Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/266/1 - September 1918 - Part 4

that was the kernel of the plan which now had to be evolved. The

capture of the town of Peronne was consequential upon it, though little

less formidable a task. The effect of both captures would be --

completely to tun the whole line of the Somme to the south, and the

line of the Canal du Nord; to open a wide gate through which the --

remainder of the Fourth and Third Armies could pour, so as to roll

up the enemy's line in both directions.

Page 182.    

Extract - Mont St. Quentin and Peronne

From early dawn on Saturday, August 31st, until the evening of

September 3rd, three Divisions of the Australian Corps engaged in a 

heroic combat which will ever be memorable in Australian history.

The extraordinary character of this Australian feat of arms 

can best be appreciated by a realization of the supreme efforts which

the enemy put forward to prevent it.

The shower of blows which he had received on the front of his

Second Army from August 8th onwards, had wrought upon it a grevious

disorganization. The battered remnants of his line Divisions had

been reinforced from day to day by fresh units, scraped up from other

parts of his front, and thrown into the fight as fast as they could

be made available.

Sometimes they were complete Divisions from Reserve, often

single reserve Regiments of Divisions already deeply involved, and

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sometimes even single Battalions torn from other Regiments - Pioneer

Battalions, units of the Labour Corps, Army Troops, Minenwerfer

Companies had all been thrown in, indiscriminately.

This brought about a heterogeneous jumble of units, and of

German nationalities, for Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons and Wurtembergers

were captured side by side. The tactical control of such mixed forces,

during a hasty and enforced retreat, and their daily maintenance, must

have presented sore perplexities to the Headquarters of the German Second Army in those fateful days.

To meet the crisis with which Ludendorff was now confronted he

determined to throw in one of the finest of the reserve Divisions still

left at his disposal. The Second Prussian Guards Division was sent

forward to occupy the key position of Mont St. Quentin, and to hold

it at all costs.

This famous Division comprised among its units, the Kaiserin and

the Kaiser Alexander Regiments, almost as famous in history and rich

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in tradition as are our own Grenadiers and Coldstreams. There is no

doubt that the celebrated Division fought desperately to obey its

instructions.

For the defence of Peronne, the enemy command went even further,

and called for volunteers, forming with them a strong garrison of

picked men drawn from many different line Regiments, to man the ramparts

which surround the town. Dozens of machine guns were posted in vantage

points from which the approaches could be swept.

[*Captured 

15 Ag by 

5th Div alone 

5 field guns

109 M.Gs & 

2 minenwerfers*]

All over the river flats lying in the angle of the Somme between

Clery, Mont St. Quentin and Peronne ran line upon line of barbed wire

entanglements, a legacy from the 1916 fighting, and much of this was

still intact, although breaches had been made in many places both by

the French in 1917 and by the Germans themselves to facilitate movement 

over the ground, during their respective re-occupations of this

territory.

The terrain, which was in greater part open, and exposed in every

3.

direction to full view from the heights, sloped gently upwards towards

the commanding knoll. Cover was scarce, and the few ruins of brickfields 

and sugar refineries which dotted the landscape had also been

garrisoned by the enemy as centres of resistance, designed to break up

and dislocate any general attack.

Our infantry was deprived of the assistance of any Tanks, for the

heavy casualties which had been suffered by this Army made it imperative

to allow the Tank Corps time for repairs, renewals and the training

of fresh crews. Nor was any appreciable quantity of Heavy Artillery

yet available, since the congested and dilapidated condition of the

roads prevented the advance of all but a few of the lighter varieties

of heavy guns.

The fighting of these four days was, therefore, essentially a

pure infantry combat, assisted only by such mobile Artillery of --

lesser calibres as was available.

Such was the formidable nature of the task, and of the disabilities

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under which the Second, Third and Fifth Divisions approached it.

That they overcame all obstacles, gained all their objectives, and

captured nearly 2,000 prisoners, mainly from crack Prussian regiments

constitutes an achievement memorable in military annals and standing

to the everlasting glory of the troops who took part in it.

Page 185 

Plan for attack Sec. P. 178

Extract - Mont St. Quentin and Peronne.

The attack opened with three Battalions of the 5th Brigade in the

first line, and one Battalion in support. The total strength of the

assaulting infantry of this whole Brigade was on this day not more

than 70 Officers and 1,250 other ranks. The centre Battalion was -

directed straight at the highest knoll of Mont St. Quentin, while the

right Battalion prolonged the line to the right. The left Battalion

had assigned to it as an immediate objective the ruins of the village

of Feuillaucourt, from which it was hoped that a flank attack upon the

Mount could be developed.

The advance began at 5 a.m. It was a dull morning and still quite

dark. The two right Battalions advanced with as much noise as --

possible, a ruse which secured the surrender of numbers of the enemy

lying out in advanced outpost positions. A nest of seven Machine Guns

was rushed and captured without any loss to us. 

[*Shows 

enemy's 

best troops 

somewhat

demoralized*]

At the appointed hour, our Artillery opened on selected targets

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the ranges being lengthened from moment to moment in sympathy with the

advance of the Infantry. Although during the advance a great deal of

machine gun fire was encountered all went well. The centre and left

Battalions gained a footing respectively in Feuillaucourt and on the

main hill, but the progress of the right Battalion was arrested by -

heavy machine gun fire from St. Denis. This was the site of a ruined

sugar refinery, and lay on the main road between Peronne and Mont St.

Quentin. It was a strong point that presented a great deal of --

difficulty and held out to the last.

