Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/272/1 - 1917 - 1932 - Part 1










AWM138
Official History,
1914-18 War: Records of C E W Bean,
Official Historian.
Diaries and Notebooks
Item number: 3DRL606/272/1
Title: Folder, 1917 - 1932
Covers the 4th Division at Messines and
includes notes by Bean and A W Bazley,
correspondence, extracts of official records and
extracts from Pte W D Gallway's diary.
AWM38-3DRL606/272/1
[* 4TH DIV. MESSINES No. 272. *]
[* 1ST SET AWM32 3 DRL 606 No 272 [1] *]
DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. B. W. BEAN
CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914-1918
THE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms
of gift to the Australian War Memorial. But, apart from those terns, I wish the
following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every
reader and writer who may use them.
These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be
true. The diaries were jotted down almost daily with the object of recording what
was then in the writer's mind. Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep;
also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so –but it does not
follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when
discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them.
These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what
their author, at the time of writing, believed. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch
for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But he
did try to ensure such accuracy by consulting, as far as possible, those who had
seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand
evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed
upon him by the second or third day of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that
those who passed on such stores usually themselves believed them to be true. All
second-hand evidence herein should be read with this in mind.
16 Sept, 1946. C E W. BEAN.
AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL
ACCESS STATUS
OPEN
4th Aust. Div. Messines, June 1917
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
THE SENATE
2 July 1931
My dear Bean
Your letter of
16th. June received & it is
noted that you will
incorporate my remarks
on the Villes British
Historian's narrative of
the Villers-Brettonneux
fighting in your comments.
I am not quite sure
as to the New-Zealand
Brigades sharing Head
Quarters with me during the
Battle of Messines. I think
Cam Robertson of the 12th
Brigade was in the same
dug-out. The New Zealanders
Brigade may also have been there.
Kind Regards
Yours Sincerely
T. W. Glasgow
[* Capt W L Young Killed in action
45 Bn 7/6/17 *]
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Department of Defence
Base Records Office, A.I.F.
Melbourne, 2nd July, 1917.
DEAR SIR,
I have much pleasure
in forwarding hereunder copy of
extract from Sixth Supplement No.
Personally, I had a great liking for
29859 to the London Gazette of 8th
December, 1916, relating to the
conspicuous services rendered by
your son, Captain (temporary) W.
L. Young, 45th Battalion.
AWARDED THE MILITARY
CROSS
his company suffered severely. As
"HIS MAJESTY THE KING
has been graciously pleased to
confer the Military Cross on the
undermentioned Officer in recognition
of his gallantry and devotion
to duty in the Field:--
Captain (temporary) WILLIAM
LANCELOT YOUNG
For conspicuous gallantry in
Action. He organised and led a
raid against the enemy trenches
with great courage and skill. He
has previously done fine work".
The above has been promulgated
in Commonwealth of Australia
Gazette, No. 103 of 29th June,1917.
Yours faithfully,
J. McLEAN, Major.
Officer i/c Base Records.
F. D. YOUNG, Esq.,
6 Milton Avenue,
Mosman, N.S.W.
B.E.F., FRANCE.
17/6/17.
DEAR MR. YOUNG,
I am writing
to you not only to sympathise with
you over the loss of your son, but
also to let you know how I appreciated
all the good work he had done
while he was with the battalion. I
was in charge of the 13th Battalion
when he first joined up, and when
I formed the 45th Battalion I gave
him his commission. He has done
sterling work ever since, and his
death is a big loss to the battalion.
Personally, I had a great liking for
him and always looked upon him
as one of my most promising
officers, He was killed while leading
his company during the attack
on Messines. As it turned out, his
task was a particularly heavy one.
The sector he was attacking turned
out to be particularly strong and
his company suffered severely. As
we were attacking over country
that was invisible from where we
started, direction was most important,
and Captain Young was responsible
for the direction on the
left flank. I discussed the matter
very fully with him and it was
decided that he was to make for a
certain road and work along it.
