Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/254/1 - 1917 - 1933 - Part 10

[* R 48/47 *]
COPY.  SECRET. 
REPORT ON ATTACK ON BROODSEINDE RIDGE BY 21st BATTALION
3rd, 4th, and 5th October 1917. 
1. The battalion moved from GORDON AREA at. 10.40.pm. on 3rd Oct. to the 
Assembly Place at D.27.c.9.5. - arriving there and formed up as previously 
arranged. viz.-in mass, sections in file without a casualty at 3.15
a.m, lthough the Hun was searching the valleys with 4.2 and 5.9 H.E.
shells.
When formed up his firing increased considerably - shells mostly .77m.m.
and 4.2 howitzers fell all round. One shell landed amongst us and
resulted in two casualties, also enemy machine gun fire troublesome at
2.10 a.m.
2. Battalion moved to Jumping Off Tape and formed up as arranged and every
thing O.K.a 5.20 a.m.
3. Established Bn Hqrs at BRICK KILN at D.27.b.9.C. at 5.25 a.m.
Enemy put down a heavy barrage on Jumping Off Tape.
At Zero 6 a.m. our barrage opened and his immediately reduced to a few
5. 9 shells.
Our men moved forward after the barrage in close formation until they xx
got past the enemy barrage line. On account of the heavy straffing
previous to Zero the Battalion was much disorganised and had lost all
Signalling gear except one 'phone and coil of wire which were at Bn
Hqrs.
4. Shortly after Zero wounded and prisoners came in to the R.A.P. which was
established in the BRICK KILN, the latter were made use of to the fullest
extent as stretcher bearers. Practically all the wounded were the result
of his pre-Zero bombardment up to about 6.30 a.m.
5. From my position in the Brick Kiln, as soon as it became light enough,
I was able to observe all movement of our troops from below DOCILE
TRENCH to the Crest of the Ridge.
At 6.20 a.m. a message was sent to Brigade that out casualties were
approximately 10% and that everything seemed to be going O.K.
At 7.10 a.m. to Brigade that the 1st Division could be plainly seen on
the Ridge firing at the enemy from a standing position also that the
6th Brigade were digging in on the RED LINE.
6. At 7.20 a.m. our men also went through our barrage on to the crest and
commenced firing at the retiring enemy and also used captured M.G.s
against him. These men came back through the barrage and took up their
correct position and then followed it at the appointed time.
There was much congestion around the pill boxes and these were immediately

straffed by the enemy on the first objective being carried.
7.50 a.m. a message was repeated to Bde which was sent me from two
Coy Commanders that "Resistance slight: Casualties light: Am on the forward
slope of the BROODSEINDE RIDGE: Prisoners surrendering easily."
9.35 a.m. Bn Hqrs moved to a pill box near the Cemetery.
10.15 a.m. Message maps arrived from O.C. Coys, and showed them in
position on BLUE LINE also they reported in close touch on Right Flank
with 24th Bn and our Left overlapping and 50 yards in front of the
Unit on our left, 26th Bn,
On the position being queried by Brigade it was confirmed by Priority
Message at 12.45 p.m.
7. Situation messages were sent to Bde at 3.50 p.m. and 6.15 p.m.
At 7 p.m. in reply to B.M.86 the following was sent to Brigade -
"Situation report from front line timed 4 p.m. states 'Local counter
attack appeared to form at D.23.d.4.8. but nothing developed' .No further
news to hand. Casualties to Officers - 3 Killed, 7 Wounded. Other Ranks,
about 60% Approximate strength in line 200 rifles."
 

