Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/272/1 - 1917 - 1932 - Part 1

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Awaiting approval
Accession number:
RCDIG1066710
Difficulty:
3

Caution: sensitive content

The inclusion of words, terms or descriptions from historical records reflects the social and political attitudes of the period in which they were written.

Page 1 / 10

AVM138 Offichal History, 1914-18 War: RecordsofCWBean, Officha! Mistorian. Diares and Notebooks Hem number: 3D606/272/1 Tille: Folder, 1917 - 1932 Covers the 4th Division at Messines and incudes notes by Bean and AVBazey, corespondence, extracts of offcal records and extracts trom Pie W D Galways diary. AVM38-3DRL606/27211
D. -72 DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. B. W. BBAN CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914-1918 HE use of these diaries and noles i subject to conditons haid down i the terms of gift to the Australien War Memorial. But, apart from those tern, wish the folowing circumstances and consideratons to be brought to the noûce of every reades and whiter who may use them. These wnunge represent only what at the moment of making ihem I believed to be irwe. The dare were joled dows amost daly wih the object of recording what was then in the wrilers mind. Often be wrole them when very Hred and half asleep; also, not ifrequenty, what he beheved to be tue was not so –but à does not follow that be always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistekes when discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember ihat he had written them. These records should, therefore, be used wih great cauton, as relaung only what their author, a the Gme of wrung, beneved. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch (ov the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But he did wy to ensure such accuracy by consuling, as (as as possible, those who had seen or otherwise taken pant im the events. The constant falsity of second-hand evidence (on which a large proporton of war stories are founded) was impressed upon him by ibe second es third day of ihe Gallpol campaign, notwihstanding that those who passed on such stores ususly themselves beheved them to be Gue Al second-hand evideuce herein should be read wih this in mund. 16 Sept, 1946. .C E W. BEAN. ereenrr
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Woung S t USRrBEF, FRANCE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 17/6/17. Department of Defence DEAR NIR. YOUNG, I am writing Base Records Offce, A.I.F. to younot only to sympathise with Melbourne, 2nd July, 1917. you over the loss of your son, but also to let you know how Iappreci¬ ated all the good work he had done while he was with the battalion. was in charge of the 13th Battalion when he frst joined up, and when Iformed the 45th battalion I gave DEAR SIR, him his Commission. He has done Ihave much pleasure sterling work ever since, and his in forwarding hereunder copy of death is a big loss to the ba'talion. extract from Sixth Supplement No. Personally, I had a great liking for 29859 to the London Gazette of 8th him and always looked upon him December, 1916, relating to the as one of muy most, promising conspicuous services rendered by offcers. He was killed while lead- your son, Captain (lemporary) VV. ing his company during the attack L. Young, 45th Battalion. on Messines. As it turned out, his task was a particularly heavy one The sector he was attacking turned AWARDED THE MILITARY out to be particularly strong and CROSS his company suffered severely. As "HIS MAJESTY THE KING we were attacking over country has been grociously pleased to that was invisable from where we confer the Military Cross on the started, direction was nuost import- undermentioned Offücer in recog- ant, and Captain Young was re¬ nition of his gallantry anddeo sponsible for the directon on the to duty in the Field:-- left dank. I discussed the matter very fully with him and it was Captain (lemporary) WILLIAM deended that he was to mnake for a LANCELOT YOUNG cartain road and work along it. For conspicuous galantry in Everything went like clock work, Action. He organised andleda and, notwithstanding the hundred raid agdinst the enemy trenches and one dißniculties, the battalion with grect courage and skill. He reached the starting point and the has previously done füne work". attack commenced. Captain Young was wounded early in the day, but The above has been promulgated refused to go to the rear. As I in Commonwealth of Australia said before, this company en¬ Gazette, No. 103 of 29th June,1917. countered particularly ferce re- sistance and suffered heavily, and when the sitwation was cleared up Yours faithfully, next morning Captain, Youngs J. McLEAN, Major. dead body was found lying on the road it was decided to work along. Offcer ic Base Records. We buried the poor old chap within a few yards of where he fell. Death apparently wasinstan- taneous. He was always a most popular offcer and his death has caused agapin thisbattalion which is very hard to fll and I have lost F. D. YOUNG, Esc., a personalfriend. 6 Milton Avenue, Yours very sincerely, Mosman, NSW. (Signed) SYDNEY K. HERRIG, Lieut. Colonel Hobsaen detor 11601 COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRAL/A Governor-Generals Offce,". Nelbourne, 30th June, 1917. DEAR SIR, I am desired by His Excellency the Governor-General to transmit to you the following message from Their Majesties The King and Queen:- The King and Queen deeeply regret the loss you andthe Army have sustained by the death of your son in the service of his country Their Majesties truly sympa- thise with you in your sorrow. In addition to the above message, am desired by the Governor¬ General to express Their Excellen- cies' heartfelt sympathy with you on the death of this gallant offcer, who fell fghting for his Country and Empire. Yours faithfully, GEORGESTEWARD, Major. Offcial Secretary. F. D. YOUNG, Esg., Rainbow, Victoria.
