Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/262/1 - 1916 - 1934 - Part 1

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Open for review
Accession number:
RCDIG1066698
Difficulty:

Page 1 / 10

AWMSS Official History, 1974-18 War: Records of CE W Bean, Official Historian. Diaries and Notebooks Hem number: 3DR1606/26217 Title: Folder, 1976 - 7934 Covers various subjects, including the origins of the war and wartime propaganda, and includes Bean's notes, cuttings, speeches (egby WM Hughes) and letters from Sir Brudenell White and JL Treloar. AWMISS-3DRI606/26211
TS S D. M S e en s a Ma DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. E. W. BEAN CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914- 1918 HE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms of gift to the Australian War Memorial. But, apart from those terms, I wish the following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every reader and writer who may use them. These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be true. The diaries were jotted down almost daily with the object of recording what was then in the writer’s mind. Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep; also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so —but it does not follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them. These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what their author, at the time of writing, believed. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But he did try to ensure such accuracy by consuiting, as far as possible, those who had seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed upon him by the second or third day of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that those who passed on such stories usually themselves believed them to be true. All second-hand evidence herein should he read with this in mind. 16 Sept., 1946. C. E. W. BEAN. MCEEEEEENEE TEETESMNT
Origins of the Warr War time propaganda & hies Mr Hughes's Speeches in England 1916
Tel.—City 10900- Ext. 81. COMSNEAITH OF AUSTRALIA. HISTORIAN To AMBEE No. VICTORIA BARRACKS, SVDNEV. The origin of the War. occasion of the war was the action of two auto- The orgn mo (a) Russia, when Austria against Serbia, insisted on cratic Boreaucracies Cordering a general mobilisation (af Resoia isistes on) nobeliny lve well fivenwars war mean knoway that this involved imment danes of a general war. (B) Germany repeaw to say the word which would have caused Austria to give way so pe settle as eper the Serbian quarret by o peacefol means. By "rany his little fieges the Raeses could have brought this about - & he, to, knew that his refasal weant t work war. But in bote cases he existence of an Enomous mclitary machine was the predisposing cause: wen aquarrd arose over a conparatively monor iasve the cambrous maching was put oits action. Bothe the the maching Kaise & the Russian ralers could have stopped i. But probably was – I am not in the wrong: why their unconscious attetde should I give way. Both were somewhate t up with the sease of possession of that machine - certainly the Raisis was. Why should he stop it? And so the ghastly thing went on working &f came into holts with the opponing machines. When they slnged automatically released themselves bere at lst intelocked tey lest the world draies of helf it from that dreatful lock
2 31 2 3 4 4 3 265 8X 5. 5 11 3 3 England & Belgin posible that As for England - it is very aill for wa grey I may have thought that England would have been forced to make was in her own wherest even of IBelgian had not been invaded by firmany. tts It is certain that her raters would have I attempted to brang her into, but it there would is equally certain that have been apposition in labivet Shocy & fitter Parliament, & people. Possibly the spectacle of France in perit would heve in the samce the Biitish people m impetle way as the cae against Belgien - but direction less violently, sace it involved no treachery. It might have been impossible for Britash Enpere again to took on, as in 1870. wiliter see France crushed to death: the conversations with France wight have been raised to the Frank of a moral obligation (though they did not involve thiis). No man can say the Coitech people with certainty that would therefore have conboace war - & uless they dit it reattered nothing what 38 Grey or anyove else thought. I is also certain that hedky the was into the waen ther suppor
Considerations Addrmng was origes. (Authorities for facts. The difficulty to composited Life of Lord Carnock. prey was he believed solition Ey ad war (o wd not July 1914. prevent it) & that the war wd Mr Hohan's lecture on be disastious. England being Gooch & Temperly friendless. He knew to 1 goot & people and not agre to alliance a Franae (& Russis) arless he rassed the German bogeg - at he adnot dream of doing, & wh in itself cod boiy was. He therefore got England to lemet herself as far as she ad amont herself -O.C. b Suppt Frans she considered he a war if, when the occasion came, the war ws anjastly forced upon France. He could nover promise the more - bec. English people (notmerely Labe Harcourt) would at stand it. Lale represented a very definite reality. Phose who think prcy wron have to prove that England would have been weser t remain isotated – it would not have stopped the freadwar, but she wd not have been in it: would her souch really have been better afterwards, mosally & physically: But it is wiged to prey shd have made his threat - explained where England stoed is on Jaly2s or 26 instead of on Aug 1. We now know to this might have stopped I was - I kaiver might have instructed his ambassado in Vienaa as he did on thig to bing pressure on Austria (nt son, o his adview) Gerw, Pooto But pey believed to profersions to citig t was i pressure on Austiia were sincere. sctually we now know, the taines s anxious to prevent war. Grey did not realise how much I kawser's attitude he's clanged since 1912 - & that hvi geven a prowice of support go t Austria was like hobbles on his feet his vanity ad not allow him to shake a