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8. At 7 p.m. a carrying party of 18th Bn arrived with 40 tins water, 20
boxes S.A.A. and 10 boxes of grenades.
At 8.15 p.m. a shell landed in Bn Hqrs, killing 2 Other Ranks, and wounding 
4., set fire to two boxes S.A.A., and holed 23 tins of water stacked 
in Hqrs.
9. Capt. F. Sale M.C. sent for water, S.A.A., and a Stokes Gun.
The two former were sent up and arrangements were made to get the
assistance of the 24th Bn Stokes Gun Section.
10. At 9.45 p.m. Bn Hqrs shifted to DEKNOET FARM.
Message from line- "All O.K. Casualties since arrival in line 5%. Material
captured, 1 Anti-Tank Gun, Several M.G.s, 1 Wireless Set (this should have
been 1 Telephone Set.)".
At 11.30 p.m. message from line "One Officer killed, 2 wounded, leaving 3
Officers in line.", so the Signalling Officer was sent up to assist.
At 1 a.m. got in touch with 24th Bn re. some assistance from their Stokes
Section, but they did not know its whereabouts.
11. At 3.30a.m B.M.I04 from Bde asking for information and stating none:
received for 12 hours.
Replied to at 3.50 a.m.as follows- "QUINCE established on BLUE LINE.
Since arriving there casualties have been light, and, except for active
sniping, the situation has been fairly quiet. Local counter attack was
reported to be assembling but did not develop. S.O.S. has not been sent
up on our front yet. Casualties to Officers heavier then previously
thought - Two more wounded through the night, leaving three in the line.
Sig. Offlcer has been sent up, making four: Capt. Sale, Capt. Sandford,
Lieut, Clarke, 2/Lt. Holt. Sale reports everything O.K.
"Situation reports have been sent every hour by your runner returning,
wired to your forward station, and by welking wounded."
"Bn Hqrs now with QUIET.  Situation satisfactory. Strength 4 Officers and
about 200 rifles in the line. They are well dug in and trench is continuous."
12. 4 a.m. 'Situation satisfactory' was sent to Bde. The day was quiet and
there was very little artillery activity, though his aeroplanes were
up continuously, and flying low over our front and sometimes firing
into the front trench.
At 5.40 p.m. a Lewis Gun Post was established about 150 yards in front
of our right centre. The crew were a bit 'windy', as they had had a bad
time, having been twice buried previously, and when at dusk an enemy
patrol attempted to outflank them, they came back to the front line
after a small 'scrap' [*2*]
The enemy sniping was practically nil till about 6 p.m. when we sent
out two patrols, then it livened up so much that the patrols could not
continue: it was mostly M.G. fire from the right front and DAISY WOOD.
13. At about 7 p.m. the S.O.S. was sent up on our right, and afterwards on
the left. At the same time the enemy put down a heavy barrage on our
front and support lines until 7.30 p.m.
At 8 p.m. a message was sent to QUAIL by an Artillery Lamp that the
situation was quiet and satisfactory, and same was sent to Bde forward
Station by Runner.
14. The Bn was relieved by the 18th at 11.25 p.m.
21 Officers and 576 Other Ranks went into action on the 4th Oct. and
casualties -  Officers    Other Ranks

Killed                   7                  24

Wounded           7                202 (D of W. 2 Other Ranks.)

Missing                -                   33
Officers Killed:- Capt. J. P. Pearce M.C., Lieut. T. Black, Lieut. F. T. Col1ins,

Lieut. F. Rigby, Lieut. J. T. Rigby, 2/Lieut. H. W. Harper, 2/Lieut. T. P. Heraud.
Officers Wounded :- Lieuts. W, McConnochie, S. H. Chapman, G. A. Edmanson,
B. Besemeres, J. A. McDonald,2/Lieuts. K. G. Scales, and T. W. Eales.
 