Everything went like clock work,
and, notwithstanding the hundred
and one difficulties, the battalion
reached the starting point and the
attack commenced, Captain Young
was wounded early in the day, but
refused to go to the rear. As I
said before, this company encountered
particularly fierce resistance
and suffered heavily, and
when the situation was cleared up
next morning Captain Young's
dead body was found lying on the
road it was decided to work along.
We buried the poor old chap
within a few yards of where he
fell. Death was apparently instantaneous.
He was always a most
popular officer and his death has
caused a gap in this battalion which
is very hard to fill and I have lost
a personal friend.
Yours very sincerely,
(Signed) SYDNEY K. HERRING,
Lieut. Colonel
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Governor-General's Office,
Melbourne,
30th June, 1917.
DEAR SIR,
I am desired by His
Excellency the Governor-General
to transmit to you the following
message from Their Majesties The
King and Queen:-
"The King and Queen deeply
regret the loss to you and the Army
have sustained by the death of
your son in the service of his
country
Their Majesties truly sympathise
with you in your sorrow,"
In addition to the above message,
I am desired by the Governor-
General to express Their Excellencies'
heartfelt sympathy with you
on the death of this gallant officer,
who fell fighting for his Country
and Empire.
Yours faithfully,
GEORGE STEWARD, Major.
Official Secretary.
F. D. YOUNG, Esq.,
Rainbow,
Victoria
47th BATTALION.
12th AUST. INF. BDE.
OPERATION REPORT
REFERENCE MAPS.
Sheet 28 1/40,000.
Sheet 28 S.W. 1/20,000.
Messines 1/5,000.
Douve 1/5,000.
The 12th Aust. Inf. Bde. was ordered to attack the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES
Ridge at ZER0 on the 7th June 1917 in conjunction with 13th Aust. Inf.
Bde. on the left and the 10th Aust. Inf. Bde. on the right, 47th Battn.
being allotted frontage on right of 12th Aust. Inf. Bde. as final
objective termed "Green Line" (OWL Support) right being on HUNS WALK
U 4 a 9505 inclusive and left being 0 34 d 3040, 45th Battalion being
Left Battalion and 37th Battalion on the right.
Orders were written as per copy No 17 attached (Battalion Operation
[*√*] Order No 138)
Battalion left Camp at BULFORD Camp (Sheet 2S T 26 a 5.8.) at 7-40 a.m.
[*X*] as per order attached (Battalion Operation Order No 139) and proceeded
to jumping off place in No Man's Land, arriving there at 11-10 a.m.,
where forming up place had been previously marked along line (ULCER
Trench) in front of MESSINES and marked by flags.
NEW ZERO not having been received the Battalion was ordered to advance
to the position of deployment on the first objective captured by the
New Zealand Division in the morning and called "Black Line", running
from U 3 d 5590 to U 3 b 1.7.
Companies proceeded at 11-30 a.m. in Artillery formation in perfect
order followed at reasonable distance by carrying party of 46th Battn.
under Sec. Lieut. BRITTAIN, enemy barrage coming down inflicting losses
on latter party. I was at this time informed at my Battalion Headquarters
that NEW ZERO time had been advanced 2 hours and was now actually ZERO
plus 12 hours or 3-10 p.m. This was despatched to the Companies moving
forward and reached them as they reached the Black Line, necessitating
a halt, full advantage was taken of it to reconnoitre the position and
companies formed up ready for the attack. Capt. F. L. DAVY O.C. "D" Coy
being killed at this juncture.
At NEW ZERO (3-10 p.m.) the Battalion moved forward to the attack on the
Green Line, in lines of half Battalion each in 4 waves, 1st line being
"B" Coy under Capt. J. W. MILLAR on the right, with right at U 3 d 5590
and left at U 3 0 3540, and "C" Coy under Capt. E. O. WILLLAMS on left,
with left at U 3 b 1.7. adjoining 45th Battalion - Capt. J. W. MILLAR's
right flank being against left of 37th Battalion.
2nd line consisted of "D' Coy (now under Lieut. J. SCHULZ) following
"B" Coy, and "A" Coy under Lieut. D. F. SALMON following "C" Coy.
"A" and "D" Coys were to go through "C" and "B" Coys respectively and
capture and hold the Green Line.
