Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/267/1 - 1914 - 1915 - Part 6

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Purchase of tugs and lighters (contd).
20.2.15 V/A Carden was advised that a Mr. GRECH acting on
behalf of Admlty had been sent to Piraeus to purchase tugs and lighters
and suitable vessels for landing Troops. All vessels when purchased
would be sent direct to Port Mudros.
Transporting Australian Troops from Egypt.
20.2.15 V/A Carden was sent a copy of a cablegram which had
been sent to Robinson, Finance, Cairo, (beginning) Urgent. Transports
are required to be ready at Alexandria by 27th inst. for conveyance of
Australian etc. troops as reqd. by G.O.C. in Egypt with whom you should
communicate at once.
Adml. Supt. Malta has been directed to return
Saturnia to Alexandria at once and Ionian also if latter has left Port
Said. These ships should be emptied and got ready also MALDA and Nizam
due Suez 24th inst. Suffolk should also be used. Braimar Castle and
Cawdor Castle will be sent on from Lemnos if available; any other
suitable ships should be used requistioning if necessary.
For the voyage contemplated 50% more troops than
normal accommodation may be carried in transports.
Telegraph at earliest possible date total numbers
you can embark under these arrangements and the names of ships used.
The greater the number for whom you can arrange conveyance locally, the
less will be the Tonnage which must be sent from england for main move
(ends).
Transports.
20.2.15 V/A Carden was sent the following message (begins)
Communicate with Morgan British Consul Dedeagatch through the Prime
Minister at Athens as to obtaining tugs, boats, lighters, brows or
ramps for disembarking from same and any other facilities needed for
landing of 10,000 Infty, at earliest moment possible should such a step
be found necessary. The troops will be sent in transports from
Alexandria. Further communication will be made as to this. (ends).
Telegram from War Office to G.O.C. Egypt.
"The mechanical transport for from the Expedition from
Egypt will not be sent from England. Allowing for the amount obtainable
locally, wire what additional at transport, if any, should be sent from
England. We will send two months complete supplies of food and forage
including hospital supplies and disinfectants, together with two months'
flour, two months' frozen meat and one month's fuel wood. The transports
will take ten days' voyage forage rations and seven days' landing rations.
We will also send Hdqrs of Administrative services
and Departments and Headqrs of a Base."(ends).
Movements of Ships.
21.2.15 Arrived off Dardanelles 19th Feb. "Albion", "Amethyst"
"Ark Royal" submarine B6, 7 mine-sweepers, "Queen Elizabeth", "Agamemnon"
"Irresistible", 20th "Blenheim", Sub B8; 21st "Sapphire", Sub B11.
Hosptl Ship Soudan.
Mystery Ships.
21.2.15 V/A Carden was advised "Two ships numbers 11 and 14
of Special Service Squadron have sailed to join you at Tenedos, proceeding
direct and should arrive about 5th March. They are under the orders
of Commd. W.B. Forbes sailing in No. 14. No. 14 closely resembles "Tiger"
and No. 11. "Indomitable". They have each one 3 pounder gun and No.14
has W/T. They are manned by Merchant Service Captains and crews but have
each a naval officer and some naval ratings on board. On the passage

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they are ordered to show themselves at various points so as to be
reported as battle cruisers proceeding outwards. They carry coal for
10,000 miles. On arrival make any use of them you think fit, such as
screening "Queen Elizabeth" from submarines and deceiving enemy as to
ships present by showing themselves in the distance. Care to be taken
that their true character does not become known. (ends).
23. 2.15 V/A Carden had following despatched to him. "Captain
DEEDES Staff Officer is being sent to Lemnos shortly. He has served for
years in Turkish Gendarnerie and knows language and country thoroughly,
and is well acquainted with opponents of Young Turk party. War Office
thinks his knowledge might prove of use to you. He will be on staff of
Genl. Birdwood."
23.2.15. Strength of French troops for Dardanelles.
French Admlty advised Brit. Admlty. total of French
troops for Dardanelles was one complete Divn. viz. 18,000 men and 5,000
horses.
Military Force for Dardanelles and their operations
24.2.15 Firts Lord to Adml. Carden. Secret and Personal.
The operation on which you are engaged consists in forcing the Dardanelles
without Military assistance, as generally described in your
telegram No. 19 of 11th Jan, and in your instruction from the Admlty.