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15. REPORT ON VARIOUS ITEMS ON ATTACK ON 3rd, 4th, & 5th Oct. 1917.
(a) ROUTE IN - It is very necessary that Infantry should have a well
defined route, quite apart from a wheeled or mule track - otherwise

blocks will be unavoidable and a unit soon loses its organisation.
(b) The time to move in from GORDCN AREA to the point of assembly
viz-5½ hours, was too long: we had 1² hours wait on WESTHOEK.
(c) The method and formation adopted at both the point of Assembly
and J.O.T. were satisfactory and quite sound.
(d) Zero time was right.
(e) BARRAGE - The rate was good, but the near line was very ill-defined
and it was impossible to keep in a line behind it. It was very thin
and at one time the men went through it up to the crest and turned
Hun M.G.s on to the retiring enemy. The men then came back to their
appointed place in rear of the RED LINE and waited for the barrage
to lift.
At times Coy Commanders could not tell the place it was intended
to be at, and would see a salvo of shells fall, and move up near
the place only to have a salvo fall in rear of them.
On the further side of the BROODSEIDE - RECELAIRE Roed the ground
is in quite good order and shows little signs of artillery fire.
(f) WIRE. On the Hun side of the ridge the wire was not out: it was only
skeleton wire, but was in good order and had to be cut by hand.
(g) The smoke line was not defined, and only in some places could it
be of use to the front troops.
(h) The training given to the troops was on the correct lines and the
enveloping tactics by platoons under cover of their Lewis Gun
proved very successful in dealing 'pill boxes.' Also firing the
Lewie Gun from the hip proved a very effective way of dealing
with enemy M.G.s and small parties in shell holes, and for retiring
groups pf Huns.

(i) A general line formed by linking shell holes - the whole well
zig zagged - seems to be a very satisfactory line.
(j) MORALE. The prisoners morale was in some cases very low, while others
appeared indifferent. It was the usual thing for Huns to shoot
until within 50 yards, then they threw up their hands.
(k) GENERAL. The 35 minutes preceeding Zero, during which our troops
had to take all the Hun could give, greatly disorganised the Bn and
was responsible in a great measure for any loss of direction or
congestion. All the signalling gear except one phone and one reel
of wire were destroyed on the J.O.T.
The communications were again poor. Lamp signal on to WESTHOEK should
have been a quite simple matter and there was no sound reason why
messages could not be acknowledged from WESTHOEK . To give an instanc
instance a 21st Bn Signaller salved and repaired an Artillery Lucas
Lamp, set it by compass for KIT KAT, and sent an important, though
short, message, through three times slowly when a Red Flare was fi

fired from KIT KAT. All that was required was an B.D.by a lamp or
torch and it would have saved the signaller exposing himself for
at least 10 minutes in a very unhealthy spot, and also he would
have had the satisfaction of knowing that he had got his message
through.
Communication from the line to Bn Hqrs was by runner and was quite
satisfactory. But from reports and queries the messages did not
appear to get satisfactorily from the  Bde forward Station to the
rear.
Use was made of prisoners as Stretcher Bearers and thus saved
large number of our men, though two parties who went to get more
stretchers were all killed or wounded, and on account of the intensity

of the Hun barrage prior to Zero it was some time before the
Regtl S.B.s were able to get going properly as there was an
abnormal number of stretcher cases.
An enemy with good morale and courage would have inflicted far
greater casualties on us from the ridge forward, as the ground had
not the appearance of having been straffed, shell holes were few an
 

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and far between, the ground was quite firm, and grass growing, the wire
was intact, and the main roads in good order.
(l) AIRCRAFT :- Except for the day of the stunt, when no enemy planes were
about, enemy aircraft seemed to do just what they liked, and were continually

flying low up and down our lines, and in a few cases dropped
small bombs and fired their M.G.s into our trenches.
Had cur anti aircraft M.G.s been issued with tracer bullets some better
results may have been expected obtained. Later in the day as a result of
our reconnaissance our line began to get shelled.
(m) Troops that do an attack should be relieved within 48 hours and should
be given a bath and 48 hours rest before being again sent in,
otherwise the success of the second stunt in undoubtedly endangered.
(Signed.) B. Duggan, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding 21st Battalion.
 

[* R48/47 *]

Co  COPY.           SECRET.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF 21ST BATTALION A.I.F.