The barrage was excellent moving forward as per schedule. At this time
Battn. H.Q. had been moved forward to a concrete shelter at U 3 a 2015,
but no communications except by runner were possible. Those were slow
and uncertain, quite a number being casualties by the enemy shell fire
which opened up now.
"B" Coy proceeded along UNBEARABLE Trench towards its objective, its
Coy. Commdr., Capt. J. W. MILLAR being killed and Lieut. G. N. M. GOODE and
Lieut. W. S. DIXON being mortally wounded, the Coy rather lost direction
in keeping touch with 37th Battalion and "D" Coy, followed gaining
OWL Trench first and waiting for "B" Coy to connect, "C" Coy proceeded
to its objective in conjunction with 45th Battn but were faced with
strong resistance from OXYGEN Trench at 0 34 c 3545. This was eventually
overcome but 45th Battalion were delayed on their side. Eventually at
about 5-30 p.m. this opposition was silenced and the advance was
continued to OWL Trench but determined resistance was again meet with.
Meantime "D" Coy was held up and remained at OWL Trench and position
at dusk on the 7th inst was :-
"C" Coy on line between OWL and OXYGEN Trench running U 4 a 9565 -
0 34 c 3545.
XX "D" Coy in OWL Trench connecting with "C” Coy.
A" Coy in OXYGEN Trench 0 34 c 3.3. to 0 34 c 3545.
and "B" Coy away to the right.
(2)
At this juncture communication became difficult and I despatched
Lieut. N. F. BREMNER to reconnoitre and report, my Forward Command Post
under Lieut. C. D. SCOTT not being heard of for some time. It was subsequently
learned that he had been killed at about 5-0 p.m.
Lieut. N. F. BREMNER made a quick appreciation and succeeded in placing "B"
Coy on the right track with the result that at 10-0 p.m. "B" and "D" Coys,
by this time considerably depleted in numbers, had advanced and occupied
OWL Support (the Green Line) while "C" and "A" Coys also merged under
Capt. E. O. WILLIAMS were delayed by anxiety to retain touch with left and
were in a position running from 0 34 c 9.3. on left to OWL Trench at
U 4 a 3.6. on right.
At 5-0 p.m. on the 7th inst. enemy delivered a counter attack in force and
at same time our barrage shortened and came down on the Green Line and OWL
Trench which we were occupying. This was withstood for some time, the attack
being repulsed but it was deemed desirable to fall back a little to clear
the barrage and endeavour to gain touch with right flank. The line was then
with-drawn to about 250 Yards in advance of original jumping off, in front
of Black Line U 3 b 6.2. to U 3 b 6.9. and dug in temporarily and thus was
the position at 12 midnight on 7th/8th June 1917.
One Company of the 48th Battalion was sent to reinforce and reported at
12-15 a.m. under Capt. MAYERSBETH.
Endeavours were made to get into position for another assault but was a
difficult operation in the darkness, but was successfully accomplished and
concurrently with tho arrival of another Coy (about 70 rifles) of 48th
Battn under Capt. D. G. C. CUMMINGS and attack was ordered, ZERO time being
3-0 a.m. It was quite impossible to start at this time as Coys were still
slightly disorganised and quite a good way from objective.
Communication s had not been properly established, so I desided to make
the best of what element of perturbation remained with the Hun after the
barrage had lifted and gave orders to move forward as far as possible and
dig in and creep forward determinedly one by one until a definite rush
could be made on the objective and lead to its final capture. XXM This was
done and my surmise proved correct, it was possible and the position at
5-0 a.m. showed us in a line 200 yards west of OWL Trench running U 4 a 1.8.
to 0 34 c 3545 with both flanks in the air, either flanking Battalion
acted prompted enough.
Strong fighting patrols were sent out to connect with flanks, at the same
time single men jumping from shell hole to shell hole advancing the line
inch by inch until we were enable at 7-0 a.m. to occupy OWL Trench and
start to consolidate.
The same progress was adopted in the advance to the final objective with
similar success and at 8-39 a.m. I reported having occupied the Green Line
our final objective. Consolidation was at once begun, fighting patrols
thrown out and attempts made to connectt with our flanks.
