Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/271/1 - 1917 - 1938 - Part 2

Savige                    
Notes to Accompany Savige's

Collection of Messages. Bullecourt.

Bullecourt Lt Harris D 24.

Harris shot thro' kidneys, near tramway

knew he ws done & refused to let

S/Bn his own men carry him back -

told them, after to save themselves.

Abt  8.20 ( see message from Elwood).

Confce at Bn HQ. (marked) - Resolved to put bombers in front

on extreme flank;

rifle grenadiers behind;

S. Mortar team behind them

Diagram - see original document

This saved / situation - clearing 50^x

to 100^x of trench at once. 

On wireless buzzer - cd only send messages one way.

as part broken.

23 Bn then lining bank

Trew ws acting O.C. 23rd.               

Diagram - see original document

Pickett led bthe bombing tho' wounded thro rt arm &

threw bombs for 5 hrs (k at Passch.)

Fethers ^(k.o. by shot thro helmet) came to but ws later shot thro' head.

12.20. Trew repd tt 7 & 5 Bdes had withdrawn along

Sunken Rd.
Diagram - see original document

Ref. message 5.32 After 5.30 Cols Davies & Forbes came along to 24 HQ (as per

message \& were satisfied tt none of their men were

in / trenches to be bombed.

(2)

H.A. ws however falling on these trenches (see Godfrey's

message recd 7.40).

24 Bn had practised carefully, men seeing air photos

etc. in pauses at practice; & it had bn

decided (as 4 Div failed thro lack of ammn)

to collect at each post G. grenades, ammn
rifles, & to use G bombs among our own

so tt Gs shdn't guess when we were running

short.

Confce decided they wd hang to last &

fight way out rather than withdraw

as a precaution.

Men were anxious to beat / enemy & but

for tt spirit they wd never have hung on.

Sav. came across a man (they were 1 to 20 or 30^x)

firing w G rifle (his own well covered) w G bombs

by him - this ws going on everywhere - abt

one man to every 3 bays (man wounded later)

Only abt 130 left at 3.30 am in 24^th.

F.L. became filled w ghastly cases of wd - One 

w gash abdomen, & entrails smokes showing,

smoking a cigarette. S. sd stick it out lad. He sd to S. "Dont worry

abt me, Sir, but give the bastards hell."

This man afterwards shot himself putting

rifle between feet).

[*Gelly's spirit 
is in all

messages- 
not to make 
the case too bad: He

wanted "the 
truth - but 
not to be 
downhearted."*]

4 Coy Commdrs were splendid - best team 24^th ever

had; men had one notion only - it doesn't matter

at what cost - we're going to beat them."

The Coy Commdrs themselves knew the objves & when

objves of 5 Bde & rest of 6^th were not tn they, as matter

of course took them.

Brown of 28^th may have bn in an imposs. positn

& withdrew his men (the men were all right) But Roydhouse

[*(Of 28^th but trained under Gelly)*]
damned him & sd he wd stay & deserted his coy & came

along to 24 Bn HQ almost in tears & stayed with 24^th. 

And the Gellibrand spirit won through.

7139.
26 November 1931.

Major E.V. Smythe, M.C.,

"Longfield",

Erigolia, N.S.W.

Dear Major Smythe,

In writing the account of Bullecourt, 3 May 1917, I

have been a little puzzled by the several accounts of the

position in O.G.1 (the old front German line) on the right of 

the road which ran between the 6th and 5th Brigades. It is

said that this trench was found empty, and that immediately on

arriving at your own objective you placed in the empty trench on

your right a post of the 6th Brigade, and maintained this there.

On the other hand we have accounts from the 5th Brigade that a 

handful of their troops reached the trench under Lieutenant Davison

and that they, later reinforced by a few men of their own brigade

who advanced with Captain Gilchrist, were fighting throughout the

morning in that trench.

