Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/260/1 - 1916 - 1930 - Part 23

2 Bn 9 April 1917
Bede Kenny, Hermies.
Kenny says
Maun had explained to his xx men the
objective of each pln, & had shown them
the air photo.  That of the pln in wh
Kenny was lay on / summit of a
rise, crossed by the road, beside
which were three trees.  Maun pointed
out / trees on / photo.
When the pln made across
country it was fired on from this
rise wh had a splendid field of fire.
The officer reckoned they were lost
but Cpls MacPhee & McNiel- of the
bombing pl section (8 strong) could see
the trees against the sky & they
went on - on their own - straight
towards them.  They crossed the road
& reached a cemetery around which were

2
open fields with manure heaps.  The
Germans had a sentry group of two or
three men under the trees, firing
flares & rifles, & this stopped /
advance.  The bombers lay under /
manureheaps & one of the bombers tried
by crossing the road (I think it was
Macniel) to get at them.  He ws
shot thro' / arm as he climbed /
road bank.  Two others Hogan & McNiel had asked K. to try a throw, but /
bomb only went half way.  Two bombers, Hogan &
Brashaw, now covered Kenny w their
rifles as he went towards / post.
As They were firing pretty close to
him & he suddenly turned & told
Hogan to stop firing & then rushed at
/ Germans.  He was wild with them for
wounding his mate, MacNiel (or McPhee),
& hardly knew what he was doing - he
has very little notion even now, except that he
rushed the trees.  The German or Germans
there firing at him & missing - he killed
the sentry (he thinks, with a kick) & went

3
on to the sandpit & threw two or three
of his bombs into it.  The Germans there
surrendered & he made them carry
back McNiel.
While lying out the bombers had
Germans running into them (escaping from
/ village) & they shot a number.  These
Germans, or some of them, came with
their hands up, but it was no time
for taking prisoners.
[Indeed, I cannot see how the 8
men confronting this post could have
taken prisoners in such a situation.]
C.E.W.B.

Lt. CK Miller A.  A Coy behind
Half moon Nyngan.
Diagram - see original document
Lt. Ladber B. S. Coast
Lt. Robbins. K.C
Lt. George Mann D
Diagram - see original document
Trott Adjt.
Kenny.  C/o Penfold's Wines.
Diagram - see original document
Butt of rifle.
Capt. Moye  Wentworth
O'Connell}
Lt Norris-Coolah.
Miller  A Coy.
C-Coy. Westhoek.
H.Q. in front line Milligan's HQ in Og 1.
Herrod - was in out at Bullect.
Saw Fl.wfr
[*B5175
JX 1673*]

FL.4151
5894.
3 June 1930.
Flight Lieutenant R. Christie, D.S.O.,
No. 1 Aircraft Depot,
Laverton, Vic.
Dear Sir,
there has arisen a question of history concerning the
start of the Battle of Noreuil on 2 April 1917.  Just before
this attack some of the 2nd Gordons were mixed up with the 51st
Battalion, and a tape was subsequently found laid at an angle
across the front of the 51st.  It was assumed that this was the
2nd Gordons' starting tape.  The then commander of the 2nd
Gordons has questioned this, and avers that they were on their
correct lines.
I should be grateful if you would let me know whether
you can personally remember anything of this, or if you know
anyone else who actually saw this tape.
Yours faithfully,
C.E.W. Bean
Official Historian.

REPORT ON ATTACK BY 13TH.AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE
ON VILLAGE OF NOREUIL AND HIGH GROUND TO NORTH AND NORTH-EAST.
Reference Map attached.
The line marked A.B.C.D. was the outpost line previous to
the attack.
The plan of attack was that the 51st. Battalion with their
Right on Road running through C.15.b. would take the village from
the South-West and co-operate with the 50th. Battalion, whose Left
flank resting on Road to NOREUIL through C.16.c. and a., would
make a flank attack on the Village from the South-East.
The 'jumping off' line for the attack was taped by both Units
perpendicular to the line of advance.
Zero time was 5.15 A.M., and proved a most suitable hour.
The objective of the Brigade is shown in red on sketch attached
Reconnaissance.  As the Units had been in the line some days,
careful reconnaissance had been made by all concerned, and parties
moved to place of assembly and taped line without the slightest
hitch.
Artillery support.  The barrage for the attack was carefully
made out and thoroughly executed.  The rate of the creep of the
barrage - 100 yards in 2 minutes - was not too quick.
The attack.  The Right Company of the Left Battalion did not
meet much opposition in the Village, but in NOREUIL-LONGATTE Road
the enemy were in force and this line was thinly wired.  An
enemy Machine Gun and 2 Trench Mortars were captured here.
One Platoon was left to mop up, and a strong point was made at
C.9.b.0.5. covering the low ground in C.9.b. and C.3.d. and
protecting the Left flank.
At 7 A.M. the main attacking line had reached its present position -
an old German trench -.  Here touch was established with both flanks
Hostile shelling and Machine Gun fire had caused so many casualties
that the Company in reserve was pushed forward to the NOREUIL -
LONGATTE Road.
The Right Battalion on reaching the Village Encountered Machine
Guns from many places, but these were enveloped and silenced by
Rifle Grenades and Bombs.  Firing the rifle from the hip proved
very effective in the Village.
The change of direction was successfully completed and the line
moved forward, but owing to the peculiar formation of the ground
and the strength of the enemy on their Right, who isolated and
captured a portion of the Right Company and caused many casualties
by their Machine Gun fire, they could not gain touch with the
52nd. Battalion , who had pushed forward and established their Left
flank at C.17.b.1.7.
Repeated attempts by the enemy were made to get through this gap ,
but a Platoon from the Reserve Company thrown in prevented this.
Towards evening consolidation of the whole line was completed, and
as the enemy appeared to be preparing for a counter-attack, our
S.O.S. barrage was put down and prevented the attack from developin
During the night of 2/3rd.April, the 50th.Battalion succeeded in
connecting up with the 52nd.Battalion on its Right.
It would appear from evidence in the Village that the enemy
had no intention of giving it up for the present.