Canyands in those hobbles. Thus it was that for tow or tive precious days frey (behieving the kaeses to be in accord with him) relied on his frecowiely successful proposal for a conference of ambossadon or, when to wo rejected, on the ferman sugjestin of duct direct negotiation between Kusoca & Hann derect when this broke down his threat was too late -though (iffferman good had been an effecient instrument) it sad not have been. It was not till fermany (by facling to prward a war to she cd have prevented) had pat herself in the position of a power wh apparently wanted dele war, to grey could his threat to England ad probably come in against her. And $5o fermany's great army & kavy, wh had been built up to support a definite national policy were ased - not to achieve aprime or necessary am of that policy but because it was there. Three great guns, loaded & poined, were ready & the hands of three monerchs, one traubling trou age, the second through weakness. + the therd a vain pakle man never certain of his own motives or aations. The great juus went of not in support of I man polieg for whose protection they had bn forged & but because they were there.
taton ties (ally aston 2//30 Austrian Fie-War Diptomacy All the principal Powers concerned in the Great War have already published or are en- gaged in preparing for publication their official documents relating to its outhreak, and the Austrian Government has made the latest contribution by issuing over 11,000 of them at the same moment. Overburdened students of the period may well quail before the fresh demand of time and effort required to master the ponderous mass of raw material now placed at their disposal, especially in view of the fact that they may expect to find no revelations of outstanding importance. But it may be usefully recalled that the War was not merely a struggle for supremacy in Western Europe or across the North Sea, but had some of its roots in one of those racial problems of Europe which caused a whole series of wars during the nineteenth century. The desire of the Vugoslavs for unity was as spontancous and as strong as had been that of Italians and Germans; and yet the Germans of the Austro-Hungarian Empire utterly refused to admit the justice of the movement, And the other Great Powers, so far from criticizing this attitude, applauded every successful stroke of policy in defence of the status quo. The pre-War diplomatists came away well pleased from any conference in which they were able to con- gratulate one another that t the status quo had been maintained? The disrup. tive explosion that followed that long period of suppression is not without its lessons for to day. The racial problems of Europe have been largely solved by Peace Treaties based on the principle of nationality. But there is no finality in history; and in the absorption of the work of eliminating war as an instru- ment of policy the effort must still be made to find an effective substitute in the evolution of nations. Another point that has been brought out in these documents, and which has been noted with generous appreciation in the Austrian Press, is the unfailing conciliatory temper which inspired Kine EDwaRD's diplomacy. This quality, of course, has long been wholly familiar to Englishmen; but the legend of his Machiavellian policy of encirclement has been most tenaciously held in Vienna and Berlin, and its refutation in the words of one of COUNT AEHRENTHAL'S own dispatches has evidently fallen on Austrian minds with the force of a fresh discovery. Reporting the visit of King EDwaRD to Ischl an 1908, the AUsTRO-HUNGARLAN FOREIGN MINISTER him- self denied that the King in any way tried to draw Austria away from her German Ally, It will always remain an interesting psycho. logical question exactly what measure of im- portance must be attributed to the diplomatio activities of the Kira. The fnct that on his numerous travels the King took with him the head of the Foreign Office is in itself an in- dication that the visits were not made for mere purposes of ceremony or pleasure. The truth is, of course, that the King enjoyed foreign polities; and his charm of manner and unerring tact made him thoroughly at home in the diplomatic world. He knew well the value of an apt phrase and of an opportune civility. His natural kindliness turned his ambassadorial purpose everywhere and always towards conciliation; and he was as friendly and as tactful at Marienbad or Berlin as on any of his other visits. He generally had the gift of communicating his geniality and kindliness to those around him, and he succeeded in bringing a great part of Europe under the infiuence of his good will. That his conciliatory activities failed in Germany was because they found no response there. The ringed fence which Germans always saw round their own frontiers was not put there by the diplomacy of Kixg EDWARD, but was of their own building.
