Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/260/1 - 1916 - 1930 - Part 2

16/17 March.
Capt. Taylor, 19 Bn
Taylors Coy had a man on Coy H.Q. counting
the flares every hour - & they were jotted down.
They also noted the points the Gs. were firing
from; & the numbers of flares per hr.
gradly decreased. The imprn ws /
Gs were going along firing from several points.

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Gen. Gellibrand's original report.
H.Q. 2^nd. Aust. Division.
The following report on the operations of the

Adv Guard is submitted.
1. H.Q. Order N^o 4 was issued at 930
p.m. on the 19^th inst. (in accordance
with the general instructions from Divnl HQ
2. In accordance with verbal instructions received
from General Staff of Division shortly after midnight 11 pm 19^th/20.
that the policy had been Corps Comdr. desired the line
[*presumably

next 

day
& therefore

had to 

be done 

by night*] 

Longatte - Noreuil - Lagnicourt to be occupied,^:X: & that

the general line policy instructions from D.H.Q. would
be modified in accordance with a memo to be
received by me during the night 19/20^th. H.Q. Order N^o 5
was issued by -    pm.
3. H.Q. Order N^o 5 was accordingly issued by telephone
to the 21^st, 23^rd & 25^th Battalions by telephone. It was
originally attend intended to move off the infantry
at 3 am 20^th so as to facilitate support of the L.H. patrols but the time was insufficient to allow

of the necessary concentration being made in time by then.
The ^general situation and the method of carrying out
the reconnaissance in force by the infantry were

fully discussed with the commanders of the Battalions

on the lines of G 1/380. and definite instructions

were given as to the method of breaking off an
engagement action and ensuring cooperation
between the 2 columns. Battalions in so doing.

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The 2nd Co. from the left was practically a left
flank guard to the 2 Companies cooperating with 22^nd
against Noreuil. This Company & the next on the right
suffered under the heavy 77 fire and 4.2" fire
(all coming from both flanks)..
The 3^rd Co. (Sales) established themselves ^by 7 am. parallel to
the Noreuil road and about 700 yds from it at
C9 with his right at 15 Central. (the 4^th Co (Pearce)
in support in echelon to the right rear. With special
orders to link up with 23^rd.
These 2 companies moved forward in cooperation
with 23^rd attack at 8.30 but were stopped by heavy

mg. fire from a trench in front of the SE face of
Noreuil. The retirement was effected slowly, the
men going back in pairs.
The V.L. were brought into actn at C 8 D 10., C14 Central
against hostile m.g. at Longatte & N of C9 Central
(one in reserve with Bn H.Q.). and did good work in
smothering the hostile m.g.
It is estimated that at least 10 ^probably 20 enemy dead were
killed in the 21^st. B^n. front.
7. Orders for the Artillery placed the 12 Bty in the S.
edge of Longatte - ^& the approaches 13 Bty on Noreuil. and later on
the road frm Lagnicourt to that village.
Direct. Observation was in our favour and a
number of objectives were engaged by our guns

without direct orders of HQ BK. The initiative displayed by
both batteries was admirable and their fire was
of the greatest assistance during the withdrawal,
especially in dispersing hostile m.g. sent forward to the spur at 17 Central
to harrass the 23^rds withdrawal.

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23^rd. Casualties chiefly in 5.30 attack on 

the village then lightly held. believed so.

also from Artillery.

(n.).

para 5

The wood was cleared by 2 Cos. ^by 3.45 am as a preliminary

to the advance on the line of the 3 villages.

Pasco's company moved off ^abt 3.40 from 21 C. along the
high ground right on the water shed in line of platoons

in file the 2 front Cos were still engaged in forming
up & the 4^th Co. Packers had not come up.

Of the 2 front companies Rossiter moved direct 

on Lignacourt & did not rejoin till 6.30 am. the other
front Co. came up with Pasco, about 6 am.

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The wood was cleared by 2 Cos. ^about 3.45 am as a preliminary to the 

forward movement on the 3 village line.

The leading Company of the advance formed line of platoon
in file protected by patrols & moved direct on the Centre
village. the second company lost is way and moved in the

direction of Lagnicourt rejoining the 23^rd about 6.30 am

The 2 Cos eventually in support to the leading which it 

reached about 6.00 am. At the same time the leading Co.
from the Bois de Vaulx reinforced the line opposite
Noreuil. making 3 Cos in line, the 4^th less 2 posts NEast of
the Bois de Vaulx forming a flank guard on the smaller
road to Lagnicourt.

In the meantime, Pascos company (leading) had 
reached its assigned position NE & E of Noreuil about
4.45 am practically unopposed.  There were however no signs

of either the 21^st or the 23^rd reinforcement companies &

the company was therefor withdrawn about 5.15 am.

to the South of the village forming on a line about 250
yards from it. On being reinforced the 2 Cos above

referred to at 6 a.m. An advance was made to reoccupy

the pn. but failed was discontinued as the enemy now brought heavy
mg fire from Longatte & Noreuil to bear. as well as

77 and 42 shelling.
23 ran a line from ^Bn H.Q. I 1 B Central. to C 21 C80. as a

report centre thence by runner.  Bn Arr^d. HQ here at 21 A 86.

During the early part of the morning the arty set fire

to Noreuil & Lagnicourt (part only).

Overlay to Sheet 57 C NW

Diagram - see original document

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4. Movements on the 20^th were delayed by the heavy

rain and the outposts line was not cleared till approx

4.30a.m. by the 21^st Bn, and at 3.15 a.m. by the 23^rd Bn
A still more serious delay took place in the movement

of the 13 LH patrols. This unit had had a spell on the 18^th.

and in my opinion should have been fit for a hard days

work on the 20^th. On my way forward to Vaulx I met

a body of the 13^th L.H. this side of Bengnatre' about 5.25 am

& was obliged to order the officer in charge to move forward

at a faster pace than a walk.