Communications.  The 51st. Battalion pushed forward a report
centre to C.9.d.; the 50th. Battalion to C.16.b., and
maintained telephonic communication throughout.  Wires to the
report centres were not once cut.  An Amplifier was placed at
C.26.d.5.5. and power buzzers were taken to each forward report
centre.  As, however, telephonic communication was maintained ,
these were not used.  Pigeons were taken into the attack and
the first authentic message from the 50th. Battalion came by
that method from the front line.  Visual messages were not
sent.
Contact to aeroplanes by flares gave admirable results.
Total prisoners captured were 5 Officers, 108 Other Ranks.
We also captured 5 Machine Guns, 4 Trench Mortars and a number
of Pineapple Bomb-throwers, some telephones, signalling
equipment and bicycles.
Out estimated casualties are 11 Officers and 340 Other Ranks.
N3. (One 50th Bn alone had over 400)
[[Nuinell]] Major,
Bde. Major, 13th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.
Telephone :
Williamstown 602 and 666.
Address all communications to
"COMMANDING OFFICER."
RC/H.
No. A.D. 
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE,
NO. 1 AIRCRAFT DEPOT.
LAVERTON (VICTORIA).
12 June, 1930.
Captain C .E.W.Bean,
Official Historian,
Victoria Barracks,
SYDNEY.
Dear Sir,
I am in receipt of your letter dated 3/6/30,
relative to action by 2nd Gordons and 51st battalion at Noreuil
on 2nd April, 1917, and in reply can state that I clearly
remember the outstanding details of that operation.  Enclosed
you will find a copy of the Battalion Commander's report on
the action and in amplification of the information contained
in the last paragraph (Action of Unit on flank), I desire to
state that on going over the ground in the vicinity of the old
line about three hours after the attack, I personally saw the
remains of the jumping off tape of the 2nd Gordons, which at the
time had been considerably disturbed, but it was very definite
from its general direction, that it had been laid diagonally
to the direction of attack, at least 150 yards to the rear of
the 51st Battalion left flank (see the attached rough sketch)
in illustration of the foregoing statement).
I well remember the reports by various members of
"C" Company, 51st Batt. who were in our old front line, that the
Gordons appeared to charge forward on to them from their left
rear just prior to the artillery barrage opening, and they were
up and mixed with our attacking Companys when the order to move
forward was given.  I saw men of the Gordons with our Right
Coy. ("A" Coy.) on the objective N.E. of Noreuil, and found out
later that they were also distributed amongst the Centre and
Left Companys.
While the 51st Battalion were consolidating their
position the 2nd Gordons were collected into small parties and
moved to the left to make good their original objective.
I am certain from of what I have stated regarding the
jumping off tape because during the very early hours of 2nd
April, accompanied by Lieut. R. Finlason, the Intelligence
Officer of the 51st, we laid the Jumping off line for our
Battalion, and thereby obtained a sound and accurate knowledge
of the ground.  The fact that the Scotchmen were mixed with
our men during the attack made me curious to view their jumping
off tape which was placed as I have already stated. It was
generally accepted afterwards that those responsible for marking
the take off of the Gordons, had in the darkness, mistaken the
Village of Noreuil for the hamlet of Longatte (which latter place
was their main objective) and laid the tape facing Noreuil.  This
resulted in the strengthening of the 51st Batt. attack by the
rush of the Gordons on the 51sts. objective, but weakened the
left flank of the operation.
The Commanding Officer of the 51st Battalion at the
time of this operation was Lt. Col. C.C.Ridley who is, I
understand, at present a Staff Corps Officer stationed in Sydney,
and who I feel sure will corroborate the statements I have made.

Trusting the information contained above, together
with the Battalion report, will assist you in clearing the
question.
I am,
Yours faithfully,
R Christie
P.S.  I estimate ^that at least one Coy of the 2^nd Gordons were
mixed with 51^st Bn.
RC

From Col Christie
51st
Diagram - see original document
Rough Sketch showing dispositions of attacking units of 2^nd Gordon's
& 51^st Bn A.I.F. at Zero hour on 2^nd April 1917.
RC.