The Times feterary suppeement 18/29 introduce us to the most secret thoughts and HERR LUDWIG ON JULY, 1914 feelings. If the historian attempts this style he must, even if he has not the reality assume the appearance of full knowledge; JULY 14. By EMIL LUDWIG. (Berlin: Ernst and this is a dangerous thing to do. He is Rowohit Veriag.) committed to giving us a graphic description Herr Ludwig's book is assured of a warm such as we get in a novel, but it is not always reception, especially among those who like easy to get the description right. It does their history served up in a style more usually not much matter, after all, that he should found in works of fiction :- speak of John Burns as a giant; it is more Sunk deep in armchairs, with their long and well- seriously misleading when he describes Lord formed legs crossed, dressed in well-fitting light Haldane as verschiviegen, and no one would grey, there sit two middleaged Counts in the exactly choose the words schon and vornehm golden-red room of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to describe Lord Morley. But, to turn to at Vienna. greater things, his whole picture of the It might be the beginning of a chapter by motives of Austrian action is almost a carica- Dumas or Stanley Weyman. As a matter ture because he completely omits to put on of fact he is starting to tell the story of how record the belief, which was both genuine the Austrian ultimatum to Serbin, with all and well founded, that, owing to the grow- its consequences, was devised and concocted ing reputation of Serbia and the persistent by the two?war Counts, Berchtold and Serbian propaganda, men had come to see Forgach, and we must not be misted. The book that sooner or later the existence of an is really a serious study of the origins of the independent Serbia would mean the destruc- War. Not, indeed, that it adds anything to tion of Austro-Hungarian integrity and, not our knowledge; all the points and facts in it Timprobably, the overthrow of the Monarchy are the commonplaces of the subject; but it itself; and it is unjust also not to record is notable because the author has very defi- what we now know—that the Serbian nitely made up his mind about the whole national plans in opposition to Austrin were matter, and, as may be expected, marshals deliberately being encouraged by Russia, and his material with great skill. His thesis is that also that, though in 1914 this could not be the whole of Europe is responsible for the War; proved as it now can be, there was every that is the result of research in all countries. The reason for suspecting it. Again, curiously sole quilt of Germany, or Germany's innocence. enough, the picture of the really dramnatic are equally fairy tales for children on this and the situation in Berlin during the Wednesday and other side of the Rhine. What country willed the the Thursday, especially on Wednesday War? Let us put the question differently. What are the circles in all countries who willed, facili- night, is inadequately dealt with. Here, as tated, or began the Warr If, instead of a hori- zontal, one makes a vertical section through the elsewhere, the narrative would have been classes, then one sees the whole responsibility lay more effective if it were simpler; the situa- with the Cabinets, the whole innocence in the tion and the events are of such a kind that streets. a straightforward record really requires The book, then, is a polemic against the no literary artifices or imaginative addi- Kings and statesmen of Europe, and in con- trast to them an encomnium of y the people, tions. In dealing with French matters the touch is not very firm; we have a sort of especially the people as organized by social democrats. It is a contrast which is over- feeling that the author has not really made up his mind about M. Poincare; he speaks done; from one point of view this insistence on the innocence of the man in the street indeed in one place of him and M. Viviani as acleverer than their colleagues in Berlin, but is absurd; it is about as sensible as if, when there was an inquiry into an acci- in no way less ready for war, less free in their actions, for they were controlled by the dent to a motor-couch or an acroplane, some. one were to make a great demonstration Republican machinery, but masters in all asserting the innocence of the passengers: devices for deceiving the multitude. t the full responsibility rests with the maker It seems quite clear from the pages he and the pilot; the passengers are free from devotes to M. Poincart's and M.-Viviani's quilt? There is not the slightest reason for dramatic return journey from St. Petersburg supposing that if the passengers had been put to Dunkirk that he has neglected to read M. in a position of responsibility they would have Poincare's own account; the dates are all acted any more wisely. wrong; he tells us, for instance, that M. Poin- care, immediately upon receiving the news But, leaving these points aside, Herr Ludwig of the Austrian ultimatum, ordered the has, as we should expect, worked out with course to be set straight for home without great vigour and great skill his indictment of the kings and statesmen. He begins with the any deviation. Of course, this is untrue; they went first to Stockholm, and it was only two war Counts in Austria, whom he re- some days later that it was determined to presents as influenced by mere unreasoning give up the visit