Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/260/1 - 1916 - 1930 - Part 16

Story of 15th Bde's Advance 
Compiled partly from memory, partly from notes, copies of orders etc
On 17 March 15th Bde was ordered to act as Adv Gd to the 5th Aust Div.
The Bde was divided into two parts - one (H.Q. 59^th Bn, 60^th Bn & ½ M.G. Coy plus Engineers
some DAC.O.A.A.M.C) to advance, and the remainder to stay in the old line as a
reserve. One Squadron (C) 13th L.H Regt was attached and one Field Battery was
to support the advance.
The Adv Gd was to swing half right through Ligny-Thilloy on to Riencourt,
Bancourt & Fremicourt. The wagons of the M.G. Coy & Battalions (3 each) were to follow
this route and actually started. Suspecting trouble I had sent an officer to
reconnoitre the first part of this route on the previous day but he reported
favourably. On 18th I was delayed for an hour rounding up some ammunition pack
mules who had failed to connect with the advancing troops. Following on I
found the wagons wallowing in the mud near Luizenhof Farm. Double-banking
teams only resulted in the wagons bogging right down to the axles. I then reversed
the transport & after guiding it as far back as Martinpuich I ordered it to march
via Baupaume - which it did successfully. The Field Battery which was to
support got bogged too and could not get through at all. The column had
gone on - Elliott having Legge with him as my understudy.
I returned via Riencourt &  Bancourt near which I found Elliott &
reported. It appeared the L.H. had some enemy out of Fremicourt & was then
held up by Delsaux Farm. This place the 59th Bn captured. This is where the
Officer was killed with the enemy plans upon him. I noticed that there was a
big gap on our right & went off to investigate. Passing thro' Barastre which was
unoccupied I could not find anyone of the flank Tommy Brigade until near
Rocquigny. Notwithstanding my entreaty that Bde Staff would not send someone to
occupy Barastre which was their territory. On my return I passed through
Barastre and Fremicourt Haplincourt (I was the first to enter) and found both
unoccupied. I went off to find the right of the 59th Bn to tell them the whole
story. In the dusk I must have been mistaken for an enemy for 300 yds
East of Haplincourt I received several bursts of L.G. fire - as I was alone
I retired gracefully & gave them my news per telephone from Fremicourt
where Bde H.Q. was established. It was then dark.
I believe some time that night the missing field battery was replaced.
Next day the 60th Bn took over the Van Guard work & moved in two
Columns one under Kerr and the other under Doyle. After some fighting Velu
and Lebucquiere were captured. I believe the method was to turn both flanks
of any resistance met. The field battery did some good work against Velu.
The actual objective was the line Beaumetz-Morchies with Beugny as Bde H.Q. but
we could not get that far.
On the 20th we advanced once more with Beaumetz-Morchies as objective
It was on this occasion that the Beaumetz-Morchies was laid down as the limit
of advance without further orders. The British had not come up on our right so
we had to drop a platoon near Barastre to maintain a certain amount of
connection. As the troops were closing round both sides of Beaumetz the L.H.
who had gone to Bertincourt sent in a warning that the enemy had laid a
trap & were preparing to counter-attack from direction of 
Hermies. The
60th Bn were outnumbered and withdrew just in time. Morchies was captured
but not Beaumetz. On this day we had the 4th Battery ^as well as the 55th and 1/2 Bn cyclists
had come up to assist us in our right flank trouble - their task was to establish
a post in Bertincourt. & so protect our right flank which was now completely
in the air.
On 21st the L.H. reported Beaumetz unoccupied so we took possession.
There was no other advance. The 29th Bn had relieved the 60th over-night & now
the 30th Bn relieved the 59th. We settled down to establish good roads, water,
& sanitation
On 22^nd. nothing happened.
On 23^rd. enemy made first attack on Beaumetz & on 24th he made
another. I read the proof of Ellis's "The Story of the Fifth Division" and
remember saying then that the account of these two fights was a good
one. I cannot add anything now. We were always nervous about our
right flank and on 23^rd sent the 59th Bn to Velu & Bertincourt as right
flank guard. (British still well back). It was early on the xx morning of
the second attack that the order was issued (and cancelled by Gen Hobbs)
for a further advance on Louverval etc.
By this time 'C' Squadron had been relieved by 'B' and the 57^th & 58^th Bns
had relieved the 29th & 30th. The whole of Phillips Brigade of field
artillery was now up - likewise some 6" Howitzers. 

