Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/258/1 - 1914 - 1927 - Part 3

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Awaiting approval
Accession number:
RCDIG1066694
Difficulty:
5

Page 1 / 10

-2 I was on the left of the road level with Elwell when he ordered to charge and was killed. I then saw Hill for the first time. He told me he was Liet. Hill from the Yarra and we consulted as to the next move. I agreed with him that as Beresford had not sent the men up to look after the dead and wounded, and as the Germans had surrendered, and as we had no maps or detailed orders - Bowen was half unconscious talking to me and seemed only to be clear about the Chinamen and binoculars being handed back - that we return to Beresford to have the ender properly written - also we were hampered with prisoners Thinking Hill was a permanent R.A.N. offier T did not ask him his seniority and allowed him tocommand. It afterwards transpired that Hill han a reserve officer like myself and I was the senior and for not ascertaining that and tak ing charge I "was hauled over the coals" I might mention that details like that did not worrv me with my comrades dead and suffering around me but it influenced recognitionnof my work on that occasion. In conclusion I again say that the accuracy of your description of the days work surpirsed me and what I give here makes actually no difference. I was afraid foolish details as given in the book "Australia VGermany" may have been reported. Yours faithfully Helebuent
gjeeeenemnnnn m Bug pupsnsnot rr-OU7O- DEBUFETe -------......... peronb eg o nuonnu seqo so siepo II red. 203. July pl, 1925. Liest -Conær. O.W. Cillam V.D. R.A.M.R.. Ronans Bingle Street Hill le. Dear Commnier Giliam, In the account of the fighting at Rabaul some difficulty has occurred in stating the correct time ond stage at chich Captain Pockley was wounded. According to his futher he zas tending Seemen Moffatt, who vus epparently one of your helf-company end had been wounded close to tho trench. This would prosumably be after Bowen was hit. We want to be absolutely accurate in this matter, as far es it is possible. Would you be so kind as to let me know when Pockloy was hit indiosting how far this is based on your oen personal obser- vation! It is also stated that tie report that natives were firing from trees is incorract, though it was gen. erally believed at the time. If this is tho case it accords with the general ofperionoe of Trance and Gallipoli where, though enipers were often reported to be firint from trees, the evidonce ia that :nis mathod was practically never resorted to. Yours Tmithfully. C.E.W. BEAN o o m omngspp pue uors umoee erus soed oy soueo Suunogs op poesep eodue pegoene 'pucuroo do semrensco sueysuen suomood 'sosregosp 'suounsque ot SDNVH
ie Newcastle 25th July 1925 Official Historian, Victoria Barracks, SYDNEY. Dear Mr. Bean: Your letter of the 21st instant referring to the dav of landing at Kabakaul to hand and trust my reply to your two questions may be of some assistance. (A) I am quite certain that no Armed Soldiers were up trees. iae (B) I am quite certain that Brian Pockley was wounded (about 15 ? minutes) before Bowen fand (over 30')2 before Moffatt were hit. As requested I will give you my experience touching, and the reason why I make those statements so definitely. Signaller Moffatt's Pal (forget name) crawled to where I was, shortly after Courtney was killed and requested to drop behind whom he had seen double up wounded (my first knowledge to heip Moffatt, He said he thought he was saot by a black Soldier whom he of this). I ordered sd him to go back and shoot this man and then saw in a tree. to advance. I later learned that as ne was scrutinising the higher branches, the blackman grabbed his rifle from behind the tree, but after Owing to the dense Jungle this a struggle was shot when running away. incident is not so ridiculous as it might seem. Lelad kannhenn dereende). The Box Battery connected by a wire to the two iron pipes filled with (British) Dynamite, laid as mines up and down the road, was found either under this tree or very close by. The nigger had no rifle and it is my belief that he was stationed there to warn anybody from accidently injuring the Battery or severing the wire - perhaps to fire it when signalled - a sharp upward pull of a handle being all needed to do this. Although later it was general talk that shooting came from tree tops, I expressed my doubtéften, and gave the above incident as a reason of how the rumour may have started. My view seem unpopular, but I definitely state that I did not find one man who admitted ever seing a Soldier in a tree, and I questioned many during the two following months. After having advanced some distance following the above incident Mid. Buller came up from behind and said that he had dragged Bowen badly wounded behind a log on my right front, and that he (Bowen" wished to give me some information. Bowen was semi-conscious and snipers had the exact range and the patter of bullets a foot above and into the But this oft repeated remark log did not make conversation easier. now, clear up your doubt Viz. "It was not my fault Pockley was shot for I both implored and ordered him from the fireing line but he would not The blood on Bowen's face was dry and caked with dirt - he go back".