to Copenhagen, and it is Serbophobia and desire for prestige, and then not unimportant when he tells us that they passes on rapidly to Berlin, where he has an easy task in depicting the violent haste of the arrived at Havre (it should be Dunkirk) on Emperor and the weak subserviency of Thursday; the date of the arrival was Wednesday, and it was in the night hours of Bethmann-Hollweg. Summing up the whole matter, he writes :— Wednesday to Thursday that some of the most important decisions were taken on Only one small point is now clearly established, the German Army and Navy, that is the lives o which Gorman writers have relied when they ten million men, is pledged by the word of on wished to strengthen the belief in French Emperor to another, and two Vienna Counts have responsibility for the War. In fact the whole from this time onwards a free hand to use the treatment of French action is most incorn- pledge wherever they may wish in their folly and plete. Equally misleading is it when he tells Trivolity. us that, even after the Tsar's decision to can- He rightly puts his finger on the absence of cel the first order for general Russian organized responsibility of the governors to mobilization, none the less?in fact during the the governed which, above all, made possible night of the 29-30 July there was mobiliza- the action of Austria and of Russia, and con tion throughout the whole Russian Empire. trasts with that to a small extent the situa- This has long been disproved. tion in Germany and France, but especially that in England, where alone there was true Notwithstanding these defects, the book responsibility, of the Foreign Secretary to the is the most vigorous and compelling picture Cabinet, of the Cabinet to the Parliament and which we have of the events of July, 1914; the country—and, indeed, his treatment both and if the lights and shadows are too strong, of Sir E. Grey and the English Government the main conclusions seem to us to be just. is throughout just and discerning. The moral of the whole work is that if a sumilar system had existed elsewhere the War could never have taken place; it is one with which we fully agree. A great deal was made of the Kronrat said to have been held at Berlin on August 5; Herr Ludwig rightly points out that the cause for regret is that no such council was called. The book is, then, a serious historical and political work; but we must recognize that what we may call the style of fiction is a dangerous one to the historian. It is the privilege of the novelist that he knows every thing; he can tell us not only the external appearance of his characters and the physical surroundings of the action, but he can also
e fut 12/3 31 Cra end once forall to the Borbian menace; hence the ultimatum to Serbia and the mobiliza- tion of the Austrian forces. But, since an attack on Serbia would probably lead to a -COMING OFTHE WAR counter-attack by Russia, it could not be adventured without the assurance of German support in such an event. Berlin THE- CoMIG Of THE WAR, 1914. was appealed to, and Mr. Schmitt shows how, with admirable diplomacy, Count Berchtold BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT. Two Voluines contrived to throw the responsibility for the (Scribner. 30s. not.) issue on the German Government. In these This work is a notable contribution to the circumstances, says Mr. Schmitt, to appraise perennial controversy raised by the unhappy the German Government's policy fairly is a inspiration of the framers of the Treaty of most difficult problem,? for the collapse of the Versailles in forcing the Germans to subscribe Hapsburg Monarchy would have been a to a confession of war guilt. The Germans serious danger to Germany. But to stand appealed from the partial judgment of the beside the Monarchy if attacked was one -victors to the impartial judgment of history, thing; to encourage it in a course which would and as a challenge to the world—or perhaps certainly provoke such an attack was quite in an effort to acquit the German people by another. casting the blame on the faulty statesmanship In the confusion of motives and infiuences of their rulers —laid bare the secrets of their which prevailed at Berlin it is hard to trace those which determined the fateful issue; but it seems clear that the Emperor and Kabinette? This created a new procedent, the Chancellor were as clay in the hands of which other nations were swift to follow, with those who believed that, since Russia and the result that, as Mr. Schmitt remarks in his France were unready and England occupied Preface, more than 35,000 documents are with troubles in Ireland, the opportunity must now at the disposal of the historian, and the he seized to secure and strengthen not only and is by no means reached There is, then, the Hapsburg Monarchy but Germany as wel material enough for any historian who has by taking the offensive defensive? The the courage to take up the German challenge. German Government, argues Mr. Schmitt, Mr. Schmitt has done so, and these two had a perfect right to adopt such an atti- volumes are the result. tude, for war was a legitimate instrument of The task was an immense one; and, as Mr. international policy, and every other Govern- Schmitt confesses, it was one which did not ment was equally prepared to fight rather admit of absolute finality, for, as Bismarck than submit to a threat to national interests observed, diplomatic history cannot be or to diplomatic humiliation. On the