There was some fighting on the 25th but I cannot remember details.
On 26th the 58th Bn took part in the advance towards Lagnicourt. On the previous
night when the 58th Bn men were advancing on a German post, the Germans
called "Hands up" - Our reply was "Hands up be b—" & a rush which
captured the garrison plus a trench mortar.
While the general story is hazy I have the following vivid recollections -

1. Our system of overcoming resistance was undoubtedly to work round both
flanks under cover of frontal fire and I believe this was followed on most
occasions.
2. The Light Trench Mortar Battery with my connivance made themselves
mobile. They evolved a system of air bursts (by cutting shorter fuzes)
over the heads of enemy in cuttings, mine craters and the like - this was
most useful on several occasions as it kept enemy heads well down.
One prisoner complained that he was happy enough until we opened
with Shrapnel (actually the T.Ms)
3. Both our L.T.M. & V.Gs were used with great boldness in the forward area
and gave most valuable assistance - particularly in the outpost line.
4. The Bde I.O. (Salmon) was absolutely fine. He got us the story direct
from front line troops every day, long before it came through the official
channel and, further, his story was extraordinarily accurate. As a rule
our Orders were based more on his story gained in this manner than on
anything else.
5. Our L.H. was wrongly used until I pointed ^this out. At the end of the
second day they were practically exhausted. From then on I was allowed
to control them for reconnaissance purposes
6. The system was for Formations to connect up with the Formation next on the
left. We tried to do our duty in this respect but the Formation to our
right was miles behind and the Formation to our left would not keep
our wire on their switchboard. On two occasions when communication
had broken down our Sig. Officer went across to the Brigade on our left
and found that our telephone wire had been disconnected and thrown
aside.
7. Arrangements had been made for the Brigade to cooperate with the
attack of the 2^nd Div on Lagnicourt. We carried out our task in its
entirety. Later Gen. Wisdom complained that we did not cooperate.
Proof of our story was shown to General Gough who agreed that we
had actually afforded more assistance than we had been asked
for.
8. At first - on 18th & 19th our men were very nervous about moving
in the open & even one distant rifle shot would send a whole
platoon to ground. This was the outcome of trench warfare. After
a day or two they got more used to it.
 Note - I have a copy of the Brigade Orders issued at that time
& will send them if required.
[CG?]

10 Higinbotham Str
Brighton
Sept 1929
Dear Mr Bean 
I received your letter on
my return from leave, & have been
extremely busy since hence my delay
in replying: I did not keep a
personal diary after having to
destroy the one I had kept since
leaving Australia at the evacuation
& to write a coherent & correct
account of the operation you
refer to in your letter I would
need access to the Official War
diary of the Battalion. This I
presume you have at hand, so if
it would be of any use to you I
will give you a rough sketch of
event & having no map must just
trust to memory, & will not be
able to guarantee the sequence of
events but war diary & map will
no doubtly, enable you to arrive at
accuracy. After having spent the
winter in the mud. it came somewhat 

2
of a surprise to me when the C.O.
Lt Col. Layh. called his Company 

Commanders together to inform them
that by 8 o'clock the following
night he expected his Battalion to
be at least 7 miles from where
they then were (viz in bivouac at
Flers). It sounded a rather large
order. However we were up bright
& early & moved off in Platoons at
intervals along the road to Bapaume
Our orders were that the Battn was
to form the Vanguard to the Brigade
which was to be Advance Guard to
the Division. On reaching the Bapume
Le Translloy Road which was almost
at right angles to our line of advance
we were to change fomation to
a Battalion advancing in line
with ½ platoons (in column) at
intervals of 1500 100 yards. with connecting
files between each, a fringe of Scouts
preceeding. The whole Battalion was
used thus. We were to open out gradually
whilst on the move like a fan, & the
left Company was to be the Company
of direction. The Late Capt Neal was
in command of the left hand Company
which was the Company of Direction
& his horse refused to jump Gill
trench which was about 7 feet wide 

3
[*Fn. *]

At about the 7^th attempt it reared
& turned round & landed on its
back in the trench & was unable to
rise. He landed on the parapet.
My mount fortunately cleared the
trench so undertook to look after
his company as regards direction
until he could get his horse out
He came along later on wounded
horse, which the light Horse had
discarded it having been shot thro
the nose. On entering Reincourt,
I set my map. & saw almost the
whole territory that was to be
the scene of operations for the
next fortnight; Bancourt, Fremicourt
Morchies, Buenies, Delsaux Farm
Haplincourt. & what I guess was
either Beaumetz or Lebucaire in the
distance. The line showing our
left of Section went thro the village
of Bancourt. It was necessary
to call a slight halt of the left
flank Company to enable the right
flank Company to get into position
as they had much further to go
to get into place. This I did as
I had told Capt Neal I would look
after his Company as the Company
of direction I then rode along
the whole Batn. checking up 