BROODSEINDE SECTOR - Oct.7th, 8th, 9th, 10th.
Oct. 7th.  Battalion moved from KIT KAT at 3.40 p.m. to relieve part of 20th
Battalion in support. In consequence of an S.O.S. from our line,
enemy shelling was extremely active and our progress much impeded
Relief complete 7.35 p.m. Casualties 1 O.R. Killed. 2 O.R. Wounded.
Oct. 8th.  Brigade Order for the attack received 3.25 a.m. Orders for BN to
support 23rd Bn cancelled verbally by B.M. at 11 a.m. and Bn ordered
to take half of frontage allotted 23rd Bn and attack at Zero.
This was confirmed by an addendum Order received at 8.13 p.m.
[* R48/47 *]

Oct. 9th.  Battalion moved to J.O.T. in excellent order end reported in caition

and O.K. at 4.15 a.m. Casualties moving up - 1 Officer killed
2 Officers and 8 Other Ranks wounded.
Barrage opened punctually but all accounts prove it to have been
light and ineffective, enemy snipers and M.G.s remaining in action
over the whole area. Attack was satisfactorily launched well on
time and troops came almost immediately under heavy and accurate
enemy fire. All Officers became casualties early in the oparation
and formations became considerably disorganised.
The 24th Bn on Right was held up at WEST edge of DAISY WOOD, a
portion of our right flank remaining with them.
Owing to accurate enemy fire very few messages came through, and
practically the only means of communication was a line to a
forward post run conjointly by 21st and 24th Bns under the supervision

of the Signal Officer of the latter Unit.  This line was
most admirably maintained under most adverse circumstances and
proved simply invaluable.
Reports from this centre and the Bn Observers showed the attack
held up on our flank on reaching the line of the Woods but progressing

under the greatest difficulties on our front by bounds from
hole to hole. The ground was very heavy and cover infrequent.
The left flank party under Sgt BOWLER progressed in touch with
some elements of the 23rd Bn and moving South of DAISY WOOD
finally dug in at approximately D.24.a.1.9. The centre under Sgts
WEIR and WARKIN finally reached the knoll near the final objective
and dug in on a line D.24.a.2.5. - D.24.a.1.7., with both flanks
completely in the air and under heavy fire from BUSY WOOD where
the Boche was extremely active. The party of 28th 5 allotted to u
was ordered forward a 8.155 a.m.13 . establish in a position betwee
the two Woods and assist the cleaning up from the flanks.
No further reports were received from this party but UB observers
reported them moving forward to position.
Bn Commanders in conference. 8.45 a.m. decided that as there was
practically nothing in rear, Bde be requested to place a Bn in the
original front line in case of emergency.
A patrol cent cut to clear up the position reported at neon some
elements of the Bn on a rough line from D.23.b.0.5. to D.23.b.4.6.
At 3.40 a.m. orders re relief by 49th Bn were received and C.O.s
consultation decided on line to be handed over.
Oct. 10th.  At 1 a.m. relief was complete and two Companies 49th Bn well dug
in on line D.23.a.5.7. to D.23.a.1.3.
Bn was withdrawn and slowly collected in old support line.
At 12.40 p.m. orders confirming previous verbal orders were received
to form a composite Bn under acting C.O. 2lst Bn.
At 7 p.m. on the C.O. 45th Bn expressing his agreement, the Bn were
withdrawn and ordered back to YPRES.
A small number of prisoners, perhaps 10 in all, were taken and sent
to the rear.
Enemy continually presented good targets which were freely availa
of by our snipers and Lewis Gunners., who inflicted upwards of 100
 

[* R48/47 *]

-2-

casualties - the estimate of course being only approximate.
Enemy stretcher parties were continually at work particularly in
the vicinity of BUSY WOOD. There is little doubt also that enemy
was considerably disorganised and knew little of the position
Hostile shelling was very heavy on original front and support
lines and in vicinity of DEKNOET and ZONNEBEKE LAKE.
Enemy aircraft was exceedingly active and seemed to have control.
Our aircraft, though often up in large numbers, did hnot seem to
prevent their operations in any way.
Tracks to the rear were very bad, and the crossing ever ZONNZBEKE
CREEK is nothing short of a menace to communications.
Stretcher bearers, who worked nobly throughout, were often
exhausted after a single trip.
(Signed.) Henry A. Crowther,
Major.
October 11th 1917