other hand, whether the phrase ? war guilt can be written from the archives, and, though the archives have been supplemented by a mass properly applied or not, he shows that of memoirs of the leading actors in the William II. and Bethmann-Hollweg were the first responsible stateemen to take decisions which drama, these are most often of the nature might have the most dire consequences. They may of apologine and therefore suspect as be acquitted of a deliberate intention to precipi- evidence. The task of the historian, then, tate a European war, but they did elect to put the has been to sift and marshal this evidence system of alliances to the severest test and to and to draw from it such doductions as it spring a crisis of the first magnitude upon Europe. seemed to justify—in short, to give a judicial It was they who took the gambler's plunge. summing up of the whole case. This is what Again, with regard to the attitude of Mr. Schinitt has attempted; and, since he Germany towards the Austrinn ultunatum to has brought to the task a judicial mind, the Serbia, Mr. Schmitt, after a detailed examina- attempt has been remarkably successful. tion of the available evidence, concludes that He opens with two chapters by way of (prolude to the main subject of the work, once again the German conduct was consistent, for the German Government had promised not to which is the diplomatic history of the fateful interfere with Austrian plans; but the German week preceding the outbreak of war. In the argument that the German Government at the last first chapter he examines the European moment found the Austrian plans objectionable, system during the pre-war period. The but was estopped by circumstances from interfor- ence, will not hold water. situation as painted by him—and the colours are not exagerated—was pregnant with war: His conclusion is that, Calthough Austria. the idea of nationality, which from being a Hungary, as the Power taking action, must liberating and constructive force had become bear the immediate responsibility for the con- a terrifying and destructive spectre; indus- sequences, it is clear that she had not pursued trial progress, leading to bitter jealousies and her course without the encouragement, and approval of her ally. rivalries between the nations and a war of tariffs; the race for imperial expansion. Several chapters are devoted to the which wasan ineluctable necessity of eleventh-hour efforts to preserve pence, and modern industrialism; and, lastly, as the to the feverish diplomatic efforts to determine safoguard of peace, the system of alliances the attitude of the greater and lesser Powers and counter-alliances established to secure a not immediately invoived. Mr. Schmitt dis balance of power which, owing to the peculiar misses, with slight consideration, the conten- circumstances of Great Britain, was not tion of the Germans that their undertaking obviously kept in equilibrium. In the second to respect the neutrality of Holland was proof chapter he deals with the problems of the of the disinterestednees of their ultimate in- Near East, and more especially with those tentions towards Belgium; a neutral Holland, arising from the strained relations between he points out, was essential to them in order Austria-Hungary and Serbia, relations which that they might import supplies. The detailed grew steadily worse after the annexation of story of the last fateful hours before the Bosnia-Horzogovina in 1909, until the out- actual fighting began is of poignant interest; come of the Balkan wars, by increasing Serb and, though much of it is already familiar, power and pretensions, seemed to Austrian Mr. Schmitt has been able to bring together statesmen an instant menace to the integrity for the first time a mass of information of the Monarchy, and they seized on the pre- hitherto scattered and to weave the whole text of the crime of Serajevo to launch the into a connected narrative. Incidentally, he ultimatum which was the signal for the out- pays a high tribute to Sir Edward Grev's break of the War. diplomacy in the cause of peace, and he fully Mr. Schmitt examines in great detail understands the poculiar difficulties which the question of the complicity of the Sorbian the British statesman had to face owing to Government in the murder of the Archduke, divided counsels in the Cabinet and the with the result that the verdict must be?Not nation. He quotes the opinions of Russian and French statesmen thatwar would be proven, though there is plenty of evidence avoided if England would declare openly on that the Government conmved at, and was in sympathy with, the general activities of the their side; but he sees that, as matters stood, secret societies by whom the crime was in this was impossible, since it was only the spired. The best argument in favour of the actual violation of Belgian neutrality that innocence of the Government itself seems to united public opinion in England in favour be that it wanted peace, and that the crime of war. He agrees with Sir Edward Grey of Serajevo was a deliberate challenge to war that, when once this had happened, honour Vet war might have been avoided had the and interest alike demanded that Great Britain should range herself with her Allies. idea of it not been welcomed in certain Mr. Schmitt is to be congratulated on the quarters. To Austrian statesmen and soldiers successful completion of a very difficult and the occasion seemed op portune for putting an laborious task.