7 47th BATTALLON. 12th AUST. INF. EDE. OLHATICN REPORT. REFERENCE MAPS. 1/40,000. Shoet 28 1/20,000. Shect 28 S.W. 1/5,000. Messines 1/5,000. Douvo Tho ißth Aust. Inf. Ddc. was ordcred to attack the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES Ridge at ZE80 on the 7th Junc 1917 in conjunction with 1Sth Aust. Inf. Edc. on the left and the 10th Aust. Inf. Edc. on the right, 47th Rattn. being allotted frontage on right of 12th Aust. Inf.Edc. as final objectivo termed "Orcen Linc"(OwL Support) right being on HUNS WALK U 4 a 9505 incluzive and left being O 94 d 9040, 15th Dattalion being Left Battalion and 97th Dattalion on the right. Orders vore vritten as per copy No 17 attachod (Battalion Opcration Order No 138 Dattalion left Camp at EULFORD Camp (Shoct 28 T 26 a 5.S.) at 7-40 a.m. as per order attachod (Battalion Opcration Order No 109) and procccded to jumping off placo in No Man's Land, arriving there at 11-10 a.m., chcre forming up placo had boen previously markod along linc (ULCEn Trench) in front of MESSINES and marhod by flags. NEs ZERO not having been received the Battalion was ordcred to advance to the position of deployment on the first objcctive captured by tho New Zcaiand Division in tho morning and called "Black Li e, running from U 9 d 6590 to U 3 b 1.7. Companies procceded at li-CO a.m. in Artillery formation in perfoct order followed at roasonable distance by carrying party of 40th Battn. under Scc.Licut. UnITTAIN, cnemy barrage coming doun inflicting losses on latter party. I was at this time informed at my Battalion Mcadquarters that NEW ZERO time had becn advanced 2 hours and was now actually ZERO plus 12 hours or 3-10 p.m. This was despatchod to tho Companics noving forward and roached them as they reached tho Black Line, necessitating a halt, full advantage was taken of it to rcconnoître the position and companics formed up ready for the attack. Capt.F.L.DAVY O.C. 'D" Coy being killed at this juncturc. At NEW ZERO (3-10 p.n.) the Dattalion moved forward to tho attack on the Orcen Line, in lines of half Battalion cach in 4 waves, ist line being "B" Coy under Capt.J.W.MILLAR on tho right, with right at U 3 d 6500 und left at U 9 0 3540, and "C' Coy under Capt.E.O.WILLLAMS on left, with left at U 3 b 1.7. adjoining 45th Dattalion - Capt.J.W. MILLAn's right flank being against left of 37th Battalion. 2ud line consistel of "D' Coy (now under Licut.J.SCHULZ) following Coy, and 'A" Coy under Licut.D.F.SALMON following Coy. eDe Coys wero to go throuch "C' and"n" Coys respcctivoly and "A" ann capture and hold the Orcen Linc. The barrago was excollent moving forward as per schedulc. At this timc Dattn. H.G. had been moved forward to a concrcte sholter at U 9 a 2015, but no communications except by runner were possible. Those vere slow und uncertain, quite a number being casualties by the onemy sholl fire which opcned up now. "n" Coy procccded along UNHEARALLE Trench towards its objcctive, its Coy.Commdr., Capt.J.W. MILLAR being killed and Lieut.G.N.M.COODE and Licut.W.S.DIXON boing mortally wounded, the Coy rather lost dircction in kccping touch with 37th Dattalion and "D" Coy, followed gaining OWL Trench first and waiting for "D" Coy to connect, "C" Coy procccded to its objective in conjunction with eôth Dattn but ccro faced with strong resistance from UXXCEN Trench at O Ct c 3545. This was cventually ovcrcome but tôth Lattalion were delayed on thoir side. Eventually at about 5-00 p.m. this opposition was silenced and the advance was continued to OWL Trench but determined resistance was again ncct with. Mcantime "D" Coy was held up and remainod at OUL Trench and position at dusk on the 7th inst was :- "C" Coy on line between OWL and OXXCEN Trench running U 4 a 9505 O 84 c 3545. "D" Coy in OWL Trench connccting with"C” Coy. A" Coy in OxYCEN Tronch O 34 c 2.3. t0 0 34 c 3545. and "B" Coy away to the right.
(2) At this juncture corrunnication bocame difficult and I despatched Licur.N.F. BRE-TUT to reconnoître and report, my Forward Command Post under Licut.C.D.SCOTT not bcing hcard of for some time. It was subsequcntly learned that he had been killed at about 6-0 p.n. Licut.N.F. BRLXCR made a quick approciation and succecded in placing eps Coy on the right track with the result that at 10-0 p.m. "n" and "D' Coys, by this time considcrably depleted in numbers, had advancod and occupied OWL Support (the Orcen Linc) whilo "C" and "A" Coys also merged undor Capt.L.O.wILLLAMS were dclayed by anxicty to retain touch with left and were in a position running from O 94 c 5.3. on left to OUL Trench at U 4 a 9.C. on right. At 5-0 p.m. on tho 7th inst. cnemy dclivcred a counter attack in forco and at same time our barrage shortened und came doun on the Oreen Line and OWL Trench chich we were occupying. This was withstood for some timo, the attack being ropulsed but it was dcemod desirable to fall back a littlo to clear the barrage and endcavour to gain touch with right flank. The line was then with dravn to about 250 Yards in advance of original jumping off, in front of Black Line U 8 b C.2. to U 0 b 6.9. and dug in tomporarily and thus was tho position at 12 midnight on 7th/Sth Junc 1917. One Company of the 4Sth Dattalion was sent to reinforce and reported at 12-15 a.n. under Capt. MiERSLETH. Endcavours cere made to get into position for another assault but was a difficult opcration in the darkness, but was successfully accomplished and concurrently with tho arrival of another Coy (about 70 rifles) of 48th Dattn under Capt.D.G.C.CULMINCS and attack was ordered, ZERO time bein; 3-0 a.m. It was quite impossible to start at this time as Coys ucre still slightly disorganised and quite a good way from objcctive. Communication s had not boen properly establishod, so I desided to mane the best of what clement of porturbation remmined with the Nun after the barrage had lifted and gave orders to move forward as far as possible and dig in and croep forward determinedly one by one until a definito ruch could bo mndo on the objective and lead to its final capture. XXñ This was donc and my surmise provod corrcct, it was possible and tho position at 6-0 a.m. showed us in a line 200 yards vest of OWL Trench running U 4 a 1.8. to 0 2i c 2545 with both flanks in the air, ncither flanking Battalion acted prompted cnough. Strong fighting patrols were sent out to connect with flanks, at the samd timo single men jumping from shell hole to shell holo advancing the line inch