Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/266/1 - September 1918 - Part 2

of the high ground as far as Le MESNIL clearing FLAMICOURT on the
way. The whole was to be in conjunction with a larger operation by
the 2nd Australian Division who were to advance along the ridge before
MONT St. QUENTIN and clear it of the enemy. None of the Senior
Commanders concerned had made a personal reconnaissance of the
ground and were evidently quite unaware of the difficulties involved.
The Brigadier told the Divisional Commander that the plan proposed
was beyond the powers of the men and impossible to accomplish and the
attempt would probably lead to a terrible disaster. The Divisional
Commander was sympathetic and said that if the Brigadier wished it he
would place his views before the Corps Commander but as the Brigadier
was aware that it would at such a stage be impossible to prevent the
attack of the 14th and other Brigades who were to be engaged he felt
obliged to attempt the impossible at all costs.
SEPTEMBER 2nd, 1918
13. A wireless message despatched by the Brigadier from the 8th
14
Brigade Headquarters at 3.20 a.m. telling the Brigade Major to warn
the 58th, 59th and 60th Battalions to be ready for action at 4 a.m.
and for Battalion Commanders to meet at Brigade Headquarters at 3.45
a.m. did not reach its destination until after he had arrived back
(having ridden all the way on horseback) and it was about 4.15a.m.
before Battalion Commanders came together and the plan of action
was explained to them as follows by the Brigadier without mentioning
his misgivings as to the failure of the plan. He stated that the 54th
Battalion of the 14th Australian Infantry Brigade was detailed to
mop up and clear PERONNE. They were to be assisted by the 58th
Battalion. The Brigadier instructed Major H.D.G. FERRES, M.C.
(Commanding) to take his Battalion across at once and report to Lieut.
Col.N.MARSHALL .D.S.O.,M.C., ^54th Battn for instructions. The 59th and 60th
Battalions in that order were detailed to push through after the 59th
Battalion and forming up behind the 14th Australian Infantry Brigade
to pass through them on the latter gaining its final objective and
gain the high ground in O.5. These Battalions were to proceed
15

as follows : Via the Northern outskirts of PERONNE to the forming up
line (See Map No     attached) 50th Battalion on the right, 59th
Battalion on the left. To the 60th Battalion was detailed the task
of clearing FLAMICOURT and CHAIR WOOD and then pushing South to form
a defensive right flank along the general line as previously indicated.
The 59th Battalion would push on and secure the high ground in O.5.
The 57th Battalion were to remain and hold the line on the East Bank
of the River in O.3 and O.9 and if opportunity offered to cross the
Bridge thrown over the River and Swamp at O.9.O c.8-1 Zero hour was
to be 6 a.m. The times when barrages would lift from localities was
also given them. (see map No.      attached). They were also --
instructed that should the 14th Brigade fail to gain any part of its
objectives the 15th Brigade must endeavour to secure them. Action
being left in this case to Senior Officer present.
14. From 8 a.m. the position is best described by a review of the
following messages received from the Commanding Officers of the
Battalions concerned.
16
[*It should now be explained that when I left General
Hobbs he tried to send a copy of the final plan arrived
at to General Stewart but owing to the lines being destroyed
it did not reach Stewart until 3 hours after zero. This
was most unfortunate & lead to great

misunderstanding*]
From O.C. 58th Battalion
To Headquarters, 15th A. I. Brigade.
Have reorganised Battalion in oldMoat at 1. 27. B. 2-4 and established
Headquarters there. I was caught in barrage coming through village
at 5.35 a.m. though I was told it was not to commence till 6 a.m.
[* ※
This
was
due to
General
Stewart
not
knowing
the 15
Brigade
was to be
in the