The centre Battalion had by 7 a.m. passed through the ruins of

Mont St. Quentin village and had crossed the main road from Peronne to

Bouchavesnes. It now had to receive the full brunt of a determined

counter attack, at a moment when it was still disorganized and --

breathless from its difficult assault. The Battalion was therefore

withdrawn across the road and firmly established itself in an old

trench system to the west of it.

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In this position it beat off five successive counter attacks,

inflicting most severe losses upon the enemy. The Brigade maintained

its position until nightfall. Its losses for the day were 380.

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Page 187

Extract - Mont St. Quentin and Peronne

As soon as I had formed a judgement on the situation, about 8.30

a.m.[*?p.m.*] (August 31st), I issued instructions to General Hobbs immediately

to put in motion his reserve Brigade, the 14th (Stewart). He was to

direct it towards the Ommiecourt crossing, and later in the day to

pass it across the river and through the ground won that morning by

the 5th Brigade, with a view to developing at the earliest possible

moment an attack in a south-easterly direction upon the town of --

Peronne itself. The ultimate objective was still to be the high

ground south and east of Peronne. His 8th Brigade was also to be

held ready to move at the shortest notice.

It was a serious performance to demand, and it was fraught with

many risks. There was no time to assemble responsible commanders

concerned, separated as they were by long distances over bad and 

congested roads. In the absence of properly co-ordinated action, there

1

was every chance of confusion, and cross purposes, and even of collision

of authority arising from the troops of one Division passing

over ground under the tactical control of another Division.

But the only alternative was to do nothing and attempt nothing.

That would have been the worst of bad generalship, and it was an

occasion when risks must be taken.

The course of subsequent events fully demonstrated that the only

true solution was the one chosen, for the whole of the defences of

Peronne were thereby taken with a rush, while they were still being

organized by the enemy. The delay of only a day or two would have

meant the capture of Peronne would have been many times more

costly than it actually proved to be. 

The 14th Brigade had before it a march of some seven miles to

bring it into a position in which it could deploy for an attack on

Peronne. Working according to text book such a march could have been

accomplished in something under three hours. It took the Brigade over

ten hours. For the line of march lay across the very worst of the

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shell-torn, tangled country enclosed in the great bend of the Somme,

and progress was most difficult and exhausting. Frequent halts were

necessary to rest the men, and restore order to the struggling columns.

Discovering the impossibility of crossing the river at Ommiecourt 

the Brigade made a wide detour to cross by the newly established bridge

at Buscourt.

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Page 189 (1)

Extract - Mont St. Quentin and Peronne - Confirming the Capture

September 1st was a day full of great happenings and bloody hand

to hand fighting. The assault by the 6th Brigade passing over the line
won the day before by the 5th Brigade carried it well over the crest

of Mont St. Quentin, and confirmed for good and all our hold on that

imperious fortress.  Few prisoners were taken, for it was bayonet work

over every inch of the advance, and the field was strewn all over with

enemy dead.  The impetus of the 6th Brigade assault carried our

line 600 yards to the east of the summit of the knoll.

[*?

Refer to 5^th Div History*]

Page 189 (2)

Extract - Mont St. Quentin and Peronne

Thus the advance on this day of the 6th Brigade materially assisted

the attack on Peronne by the 14th Brigade, while the progress of 

the latter removed much trouble from the southern flank of the 6th

Brigade.

The 14th Brigade advanced to the assault at 6 a.m. concurrently 

with the eastern thrust of the 6th Brigade. One Battalion, with two

others in support, was directed against St. Denis, while the fourth

made a direct attack on Peronne.  Many belts of wire had to be --

struggled through. There was much machine gun fire, from front and

flanks, and it looked as if further progress would be impossible.

Nevertheless, this gallant Brigade, with persistent effort, made itself

master of the western half of Peronne.

Page 190

Extract - Mont St. Quentin and Peronne

The records of the events of these three days are confused and

discontinuous. Many of the men who could have filled the gaps of

the story were unfortunately killed or evacuated as casualties. But

from the mass of reports, the salient facts emerge clearly.

The 15th Brigade succeeded, on September 2nd, in putting a

Battalion across the river, and this assisted the 14th Brigade to "mop

up" the remainder of the town of Peronne. Later the rest of the 15th

Brigade and two Battalions of the 8th Brigade (Tivey) 

[*scarcely at all Vide 5^th Div History*] were also drawn 

into the fighting. St. Denis and the brickfields fell to us during

this period.

[*This is

correct

but the

map which

accompanied

the account of

the Battle

indicated that

they were 

taken earlier.
It is wrong.*]

Although the situation, from the point of view of the advance 

eastwards, remained almost stationary, it was a time of fierce local

fighting. Many deeds of valour and sacrifice adorn the story.

It was late on September 3rd that the effects of this long

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sustained struggle became apparent. The whole of Peronne and most of 

the high ground in its vicinity were, by then, definitely in our hands,

and although the little suburb of Flamicourt held out determinedly for 

another day, the further resistance of the enemy began to fade away.

Doubtless the loss of Mont St. Quentin was a controlling factor 

in the decision which was forced upon him to undertake a retreat, for

with that eminence in our possession, he could not have maintained

himself for many days in the town, nor would its retention have been

of any tactical value to him.

As an immediate result, the high ground of the Flamincourt spur

just south of Peronne fell into our hands on September 3rd, and the enemy outposts spread along the banks of the marsh in front of the

32nd Division sought safety from complete envelopment by a hasty

withdrawal; a number of their isolated posts were, however, left

unwarned of this retreat, so that these were, later on, captured by

us from the rear.

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