 

OPERATION of 22nd Battalion, 6th Inf. Brigade, A.I.F. from lst/10th
October, 1917.
--------------------
[* R48/82 *]

Preliminary instructions regarding the attack of 4.10.17 were
received from Brigade H.Q. 28.0.17., and reconnaissances were
carried out by C.0. and Officers on 3 days preceding the assault.
On the night 30th Sept/lst October, the Battn. relieved the
47th and 34th Battns A.l.F. in Support. Battn. H.Q. AT
BANNEBEKE WOOD, J.2.a.7.4.
[* fairly defined
by day aft

Sept 20. *]
DISPOSTIONS.- 2 Coys. at ABZAC HOUSE, 1 Coy at ZONNEBEKE
REDOUBT, I coy at NUHL E., 1.10.17.
The positions at MUHL were heavily shelled, the Coy there
sustaining severe Casualties.
Night 2nd/3rd October, 1917.- The Battn. relieved the 23rd
Battn. A.I.F. in Front Line on the Brigade Frontage.- Battn.
H.Q. at ANZAC HOUSE.
3.10.17.
Our Artillery caused 30 Casualties and destroyed 2 Lewis Guns
by "shorts".
4.10.17
[* Blanchard ws w

a party round | left o.|

lake to keep touch with

7 Bde. He was never

seen arain, Some of pty

returned v. shaken.

His body was found by

4th D.A.M.Q. *]

After midnight conditions were quiet, and there was little
shelling. Jumping-off Tapes had already been laid by 6th Field

Coy Engineers. Battn. H.Q. moved to D.28.a.30.45.

By 4.10 a.m. the assaulting waves were formed up on their tapes

disposed to attack in 4 waves on a front of 4 Companies.

[* L^T Kelleway K

L^T Blanchard K *]

At 5.35 a.m. enemy opened a heavy bombardment, and caused many
Casualties on J.0.T.
Our Barrage opened, at 6 a.m. (Zero time)
In conjunction with 8th Battn A.l.F. on our right, and 25th Battn
A.I.F. ON OUR LEFT, the Battn. advanced to the attack on the
frontage D.22.d.9.3. to D.22.d.8.3., its objective being the

RED LINE.
The advancing waves almost at once encountered the enemy in force
[* 2/L^T J. A. MacIntyre

who ws directing

on the right

meet h compass

met | Germans,

emptied his

revolver &

shot several

& ws hit on | head. 

Some of the

Germans

were coming

with their

rifles slunge &

bayonets fixed *]
Parties with fixed Bayonets were met advancing. It soon became
evident that we had anticipated an enemy attack. Considerable
Casualties were inflicted by our Lewis Cunners firing from the
hip. From Battn. H.Q. our troops could be observed following
the barrage..
At 7.23 a.m. the Battn had captured the whole of the RED LINE,
and consolidation was in progress.
The brunt of the fighting fell upon this Battn., owing to the
assembly of enemy troops for his attack. Enemy availed themselves

of the time our protective barrage was stationary to
withdrew much of his troops as were in advance of the BLUE LINE,
and towards the rear. The number of prisoners captured by the
Battn. is difficult to estimate, as some parties were sent to
the rear by routes outside the Brigade Boundaries. A conservative

estimate would be 200.
Mopping-up later resulted in the capture of 2 Battn. Commanders
and staff, and important Maps and Orders.
The latter were sorted, and the most important sent to Brigade
H.Q. by special D.C.
During consolidation the enemy commenced a heavy bombardment,
which caused many casualties.
At 8.10 n.m. Battn. H.Q. was established at DE KNOET FARM.
Our casualties were :-
                         Officers.     O.R.

Killed.-                  1.              62.

Missing.-              2.              17.

Wounded.-          3.            154.
[* L^T Speak - shell splints in face early in attack.

L^T Westaway - during consolidation on Red Line 4 pm.