I take it that the post was probably a mixed one, 

but I should be grateful if you could assist me with your own

recollection of what exactly was the position in that trench,

both in the morning of May 3 and during the night following

(May 3/4) until the 2nd Battalion came in and the brigade was

relieved. I understand from the 2nd Battalion that at that

time the block was at the road-bank, the stop in the trench

having been withdrawn the night before.

I shall very soon be getting on to the fighting at

Broodseinde and Daisy Wood, concerning which you and I had a 

yarn in 1917. I hope this finds you fit and well.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely, 

C.E.W. Bean.

[*HN Bullecourt

3.5.17.*]

"Longfields"

Erigolia

2/12/31

Dear Capt Bean

I am very pleased to be able to give you

any information that may help to clear up whats seems to be 

a very confused position. I have to trust to memory, mostly,

in setting down the events of 3^rd May 1917 at Bullecourt

and if anything I say conflicts with the statements of

other participants it only means that the angle of view

was different & its extent incomplete or the chronological

order has been disarranged.

After occupation of O.G.1 by my company, it was reported that

the right flank was "in the air" I took a party of my men with

a couple of 23^rd strays & made contact with a strong German

MG post about 200 yards right of the Road. The MG was firing

(at Capt Gilchrists attack of which we were not then aware) We 

exchanged revolver shots & a few bombs & withdrew a couple of 

bays where the ground favoured us & established a post.

I then noticed that an attack (Gilchrists) had been launched & was then

petering out about 300 yds short of its objective which was the

trench in which we stood. I saw a Sgt & another with Lewis

Gun & panniers reach OG1 between us & the road. I was

returning to the road when (with Sgt West, MM later Lt & MC.) when I

met Capt Gilchrist coming eastward along O.G.1. alone.

He said to me "These men are alright, all they need is

a leader" I commenced to explain the situation to him

[*P.S. Please excuse writing as I am laid up with a bad foot and am writing

with the pad on my knees. E.S.*]

as he was my senior (I was then a 1^st Lt) but he pushed

past me repeating "All they need is a leader"

I told him there was a post on the right and he went

on. I did not see him again. There were some 5^th Bde

men in & about OG1 at the road. While ^I was away on the 

left I heard bombing on the right & hurrying across I

found the post had been driven in but had reestablished

itself helped by the Stokes gun under Sgt Roberts (I believe).

L cpl Fitzpatrck had been killed in this action. There was

still some bombing. going on but no attack was pressed.

When I returned to the road I found a couple of officers &

about 50 O/Rs of the 5^th Bde mixed units. I discussed

the situation with them ^(the officers) & instructed them to organise the

5^th Bde men & occupy the trench up to my post. There was 
a little demur about taking orders from a Lt in oth another Bde

but at this juncture a message reached me from

Major Trew D.S.O. senior officer on our front & in

charge of the line. I visited him in his advanced H.Q.,

a shell hole, & found him wounded He confirmed my

instructions to the 5^th Bde officers (I regret that I have

forgotten their names) & told me to take charge of OG1. The 5^th

Bde units then occupied OG1. ^to the R of Road. I arranged Lewis & Stokes

support & bomb supplies & left Sgt Major Morcom to keep

supplies up to them in my absence. Abt 11am a determined

German bomb attack almost reached the road but was repulsed

There were then about a hundred 5^th Bde men lining the

roadblock and, when I got there from the left, they

had made a big hole in my stock of bombs. I 

stopped some unnecessary throwing and arranged

Lewis guns & Stokes mortar support. Coy Sgt Major Morcom

of my Coy was wounded in this stunt. I believe that the

6^th Bde men had of the Right post had become casualties

by this time. During the afternoon the 28^th Battalion

came in & formed a defensive flank on the road & sent

strong parties of bombers eastward along OG1. considerably

extending the position. I believe the 5^th Bde men withdrew

when the 28^th came in, at any rate. I did not see them

again. Late in the evening I received word that that 28^th had

withdrawn leaving my right wide open. A post was at once

placed in OG1 a little east of the road. My company then

consisted of two posts, one on each flank & a small

reserve of less severely wounded men. ^This was the position when 

we were relieved. It is fortunate that

we were not attacked after the 28^th withdrew.