(2) - he had been thee some tie, perhaps half an hour. Bowen was then only about sixty yards from the Trench, but we did not know that when conversing. don't know what time it was but estimate it to be about 11:30 A.M. and thet Pockley was wounded an hour previouséand Bowen less; Moffatt about 20' after Bowen. I have always been of opinion that Pockley was the first but only men of Bowen's party could give definite Australian hit information as to that. Until I met Buller they ware always ahead of my Company. I also have a recollection that N.O. Ye0 who returned to meet and guide us up and before we came under fire that both Pockley and Bowen were wounded, but am not absolutely definite on that point. If this letter contains useful information I will be pleased to answer any other questions to the best of my knowledge and memory. It is refreshing to know in what thorough hands the writing of this History is in, for No. 3 Company was, to use the mildest term, unfortunate when the first reports of the landing was sent south and the fact that it took prisoner the men who signed the surrender and made it possible for the more spectacular handing over of the Wireless Station (under a White Flag) was overlooked. I promised those men (who wære very sore because they were repremanded for carrying a number of dead and wounded back to the supports under my direction, that I would do my utmost to right things later - a Job I found beyond me. Yours faithfully, Heesdv ered 4 a At
e Rrerpenshert NeDOUNTO TTRUTRER Fri Peronb eg og Krtovonw degho so siepo II erd. 219. July 28, 1925. "Dorr. Cillam, R.A.N.R., Lient V.D. "St. Ronans Stroot, Bingle ihe "tll, Nowonstle Dear Commandor Gillan, Nany thanks for your lotter. I an writing to Doven for a chock of some othor facts. You attribute to mo more importance in tho writing of this voluse than Ireally. possoss. Two acsounts of the fichting at Rabaul will shortly be published - one on our Naval volume, and another in tho vol- vre on Rabeul. Theso two volres are not written by me, but as editor f have, as far as possible, to chock tho accounts and to ensure that thoy tgroo. As soon as I hoar fron posen I will send Foua final typei oopy of the passage about wnich I wroto to you - i.e.. . portion of tho paseage that was sont to you bofore - and wolld ask if gou would kindly glanco through it asa final Your assistance is much sppreciated. chock. Youre eincorely, C.EM. BEAN Sydnoy at ihs u nos sorring .8. glad to Barracks, and should be Victeo seo you any tino you oare to lock in. amf on Ternsre onsrp pue suens Bumoee es snoed mon sosuego Bons op poiesep peode ponoone pururuoo do semenseo sesuen suoomond seregosp sueunsue po ot SHDNVH
Tronn G5ul. GGiUaur. Rercastle 17th August 1925 Official Historian Victoria Barracks, SYDN EY. Dear Sir: Your favour of the 13th instant with revised chapters of Official History to hand, reached me Saturday night. I hasten to reply with your request to return them immediately. I regret not being able to go to Sydney through illness an to better explain what I consider will give you the correct positions and happenings I have endeavoured to give them in four Sketches. These of course are only from my own knowledge, without the advantage of consultation with anyone else. Some confusion seems to exist in the description from the times the mines were passed. As the shooting which accounted for Courtney came from the right side of the road we extended on the left side, Elwell going ahead with the right half of the Company, and I followed as supports with the left half Company. When Buller advised Elwell (from Bowen)to cross to the right side and after Bowen explained things a little to me,without being able to consult Elwell or anyone else, I drew my men in towards the road and pushed up to be on a level with Elwell's, reasoning without being in the same line we would easily shoot our own men. This action brought the whol e attacking he force before, and half round the whole of the attacking force (Sketch 4) in the Trench, of course with a certain amount of luck on my part, as when I first gave the order to "close on the left and advance quickly" I had no knowledge of the Trench or its description. Nor did I know Hill was there or see the White Flag hoisted to nim (on the left) until after he ordered cease Fire, and we walked out towards each other. yours Faithfully, Herberet