It is not proposed at this stage to use military force, other than
parties of Marines landed to destroy particular guns or Torpedo tubes.
On the other hand if your operation is successful, we consider it
necessary that ample military force should be available to reap the
fruits. The following military forces are therefore being moved or held
ready to move to withing striking distance:-
Royal Naval Division                 8500
2 Australian Divisions            30,000
A French Division                    18,000
It is also possible that the 29th Regular Divn of
18,000 will be sent from England. Youwill receive full details of these
movements; but they do.not affect your immediate operations. It has
been arranged that 10,000 troops should be held ready, part in Egypt,
part in Lemnos, for unexpected contingencies, should your operations
proceed more rapidly than had been estimated. but it is not intended
that they should be employed in present circumstances to assist the
naval operations, which are independent and self-contained.
General Birdwood who will command the Army is leaving
tonight in the "Swiftsure" to join you. You should discuss the whole
position with him and if you are of opinion that the army can help your
operations, you may make recommendations. An official telegram is
also being sent you on this subject.
First objective of Naval attack outlined.
24.2.15 Admlty to V/A Carden Telegram (begins). Referring
to telegrams exchanged between you and Genl. Birdwood as to the employment
of Military Forces in Dardanelles Operations, the War Office
consider the occupation of the southern and of the peninsula to the
line Saundere - Chana Ovasi is not an obligatory operation for ensuring
success of first main object, which is to destroy the permanent batteries.
Though troops should always be held in readiness to assist in Minor
operations on both sides of the straits in order to destroy masked 
batteries and engage enemy forces covering them, our main army can remain in camp
at Lemnos till the passage of the straits is in our hands when holding
Bulair Lines may be necessary to stop all supplies reaching the peninsula.
You should discuss the whole position with Genl.
Birdwood on his arrival before deciding any major operation beyond covering
range of ships guns, and report conclusion arrived at (ends). 

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25.2.15 Following by W/T from V/A Carden (begins).
If only 10,000 men are sent I propose at first to base them on Mudros
and make occasion feints in Xeros without actually landing troops. If
it becomes necessary to prevent serious interference with fleet by
concealed guns, force could be landed at Seddul Bahr to occupy the
Peninsula up to the line Saundere River - Chanaotasi, being supported
on both flanks by ships. A landing, at Seddul- Bahr and maintenance
after landing being so dependant on weather. I do not intend to take
this step unless essential. I have informed G.O.C. Egypt that force
should be sent to Fort Madros as soon as possible in order to be
instantly available should be entirely independent of fleetfor all
supplies.
Have also informed him that troops will have to live
in transports at Mudros, landing only for exercise. If the Royal Marine
Brigade is to be employed in conjunction with Hospital Force, I submit
they may be in addition and that Portsmouth and Deal Battalions be sent
out with one Field Ambulance, one company supply and transports to
complete the Brigade.
Movements Ships. 25.2.15.
Following by W/T from "Inflexible":- "Dartmouth"
"Majestice" arrived. B9. sailed for Malta in tow of Collier "Amicus."
25.2.15 Admlty to V/A Carden:- "Askold" will join your flag
shortly to represent Russian Navy in combined allied fleet before the
Dardanelles. Her principal use will be for wireless commn. with the
Black Sea fleet. Should her installation not be sufficiently powerful,
her operations can be transferred to a ship with the necessary power.
Movements Australian Troops. 26.2.15
FromLieut. Genl. Sir J. Maxwell, to Earl Kitchener.
"The troops leave Cairo on Saturday night and I hope that the embarkation
will be finished by Monday, when the convoy should leave. The following
ships are all victualled for one month:-
"Malda", "Nizam", "Devonha", "Ionian" and "Suffolk". The following
are the details of the troops.
Headqrs. 3rd Aust. Bde. under Col. Maclagan.
9th 10th and 12th Bns.
One Brigade Section Div Sig Co.
One G.A.A. Section F.A. Bde Ammn. Col.
One Field Coy Royal Engrs.
One Field Ambulance.
Two Sections Field Bakery.
One Sqd. Field Butchery.