by inch until vo were cnable at 7-0 a.m. to occupy OWL Trench and start to consolidato. Tho same progress was adopted in the advance to the final objcctive with similar success and at 8-39 a.m. I reportod having occupied the Orcen Line our final objcctive. Consolidation was at once begun, fighting patrols throvn out and attempts made to conncctt with our flanks. The position at 5-0 a.m. on the Sth inst. was :- Grccn Line occupied by 47th Dattalion from HUNs Wi at U 4 A9565 to O 91 d 8.4. OwL Trench occupied from U 4 a 4175 to 0 84 d i.8. dôth Lattalion at a position somewhere loft of us in rear. und 37th Dattalion on UNCANNI Trench at junction with UNDULATING Trench. Defensive measures cere taken accordingly. A Sap was started connccting right of OXXCEN Trench at 0 91 c 3.3. with HUNS WALK at U 4 a 4.7. thus forming a third line of resistance. At 3-0 p.m. on the Sth inst. a body of encmy attempted a counter attack on left but vere beaten off by Lowis Gun fire and 2 Vicker Guns which I despatchod to support. Consolidation was carried on all day and communication established and at nightfall wo were in position on Green Linc. Our casualties had been fairly heavy in Officers and Other Ranks, though it was impossible to dctermine cxactly how many. A number of Officers were casualtics and Capt.E.O.WILLIAMS remmined senior Officer on the spot. Endoavours wero made to get tho tôth Batth to link up but theu could not respond, so I extendod my loft along the Orcen Line for another 200 yards practically to O S4 d 4500 covcring Loft Battn position to cnable line to como up. In moantime right Lattalion had been relicved by the 44th Dattn. who worked up to angle of UNCANNY Trench, UNCANNY Support and UNDULATING Trench at 3-0 p.m. on Oth inst., and endcavoured to move to Creen Linc in his Scctor. Rations and food woro brought up this night without much difficulty but continuously throughout the day the sholling was hcavy. Carrying Partics had bocome dopletod and reliance had to be placed on Pack Mulo Troops, but their handling was inferior and no stores could be gotten to front linc.
() Thcre were indications on tho Oth inst all day of a counter attack devoloping as great activity was reported from near WARMETON on WARNETON-CONIMES Road at 9-00 a.m. and in GAPAARD about noon and at STEIGNAST Farm at 12-30 p.m. Desultory attempts to gain OWL Support in front of th Dattn Scctor ucre foiled by our Lowis tun firc. Right Dattalion connccted with my right at 4-0 p.m. at HUNS wALK at U 4 a 0500 and Left Dattalion could not manage to offectually do it, so compromised by cstablishing a line of Posts from their right across the terrain between OwL Trench and OwL Support joining the latter at 0 S4 d 2040. This now gavo us a continuous line for the first timo with both my flanks linked up at U 4 a 9565 and O 94 d 3040. During the night the Scctor was divided into three by the inscrtion of 40th Battalion betucon 47th and 4ôth Battalions. Line hold from right to left being :- 47th Dattalion- right- HUNS WALK at U 4 a 9.7. to 0 34 d 5027. OUL Trench at junction of UNCANNY and UNDEARAHLE to O S4 c O.3. NEW OXYCEN Trench at O 94 c 8.3. to HUNS WALK at U 4 a 1.9. 4Cth Battalion OWL Support from 47th Dattalion left to 45th Battn right at O 94 d 2.8. 4ôth Dattalion OWL Trench from 40th Dattalion loft O 94 d 1.7. to Road O 04 a 8.3. Rclicf was completed at 9-80 a.m., Coys of 48th Battalion going out. Fighting patrols vero sent out at 12 midnight carrying tape lines for redircction one to rcach LE QUATREHOIS dabarot at O 35 c 8.4. tho other to go to STEICNAST Farm at U 5 a 2.7. and establish Strong Posts there, crush any oppsoition.he; They unfortunatcly cncountered Machine Guns and had to return with 50 casualties and without accomplishing anything cxcept determining the localo of Machine Cunn which were subsequently dcalt with. Another strong patrol under Licut.F.J.McK LON started out to locatc KumL SChLOss which was indicated b a Hun prisoner to be a regimental headquarters situated at U 4 a 8.2. This party surprised a party of cnemy who put up their X S.O.S. chich coincidentally was a Rod Flarc and the result was both our barrage and enemy's came doun and enveloped them causing slight casualtics but they returned O.K. During morning of lOth inst. cnemy plancs flow low over position and the line was subject to severe strafing all day doing a considcrablo amount of damage and destroying some Lewis Cuns. Light Trench Mortars were established at ncar O"L Support at U 4 a 9.7. and OWL Trench at O 34 c9.3. Position remnined unaltered until the 47th Battalion were rolicved by 40th Dattalion extending their right to HUNS WALK and we moved into Supportsat HANBURY Support until relicved by lith Fusiliers at 8-10 p.m. on i2t4/19th June 19 Material captured :- i 77 mm Cun and left in front of Black Line near ZAREEBA. '08/'1? Light Machine Guns. Machine Guns left in position. 194 Prisoncrs. Dag of important Papers and Maps from Major of XXX CBPEnH Cerman Army Corps (forwarded to Brignde by special runncr) Also Miscellançous collection of Documents. (AZlan 13th JUNE 1917. LIEUT. COLONEL. ZLNDING 47th BATTALION.
424 3 E ORE T. Gops Res.St.. BATTALION OFERATION ORuER Sheet 28 1/40,0 Sheet 28 S.w. 1 lkiv. 6.300. ) unn 1917. DOOVE (part 28) 1/5,000. 1. The ME yallied Fropp. ZER0 üme wir nemi! TheSector a 1ath Aus inon t and on right by l0th Anst.Inf.Bde. ons will atta¬ t.Inf.Bde. front; and ath pat 85 The 4Tth Battalion will en line on slnding frontage froa U4 Unb eits junc V4 a 30.55. turing nd rin Gospeny turing right of Eg :) Line of "A" and form u under:- d) Frontages allottei Comp "O" Oy -O34 c 00.30-UA ineluding South eige of b60.s0to0 ole Treuch froar X thenee along! 7. Treuch to right of "C' Cy. 1 50.40 to left of" 2 D Coy.-Oå ammtes from zun t Companies will War forder in follwir uang I Route, geng ra, to avoid enemy fir (b) Dattalion Headquartersand Carr Route and will urs, resdy to move. be formed up at assembly place b n. Nor ) When reidy to moye runners Trac ermeitre ee Scout and Inte forming u Walien Po Readnnart ame unifern as the (a) offace equirment) ghting orde (b) othe ter, an Gae botto Ver vols of Hen veuse scnnaneet not stion: black 11 fora Cmpa of ain enay ades