Maj. Craig wd at R.A.P near Brick Kiln Lake

abt 10 a.m.

(This had one 

concrete wall

only, facing

us - the side

towds germans.

ws brick. All

AMC staff ws

wd exc. Ser??

who ws badly

skaken. but

carried on, evacuate)

???. Later the MO 21

Bn sent him back

after he had bn blown

up by another shell.

Sergt E C Johnston, AMC *]
Enemy losses were severe, as our moppers-up bombed PILL-BOXES
and occupants thereof were killed.
Night of 5th/6th October. 1917.- The Battn, was relieved by
20th rattn. A.I.F.., and moved back in reserve. Battn. H.Q. and
1 Coy. at HANNEBEKE WOOD. Coys at ANZAC, and 1 Coy at
ZONNREEKE REDOUBT. [* (shell holes & Pillboxes) 

During these operations the Battn captured the following material
14 Heavy Machine Guns.
  1 Minnewerfer.
Several small Trench Mortars & Automatic Rifles.

 

PAGE 2. OPERATIONS of 22nd Battn., 6th Inf. Brigade, A.I.F. lst/1Oth
October, 1917 (continued.)
-------------
6.10.17. Battn. still in Support with H.Q. at HANNEBEKE YOOD.
7.10.17. The Battn. in Support (H.Q. HANNEBEKE WOOD) Strength, all
[* R48/82 *]

Ranks, 117. Men suffering greatly from exposure and exhaustion,

and their condition was such as to cause grave doubt as
to their ability to carry on under the special circumstances,
viz., projected attack etc. Representation to this effect
was made by C.0. to G.O.C.
[* Living in shell holes

covered with W.P.

sheet, During |

day they wd

take these sheets

w them, as it ws

raining , of course

when they got back

the place wd be soaked. *]

Battn. during the morning were on fatigue laying cables.
At 7 p.m. the Battn. moved forward to relief of 18th Battn.
A.I.F. on the frontage D.29.b.70.20. to D.23.c.70.70.
DISPOSTTIONS. Front Line, 4 Officers, 53 O.R's.
                                Support,     8     "           41    " 
Relief was completed at 4 a.m.. 8.10.17. The trenches were
in an extremely bad state, owing to rain and mud.
8.10.17. Orders for attack were communicated to all concerned, and the
J.O. Tapes were laid before midnight on a line about 200 yards &
in rear of the front line positions. Apart from usual
artillery activity, the day was without incident.
9.10.17. The orders received required the capture end consolidation of
a line from D.29.a.00.10. to D.23.d.40.50. The plan adopted
in view of our depleted numbers was as follows :-
"C" Coy. Lieut. V. McC. BRAITHWAlTE, M.C., with 44 all ranks
to advance under our barrage from the J.O.T. and reestablish

the line from Divisional right Boundary to
D.23.d.40.50.
No. 1 S.P. Party. Capt. W.H. BUNNING, 2 Officers, 25 O.R's,
and 1 Vickers Gun section. This party was ordered
to advance under the barrage, and establish Post at
D. 23.d.25.30.
No. 2 S.P. Party.- Lieut. K. S. ANDERSON, 2 Officers, 25 O.R'S
and 1 Vickers Gun Section. This party was ordered to
advance in conjunction with 24th Battn on the left
and No 1 S.P. Party on the right, and establish a
post at D.23.d.40.40.
At Zero our barrage came down and was of an unsatisfactory
natture, being feeble and inaccurate, and did not seem to
neutralize the enemy activity. A nusber of Castalties resulted

from " shorts".
"C" Coy (Lieut W. MaC. BRAITHWAITE M.C.) successfully carried
out the task allotted, and succeeded in reaching their objective

without casualties.
No. 2 S.P. Party (Lieut. K.S. ANDERSON) obtained connection
with24th Battn. on J.O.T., but lost touch on that Unit being
held up. This party consisted of 2 Officers and 25 O.R's, &
1 Vickers Gun Section. Shortly after jumping off, 3 men were
killed by our own barrage, and 2/Lieut DOOLEY and 1 O.R.
wounded. No opposition was encountered until after passing
our original front line. About 20 yards in front of our old
line a zone of heavy Machine Gun fire was encountered, and all
the party except 8 were either killed or wounded, Lieut.
ANDERSON being shot through the leg. The party of 8 (including
[* 2/Lt P. G.