As already reported to the Divnl General Staff no

reports were received and the Squadron took no part

in the action. that I know.

5. The method of advance on the right was affected
by the necessity of clearing the Bois de Vaulx where

considerable enemy activity had ^been noticed on ^during the 19^th.

The wood was cleared by 2 Cos 23^rd. as a preliminary

to the forward movement in 2 waves. of 2 Cos each.

The leading ^[[?]] Coy in line of platoons in file. with patrols on the flank

The 2nd wave consisted of only 1 Co. as the Second Company

allotted missed connection after traversing the wood moving direct on Lagnicourt. & didnt rejoin
till about 6.30 am. (Rossiter). 

Capt Pascos company reached the objective   G5.

successfully to the N & N.E. & E of Noreuil about 4.05 a.m.

but as there were no signs at this time ^{^}by 4.30 am of the 21^st linking up on

the left ^or the remainder of the 23^rd coming up the 23^rd Co_. formed ad a line facing ^ NW S of the village Noreuil

Pasco was reinfrd with 2 Cos by about 5.30 am. 6G. When 1^st effort was made 

with 3 Cos. and engaged the enemy in that village
but brought to a standstill from 1000^x to 400^x - heavy MG from front & Longatte.

with a defensive flank against Lagnicourt. This 
fire position was maintained until 8.30 a.m. not done when 

the a frontal attack was pressed made in cooperation with 2

Companies of the 21^st. on the left.  Owing to the

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strength displayed by the enemy, whom I estimate

at 1 Battalion ^4 m.g. on Lagnicourt - 1 Co. & 6 m.g. in 

Noreuil and 2 Cos. 6 mg. in Longatte, no less than
the effective support of the hostile artillery (4 to 6 77mm

^about 4.2" good observn guns on our front line - 4 to 6  15cm howitzers on Vaulx

and Vraucourt) I ordered the action to be broken off

at 9.15? am. and a line to be held about 1000^x
S of the enemy line. This was duly carried out by

1.15pm. 
the only enemy movement being from Lagnicourt and

was promptly brought to a standstill by our right Bty.

Our forward postions were dug in during the afternoon

under intermittent shell fire.

6. The advance on our left having the advantage

of high ground as well as the cover of dawn

moved as a column preceded by an advanced Guard

until reaching C13 C11. where in accordance

with my verbal instructions Longatte was

engaged with ^1 Co whilst the reconnaissance was forced

against Noreuil by 1 Co via Xrds. C13 B72 with a 2nd Co in the left The left Co. had however
[*one Coy 23 Bn mistook rd & got to nearby
Lagnicourt*]

 [?Resight] Company via 14 Central & 15 Central before 

advanced too far kept too far to the left before making the a charge closing to their right
of direction and suffered considerable losses

from enemy m.g. fire at Longatte & in the Centre.

on the road between Noreuil & Longatte (contours

are incorrect).

The Left Company established themselves in a

line through 8 Central & maintained a fairly

severe sniping action -  one party {?mashed] a machine

gun. bombed the dug out and brought back the lock

from the sunk road in C8 a 05 (approx). This company

also silenced an enemy MG in Longatte by converging Lewis Gn fire

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Verbal by telephone

Talk with Lionel.

2. Talk with Forbes and Bateman

3. Move with F & B i.e. reducing 2.30 to 3.

4. Move to Forbes about support only of Car. to pass to [[?]]

5. Sleep till 4.30. instance with L.H. about 5.30.

6. ring up Benngatre. nix. then Vaux. (Brown).

7. report from Gilchrist - normal. less distrubances

8 4.50.  23^rd report Bois de Vaulx clear.

5.

9 5.40.  23^rd. report. Noreuil reached at 5.30.

[* 5.57
2 small parties
Boche [?unopposed]
on our right*]
6.  23 H.Q. at V Rancourt Copse.- 2 Coys reinforcing Coy at Noriel.
10 6.10.  23^rd report line withdrawn to S of Village
6.40       "           "       opposition.
11  7.  23^rd report line probably tapped by enemy
12  7.30.  23. report line established and ask
for instructions.
13
14
15  8.am  23^rd. propose to push on. at 8.30.
16  8.45.  23. report shelling [[?]]
17  - " - 21.          "      the same.
18  9.20 )
19  9.25  ) 21^st. & 23^rd. report against attack further advance
20.  9.30. orders to fall back to new positns.
report accorly to DHQ.

My dear Bean.
Acquit me of having on any occasion attempted
to influence your views to suit personal ends or -
just drop this in the W.P.B.
I am told that both Corps & Division phoned
to the Bde to congratulate on leading the way to
Bapaume.  I am certain no such message was
phoned to 6 Bde. & yet facts are as follows.
6 Bde gained their 1st. task before the first
formed troops of 5 Bde were in the enemy line.  They
had got their picquets to the line Divn suggested
for patrols by the time that suggestion was received
they occupied Grevillers without higher authority than
Bde. and without support or assistance from any unit.
The 8^th Bde refused to move even a patrol that night and
the 5^th. did not come up till all 6^th. posts were held
& organised.
I rang up Division to tell them what I expected
to find & to do. & to give them the chance of
coordinating 5^th 6^th & 7^th. Bdes - nothing doing.
I rang up 5^th. Bde & told Smith that he ought
to leave his old area to 8^th. Bde & come over to where
movement was likely & succeeded in getting this
done.
Now - I regard the work of the 6^th. on this
occasion as quite good. having regard to the
length of time they have been in the line and
their present state of training for open warfare.
P.T.O.