AWM138
Official History,
1914-18 War: Records of C E W Bean,
Official Historian.
Diaries and Notebooks
Item number: 3DRL606/272/1
Title: Folder, 1917 - 1932
Covers the 4th Division at Messines and
includes notes by Bean and A W Bazley,
correspondence, extracts of official records and
extracts from Pte W D Gallway's diary.
AWM38-3DRL606/272/1
 

 

[* 4TH DIV. MESSINES   No. 272. *]
[* 1ST SET  AWM32  3 DRL 606 No 272 [1] *]
DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. B. W. BEAN
CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914-1918
THE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms
of gift to the Australian War Memorial. But, apart from those terns, I wish the
following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every
reader and writer who may use them.
These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be
true. The diaries were jotted down almost daily with the object of recording what
was then in the writer's mind. Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep;
also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so –but it does not
follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when
discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them.
These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what
their author, at the time of writing, believed. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch
for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But he
did try to ensure such accuracy by consulting, as far as possible, those who had
seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand
evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed
upon him by the second or third day of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that
those who passed on such stores usually themselves believed them to be true. All
second-hand evidence herein should be read with this in mind.
16 Sept, 1946.            C E W. BEAN.
AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

ACCESS STATUS

OPEN
 

 

4th Aust. Div.  Messines, June 1917

 

 

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
THE SENATE
2 July 1931

My dear Bean

Your letter of

16th. June received & it is

noted that you will

incorporate my remarks

on the Villes British

Historian's narrative of

the Villers-Brettonneux

fighting in your comments.