IV Tienehe eeeeeecciicicllic ..... ) fills han o . . ... . .. . . . . Rouled Sa 1 T3 S lt Trenel was bongish Slovellg beam T3C Rt?) s Reghet Kand ardet 4 a o S V din hageg abont line. bt voned tag 2o t 3o worned 4 Rlafsse helken rach Bordliov Aleo Lllane shonn here. a beltle targ as to hou that tend is smantt, en Kir tord! hort tr inef omde ot Ki line. Trenst leslihilliclilcill 4 a Leond he 4 .ke Hverluon i aee barleis A3....... A "... ws Hele nse llett Before1 frrad bopomets. Lould gat word to otes han hre fers nen nennst me ilned ue. shøt ohat aemådlenmnetistg Aelesvonds Hagg serrenderdb Hall ov reghd Erde o kre brend. Tenh Shravning ålbead deng sken ns brosde, 66 11)) IIIIIGNETETIKRREEN De Ton D Roguhare Boven i Skallerad vorendeå. Og Balles gave llevell urfoomatton åo Ihnell ke eressed oes the rood. +mmminidy Gee tig oflinwarde ke lad dellan to Bowen. . . unllang forst ordering haft freg log b Eone Katt log if m lene untt rnglet Har by. tiaal Canleon had tobe greverststere ned oskes to hot shost Bowens og Hillo men en frout, utase werr faen horer Gane prat a skast guhåte ronge tr punngle nan, fe tressed føring fo aner Teeh 2 ssig...............0 Aotiost slet So fad net us ån glet å Howens men a t bret cloch brun ? Cattueg wag shot atont 15633 aut zlag hrel Mene. blfore beis biune desr IellanstGonk
NEWCASTLE: 1Sth. August 1925. Official Historian Victoria Barracks, SYDNE Dear Sir:- Following my letter of yesterday I forgot to mention (you may not think it worth while) that the man who shot the nigger who had descended the tree where the ke to the mines was placed, did not lean his rifle against the He was passing on holding the rifle pointing out tree. from his body and looking upwards, when the native grabbed the barrel and the struggle ensued. Yours faithfully, Besshd Grlan
Tel. - CAy 10900-Ext. 81. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. HISTORIAN. ynnugral aé. aroligghjsmigikråktnd. No.271. .... VICTORIA SARRACKS, SYDNEY. 20 August, 1925. Lieut.-Commander O.W. Gillam, V.D., R.A.N.R., 'St. Ronans Bingle Street, The Hill Neweastle. Dear Commander Gillam I am sorry to worry you further, but there is one point which your notes still leave uncertain. This is due to the confusion which invariably arises in records between our left and right and the enemy's left and right. In your account you clearly show Hill's main attack proceeding against the portion of the enemy's trench on our Would you mind telling me whether this was Hill's right front. main attack; whether Hill himself was with it (on our right flank); and whether the white flag went up in front of Hill in the (to us) right-hand end of the enemy's trench? I ask this because, in the official collation of naval documents, Hill's attack and his own position are placed on our left of the road. It is quite possible that the collator was misled by mistakes in the interpretation of "left" and "right which I have found to be common in almost every account of fighting. If you wouldn't mind jotting down your answers on this paper and posting it back to me in the enclosed envelope, I should be much obliged, as some of the small maps have had to be held up until the matter is decided. Yours sincerely, Grsssdlean:
Tr TKs dane t sinng 653. Ihile brrspe t hamsel( wert on He Lenveortte 25 14 95 (45t o ke raad but Tat some o stelie mend (rodady) oroseed ou u Heanbiy i foi elwell - Rlanssent giöen bry us, dliustor Ketreg Danach.. Tapsrens amde. Pautt gregret deamnot befenelelg answed gons Bestbu destrøns - nubte ions otked ueføometuves fris gnang lelfoffon de breveonsdg, Srota å det nest åev Tlial antd Zods ou the lett ne its täas k ad- Gein ka gedne K6. sdg, Geng hem füuadhs fouc ds an, att. pkonss kud grtung Otwm di tk de td, o kr skide ktkd e e e e he e e id fii t. te ke te kote id, in tiie-nda--S6g S keiekien e i e ka resarte kol å dnns fri derst skded jand yoo ktin 6 od skiel gg shit fütlus av sinnfkkn- kake ho de e ede e e ie te eit e te iste S te dig Sdg grmd krkrok käksi kat 2. Mei te- skisks t r stoands " ese tie e st e /7 e e e i i t i i Soe g ei o e 1o -- -- a- t tt skan krd e tr 1 e t ete tit e e i o e e ie e i he i eesen stee t- fane t k t t gornien di te ee fe st me a t kor sk dkke bes dr Kr dig kor kar stened gon Krukea, degker Sdd auf afdt a p stod ofls Het. guprid again Borf ont Rat te brenet ges Korger ontte(on)rnget rude ofThe Rans 2tt deken goidd adis her dtvonge - Cles Kr Geuttg Gendd di te der Lrongte + lon vontter hrttes Kies miennng Wie (onid erfet onded. o the lesmi lept was ont lalt -not ther znennsgo Jrng tm dfond sth enforelie brtn jae gorg dusstitt knorttrtag udrdnse 2 25