attack
through
Peronne
itself.
he had
arranged
a temporary
withdrawal
of his

advanced
posts in Peronne
& subjected the whole place to a
preliminary bombardment of which I knew nothing at the time *]
Heavily shelled by enemy at corner near l.27.B.2-2. The Battalion
suffered about 40 casualties. Capt. R.B.FORSYTH and myself wounded
shell fire leg, both still on duty. Lieut C.A.DEANE O.C. "D" Company
wounded shellfire stomach. Our own Barrage shelled this position with
shrapnel. Have post Eastwards on road at about 1.27.B.9-0 and have
sent half a company covered by scouts through the village in N.E.
corner of 1.27 B. Have received at 7.30 a.m. a note from C.O. 54th
Battalion stating he had no orders in respect to 58th Battalion and
that C.O. 56th Battalion was running the show. My Intelligence
Officer who was in touch with 54th Battalion is now away to get touch
with 56th Battalion. Have sent another 2½ Companies through the
17

village to clear it in addition to the half Company before mentioned.
Am in touch with the 59th and 60th Battalions. Hostile Machine Guns
not yet located are playing down streets in East end of PERONNE. Have
sent forward Stokes Gunners.
1. 27. B. 2-4
2-9-18 8.5 a.m.
By runner
Sgd. H. Ferres, Major
C.O. 58th Battalion A. I. F.
In regard to that it was quite impossible owing to the short
notice to have got the Brigade across before the opening barrage at
Zero minus 30 had commenced. In the hurry the Brigadier at the conference
had told Major FERRES that the barrage would lift at Zero plus
30 minutes but not that the bombardment would start at Zero minus 30
minutes 

[*nor of course that our own guns would be shelling the
western end of Peronne (which as above mentioned had been arranged by Genl
Stewart)*]
(From the description already given of the causeway loading into
the town, littered as it was with debris of the houses, intersected
by streams which could only be passed by the shattered
planks of broken bridges, exposed to the fury of the enemy
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artillery barrage and within a few hundred yards of the enemy
Machine Guns it will perhaps be realised how hazardous this
operation of defiling the whole Brigade across the enemies front
appeared to its Commander. It might indeed be said with safety
that no such operation has ever before been attemped in War. The
very audacity of the scheme seems to have been its salvation and
the enemy could not have foreseen the attempt. As it was the
leading Battalion, the 58th, had its Battalion Commander wounded
and over 40 casualties passing this causeway whilst the 59th
and 60th Battalions also suffered severely. But notwithstanding
all three Battalions reached their assembly positions unbroken.)
From C.O. 60th Battalion,
The 15th A. I. Brigade Headquarters,
At 7 a.m. had great difficulty in crossing Bridge broken at I.33.A.9-9
Passed through heavy machine Gun fire and Gas shelling. Reached area
22.A. at 8.30 a.m. Hun very active M.G. in PERONNE vicinity 22.D.
19

Artillery fire dying away. 55th Battalion line at 8.30 a.m. along
Railway Line from 22.A.7-8 to 22.C.3-2. Col. SCANLAN gone to see
Major FERRES. 9 a.m. 59th Battalion not moving. Self of opinion unwise
to advance to objectives without further intense Artillery barrages
on objectives. 60th Battalion lying in open 22.A.
I.22.A.5-2.  

9 a.m.  

Sgd. T.KERR Major
Commanding 60th Battalion A.I.F.
From C. O. 59th Battalion  2.9.18.
To 15th A. I. Brigade Headquarters,
Situation at present. Remnants of 55th and 56th and my Battalion at
I.22.A.7-2. 60th Battalion in rear in I.22.6.5-5. 14th Brigade held
up by Heavy Machine Gun Fire from I.16. B - I.17.A. St. DENIS WOOD.
Enemy reinforced St. DENIS WOOD. Machine Gun fire intense where
movement is seen. Machine Gun Fire heavy from ridge I.16. - 17. - 18.
Whole attack held up. 14th Brigade report heavy casualties. Enemy
has now enfilade and reverse fire. 58th Battalion pushing on through
and mopping up PERONNE. Am at present with 58th and in touch with 60th
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Am of opinion that considerable artillery fire and a further advance
along spur East of MONT ST. QUENTIN is essential for any further --
advance to be made. C.O. 60th Battalion concurs also C.O. 55th Battalion.
Am digging in awaiting developments. Headquarters at I.27.B.2-4.
9.55 a.m.  Sgd. J.J. SCANLAN Lieut. Col.
Commanding 59th Battalion A. I. F.
From C.O. 58th Battalion,
To 15th A. I. Brigade Headquarters,
Forwarded 4 Officers 81 Other Ranks prisoners. We are now almost in
Eastern end of Village and still moving forward. There is heavy --
Machine Gun opposition. Cannot hope to push beyond village unless Left
Flank is brought up between us and Mont ST. QUENTIN. Casualties to
present 2 Officers wounded evacuated, 2 Officers wounded at duty and
about 60 Other Ranks. This includes my previous estimate. Am
attempting to reach beyond Crossroads in 22.D. We estimate more than
100 enemy killed.
I.27.B.2-5.  