I am not quite sure

as to the New-Zealand

Brigades sharing Head
 

 

Quarters with me during the

Battle of Messines. I think

Cam Robertson of the 12th

Brigade was in the same

dug-out. The New Zealanders

Brigade may also have been there.

Kind Regards

Yours Sincerely

T. W. Glasgow
 

 

[* Capt W L Young Killed in action

45 Bn   7/6/17 *]

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Department of Defence
Base Records Office, A.I.F.
Melbourne, 2nd July, 1917.
DEAR SIR,
I have much pleasure
in forwarding hereunder copy of
extract from Sixth Supplement No.
Personally, I had a great liking for
29859 to the London Gazette of 8th
December, 1916, relating to the
conspicuous services rendered by
your son, Captain (temporary) W.
L. Young, 45th Battalion.
AWARDED THE MILITARY
CROSS
his company suffered severely. As
"HIS MAJESTY THE KING
has been graciously pleased to
confer the Military Cross on the
undermentioned Officer in recognition

 of his gallantry and devotion
to duty in the Field:--
Captain (temporary) WILLIAM
LANCELOT YOUNG
For conspicuous gallantry in
Action. He organised and led a
raid against the enemy trenches
with great courage and skill. He
has previously done fine work".
The above has been promulgated
in Commonwealth of Australia 
Gazette, No. 103 of 29th June,1917. 
Yours faithfully,
J. McLEAN, Major.
Officer i/c Base Records.
F. D. YOUNG, Esq.,
6 Milton Avenue,
Mosman, N.S.W.

B.E.F., FRANCE.

17/6/17.

DEAR MR. YOUNG,

I am writing

to you not only to sympathise with

you over the loss of your son, but

also to let you know how I appreciated

all the good work he had done

while he was with the battalion. I

was in charge of the 13th Battalion

when he first joined up, and when

I formed the 45th Battalion I gave

him his commission. He has done

sterling work ever since, and his

death is a big loss to the battalion.

Personally, I had a great liking for 

him and always looked upon him

as one of my most promising

officers, He was killed while leading

his company during the attack

on Messines. As it turned out, his

task was a particularly heavy one.
 The sector he was attacking turned

out to be particularly strong and

his company suffered severely. As

we were attacking over country

that was invisible from where we

started, direction was most important,

and Captain Young was responsible

for the direction on the 

left flank. I discussed the matter

very fully with him and it was 

decided that he was to make for a

certain road and work along it.

Everything went like clock work,

and, notwithstanding the hundred

and one difficulties, the battalion

reached the starting point and the 

attack commenced, Captain Young

was wounded early in the day, but

refused to go to the rear. As I

said before, this company encountered

particularly fierce resistance

and suffered heavily, and

when the situation was cleared up

next morning Captain Young's

dead body was found lying on the

road it was decided to work along.

We buried the poor old chap

within a few yards of where he

fell. Death was apparently instantaneous.

He was always a most

popular officer and his death has

caused a gap in this battalion which

is very hard to fill and I have lost

a personal friend.

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) SYDNEY K. HERRING,

Lieut. Colonel

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Governor-General's Office,

Melbourne,

30th June, 1917.

DEAR SIR,

I am desired by His

Excellency the Governor-General

to transmit to you the following

message from Their Majesties The

King and Queen:-

"The King and Queen deeply

regret the loss to you and the Army

have sustained by the death of

your son in the service of his

country

Their Majesties truly sympathise

with you in your sorrow,"

In addition to the above message,

I am desired by the Governor-

General to express Their Excellencies'

heartfelt sympathy with you

on the death of this gallant officer,

who fell fighting for his Country

and Empire.

Yours faithfully,

GEORGE STEWARD, Major.

Official Secretary.

F. D. YOUNG, Esq.,

Rainbow,

Victoria
 

 

47th BATTALION.
12th AUST. INF. BDE.
OPERATION REPORT
REFERENCE MAPS.
Sheet 28           1/40,000.
Sheet 28 S.W.  1/20,000.
Messines          1/5,000.
Douve               1/5,000.
The 12th Aust. Inf. Bde. was ordered to attack the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES
Ridge at ZER0 on the 7th June 1917 in conjunction with 13th Aust. Inf.
Bde. on the left and the 10th Aust. Inf. Bde. on the right, 47th Battn.
being allotted frontage on right of 12th Aust. Inf. Bde. as final
objective termed "Green Line" (OWL Support) right being on HUNS WALK
U 4 a 9505 inclusive and left being 0 34 d 3040, 45th Battalion being
Left Battalion and 37th Battalion on the right.
Orders were written as per copy No 17 attached (Battalion Operation
[*√*] Order No 138)