-2-

I was on the left of the road level with Elwell when he

ordered to charge and was killed. I then saw Hill for the first

time. He told me he was Liet. Hill from the Yarra and we

consulted as to the next move. I agreed with him that as

Beresford had not sent the men up to look after the dead and

wounded, and as the Germans had surrendered, and as we had no

maps or detailed orders - Bowen was half unconscious talking to

me and seemed only to be clear about the Chinamen and binoculars

being handed back - that we return to Beresford to have the

surrender properly written - also we were hampered with prisoners

Thinking Hill was a permanent R.A.N. officer I did not ask him

his seniority and allowed him to command. It afterwards

transpired that Hill being a reserve officer like myself and I

was the senior and for not ascertaining that and taking charge

I "was hauled over the coals".

I might mention that details like that did not worry

me with my comrades dead and suffering around me but it influenced

recognition of my work on that occasion.

In conclusion I again say that the accuracy of your

description of the days work surprised me and what I give here

makes actually no difference. I was afraid foolish details as

given in the book " Australia V Germany" may have been reported.

Yours faithfully

Geo W Gillam

 

203.

July 21, 1925.

Lieut. -Commr. G.W. Gillam, V.D., R.A.N.R.,

"St. Ronans",

Bingle Street,

The Hill,

Newcastle.

Dear Commander Gillam,

In the account of the fighting at Rabaul

some difficulty has occurred in stating the correct time and

stage at which Captain Pockley was wounded. According to his

father he was tending Seaman Moffatt, who was apparently one of

your half-company and had been wounded close to the trench.

This would presumably be after Bowen was hit. We want to be

absolutely accurate in this matter, as far as it is possible.

Would you be so kind as to let me know when Pockley was hit,

indicating how far this is based on your own personal observation?

It is also stated that the report that

natives were firing from trees is incorrect, though it was generally

believed at the time. If this is the case it accords

with the general experience of France and Gallipoli where,

though snipers were often reported to be firing from trees, the

evidence is that this method was practically never resorted to.

Yours faithfully,

C.E.W. BEAN

 

Newcastle

25th July 1925.

Official Historian,

Victoria Barracks,

SYDNEY.

Dear Mr. Bean:

Your letter of the 21st instant referring to the day

of landing at Kabakaul to hand and trust my reply to your two questions

may be of some assistance.

(A) I am quite certain that no Armed Soldiers were up trees.

(B) I am quite certain that Brian Pockley was wounded (about 15?

minutes) before Bowen and (over 30')? before Moffatt were hit.

As requested I will give you my experience touching,

and the reason why I make those statements so definitely.

Signaller Moffatt's Pal (forget name) crawled to where

I was, shortly after Courtney was killed and requested to drop behind

to help Moffatt, whom he had seen double up wounded (my first knowledge
of this). He said he thought he was shot by a black Soldier whom he 
saw in a tree. I ordered to him to go back and shoot this man and then 
to advance. I later learned that as he was scrutinising the higher 
branches, the blackman grabbed his rifle from behind the tree, but after 
a struggle was shot when running away. Owing to the dense Jungle this 
incident is not so ridiculous as it might seem. He had meantime descended.

The Box Battery connected by a wire to the two iron pipes

filled with (British) Dynamite, laid as mines up and down the road, was

found either under this tree or very close by. The nigger had no rifle

and it is my belief that he was stationed there to warn anybody from

accidently injuring the Battery or severing the wire - perhaps to fire

it when signalled - a s harp upward pull of a handle being all needed to

do this. Although later it was general talk that shooting came from

tree tops, I expressed my doubt often, and gave the above incident as a

reason of how the rumour may have started. My view seems unpopular, but I
definitely state that I did not find one man who admitted ever seeing 
a Soldier in a tree, and I questioned many during the two following
 months.