One clearing Hosptl.
4th Coy. Divl. Train.
Total 167 officers; 474 men; 647 Horses. Seven days landing rations
and two months reserve supplies for men and horses.
4.3.15 From Admlty to V/A Carden. Secret and Personal
The following matters require your attention with a view to action when
the time comes.
Should you succeed in entering the Sea of Marmora,
your first task is to destroy the Turoo German Fleet wherever it is.
As soon as this is achieved you should send vessels to
cut, by fire or landing parties, according to circumstances, the Scutari -
Ismid Railway line and the railway and road from Constantinople to
Kuckuk Chekmeje.

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Our policy is to cut off on the European shore as
much of the Turkish Army as possible and to force them to capitulate later
You are next to attack the Forts of the Bosphorus
on which operation a memorandum prepared bySir H. Jackson is being
telegraphed to you in Sections. This is to be taken as a guide and not
as a rule. When you see yourself within four days of entering the sea
of Marmora, you are to make Askold telegraph to the Russian fleet at
Sebastopol to come to Blockade the Black Sea mouth of the Bosphorus and
to attack with long range fire the outer forts.
You are to duplicate this telegram to us. We want
the Russians to block the exit and to increase the moral effect by
opening fire simultaneously with your attack.
We are not counting on them at this Stage for any
decisive operation. When the above military necessities have been fully
provided for you should deal with Constantinople.
The number of ships at your disposal will probably
enable Constantinople to be summoned as soon as the Turco German fleet
has been destroyed, without prejudice to the other warlike movements
against railways and the Bosphorus just described. We wish to obtain the
peaceful surrender of the City and if you think it advisable and likely to
prevent massacre or futile resistance, you may at any time after you have
entered the Sea of Marmora communicate with the American Ambassador, or
other Neutral or Turkish Authorities accessible to you, assuring them
that prompt obedience and the orderly surrender of the city will save all
private property from injury and that the most respect will be shown to
all religious buildings, especially Mosques and objects venerater by
Moslems. You will also concert with Genl.Birdwood the necessary movements
of troops.
You will report fully and regularly your views and
intentions, using your chief of Staff for this purpose when you are too
pressed.
It is of the utmost importance that we should be kept
informed.
Antecedent to the above, it is of course presumed that
by the fire of ships in Saros Gulf you will as far as possible prevent all
movements of troops guns and convoys across the Bulair Isthmus.
This appears to be of importance in the present phase."
From Lt.Genl. Sir J. Maxwell to Earl Kitchener.
4.3.15
The following telegram has been received from Birdwood.
3rd March. Your No. 3299 received. The proposal
I made in my telegram dated 2nd March seems to be generally in accordance
with your views, and to cover most of the points mentioned in your telegram, 
I anticipate that, if required to land, by the Navy, we shall not
be alble, in taking concealed guns or howitzers, to restrict movements to
minor operations, as any guns are sure to be in strong positions and
would be covered by strongly entrenched infantry who in some places would
be doubtless able to command coast fort guns which might have been required
by the Navy. With the exception perhaps of two mounted Brigades, I shall
probably be taking with me in the first instance, my whole corps; there
will not at first be much scope for mounted Brigades, and one of these
lately arrived from Aust. is but litle trained. I will certainly try to
domenate the Eastern side from the Gallipoli peninsula as I am particularly
anxious to avoid, if possible, placing any troops on the Asiatic side, for
not only do I fully realize the danger if placing there a more or less
isolated force, but I know from personal observation that the county is big
and difficult, and even a whole division would soon lose itself. You can
therefore rely on my avoiding it if possible.

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(contd).
You will have seen that arrangements have been made
already in the direction you have indicated, regarding threats on Bulair
Lines. Also before receiving your telegram, I had issued orders in
practically identical terms regarding embarkation and disembarkation
practice at Mudros Bay. It is probable that only the advanced Brigade
would be able to take much advantage of this.