Battalion left Camp at BULFORD Camp (Sheet 2S T 26 a 5.8.) at 7-40 a.m.
[*X*] as per order attached (Battalion Operation Order No 139) and proceeded
to jumping off place in No Man's Land, arriving there at 11-10 a.m.,
where forming up place had been previously marked along line (ULCER
Trench) in front of MESSINES and marked by flags.
NEW ZERO not having been received the Battalion was ordered to advance
to the position of deployment on the first objective captured by the
New Zealand Division in the morning and called "Black Line", running
from U 3 d 5590 to U 3 b 1.7.
Companies proceeded at 11-30 a.m. in Artillery formation in perfect
order followed at reasonable distance by carrying party of 46th Battn.
under Sec. Lieut. BRITTAIN, enemy barrage coming down inflicting losses
on latter party. I was at this time informed at my Battalion Headquarters
that NEW ZERO time had been advanced 2 hours and was now actually ZERO
plus 12 hours or 3-10 p.m. This was despatched to the Companies moving
forward and reached them as they reached the Black Line, necessitating
a halt, full advantage was taken of it to reconnoitre the position and
companies formed up ready for the attack. Capt. F. L. DAVY O.C. "D" Coy
being killed at this juncture.
At NEW ZERO (3-10 p.m.) the Battalion moved forward to the attack on the
Green Line, in lines of half Battalion each in 4 waves, 1st line being
"B" Coy under Capt. J. W. MILLAR on the right, with right at U 3 d 5590
and left at U 3 0 3540, and "C" Coy under Capt. E. O. WILLLAMS on left,
with left at U 3 b 1.7. adjoining 45th Battalion - Capt. J. W. MILLAR's
right flank being against left of 37th Battalion.
2nd line consisted of "D' Coy (now under Lieut. J. SCHULZ) following
"B" Coy, and "A" Coy under Lieut. D. F. SALMON following "C" Coy.
"A" and "D" Coys were to go through "C" and "B" Coys respectively and
capture and hold the Green Line.
The barrage was excellent moving forward as per schedule. At this time
Battn. H.Q. had been moved forward to a concrete shelter at U 3 a 2015,
but no communications except by runner were possible. Those were slow
and uncertain, quite a number being casualties by the enemy shell fire
which opened up now.
"B" Coy proceeded along UNBEARABLE Trench towards its objective, its
Coy. Commdr., Capt. J. W. MILLAR being killed and Lieut. G. N. M. GOODE and
Lieut. W. S. DIXON being mortally wounded, the Coy rather lost direction
in keeping touch with 37th Battalion and "D" Coy, followed gaining
OWL Trench first and waiting for "B" Coy to connect, "C" Coy proceeded
to its objective in conjunction with 45th Battn but were faced with
strong resistance from OXYGEN Trench at 0 34 c 3545. This was eventually
overcome but 45th Battalion were delayed on their side. Eventually at
about 5-30 p.m. this opposition was silenced and the advance was
continued to OWL Trench but determined resistance was again meet with.
Meantime "D" Coy was held up and remained at OWL Trench and position
at dusk on the 7th inst was :-
"C" Coy on line between OWL and OXYGEN Trench running U 4 a 9565 -
0 34 c 3545.
XX "D" Coy in OWL Trench connecting with "C” Coy.
A" Coy in OXYGEN Trench 0 34 c 3.3. to 0 34 c 3545.
and "B" Coy away to the right.
 

 

(2)
At this juncture communication became difficult and I despatched
Lieut. N. F. BREMNER to reconnoitre and report, my Forward Command Post
under Lieut. C. D. SCOTT not being heard of for some time. It was subsequently
learned that he had been killed at about 5-0 p.m.
Lieut. N. F. BREMNER made a quick appreciation and succeeded in placing "B"