More fighting occurred on the right than I have recorded.

Only those incidents which are fixed in memory by my own

participation are set down. If Lt Davies was one of the two Lts.

I met on the road, the 5^th Bde account is correct but not complete.

I traversed the trench from my Right post to the road immediately

after Capt Gilchrists attack and met him only until I

reached the road. There were 5^th Bde men in ^& about OG1 at its junction

with the road, practically all of whom had reached the road

from 'No mans land' & had gone along it to my position OG1

The "handful of men" was a tidy size when they occupied the

trench. They were mixed, disorganised rather 'lost' & were

thus not very effective as an offensive force when I saw them.

From then on I was pretty well occupied on the left & attending

to the requirements of OG2. in supplies & reinforcements. The

position & personnel of posts was never of a fixed nature

either on the left or the right. for instance when I first visited

the left it was held strongly by Capt Kennedy & a party of 22^nd.

on my next visit. the post was held by two of my own men with

three of four slightly wounded round the next traverse. A bomb attack

had swept over it & back & all its original defenders were casualties

Both flanks were advanced or withdrawn according to how

opportunity or pressure reacted on the defenders, many times.

The men stood up to the job splendidly and only their courage

determination & resource made such an impossible position tenable.

Trusting that this account will clear up the position

& be reconcilable in the main to other accounts of the

action, so that a coherent account of the battle can be made.

Wishing you every success

Yours faithfully                    
E.V. Smythe.

[*H/N Bullecourt

5/5/1917 *]                                  
March 25^th/22

Cliveden West St
Hurstville

To officer in charge

Your request Biographical Details

of interest to Historian of A.I.F.

I take the liberty of enclosing a copy
which was sent to me by his Sergeant

of 1^st Battalion.

Sergt S.. T. Craig 3280

1^st Battalion

Private Address Hillingworth N.S.W.

[*Base Reocrd

MAR 31 1922
RECEIVED*]

[*L/Cpl. A.M. Cullen

1^st Bn 5/45/1917

Bullecourt*]

Report of enclosed officer

I saw Cullen killed at Bullecourt about

11am. on 5^th May 1917. I was the Corporal in 

charge of machine Gun section of the Company

The Battalion was hard pressed and Cullen

jumped up on the parapet and was firing

a machine gun from his hip helping to

repel an attack. Whilst so engaged he was

sniped and killed. Death was instantaneous.

His action was considered an exceptionally brave

deed by all who saw him. Cullen was Scotch

of medium height. Dark & had a small dark

moustache. He was very popular in his

Company. I have no idea as to his burial place.

Informant. Sergt. S.T. Craig 3200

1^st Battalion
Private Address Hillingworth. N.S.W.

returned on Troopship Boonah

10/6/19-

7181. 
9 December 1931.

Major J. Pascoe, M.C.,

212a, Lyons Street,

North Ballarat, Vic.

Dear Major Pascoe,

I remember your telling me shortly after the Battle

of Bullecourt that at about 8 o'clock on May 3, when you were

in the sunken road which passed through O.G.1 and 2, the 24th

was driven out of O.G.2 and you sent for a trench-mortar, the 

trench-mortar which had previously been stationed there having

been withdrawn. So far as my information goes, the first

trench-mortar, which was withdrawn, was one of the 5th Brigade,

and the second under L/Cpl. Mitchell of the 6th Brigade. This 

conclusion, however, is only arrived at from circumstantial

evidence.

It is a long time ago, but it occurred to me that you

might possibly have some recollection concerning this point, in

which case I should be grateful if you would confirm, or

otherwise, my supposition. I enclose a couple of pages of the

manuscript dealing with the matter, and should be glad if you

would let me know if in your opinion it is correct.

Yours faithfully,

C.E.W. Bean.

P.S. Would you kindly return the

pages of the manuscript with your

reply?