4
distances & direction connecting
files etc . This I did at the gallop
& return to find an irate
Colonel. Who asked. Who instructed
you to halt my Battalion.
I replied "I halted the Company
of direction Sir" to enable the
remainder to get into position
for the advance.
He then said "See that village
there are Huns in it. Take it!
"Very good Sir!" I replied:
I ordered my Company to
extend & set about the task.
In less than 10 minutes we were
in occupation - A bloodless victory.
In taking Delsaux Farm which
was on the front of the right flank
Platoon of my Company I heard
we had 2 casualties. There was
a strong post there in a crater.
consisting of an officer & a M.G.
Section. They were sniped out
by ∧the late Sgt Lt Facey then Platoon
Sergeant. The M G section retreatx
by the officer was shot thro the
Head. He was [[factoreding]] this
Section only. His lunch was 

5
cooking on a Primus when I
arrived a the Post & as he had
partaken of his last meal though
still living I ate it.
You can see
by the few casualties to date
that the whole show was what
one might call picnic warfare.
We found in the dug out of
the officer mentioned; documents
which set out (so l was told)
the whole of the enemies system
for the [retiring?] action; documents
that were not supposed to be
taken into the front line.
The only attack that caused us
to suffer casualties was on a
strong point in front of Vellu Wood.
We had 77∧ [*check*] .. I think it was
though we drove Fritz out inflicting
casualties. The formations used
varied during this vanguard &
advance guard work according
to the exigencies of the case
diamond formation was much
used when hostile aircraft were
attacking us with machine guns
from the air. The Company would
move with Platoons in diamonds
then Platoons into a diamond
of sections. Then the section had

6
orders to split into a diamond
on the approach of the hostile plane
This enable the Company to move
along without delay or disorganization
When carrying out flanking
work we used eschelon formation.
I dont know that this scratchy
account of some phases of the
show will be of any interest to
you. So long has elapsed that
I cant think of anything much
that could be recorded. The
57th Btn & the 7th Brigade I think
had the worst end of the stick
at Beaumetz, where Fritz was most
aggressive & where 9' shells were
plentiful. I found the 18' pounder
Battery which allotted to each Coy
very useful; also having a call
on heavys when required.
The former we used successfully
at Velu & theLatter at Doignies.
I trust you will be able
to make some little
use of this

Yours sincerely
K.G McDonald 

Tel.—City 10900 - Ext. 81.
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.
HISTORIAN.

TUGGRANONG FEDERAL TERRITORY

Via QUEANBEYAN, N.S.W.
No. 4957.

VICTORIA BARRACKS, SYDNEY.
4 October 1929.
Captain K.G. McDonald, M.C.,
10, Higinbotham Street,
Brighton, S.5, Vic. 

Dear Captain McDonald,
Many thanks for your reply to my letter, which
corrects in several respects the account that I had received.

I should be glad of confirmation in one matter.
The account of the taking of Delsaux Farm usually given states
that the German officer in charge of the post, apparently
observing that his men were becoming anxious to retire, walked
out to the crater swinging a walking-stick, and had just reached
it when he was shot; and that on his body was found the order
to which you refer. I take it from your account that the 

Germans were withdrawing and he following them when he was shot,
and that the order was found not on his body, but in his dugout.
If you are certain of the details, I will follow your account,
but, if you have any doubt, I should be grateful if you would
refer me to someone who could possibly settle the question.

Yours sincerely,
CEWBean
[MAM?]
[*Dear M^r Bean
I sent your letter on to the Platoon
Commander- of the Platoon which took the crater.
He said some of his men under the late Lt Facey &
some of the late Capt Stockfelds men who were
on his right combined in taking the crater, but as
to the details in reference to the finding of the
documents & the manner in which the German officer
met his death he is unable to furnish them
Trusting this will suffice
Your Sincerely
K.G. McDonald.

4759.

20 August 1929.

Captain R.A. Salmon, M.C.,
1209, Mair Street,
Ballarat, Vic.

Dear Salmon,

I have been describing the fine advance of Elliott’s
column from Bapaume in 1917, but the description would be much
improved if one could relate not merely that the flanking
companies "moved round" Fremicourt, Delsaux Farm, Beaumetz, etc.,
but how that movement was carried out. For example, was it a
general advance, the companies moving forward extended in
successive lines of platoons (if so, how widely extended)? What
was the experience of officers and men? Did it become
necessary to adopt section rushes with covering fire, or was
this done in some places where the fire was hot? Did the line
facing the enemy posts creep forward on its bellies? And so on.

I know that it is a long time after the events for
such recollections, but you may remember enough to say which of
these tactics was adopted on each of these occasions. If so
I would be grateful if you would give me any particulars, or
put me in touch with anyone who can. I have written also to
General Elliott, Colonels Layh and Wieck, and Major Legge.
Yours sincerely,
CEW Bean
[MAM?]