10 a.m. 

Sgd. H.D.C.FERRES,Major,
Commanding 58th Battalion A. I. F..
21

 15. Meanwhile patrols had attempted to cross on the front of the 57th
Battalion. Those attempts had been frustrated and heavy losses
sustained owing to enemy Machine Gun fire which confirmed the fact that
the enemy was holding that position fairly strongly with Machine Guns
distributed along the front. Artillery harrassing fire was accordingly
arranged to sweep the area at intervals.
16. The situation at 10 a.m. was that remnants of the 55th and 56th
Battalions were mixed with the 59th Battalion at I.22.4.7-2 to I.22.A.

7-9. The 14th Brigade advance appeared to have been held up by heavy
Machine Gun fire from I.16.B. and I.17.A. also from ST. DENIS WOOD.
It appeared that the enemy had reinforced St. DENIS WOOD Area. The
enemy had enfilade and reverse fire on our positions from the left
owing to the failure of the 2nd Division to advance from the MONT ST.
QUENTIN position. Machine Gun fire was extremely hot from I.16.B. and
I.17.A. The Brigadier reported to Headquarters 5th Australian Division
(B.H.594) at 11 a.m. that he considered it essential to maintain
22
Artillery fire on enemy positions and also for a further advance to be
made by the troops on our left along the Spur East of MONT ST. QUENTIN
before any further advance could be made by us.
17. The 58th Battalion had been making fine progress in PERONNE and
had captured 4 Officers and 100 others including a Battalion Commander
and Staff (as reported above). They were meeting with strong Machine
Gun opposition from the Eastern extremities of the village and also
reported that they would be unable to advance until the situation on
the left was relieved.
18. At 12.30 p.m. the 58th Battalion line ran - I.22.BC.2-3. - to I.22. 

D.5-5. connecting with the 54th Battalion who held a line facing the
swamp along the South-Eastern edge of the village facing FLAMICOURT.
The 59th Battalion at this stage were endeavouring to push forward
their right flank along the line of the Railway through I.22.A. and B.
to the junction of the roads at I.22.BD.3-3. pivoting on the right
flank of the 55th Battalion near the factory at I.22.A.70-95. During
23

 this stage the enemy artillery fire was extremely heavy in this
locality and is said by those who passed through it to have equalled
the intensity of that experienced in POLYGON WOOD in September 1917.
Those in the City of PERONNE itself had an extraordinary experience
The City is built upon a foundation of peaty substance and under the
shock of the heavy artillery fire the very foundations of the old City
seemed to rock and sway as if in the throes of an earthquake. Add to
this the crash and dust of falling masonary as the tall old houses
tottered and crashed across the footpaths under the hail of shells and
you will have some idea of the fight that went on amidst it all.
19. The situation regarding PERONNE was cleared ^up at approximately
1.30 p.m. when the following message was despatched by the C.O. 58th
Battalion to Brigade Headquarters :
"We have worked through PERONNE to the extreme ends of the
Town and at present are digging in on the banks of the Moat in a semi
circular position reaching from I.22.C.9-5 across Grid between C. and
24
D. to about I.28.B.0-9. Whilst I was up in the line at about 12.30
the enemy put down a very heavy barrage of 5.9's and lighter Gas
Shells which came mostly from the direction of DOINGT. Bombardment
lasted for about 15 to 20 minutes and caused a lot of casualties. The
position is a very precarious one and though we got about 70 men up
to reinforce after the bombardment I consider that provision should
be made for further reinforcements if he continues shelling. All the
Battalion is in the line at present. Our left flank is very much
exposed and we are putting in a post further to left on that flank
about I.22.C.7-4. Machine Gun fire is very heavy from direction of
FLAMICOURT. 29 Cent. and 22.B. Altogether the position we are holding
is enfiladed from almost every direction and I consider it --
impossible to push forward any more until the left flank swings round.
We have sent in altogether 4 Officers and about 100 Other Ranks --
prisoners and by the looks of things there were considerably more
killed than taken. Those men were from the 85th, 258th 67th and 28th
25