Chalmers *]

the Vickers Gun and a crew of 3) pushed on and dug in
about 50 yards in front of D.22.4.40.40. About midday the
Vickers Gun was blown up by shell fire, and the garrison
either killed or wounded, only a few managing to reach our
lines at dusk.
No. 1 S.P. Party. (Capt. W.H. RUKNINC.)
   2 Officers, 24 O.R's 22nd Battn.

    1        "          6    "       6th M.G. Coy .

This party advanced to the assault in 2 sections, leaving the
Vickers detachment a short distance in rear ready to come on
when the position was taken. No opposition or hostile fire
was encountered until 50 yards over our original front line,
when a Machine Cun opened from a hostile strong post at
D.23.d.35.20., and the enemy opened rifle fire. About half a

dozen casualties resulted, and the party deployed into line.
The advance was continued under this fire by bounds from shell-
hole to shell-hole, under cover of Rifle Grenades. The party
then dug in at D.23.d.35.30, near a hedge. Whilst digging in
4 men were killed by enemy snipers. Lt. A. SKENE-SMITH M.C.?
22 Battn. and Lt. J. CAMPBELL, 6th M.G. Coy were killed.
 [* Skene Smith ws . .

sniped while digging

in & K. by shell (after

while on stretcher

waiting to be

evacuated. *]

 

PAGE 3. OPERATIONS of 22nd Battn A.I.F., 1st/10th October 1917 (contd)
---------.------------------------------------------------------------------
[* R48/82 *]

by hostile rifle fire at this time. The Vickers Gun and its
crew, for some reason still to be ascertained, did not advance
to its position in this post. By 7 a.m. the post was well
dug in, and the garrison numbered 1 Officer (Capt BUNNING)
and 18 O.R's, with 2 Lewis Guns. Rifles and Lewis Guns were
cleaned in readiness for the counter-attack. A small bombing
party of about 6 attempted to rush the post at 9 a.m., but was
beaten off, leaving 2 killed. A few wounded crawled back to
the enemy post. About 10.30 a.m. a party about 15 strong
with a Machine Gun attempted an attack, but were beaten off.
About 5 returned to their post. Sniping and shell-fire caused
a few more casualties. Attempts to gain connection with other
posts failed, owing to the isolated position of this post,
and shortly after dark parties of the enemy were observed
working round both flanks. This was checked as far as possible

by our Snipers, but the position of flares later indicated
that the enemy was in rear of the post. At 10 p.m. it became
apparent that the position was untenable, and Capt. BUNNING
decided to extricate his post from this place. The operation
was accomplished with difficulty, and it was 10.30 p.m. before
the 14 survivors of this party had regained our line.
At midnight the 49th Bettn. arrived, and relief was completed
by 4 a.m.
The Battn. then returned to Support Trenches on old Red Line,
BROODSEINDE RIDGE.
Our Casualties were¬
                        Officers.     O.R's.

Killed.                 1.                  11.

Missing.                                  9.

Wounded.         4.                31.

 

TOTAL CASUALTIES, 1st/10th October. 1917.-

Killed.                  2.                 73.

Missing.              2.                 26.

Wounded.          7.                125.

[*  Lt. G. O. Gregg - k. during holding line abt Sept. 16.1917
Lt. Thwaites - (wd. by shell going up on on 21 Sept.             
       severely    (in/c of advance party near Anzac)

Lt H. H. de Bourbel (wd Sept.23 by shell in supports on Anzac). *]

 

Lieut.-Colonel,
11.10.17.
C.O., 22nd Battn. A.I.F.
 

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[* R48/82 *]