AWM38
Official History,
1914-18 War: Records of C E W Bean,
Official Historian.
Diaries and Notebooks
Item number: 3DRL606/262/1
Title: Folder, 1916 - 1934
Covers various subjects, including the origins of
the war and wartime propaganda, and includes
Bean's notes, cuttings, speeches (eg by WM
Hughes) and letters from Sir Brudenell White
and JL Treloar.
AWM38-3DRL606/262/1

 

Misc - incl. Origins of the War. No. 262
DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. E. W. BEAN
CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914 - 1918
THE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms
of gift to the Australian War Memorial. But, apart from those terms, I wish the
following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every
reader and writer who may use them.
These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be
true. The diaries were jotted down almost daily with the object of recording what
was then in the writer’s mind. Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep;
also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so —but it does not
follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when
discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them.
These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what
their author, at the time of writing, believed. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch
for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But he
did try to ensure such accuracy by consuiting, as far as possible, those who had
seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand
evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed
upon him by the second or third day of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that
those who passed on such stories usually themselves believed them to be true. All
second-hand evidence herein should he read with this in mind.
16 Sept., 1946.    C. E. W. BEAN.

 

Origins of the War
War time propaganda & lies
Mr Hughes's Speeches in England 1916

 

[*HN*]

Tel.—City 10900- Ext. 81.
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.
HISTORIAN
No......
TUGGRANONG FEDERAL TERRITORY
QUEANBEYAN, N.S.W.
VICTORIA BARRACKS, SYDNEY.
The origin of the War.
The origin occasion of the war was the action of two autocratic Bureaucracies:
(a) Russia, when Austria threaten mobilised against Serbia, insisted on
(a) Russia insisted ^ordering a general mobilisation mobilising kno well 
knowing that this meant war a general war: ^involved imminent danger of a general war.
(b) Germany refused to say the word which
would have caused Austria to give way so far
& to refer as to settle the Serbian quarrel by
peaceful means. By "raising his little
finger” the Kaiser could have brought
this about - & he, to, knew that his
refusal meant the world war.
But in both cases  the existence of an enormous
military machine was the predisposing cause: when
a quarrel arose over a comparatively minor issue 
the cumbrous machine was put into action. Both the
Kaiser & the Russian rulers  could have stopped it ^the machine.  But
they they probabl their unconscious attitude probably was - I am not in the wrong: why
should I give way. Both were somewhat swollen puffed up with the
sense of possession of that machine - certainly the Kaiser was. Why
should he stop it?  And so the ghastly thing went on working &
automatically plunged came into holts with the opposing
machines. When they
were at last interlocked they left the world drained half of its released themselves from that dreadful lock,
 [*the world mankind staggered out, drained of half its life’s blood *].

 

England & Belgium
As for England - it is very well for even possibly that for Grey xx may
have thought that England would have been forced
to make war in her own interest even if
Belgian had not been invaded by Germany.