Coy on the right track with the result that at 10-0 p.m. "B" and "D" Coys,
by this time considerably depleted in numbers, had advanced and occupied
OWL Support (the Green Line) while "C" and "A" Coys also merged under
Capt. E. O. WILLIAMS were delayed by anxiety to retain touch with left and
were in a position running from 0 34 c 9.3. on left to OWL Trench at
U 4 a 3.6. on right.
At 5-0 p.m. on the 7th inst. enemy delivered a counter attack in force and
at same time our barrage shortened and came down on the Green Line and OWL
Trench which we were occupying. This was withstood for some time, the attack
being repulsed but it was deemed desirable to fall back a little to clear
the barrage and endeavour to gain touch with right flank. The line was then
with-drawn to about 250 Yards in advance of original jumping off, in front
of Black Line U 3 b 6.2. to U 3 b 6.9. and dug in temporarily and thus was
the position at 12 midnight on 7th/8th June 1917.
One Company of the 48th Battalion was sent to reinforce and reported at
12-15 a.m. under Capt. MAYERSBETH.
Endeavours were made to get into position for another assault but was a
difficult operation in the darkness, but was successfully accomplished and
concurrently with tho arrival of another Coy (about 70 rifles) of 48th
Battn under Capt. D. G. C. CUMMINGS and attack was ordered, ZERO time being
3-0 a.m. It was quite impossible to start at this time as Coys were still
slightly disorganised and quite a good way from objective.
Communication s had not been properly established, so I desided to make
the best of what element of perturbation remained with the Hun after the
barrage had lifted and gave orders to move forward as far as possible and
dig in and creep forward determinedly one by one until a definite rush
could be made on the objective and lead to its final capture. XXM This was
done and my surmise proved correct, it was possible and the position at
5-0 a.m. showed us in a line 200 yards west of OWL Trench running U 4 a 1.8.
to 0 34 c 3545 with both flanks in the air, either flanking Battalion
acted prompted enough.
Strong fighting patrols were sent out to connect with flanks, at the same
time single men jumping from shell hole to shell hole advancing the line
inch by inch until we were enable at 7-0 a.m. to occupy OWL Trench and
start to consolidate.
The same progress was adopted in the advance to the final objective with
similar success and at 8-39 a.m. I reported having occupied the Green Line
our final objective. Consolidation was at once begun, fighting patrols
thrown out and attempts made to connectt with our flanks.
The position at 9-0 a.m. on the 8th inst. was :-
Green Line occupied by 47th Battalion from HUNS WALK at U 4 A 9565 to
0 34 d 3.4. OWL Trench occupied from U 4 a 4175 to 0 34 d 1.8.
45th Battalion at a position somewhere left of us in rear.
and 37th Battalion on UNCANNY Trench at junction with UNDULATING Trench.
Defensive measures were taken accordingly. A Sap was started connecting
right of OXYGEN Trench at 0 34 c 3.3. with HUNS WALK at U 4 a 4.7. thus
forming a third line of resistance.
At 3-0 p.m. on the 8th inst. a body of enemy attempted a counter attack
on left but were beaten off by Lewis Gun fire and 2 Vicker Guns which I
despatched to support.
Consolidation was carried on all day and communication established and at
nightfall we were in position on Green Line.
Our casualties had been fairly heavy in Officers and Other Ranks, though
it was impossible to determine exactly how many. A number of Officers were
casualties and Capt. E. O. WILLIAMS remained senior Officer on the spot.
Endeavours were made to get the 45th Battn to link up but they could not
respond, so I extended my left along the Green Line for another 200 yards
practically to 0 34 d 4590 covering Left Battn position to enable line to
come up. In meantime right Battalion had been relieved by the 44th Battn.
who worked up to angle of UNCANNY Trench, UNCANNY Support and UNDULATING
Trench at 3-0 p.m. on 9th inst., and endeavoured to move to Green Line in
his Sector.
Rations and food were brought up this night without much difficulty but
continuously throughout the day the shelling was heavy. Carrying Parties
had become depleted and reliance had to be placed on Pack Mule Troops, but
their handling was inferior and no stores could be gotten to front line.
 

 

(3)
There were indications on tho 9th inst all day of a counter attack
developing as great activity was reported from near WARNETON on
WARNETON-CONINES Road at 9-00 a.m. and in GAPAARD about noon and at
STEIGNAST Farm at 12-30 p.m.
Desultory attempts to gain OWL Support in front of 45th Battn Sector
were foiled by our Lewis gun fire.
Right Battalion connected with my right at 4-0 p.m. at HUNS WALK at
U 4 a 9560 and Left Battalion could not manage to effectually do it,
so compromised by establishing a line of Posts from their right across
the terrain between OWL Trench and OWL Support joining the latter at
0 34 d 3040. This now gave us a continuous line for the first time with
both my flanks linked up at U 4 a 9565 and 0 34 d 3040.
During the night the Sector was divided into three by the insertion of
46th Battalion between 47th and 45th Battalions.
Line hold from right to left being :-
47th Battalion- right- HUNS WALK at U 4 a 9.7. to 0 34 d 3027.
                                          OWL Trench at junction of UNCANNY and UNBEARABLE 
                                          to 0 34 c 9.3.
                                           NEW OXYGEN Trench at 0 34 c 3.3. to HUNS WALK
                                           at U 4 a 1.9.
46th Battalion                OWL Support from 47th Battalion left to 45th
                                            Battn right at 0 34 d 2.8.
45th Battalion                 OWL Trench from 46th Battalion left 0 34 d 1.7.
                                            to Road 0 34 a 8.3.
Relief was completed at 3-30 a.m., Coys of 48th Battalion going out.
Fighting patrols were sent out at 12 midnight carrying tape lines for
redirection one to reach LE QUATREHOIS Cabaret at 0 35 c 8.4. the other
to go to STEIGNAST Farm at U 5 a 2.7. and establish Strong Posts there,
crush any opposition.xxxx; They unfortunately encountered Machine Guns
and had to return with 50% casualties and without accomplishing anything
except determining the locale of Machine Guns which were subsequently
dealt with.
Another strong patrol under Lieut. F. J. McKEON started out to locate
KUMRMAL SCHLOSS which was indicated b a Hun prisoner to be a regimental
headquarters situated at U 4 a 8.2. This party surprised a party of
enemy who put up their XXXX S.O.S. which coincidentally was a Red Flare
and the result was both our barrage and enemy's came down and enveloped
them causing slight casualties but they returned O.K.
During morning of 10th inst. enemy planes flew low over position and the
line was subject to severe strafing all day doing a considerable amount
of damage and destroying some Lewis Guns.
Light Trench Mortars were established at near OWL Support at U 4 a 9.7.
and OWL Trench at 0 34 c 9.3.
Position remained unaltered until the 47th Battalion were relieved by
46th Battalion extending their right to HUNS WALK and we moved into
Support at HANBURY Support until relieved by 11th Fusiliers at 8-10 p.m.
on 12th/13th June 1917.
Material captured :- 1 77 mm Gun and left in front of Black Line
near ZAREEBA.
2 '08/'17 Light Machine Guns.
2 Machine Guns left in position.
194 Prisoners.
1 Bag of important Papers and Maps from Major
of XIX GEMAN German Army Corps (forwarded to
Brigade by special runner)
Also Miscellaneous collection of Documents.
A. P. Imlay
LIEUT. COLONEL.
COMMANDING 47th BATTALION.
13th JUNE 1917. 