Regiments and there are also one or two wounded up there from 167th.
At about 11.45 a.m. a number of the enemy were seen retiring from
around about the Railway in 22.B.2-2. in direction of square 18.
20. At 1.50 p.m. a message was received from Headquarters 5th
Australian Division stating that the 78th German Division had evidently
been placed in the line with the object of retaking PERONNE and had
established itself on the high ground in I.35., FLAMICOURT and CHAIR
WOOD. The advanced troops of this Division had been dealt with as
previously stated by the 58th Battalion. The 15th Australian Infantry
Brigade was ordered to take special measures to cover the approaches
to PERONNE. This was done by so siting Machine Guns of the 25th
Machine Gun Company (attached to the Brigade) that they covered all
approaches and entrances to PERONNE. the 57th Battalion were also
ordered to guard the road and Railway Bridges at I.33.D.3-9. and I.33. D. 4-2. by placing strong platoon posts over them.
21. At 3.40 p.m. the following message was received from Divisional
Headquarters.
26
"Construct a strong supporting point at St.DENIS and move forward
and occupy the line of DARMSTADT Trench in I.23.A. and C. Addressed
14th Brigade repeated 15th Brigade."
Consequent upon this the l4th Brigade issued an order to the C.O.
55th Battalion;
"Construct a strong support point at St. DENIS and move line forward
and occupy the DARMSTADT TRENCH line I.23.C.I-5. to I 23.A.7-2. to I. 17.C.6-2. You have at your disposal 55, 56, and may call on 53 if you
require further assistance. Select your time for the operation and
inform Brigade and flank Brigades as soon as possible time chosen.
Arrange with 2nd Division unit on your left to assist in protection
of your flank. Acknowledge. Sent Col. WOODS repeated all concerned."

The Brigadier pointed out to the Divisional Commander the impracticability
of carrying out this operation in view of the general situation

at that particular part of the front [*^& the utter exhaustion of the remnant of the 14^th Brigade*]. The Divisional Commander
then arranged for a conference to be held at Brigade Headquarters at
27

about 6 p.m. Present: G.O.C. and B.M. 15th A.I. Brigade, C.O.C. 14th
A.I. Brigade, C.O.C. and B.M. 8th Brigade, Divisional Commander, C.S.O.1
and C.R.A. 5th Australian Division. The general situation along the
front was discussed and a complete understanding was come to regarding
St. DENIS WOOD. During the day the 14th Australian Infantry Brigade
had reported that they had "Mopped up" St. DENIS WOOD. This was
stoutly contradicted as St. DENIS WOOD at I.22.B and I.23.A. (as shown
on the 1/40,000 maps) was giving us a great deal of trouble, being
strongly held by Machine Guns and in a position still East of our line.
The 14th Australian Infantry Brigade working from the 1/20,000 maps,
considered that St. DENIS WOOD was at I.22.A.8-4, this wood is clearly
shown on the 1/40,000 map as being in I.22.B. and I.23.A. This
mistake should not have arisen as orders had been previously issued
that the 1/40,000 map would be used for all future operations. The
fact that St. DENIS WOOD was still occupied affected the situation and
the Divisional Commander decided that the proposed operation should
28
therefore be cancelled.
Had this operation been insisted upon there is no doubt that the
troops launched to the attack would have been utterly annihilated.
The valley beyond St. DENIS is completely commanded by hills on three
sides of it and these were strongly held by the enemy whose machine
gun fire was terrific. This again emphasises the grave necessity for
personal reconnaissance even at great risk for higher commanders before
such orders are issued. In this instance the Brigadier ^[*15 Brigade*] found himself
obliged to state that if the operation as laid down was insisted on
contrary to his judgment he would have no option but to resign his
command the following day. This led to the conference.
22. It was also decided at the conference that the 15th Brigade
should that night take over that portion of the front held by the 14th
Australian Infantry Brigade whose troops were exhausted. General
HOBBS also pointed out that the policy to be adopted was not to push
the enemy but to maintain touch should be retire. Accordingly the 57th
29 