The position at 9-0 a.m. on the 8th inst. was :-
Green Line occupied by 47th Battalion from HUNS WALK at U 4 A 9565 to
0 34 d 3.4. OWL Trench occupied from U 4 a 4175 to 0 34 d 1.8.
45th Battalion at a position somewhere left of us in rear.
and 37th Battalion on UNCANNY Trench at junction with UNDULATING Trench.
Defensive measures were taken accordingly. A Sap was started connecting
right of OXYGEN Trench at 0 34 c 3.3. with HUNS WALK at U 4 a 4.7. thus
forming a third line of resistance.
At 3-0 p.m. on the 8th inst. a body of enemy attempted a counter attack
on left but were beaten off by Lewis Gun fire and 2 Vicker Guns which I
despatched to support.
Consolidation was carried on all day and communication established and at
nightfall we were in position on Green Line.
Our casualties had been fairly heavy in Officers and Other Ranks, though
it was impossible to determine exactly how many. A number of Officers were
casualties and Capt. E. O. WILLIAMS remained senior Officer on the spot.
Endeavours were made to get the 45th Battn to link up but they could not
respond, so I extended my left along the Green Line for another 200 yards
practically to 0 34 d 4590 covering Left Battn position to enable line to
come up. In meantime right Battalion had been relieved by the 44th Battn.
who worked up to angle of UNCANNY Trench, UNCANNY Support and UNDULATING
Trench at 3-0 p.m. on 9th inst., and endeavoured to move to Green Line in
his Sector.
Rations and food were brought up this night without much difficulty but
continuously throughout the day the shelling was heavy. Carrying Parties
had become depleted and reliance had to be placed on Pack Mule Troops, but
their handling was inferior and no stores could be gotten to front line.
(3)
There were indications on tho 9th inst all day of a counter attack
developing as great activity was reported from near WARNETON on
WARNETON-CONINES Road at 9-00 a.m. and in GAPAARD about noon and at
STEIGNAST Farm at 12-30 p.m.
Desultory attempts to gain OWL Support in front of 45th Battn Sector
were foiled by our Lewis gun fire.
Right Battalion connected with my right at 4-0 p.m. at HUNS WALK at
U 4 a 9560 and Left Battalion could not manage to effectually do it,
so compromised by establishing a line of Posts from their right across
the terrain between OWL Trench and OWL Support joining the latter at
0 34 d 3040. This now gave us a continuous line for the first time with
both my flanks linked up at U 4 a 9565 and 0 34 d 3040.
During the night the Sector was divided into three by the insertion of
46th Battalion between 47th and 45th Battalions.
Line hold from right to left being :-
47th Battalion- right- HUNS WALK at U 4 a 9.7. to 0 34 d 3027.
OWL Trench at junction of UNCANNY and UNBEARABLE
to 0 34 c 9.3.
NEW OXYGEN Trench at 0 34 c 3.3. to HUNS WALK
at U 4 a 1.9.
46th Battalion OWL Support from 47th Battalion left to 45th
Battn right at 0 34 d 2.8.
45th Battalion OWL Trench from 46th Battalion left 0 34 d 1.7.
to Road 0 34 a 8.3.
Relief was completed at 3-30 a.m., Coys of 48th Battalion going out.
Fighting patrols were sent out at 12 midnight carrying tape lines for
redirection one to reach LE QUATREHOIS Cabaret at 0 35 c 8.4. the other
to go to STEIGNAST Farm at U 5 a 2.7. and establish Strong Posts there,
crush any opposition.xxxx; They unfortunately encountered Machine Guns
and had to return with 50% casualties and without accomplishing anything
except determining the locale of Machine Guns which were subsequently
dealt with.
Another strong patrol under Lieut. F. J. McKEON started out to locate
KUMRMAL SCHLOSS which was indicated b a Hun prisoner to be a regimental
headquarters situated at U 4 a 8.2. This party surprised a party of
enemy who put up their XXXX S.O.S. which coincidentally was a Red Flare
and the result was both our barrage and enemy's came down and enveloped
them causing slight casualties but they returned O.K.
During morning of 10th inst. enemy planes flew low over position and the
line was subject to severe strafing all day doing a considerable amount
of damage and destroying some Lewis Guns.