 

 

SECRET.
47th BATTALION OPERATION ORDER No. 138,
Copy No. 22
REFERENCE SHEETS.

Sheet 28 1/40,000.
Sheet 28 S.W. 1/20,000.
MESSINES 1/5,000.
DOUVE (part 28) 1/5,000.
IN THE FIELD.
1st JUNE 1917.
1. The MESSINES-WYTSCHAETE XXX RIDGE will be attacked by Allied Troops
on Z day.
ZERO time will be notified later.
2. The Sector allotted to the 12th Aust. Inf. Bde, is a green line on OWL
Support from HUNS WALK at U 4 a 9565 to 0 34 a 2050,
with co-operation on left by 13th Aust. Inf. Bde., and on right by
10th Aust. Inf. Bde.
45th and 47th Battalions will attack on 12th Aust. Inf. Bde, front;
45th Battn. on left and 47th Battn on right.
3. The 47th Battalion will attack and hold the green line on
frontage extending from U 4 a 93.65 to 0 34 d 30.40 including 
Unbearable Trench to its junction with Uncanny Trench at U 4 a 35.55.
(a) "C" Company capturing OWL Trench and "B" Company capturing 
UNBEARABLE Trench and portion of OWL Trench.
(B) "A" Company capturing left of OWL Support and "D" Company
capturing right of OWL Support to HUNS Walk.
(c) Line of "A" and "B" Coys forms GREEN Line
(d) Frontages allotted Company's to capture are as under:-

"C" Coy - 0 34 c 90.55 - U 4 a 55.90, including South edge of 
Oxygen Trench.
"B" Coy. - Unbearable Trench from X U 3 b 60.80 to OWL Trench
at U 4 a 35.55, and thence along OWL Trench to right of "C" Coy.
at U 4 a 55.90.
"A" Coy. - 0 34 d 50.40 to left of "C" Coy at 0 34 d 20.00.
"D" Coy. - 0 34 d 20.00 - HUNS Walk at U 4 a 95.65.
4. Companies will move off at ZERO plus 4 hours 30 minutes from xxxx
Camp in following order:-
(a) "B", "C", "D", "A" using X Route, going over crops if necessary
to avoid enemy fire.
(b) Battalion Headquarters and Carrying Parties by W Route and will
be formed up at assembly place by ZERO plus 5 hours, ready to move,
(c) When ready to move runners will be sent to Battn. Hqrs, at
WINTER Trench
5. Scout and Intelligence Officer will go forward and reconnoitre
forming up places on black line after it capture and select Battn.
Headquarters and establish Battalion Forward Command Post.
6. (a) Officers will wear same uniform as the men and XXX wear
equipment.
(b) Other ranks will wear fighting order and a special distinguishing
mark which will be issued later, Box Respirators in ALERT position,
carry 170 rounds S.A.A. (XX 120 rounds in pouches, 50 rounds in 
bandolier) 4 Mills Grenades (except Rifle Bombers) XXXXXX in
bottom pockets, 3 Sandbags under braces, 1 ground Flare and 1
Very Light, 48 hours rations and TWO waterbottles FILLED per man.
(c) Rations and water will not be touched until advance commences
from black line.
(d) All material on arrival in enemy position will form dumps of all 
Bombs, spare S.A.A., Flares, Sandbag and enemy grenades. 

 

 
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