Battalion relieved the 58th and 54th Battalions and Lieut. Col. J. J.
SCANLAN, D.S.O. taking charge of the 59th and 60th Battalions relieved
all other troops of the 14th Australian Infantry Brigade. On completion
of these moves the Brigade was disposed as follows :
58th Battalion holding that portion of the front East of
the River SOMME.
57th Battalion on the South-Eastern and Eastern edges of
PERONNE.
59th Battalion from I.22.D.4-8 to I.22.A.3-9.
60th Battalion in support of 59th Battalion.
23. During the late afternoon of the 2nd inst, the 58th Battalion had
reported that they thought FLAMICOUlT to be unoccupied. They had seen
a number of the enemy leaving there and retiring onto the Railway in
I.29.C. Attempts to enter the village, however, ^failed owing to the enemy
having cleverly concealed Machine Guns along the North-West side of the
village. Our patrols accordingly could make no headway. At the
30
Divisional Commanders conference in the afternoon it was arranged that
the 32nd Battalion (in a support position) of the 8th Australian --
Infantry Brigade be placed at the disposal of the C.O.C. 15th Australian
Infantry Brigade, to exploit any entry which might be gained into
FLAMICOURT during the night. It was desired if possible to secure the
high ground in I.35. Organised Artillery shoots were arranged to take
place on the village during the night and the 57th Battalion were
instructed to push out patrols to effect an entry during the intervals.
These attempts were again frustrated by Machine Cun fire and at 4.35.
a.m. on the 3rd inst, a message was despatched to the 8th Australian
Infantry Brigade stating that FLAMICOURT was still held by the enemy
and that the 32nd Battalion could not therefore be used.
SEPTEMBER 3rd.
24. At about 8 a.m. ^on the morning of the 3rd inst. the Brigadier made a
personal reconnaisance of the Railway Line leading from the Railway
Bridge at I.33.D.8-4. He was convinced that an advance could be made
to some extent at least along the line and a post established on the
31

 line which might eventually assist us to gain a footing in the village
or turn it by our troops getting onto firm ground in I.28.D. He
accordingly instructed Lieut. R.MARXSEN, 57th Battalion, who was commanding
a platoon post at the Railway Bridge, to push a patrol along. This
patrol got to within 60 yards of the Railway Yard but was compelled to
withdraw on account of the Machine Gun fire. The patrol got so close
that the occupants of one of the Machine Cun Posts beckoned to our men
to come in. A post was eventually established at approx. I.27.D.9-1.
and Lieut MARXSEN returned to secure a trench mortar to deal with the
Machine Guns at the Station. This was not effective so artillery concentration
onto the position was carried out during the afternoon. Lieut
MARXSEN was unfortunately killed while patrolling in this vicinity
during the morning. The loss of this brave and skilful officer was
severely felt in the Brigade.
25. At 1.20 p.m. we were informed by the C.S.O.1 that the 2nd Australian
Division had established a bombing block at I.17.A.6-4. and that during
32
the afternoon they intended to bomb down DARMSTADT TRENCH. The 59th
Battalion were instructed to co-operate if possible by pushing forward
to this trench. The 2nd Division operation, however, did not eventuate
either during the afternoon or evening. However, during the night the
60th Battalion advanced our line on the left by passing two companies
through the 59th Battalion, and establishing on a line from I.16.B.8-1.
on the North and
connecting with our old line at I.22.D.2-8. The line was about 50
yards East of the PERONNE - NURLU Road.
September 4th.
26. A readjustment of the Northern Divisional Boundary and Inter-
Brigade boundaries was ordered to take place during the night 4th/5th
inst. This meant that the 59th and 60th Battalions would be relieved
by the 8th Australian Infantry Brigade, the Inter-Battalion Boundary
then being the East and West Grid Line between I.22.Central. Orders
33