It is certain that her rulers would have
attempted to bring her into it, but it
is equally certain that there the Germs would have
been ^strong & bitter opposition xxxx in Cabinet
Parliament, & people. Possibly the
spectacle of France in peril would have
acted on impelled the British people much in in the same
way direction as the crime against Belgium - but
less violently, since it involved no treachery.
It might have been impossible for ^the British
Empire again to look on, as in 1870, & 
see France crushed to death: the ^military conversations
with France might have been raised to the
rank of a moral obligation (though they did
not involve this). But really No man can say
with certainty that this ^the British people would therefore have embraced
war - & unless they did it mattered nothing what
Grey or anyone else thought. It is also certain
that had they then come into the war their support 

would have been less united. There would throughout have

been a party which would have argued with reason: "England

entered the war without necessity - after r carefully preserving her

right to freedom of action & def avoiding definite entanglements or

promises, her statesmen all went took its adopted the assumption

that she was bound, & thrust landed her into this fright fearful struggle."

What a cry it would have been - at critical times it

would have had enormous influence on the attitude of people &

army, & would brought about forced a negotiated peace long 

before Germany had been fought down.

C.E.W.B

87.5.29*]

 

Considerations and driving War origins
[*(Authorities for facts.
Life of Lord Carnock.
July 1914.

Mr Holman's lecture on

Gooch & Temperley)*]
The difficulty tt confronted 

Grey was: he believed isolation

wd lead to end in war (or wd not

prevent it) & that the war wd
be disastrous, England being
friendless.
He knew tt / Govt & people
wd not agree to alliance w France (& Russia)
unless he raised the German bogey - wh he wd not
dream of doing, & wh in itself wd bring war.
He therefore got England to commit herself as
far as she wd commit herself - i.e. to suppt France
in a war if, when the occasion came, ^she considered the war ws
unjustly forced upon France. He could never promise
more - bec. English people (not merely [Luke?] Harcourt) wouldnt
stand it. Later represented a very definite reality.
Those who think Grey wrong have to prove that
England would have been wiser to remain isolated – it
would not have stopped the a great war, but she wd not have
been in it: would her postn really have been better
afterwards, morally & physically?
But it is urged tt Grey shd have made his
threat - explained where England stood - on July 25
or 26 instead of on Aug 1. We now know tt this
might have stopped / war - / Kaiser might have
instructed his ambassador in Vienna as he did
on Aug 1 to bring pressure on Austria.
But Grey ^(tho' not some of his advisers) believed tt / Kaiser's Germ. Govt's  professions tt
it was bringing exerting pressure on Austria were sincere.
Actually, we now know, the Kaiser was anxious to
prevent war. Grey did not realise how much / Kaiser's
attitude had changed since 1912 - & that having given
a promise of support gn to Austria was like hobbles
on his feet - his vanity wd not allow him to shake off

 

those hobbles. Thus it was that for four or five
precious days Grey (believing the Kaiser to be
in accord with him) relied on his previously
successful proposal for a conference of ambassadors
or, when tt ws rejected, on the German suggestn of
direct negotiation between Russia & Vienna Austria.
When this broke down his ^direct threat was too late
- though (if / German Govt had been an efficient
instrument) it shd not have been.
It was not till Germany (by failing to prevent
a war tt she cd have prevented) had put herself in
the position of a power wh apparently wanted
war, tt Grey could make deliver his threat tt
England wd probably come in against her.
And / so Germany's great army & navy, wh
had been built up to support a definite
national policy were used - not to
achieve a prime or necessary aim of that
policy but because it was there. Three
great guns, loaded & primed, were ready & the
lanyards in / hands of three monarchs, one trembling through
age, the second through weakness. & the
third a vain fickle man never certain of his own
motives or actions. The great guns went off -
not in support of / main policy for whose protection
they had bn forged & - but because they were there!

 

London Times (Weekly Edition)

2/1/30
Austrian Pre-War Diplomacy

 

The Times Literary Supplement
1/8/29
HERR LUDWIG ON JULY, 1914

 

The Times 

Literary Supplement
12/3/31
COMING OF THE WAR

 
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Ray WilsonRay Wilson
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