After having advanced some distance following the above

incident Mid.Buller came up from behind and said that he had dragged

Bowen badly wounded behind a log on my right front, and that he (Bowen) 
wished to give me some information. Bowen was sem-conscious and snipers 
had the exact range and the patter of bullets a foot above and into the 
log did not make conversation easier. But this oft repeated remark 
now, may clear up your doubt Viz. "It was not my fault Pockley was shot for 
I both implored and ordered him from the fireing line but he would not 
go back". The blood on Bowen's face was dry and caked with dirt - he 

 

(2)

-he had been there some time, perhaps half an hour. Bowen was then

only about sixty yards from the Trench, but we did not know that when

conversing. I don't know what time it was but estimate it to be about

11:30 A.M. and that Pockley was wounded an hour previously and Bowen

less; Moffatt about 20' after Bowen.

I have always been of opinion that Pockley was the first

Australian hit, but only men of Bowen's party could give definite

information as to that. Until I met Buller they were always ahead

of my Company.

I also have a recollection that W.O.Yeo who returned

to meet and guide us up and before we came under fire ^said that both Pockley 
and Bowen were wounded, but am not absolutely definite on that point.

If this letter contains useful information I will be

pleased to answer any other questions to the best of my knowledge and

memory. It is refreshing to know in what thorough hands the writing

of this History is in, for No. 3 Company was, to use the mildest

term, unfortunate when the first reports of the landing was sent south 

and the fact that it took prisoner the men who signed the surrender and 
made it possible for the more spectacular handing over of the Wireless 
Station (under a White Flag) was overlooked. I promised those men (who 
were very sore because they were repremanded for carrying a number of 
dead and wounded back to the supports under my direction, that I would 
do my utmost to right things later - a Job I found beyond me.

Yours faithfully,

Geo. W. Gillam

P.S.

How long will you be in Sydney?

A conversation may be of value &

I may be down shortly.

 

219.

July 28, 1925.

Lieut.-Commr. G.W.Gillam, V.D., R.A.N.R.,

"St Ronans",

Bingle Street,

The Hill,

Newcastle.

Dear Commander Gillam,

Many thanks for your letter. I am writing

to Bowen for a check of some other facts. You attribute to me

more importance in the writing of this volume than I really

possess. Two accounts of the fighting at Rabaul will shortly

be published - one on our Haval volume, and another in the volume

on Rabaul. These two volumes are not written by me, but as

editor I have, as far as possible, to check the accounts and to

ensure that they agree.

As soon as I hear from Bowen I will send

you a final typed copy of the passage about which I wrote to you

-i.e., a portion of the passage that was sent to you before -

and would ask if you would kindly glance through it as a final

check. Your assistance is much appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

C.E.W.BEAN

P.S. I am now working in Sydney at the

Victoria Barracks, and should be glad to

see you any time you care to look in.

 

From Comdr Gillam.

Newcastle,

17th August 1925

Official Historian,

Victoria Barracks,

SYDNEY.

Dear Sir:

Your favour of the 13th instant with revised

chapters of Official History to hand, reached me Saturday night.

I hasten to reply with your request to return them immediately.

I regret not being able to go to Sydney through

illness, and To better explain what I consider will give you the

correct positions and happenings I have endeavoured to give them

in four Sketches. These of course are only from my own knowledge,

without the advantage of consultation with anyone else.

Some confusion seems to exist in the description

from the times the mines were passed. As the shooting which accounted 
for Courtney came from the right side of the road we extended on the 
left side, Elwell going ahead with the right half of the Company, and I
followed as supports with the left half Company.

When Buller advised Elwell (from Bowen) to cross to the

right side and after Bowen explained things a little to me, without

being able to consult Elwell or anyone else, I drew my men in towards

the road an pushed up to be on a level with Elwell's reasoning without

being in the same line we would easily shoot our own men.

This action brought the whole of the attacking

force before, and half round the whole of the attacking DEFENDING force 
(Sketch 4) in the Trench, of course with a certain amount of luck on 
my part, as when I first gave the order to "close on the left and

advance quickly" I had no knowledge of the Trench or its description.

Nor did I know Hill was there or see the White Flag hoisted to him

(on the left) until after he ordered cease Fire, and we walked out

towards each other.

Yours faithfully

Geo W.Gillam

 

(IV) 

Diagram - See original document 

Trench

Geo. W. Gillam 

Trench was longest on right hand side of the road.

Am hazy about times but would say 20' to 30' would

elapse between each position I have shown here. Also

a little hazy as to how that bend is [shortly?] in the road & I

lost the map I made at the time.

 

(III) Trench

Diagram - See original document 

As the place & time of

Pockleys foll is all assumption

gathered from others I prefer ^ not to say

more than I did in my previous letter on that subject.

I consider the position of all parties

was thus when ^I heard Elwell "fixed bayonets".