If I get in touch with local information later on, I
will telegraph an appreciation, but, as I said in a former telegram, at
present this is not feasible, and it is impossible to say what troops may
be in the vicinity of Constantinople, when the Dardanelles have been
forced. I cannot help thinking that when the fleet arrives before
Constantinople, and threatens the bombardment of the city, opposition will
collapse. At present I have no information to guide me in advising as
to operations after the Gallipoli Peninsula has been taken, and I have as
yet, no maps of the country. A man lifting Kite or a captive balloon
would be of great use to the navy. It would not only give great assistance
in the spotting of long range fire, but I would also be able to detect by
its means, the concealed batteries which are already troubling the navy.
I therefore strongly recommend the immediate despatch of one of the other."
Intended use of troops in Egypt with regard to
Gallipoli Peninsula. 4.3.15
From Earl Kitchener to Lt.Genl Sir J. Maxwell.
Please transmit the followingto Genl. Birdwood:-
From the Admeral's estimate, I understand that by
20th March he will probably have accomplished the forcing of the
Dardanelles. It will therefore be possible by 18th March to concentrate
at Lemnos the whole of your Australasian contingent and in addition one
Division of French troops and 10,000 of the Naval Brigade, a total of
approx. 65,000 men. If, however, anything should occur to upset this
calculation, I will let you know.
We do not intend to issue orders for any more troops
than the Brigade now there and the naval Division, to start for Lemnos
until 12th March as it is evidently objectionable to keep troops in transports
at Lemnos longer than is necessary.
The date mentioned will give us time to judge the
progress that has been made in clearing the passage and to obtain another
and clearer estimate from the Admeral of the time when he will have passed
the straits. Unless the navy are convinced that they cannot silence the
guns in the straits without military co operation on a large scale in which
case further orders will be issued, there is no intention of using the
troops enumerated above to take the Gallipoli peninsula. In such a case
even more troops might be required to force the Turkish positions, and you
might have to wait for further reinforcements from here. The numbers and
composition of the additional forces will/be communicated to you after a
decision has been taken, probably on 10th March. In the meantime only
small bodies of troops will/be required for subsidiary operations while the
Fleet are successfully silencing the forts, and, when needed by the
Admeral, these should/be supplied by you from the Brigade now at Lemnos.
If about 18th March it appears that the forts have been successfully
silenced by the fleet, and the latter is about to proceed to Constantinople,
it should be followed at close interval by the transports conveying the
whole force for operations either at or near Constantinople or on the
mainland on the European side in whichever place these may be found advisable
The abovementioned reinforcements from England would, of course, follow
and join the forces later. The situation which will be created in
European Turkey by the passage of the Dardanelles by the fleet is almost
impossible to foretell. It will most probably only be necessary to leave a
force sufficient to hold the Bulair lines, as it is anticipated that the
Turks will abandon the Gallipoli Peninsula. Therefore, the concentration
of troops at the entrance to the Dardanelles, is not so much for operations
on the Gallipoli peninsula as for operations subsequently to be undertaken
in the neighbourhood of Constantinople after sinking the Turkish Navy on
arrival at/ 

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arrival at Constantinople the first duty of the fleet will be to open
up the Bosphorus for the entrance of the Russian Fleet, which will be
accompanied by a Corps of Russian Troops probably numbering 40,000 men
and the operations on land will take place in co operation with these. forces.
(note underlined is my own and not part of original message).(Sgd).S.F.
General Birdwood's criticism of forcing Dardanelles.
5.3.15
From Lieut Genl. Sir J. Maxwell to Earl Kitchener.
Birdwood sends the following in continuation of
his message transmitted to you under my No. 683 of 4th March:-
"With reference to the last para. of your telegram No. 3261, I am very
doubtful if the navy can force the passage unassisted. In any event the
forcing of the passage must take a considerable time, the forts that have
been taken up to the present have been visible and very easy, as the
ships could stand off and shoot from anywhere, but inside the straits,
the ships are bothered by unknown fire. The weather at present is very
bad, only one out of several days being fine, and the operations are much
delayed in consequence. Before troops can be landed it is absolutely
essential that the weather should be settled as the landing sites are
small and indifferent and a small force only cannot be landed owing to
the risk of being out off by the weather, I think Adml. Carden would
have liked to see the troops landed at Bulair Lines, but I am averse to
doing this for the following reasons:-
1. I should be in no way enabled to carry out my role of
assisting the navy if necessary.
2. Owing to the conformation of the coast it would be necessary
to land on the northern side of the lines, and these
have been constructed expressly to meet a force from this
direction.
3. If the navy and my troops advance together from the South
we can fully help each other while if the troops work
from the North to the South, and the Navy South to North,
from opposite ends of the peninsula, no co-operation is
possible.
4. My rear would always be open to attack from any forces
coming down from Thrace.
The coast of Besika Bay has also been entrenched and fully
organized for defence. Moreover the crossing of Mendere River and the
adjoining Marshes would be a very difficult operation while the right flank
of an army advancing from there would be much exposed.
I therefore think the best line of action to be a cautious
advance from Helles Point."
Movements of Troops. 5.3.15.
The R/A Mudros advised Admlty that five Military
Transports viz. "Frizam" "Suffolk", "Devanha", "Ionia" and "Malda", with
5,000 troops had arrived from Egypt.
From Lieut. Genl. Sir J. Maxwell to Earl Kitchener.
6.3.15.
Following from Genl Birdwood:-
I have just returned to Cairo for a few days to make
the necessary arrangements with Maxwell with regard to my corps, and shall
shortly proceed again to Lemnos. I have already informed you that I
consider the Admirals forecast is tno sanguine and though we may have a better
estimate by/

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estimate by March 12th, I doubt his ability to force the passage
unaided. I have in the meantime, placed the Brigade at Lemnos at the
disposal of the Admiral for minor operations. I have no intention of
wishing to rush blindly into Gallipoli Peninsula and quite realise
that my movements must entirely depend on the progress made by the
navy. On this point I note I shall receive further orders, but if
my anticipation is fulfilled and military co-operation is needed, I
should propose to make my first and definite objective the line Kiled
Bahr - Gabatepe when this is attained the Fleet would be enabled to
get through to the Sea of Marmora. The Bulair lines would then be
reduced en route by bombardment from both sides, and for the time being
my sole would have been accomplished. Once the fleet is through the
Dardanelles, I agree that the Turks might evacuate the peninsula, and
that my transports should therefore follow the fleets if such a course
should be safe. I fear, however, that the transports would be liable
to loss from guns, with which the Navy might not have been able to deal
elsewhere than in the forts."
Water Supply. 6.3.15.
Admeral Mudros advised Admlty as follows:-
"Water supply Port Mudros quite einsufficient for
large numbers of troops. Distilling ship is absolutely necessary."
Purchase of Tugs and Lighters for landing troops.
6.3.15.
Adml. Mudros advsd. Admlty that Greeh wired that he
had bought 4 tugs and a salvage vessel at Marseilles. As time presses
however, he (Adml Murdros) had engaged a British subject named David
Chalmers to purchase between 40 and 50 lighters capacity 100 - 120 men
each and Piraeus and to engage men for handing same. Two steam hoppers,
most suitable, had been purchased and delivered at Port Mudros.
Water Supply.  7.3.15.
Admlty wired Robinson. Finance Egypt as follows:-
"There is great difficulty in obtaining fresh water
at Lemnos and no distilling ships are available. Transports must be
supplied with as much fresh water as they can stow and troops should be
cautioned to exercise strictest economy of water."
Admly also wired R/A Mudros re same subject. on
7. 3. 15 as follows:- "There is no distilling ship. Transports have
been warned to stow as much water as possible before leaving and to
practice strict economy. On Feb. 24th Malta was ordered to put
improvised distilling plant in a steamer, and until it arrives, men of
war in harbour should distil and distribute water. You should if
necessary charter vessels to bring water from Piraeus or Salonika by
communicating with British Minister or Admiral Kerr.
Our reports state there was plenty of water in
Lemnos island after 3 months drought and Royal Engineers should
consider bringing an additional supply to Mudros."
French force for Dardanelles. 7.3.15.
Marine Paris advised French Embassy, for War Office
London, of following:- "The French Expedty Force at present assembled
at Bizerta will leave that port in two convoys with G.O.O. consisting
of five, or six ships which will need replenishing after the voyage
leaves on 10th for Lemnos, when it will be replenished from our own
resources; the second convoy consisting of the remaining ships, leaves
on 13th and will rendezvous with Expedty force at the month of the
Dardanelles where they will be completed ready for landing on 18th
March."

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Water supply. 8.3.15. 
Marine Paris advised F.N.A. as under:-
"We are making all arrangements in our power to
remedy the lack of drinking water. I suggest that you find out if it
would be possible to charter in England tank vessels engaged in the
transport of Molasses between England and the West Indies and which
after being cleaned might transport drinking water."
Transport of Sir Ian Hamilton to Mudros.
12.3.15.
Special train arrived at Marscilles Sunday 14th
March contining Genl. Sir Ian Hamilton with 13 Staff Officers and 14
servants and Military Clerks. Baggage one freight car full of
personal effects and mess stores. "Phaeton" was ordered to meet party
and convey them to Mudros at 2/5th Horse Power.
As more Aeroplanes were urgently required at
Dardanelles, Admlty also advised Cmdr. "Phaeton" that as many as
possible airoplanes and seaplanes with their personnel were to be taken
back with Genl Hamilton.
Water Supply. 13.3.15.
Admlty to Adml. Supt. Malta (begins). "S.S."Sunik"
a molasses tanker which has been used for water at Scapa. Flow is being
sent out. She holds 6,000 tons. The French are sending two 200 ton
steam tanks from Biserta and are fitting an old transport to distil
with main condensers. Sunik will be told to fill at Biserta" (ends).
Strengthening of Dardenelles.Fleet.   13.3.15
F.N.A. to Marine Paris (begins).
"Battleships "Queen" and "Implacable", under the
command of Rear Admeral Thursby are being detached from Channel Fleet
and sent at once to reinforce Dardanelles Fleet." (ends).
Ships appropriated for 29th Division.
Alaunia           City of Edinburgh        Manitou
Ausonia          Canada                           Campanello
Haverford       Dongola                         Aragon
Merican          Marquette                      Caledonia
Andania          Knight of the Garter   Southland
Kingstoman   Verdala                           Harmatris
Tintoretto        Melville                           Arcadian.
Totals officers 1294. Men 20,390 Horses 7082.
Sailed 16th. 3.. 15.
Position of Base for Dardanelles troops 15.3.15.
From Lieut Genl. Sir J. Maxwell to Earl Kitchenor
(Begins).... Both Birdwood and I would like definite instructions in
view of the fact that troops and supplies are being sent direct from
England to Lemnos without calling here. Is the base to be formed at
Lemnos or Alexandria. My latest information from Lemnos is that only
horses can be landed, the troops remaining on transports. I have
heard nothing from Admeral Carden and I hear from the French Military
Mission that Genl. D. Amade has left Biserta for Lemnos, with his
force." (ends.) 

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Accident in Boiler Room "Dartmouth" 15.3.15.
"Queen Elizabeth" to Admlty (begins). "C" Boiler
Room of "Dartmouth" wrecked by boiler explosion. Ship willrequire to
go into Dock yard to make good defects. Cause of explosion not known
yet, but not due to enemy gun fire. Regret to report 11 men Killed.
"Dartmouths" speed reduced to 15 knots. Request "Chathann" may relieve
her. Am retaining "Dartmouth" until relieved. Submit two cruisers of
Talbot Class would be of great assistance here.
French troops movements. 16.3.15
Adml. Mudros to Admlty (begins). First division
of French Army consisting of 8,500 troops arrived this evening and
remain afloat. There is sufficient water supply for troops now at
Lemnos provided they are kept afloat."
Criticism of Mudros as base by V/A Carden.
16.3.15
V/A Carden Tenedos to Admlty (begins). First
Lord of Admlty. Secret and Personal. Fourth concentration of
Birdwoods force Lemnos would create congestion there is no room for
transports in Mudros. Landing stages are being built Port Mudros but
some time is needed before these can be finished sufficiently to cope
with so large forces and necessary stores. The difficulty of water
supply is great, wells are being sunk but water would have to be landed
also for the use of the troops.
The re embarkation of the force into transports
prior to active operations would be a lengthy operation. If troops
were landed at Lemnos under these circumstances it is considered that it
would take 3 times as long for them to reach area of active operations
as would be the case if they were completely held in readiness in
Egypt where embarkation faultities exist. If the remaining troops from
Egypt are sent here it will be necessary for them to live in their
transports at some other port than Mudros. Suggest that no definite
decision be taken until General Hamilton has been consulted. He
arrives in the forenoon of 18th" (ends).
The health of V/A Carden. 16.3.18.
Rear Adml. Wemyso Tenedos. to Admlty. (begins)
"V/A Carden is suffering from Atonic dyspepsia and will require at
least three or four weeks complete rest. He has been placed on the
sick list." (ends).
On same date - 16.3.15 - V/A Carden advised that
owing to his being placed on sick list he was handing over to Adml de
Robeck who was well in Touch with all arrangements, present and future,
and had been of great assistance in their preparations, and in whom
Adml. Carden had fullest confidence of his judgment and determination.
Change of Command.  16.3.15.
Adml. Wemyss Mudros to Admlty (begins).
"Urgent. In view of Adml. Cardens illness, Adml. de Robeck continues
to carry out operations as arranged. I have returned to Mudros to be
ready to turn over command of Base if necessary.
Strongly recommend Captn. Boyle, who has arrived
here with a letter from Minister at Athens, should remain at Mudros
in charge of base temporarily, if I proceed to Tenedos.
I am quite prepared to act under orders of de 
Robeck if you shoud think it desirable to promote him. De Robeck
and I are in perfect accord and can loyally co operate whichever way
you decide. Suggest Captn. Sadler be made Commodore. I am arranging
to meet Genl Hamilton on his arrival and confer with him and Genl
D'Amade"(ends). 

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On 17.3. 15. First Lord advised both R/A de Robeck and
R/Adml. Weymss that while Adml. Carden was on the sick list Rear/Adml.
de Robeck would be directed to assume command of the Fleet with acting
rank of Vice Adml. and that Adml. Weymss would act under his orders in
command of the base or on any service required.
Report of Adml. de Robeck on operations of 18/3/15.
Addressed to Secy of the Admlty.
With regard to the general results of this attack,
although the principal forts remained silent for considerable intervals,
only a portion of their armaments can be considered disabled. The
tactics employed by the enemy when the bombardment by the fleet
becomes heavy, are to desert their guns and retire to bomb proof shelters
When they consider a favorable opportunity offers they reman the guns
and open fire again.
But takint into consideration the accuracy of fire
of the ships and the number of explosions which occurred in the forts,
both material and personnel must have suffered considerably. Throughout
the greater part of the day, the fleet appeared to have a marked
advantage as regards gunfire, so much so that the minesweepers were
called in at 2.p.m. Soon after they were inside, it was, however,
evident from the amount of fire from howitzers and field guns that they
would not, be able to proceed into the minefield at Kephez Point, and
beyond sweeping in the area, where Bouvet Sank the sweepers effected
nothing.
Up to the time Bouvet was mined, everything had
proceeded satisfactorily, the ships receiving little damage by the
enemys gunfire, although the annoyance from concealed batteries was very
great, It was evident that some of these batteries were directing their
fire on the control positions of the Ships. In this way "Inflexible"
lost two very fine officers who were in her fore control viz. Commander
Rudolf H.C. Vener and Lieut Arthur W. Blaker.
During the period the second division Battleships
"Ocean" "Irresistible" "Albion" and "Vengeance" were bombarding, the
situation again looked satisfactory.
"Inflexible" reported shortly after 4.p.m. that
she had struck a mine and she was ordered out of the Dardanelles. I
submit that it reflects great credit on Captn. Phillimore and his
ships company that "Inflexible" was able to reach shoal water off
Tenedos.
Herewith Fuller report of operations carried out on 17th -
18th March, 1915.
"The attempts to clear the minefield at Kephez
Point during the dark hours having failed, it became necessary to carry
this out by daylight.
The plan of operations was fully explained to
Captains of Ships on the 16th and issued to them on 17th March.
Sweeping operations against the Kephez minefield
were suspended during the nights of 15/16 - 16/17 - 17/18 March
trawlers during this time being employed in thoroughly sweeping the
area in which the ships would have to manoevore.
It was considered impracticable for ships to be
at anchor inside the Dardanelles, owing to the heavy howitzer fire which
can be brought to bear on them, subject to the necessity of occasionally
moving, so as to throw off the enemys fire, ships remained stationary on
the 18th/