Light Trench Mortars were established at near OWL Support at U 4 a 9.7.
and OWL Trench at 0 34 c 9.3.
Position remained unaltered until the 47th Battalion were relieved by
46th Battalion extending their right to HUNS WALK and we moved into
Support at HANBURY Support until relieved by 11th Fusiliers at 8-10 p.m.
on 12th/13th June 1917.
Material captured :- 1 77 mm Gun and left in front of Black Line
near ZAREEBA.
2 '08/'17 Light Machine Guns.
2 Machine Guns left in position.
194 Prisoners.
1 Bag of important Papers and Maps from Major
of XIX GEMAN German Army Corps (forwarded to
Brigade by special runner)
Also Miscellaneous collection of Documents.
A. P. Imlay
LIEUT. COLONEL.
COMMANDING 47th BATTALION.
13th JUNE 1917.
SECRET.
47th BATTALION OPERATION ORDER No. 138,
Copy No. 22
REFERENCE SHEETS.
Sheet 28 1/40,000.
Sheet 28 S.W. 1/20,000.
MESSINES 1/5,000.
DOUVE (part 28) 1/5,000.
IN THE FIELD.
1st JUNE 1917.
1. The MESSINES-WYTSCHAETE XXX RIDGE will be attacked by Allied Troops
on Z day.
ZERO time will be notified later.
2. The Sector allotted to the 12th Aust. Inf. Bde, is a green line on OWL
Support from HUNS WALK at U 4 a 9565 to 0 34 a 2050,
with co-operation on left by 13th Aust. Inf. Bde., and on right by
10th Aust. Inf. Bde.
45th and 47th Battalions will attack on 12th Aust. Inf. Bde, front;
45th Battn. on left and 47th Battn on right.
3. The 47th Battalion will attack and hold the green line on
frontage extending from U 4 a 93.65 to 0 34 d 30.40 including
Unbearable Trench to its junction with Uncanny Trench at U 4 a 35.55.
(a) "C" Company capturing OWL Trench and "B" Company capturing
UNBEARABLE Trench and portion of OWL Trench.
(B) "A" Company capturing left of OWL Support and "D" Company
capturing right of OWL Support to HUNS Walk.
(c) Line of "A" and "B" Coys forms GREEN Line
(d) Frontages allotted Company's to capture are as under:-
"C" Coy - 0 34 c 90.55 - U 4 a 55.90, including South edge of
Oxygen Trench.
"B" Coy. - Unbearable Trench from X U 3 b 60.80 to OWL Trench
at U 4 a 35.55, and thence along OWL Trench to right of "C" Coy.
at U 4 a 55.90.
"A" Coy. - 0 34 d 50.40 to left of "C" Coy at 0 34 d 20.00.
"D" Coy. - 0 34 d 20.00 - HUNS Walk at U 4 a 95.65.
4. Companies will move off at ZERO plus 4 hours 30 minutes from xxxx
Camp in following order:-
(a) "B", "C", "D", "A" using X Route, going over crops if necessary
to avoid enemy fire.
(b) Battalion Headquarters and Carrying Parties by W Route and will
be formed up at assembly place by ZERO plus 5 hours, ready to move,
(c) When ready to move runners will be sent to Battn. Hqrs, at
WINTER Trench
5. Scout and Intelligence Officer will go forward and reconnoitre
forming up places on black line after it capture and select Battn.
Headquarters and establish Battalion Forward Command Post.
6. (a) Officers will wear same uniform as the men and XXX wear
equipment.
(b) Other ranks will wear fighting order and a special distinguishing
mark which will be issued later, Box Respirators in ALERT position,
carry 170 rounds S.A.A. (XX 120 rounds in pouches, 50 rounds in
bandolier) 4 Mills Grenades (except Rifle Bombers) XXXXXX in
bottom pockets, 3 Sandbags under braces, 1 ground Flare and 1
Very Light, 48 hours rations and TWO waterbottles FILLED per man.
(c) Rations and water will not be touched until advance commences
from black line.
(d) All material on arrival in enemy position will form dumps of all
Bombs, spare S.A.A., Flares, Sandbag and enemy grenades.

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