Before I could get word to other than the few

men nearest me Elwell was shot & what seemed

immediately afterwards they surrendered to

Hill on right side of the trench. I having closed my men

in towards the road.

(II)Trench

Diagram - See original document 

(-) Log where Bowen sheltered wounded.

Buller gave Elwell information so he crossed

over the road. Immediately afterwards he

led Gillam to Bowen. Gillam first ordering left

half Coy to come up in line with right half Coy. Great

caution had to be exercised here in order to not 

shoot Bowens or Hills men in front. These were seen twice

by me (just a speck of white through the jungle. now 

So I ceased firing for awhile.

(I) Trench

Diagram - See original document 

So far not in sight of Bowens men

AM but clock time?

Courtney was shot about 15' to 20'

before this time.

 

NEWCASTLE. 18th. August 1925.

Official Historian,

Victoria Barracks,

SYDNEY.

Dear Sir:-

Following my letter of yesterday I forgot to

mention (you may not think it worth while) that the man who

shot the nigger who had descended the tree where the key

to the mines was placed, did not lean his rifle against the

tree. He was passing on holding the rile pointing out

from his body and looking upwards, when the native grabbed the barrel 
and the struggle ensued.

Yours faithfully,

Geo W.Gillam

 

Tel. - City 10900 - Ext. 81.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

HISTORIAN.

TUGGRANONS. FEDERAL TERRITORY.

VIA QUEANBEYAN  N.S.W.

No. 271.

VICTORIA BARRACKS, SYDNEY.

20 August, 1925.

Lieut.-Commander O.W.Gillam, V.D., R.A.N.R.,

"St. Ronans".

Bingle Street,

The Hill,

Newcastle.

Dear Commander Gillam,

I am sorry to worry you further, but there is

one point which your notes still leave uncertain. This is due to

the confusion which invariably arises in records between our left

and right and the enemy's left and right.

In your account you clearly show Hill's main

attack proceeding against the portion of the enemy's trench on our

right front. Would you mind telling me whether this was Hill's

main attack: whether Hill himself was with it (on our right flank);

and whether the white flag went up in front of Hill in the (to us)

right-hand end of the enemy's trench?

I ask this because, in the official collation

of naval documents, Hill's attack and his own position are placed

on our left of the road. It is quite possible that the collator was

misled by mistakes in the interpretation of "left" and "right",

which I have found to be common in almost every account of fighting.

If you wouldn't mind jotting down your answers

on this paper and posting it back to me in the enclosed envelope, I

should be much obliged, as some of the small maps have had to be

held up until the matter is decided.

Yours sincerely

C.E.W.Bean.

[*All through I refer to the left or right as our left not the enemy's*.]

 

[*[Jose: This seems to show that 

Hill's troops & himself went on the 

left of the road but that some of Hells

men (probably) crossed over

to join Elwell - The account given by us, therefore,

appears correct.  C.E.W.Bean]*]

Newcastle
23/8/25

C.E.W.Bean Esq

Victoria Barracks.

Dear Sir

I regret I cannot definitely answer your

questions - with your other information this may help you.

As previously stated I did not see Hill until

after I had heard the order to "Cease Fire". I was on the left

of where the order came from & walked towards my right

& found Hill coming towards me. He was on the edge of the

road & must have been on our left side of it when the white

flag was hoisted. which but I cannot swear to that. The German

flag with the white flag was with Hill - the first I saw of that flag.

When I drew No4 rough sketch sent you it was

the only sketch on which I relied on assumption - partly

from what was written in the chapter you sent me which I took

to be definitely correct & partly from the facts I do know.

The whole of our attacking force advanced on

(our) the left side of the road. Just above opposite of where

the mines were the right side was practically impossible.

When I met Buller & Bowen I saw three of Hills men

(in white uniforms) in front of us & on the left (our) side of

the road & knowing I was then advancing quickly

& coming into line with Elwells & Hills men they naturally

crossed over & joined them, leaving me with the firm

impression that they were then all on our right & on

that side of the road when the white flag was shown. I

still think so. Anyhow I did not catch sight of one

after that.

I would again point out that the trench

was longer on the (our) right side of the road & the defence

would also be stronger. Also the centre would be on

the (our) right side.

All through I have written with the meaning

that the term "left" was our left - not the enemy's

Very sorry I found it impossible to see you

last Friday in Sydney

Yours sincerely

Geo W Gillam

 

 

Last edited by:
Sam scottSam scott
Last edited on:

Last updated: