named.
STATION FROM.     WORDS.    TIME LODGED. No 27
2 SCONE.... 63 11 20AM
Remarks
To Senator Glasgow
CANBERRA.
This message has been received subject to the Post and
Telegraph Act and Regulations.
The time received at this Office is shown at the foot of the
Form.
Sch C425-10/1929.
THE INFORMATION ON THE BACK OF THIS FORM WILL INTEREST YOU
FORTYNITHINTH BATT. OBTAINED THEIR OBJECTIVE NO GAP EVER OCCURRED THEIR LINE
STOP FLANKS NEVER IN LIASON WITH BRITISH DURING MESSINES STOP MESSAGE
DID COME THROUGH FORTYNINTH FROM FIFTYSECOND THAT 52 HAD OBTAINED FULL
OBJECTIVE BUT LEFT FLANK NOT LINKED WITH BRITISH STOP POSTED YOU FULL
REPORT FROM MEMORY YESTERDAY OF WHAT ACTUALLY OCCURRED IN CONNECTION
WITH THE MATTER ... ROY MORELL...11-52a mv

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Dear General,
I have written out
what I can remember of
our what we did at
Messines in reference to
your 'phone conversation.
I am posting this on
the train but will try
and ring you tomorrow.
Yours sincerely
Roy Morell
26/5/31 

TO:-
Sir WILLIAM GLASGOW,
Parliament House,
CANBERRA.
With reference to our telephone conversation last
night; I have not been able to find any of our old reports
but I got into touch with Swain by telephone in Brisbane
and after a conversation with him, think from memory that
the activities of the brigade at Messines were as follows :-
We sent the 52nd.battalion in on the left and the
49th. battalion in on the right (you will remember we put
the 51st.battalion in the next day). The left flank of the
52nd.battalion was an English division and the right flank
of the 49th.battalion was the 3rd. Australian division.
I feel quite confident that the 49th.battalion
got their full objective and ^that there was never any gap in
their front line. They were able to keep touch with the
52nd.battalion on their left, but you will remember they
did not at first have a complete liason with the 3rd. Division
and I think you, and I am not sure whether I myself
was with you, went to the 49th. battalion and they pointed
out to us where the 3rd. Division should have been, and that
they had not yet reached their full objective.
You will remember also that Paul took the 49th.
battalion into action and was wounded and handed over to
Swain and subsequently we sent over Rowe from the 51st.
battalion to take over from Swain.
I now well remember ^well that there was some difficulty
with the 52nd.battalion completing touch with the English
regiment on their left and Maxwell reported to Paul,
who, being wounded, passed it on to Swain, who sent it back
to brigade, that they, the 52nd,battalion, had obtained
their objective but were not in touch with the British on

-2-
their left, and I think this may be where the British
historian has incorrectly reported that a staff officer
had come back from the 49th,Battalion with the information
that there was a gap in their line and that they had
failed to obtain their full objective.
You will remember quite well that Maxwell did
very good work in getting in through to the British on
his left and it was on the supporting recommendadtion of
a British officer that we ultimately recommended him for
the D.S.O.
On the second day of Messines, owing to casualties
&c., in the 49th.Battalion,and the vagueness of the
position in regard to the 3rd. Australian Division, we
sent the 51st. Battalion to take over a portion of the
right flank of the 49th.Battalion front and to endeavour
to extend to their right and make close contact with the
3rd Australian Division. Then, if you I remember rightly
the 12th. Australian Brigade relieved or took over the left
flank of the 3rd. Australian Division and we did have some
difficulty in clearing up the situation regarding a certain
strong point ^or area between our right flank and the 12th.
Brigade but the British were in no manner concerned with
this. I can only speak from memory, but I feel quite
confident that the 49th.never had any gap in their line
and obtained their full objective without great difficulty.
I am also sure that the 52nd. Battalion also obtained
their objective but that there was a hiatus between
their left flank and the British right.
I am sorry that I cannot find out report on the
operations but I would suggest that Dr. Beane might be
able to obtain our report and perhaps the battalions'
too from the War Records Office.
I am certain their that neither you nor myself
brought any message back from the 49th,Battalion at 10
p.m. on the night of the 7th.June. You, accompanied by

-3-
someone, it may have been me, were at their Head Quarters
in daylight, as they pointed out to us where the co-operating
Battalion on their right should have been and
were not. Finlayson and myself did go and see Ridley of
the 51st.Battalion the day after we put them in but this
was of no concern to the British. Pongo Clark or Finlayson
would have been the only two possible officers to
have brought any messages or reports back from the 49th.
Battalion, but it looks very much as if the British historian
is confusing the message that came through the 49th.
Battalion from the 52nd. in reading that report as if it
came from the 49th.battalion instead of from the 52nd.
Battalion. I do not think the 49th.Battalion at any time
during the Messines battle were in liason with any British
units.
Pope, who took the 52nd Battalion in, was wounded
very early in the battle, so that that unit's means
of communication were disorganised soon after they started
and most of the information which we got from the 52nd.
came, I think, direct from Maxwell, who was apparently on
in command of the whole of the Battalion's front line
troops.
R. Morell
Tullochard
Inverell
26/5/31