Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/254/1 - 1917 - 1933 - Part 2

Capt Bean
1.11.17. - 9 -  1-11.17
viding protection for its right flank by gaining ground in a north-easterly
direction immediately south of the ROULERS Railway and
securing a position astride the DROOGENBROODHOEK Spur.
The same troops were opposed to us as on the 9th, but both
the 195th and 233rd Divisions had all three regiments in the front
line.
The Corps gained its first objective, and ASSYRIA HOUSE was
stormed. On the decision of the troops on our left not to proceed
further, our advance was checked and orders given to consolidate
the line held. At about 4.5 p.m. a battalion of the enemy advanced
in massed formation against our right flank. The artillery
dealt with it satisfactorily and rifle fire repulsed the remnants
of this force.
At this juncture the enemy, consisting of at least a brigade,
probably belonging to the 45th Res. Divn. which was reinforcing the
195th, developped an attack from the direction of PASSCHENDAELE,
which struck the Railway at about DECOY COPSE. In consequence of
this and a further withdrawal of the troops on our left, it was
decided to retire to our original line.
The prisoners taken revealed the fact that the 45th Res. Divn.
was reinforcing the 195th Divn., and the presence of the 220th
Divn. and the 5th Bav. Divn. as divisions in reserve.
The fighting on the 9th and 12th showed that the enemy had at
least with regard to machine-guns applied the new policy of defence.
This policy had produced good results, but to conclude that it had
proved itself to be an undoubted success would be an exaggeration.
It must be remembered that in the two battles of the 9th and 12th
October, the weather conditions had entirely changed. Men were
not able to follow up the barrage with that speed which earlier
had surprised the rifle and machine-gun defenders. The barrage
itself, owing to the soft state of the hostile ground and the severe
weather conditions in which the artillery was working had not
the punitive and moral effect of those put down in the previous
attacks of the 20th and 26th September, and of the 4th October.
There is reason to believe that the enemy appreciates the
above points. A g rman officer recently captured, who was silling
to discuss general tactics, stated that the policy of holding the
line with light garrisons was again to be brought into practice.
The condition of the ground getting worse and worse, there was no
reason in imposing hardship on more men than necessary by keeping
them in the front line; the sudden overwhelming barrage with
the infantry following up close behind were dry weather tactics;
an indefinite line held in depth with support battalions from
2,000 to 3,000 yards and reserve battalions from 5,000 to 6,000
yards behind, would be, he considered, the policy of defence during
the winter months.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS
1-11-17 - 10 - 1-11.17
The feature of all the German criticism of the operations of
September 20th to October 12th has been the stubborn refusal to admit
that any ground of tactical or military importance has been lost,
and the significant silence as to the losses sustained both in defence
and counter-attack.
The BROODSEINDE Ridge has, ever since its first occupation of
the enemy, been rightly regarded by him as the key to western
Flanders, and the primary result of recent operations under review
has been, that the enemy has lost that portion of it opposite the
Corps front and has been driven to a position which is very much less
favourable, not only topographically but tactically as well.
He no longer has the observation over our lines which the
ridge afforded him, and he is also at a distinct disadvantage
in that he is now under direct observation. Any massing of
troops, formerly effected under shelter of the eastern slopes of
the ridge, is now carried out in the open, while movement in the
trenches and forward areas is no longer possible.
The importance the enemy attaches to this ridge has been shown
by the repeated efforts to regain it, and the prodigal use of divisions
thrown in for this purpose. Between the 20th September and
the 12th October, no less than 16 divisions came into the line and
were withdrawn after suffering heavy losses.
In prisoners alone the enemy lost over 3,000, while all reports
show that the numbers killed and wounded far exceeded our own.
In addition to the above he lost to the Corps 10 Guns, 236
Machine-Guns and 35 Trench Mortars, and numerous other material
such as wireless sets, telephones, etc., etc, were captured. 

Third Battle of Ypres.
Progress made by and Hostile Dispositions against
I. Anzac Corps.
Map - see original document 

7-10-17 - 3b - No. 33
TRANSLATION of captured German Divisional Divisional Orders.
4th Guard Infantry Division
Ia. No. 9625 SECRET 30/9/17.
DIVISIONAL ORDERS
For the preparations for the attack
"HOHENSTURM"
1. OBJECTIVE is the Southern portion of ZONNEBEKE and the ridge
due South of ZONNEBEKE as far as the Western exit of MOLENAARELSTHOEK
Day of attack is 3rd October.
2. The attack will be commanded by Major-General Graf FINKENSTEIN
of the 4th Guard Divn.
3. TROOPS
(a) Infantry. 212th R.I.R. - 2nd Bn., 211th R.I.R. - 8
assault sections of 4th Assault Battalion.
(b) Artillery. Of the 4th Guard Divn, and neighbouring divisions
(In conformity with special orders)
(c) Minenwerfer. 4th Guard M.W. Coy., - 245th M.W. Coy.
(d) Aircraft. 19th Flying Detachment (as infantry airmen).a
Several pursuit echelons (in conformity with Group orders,
4. (Note: Already appeared in another translation).
5. The execution of the attack to be prepared for as follows:
(a) (Deleted)
(b) Attack. The artillery fire and M.W. begin simultaneously
at 5.35 a.m. At the same time, 212th R.I.R. advances with all
waves closely following, and will work itself as near to the enemy
as our own barrage permits. At 6 a.m. the artillery and M.W.'s will
increase their range; and the infantry will advance to their objective
without interruption. (The objective is marked in green on
the sketch).
(c) After the objective has been reached, the 212th R.I.R. will
dispose itself in depth in a prearranged manner and in such a manner
that they may, with the aid of their light machine-guns, Minenwerfer
and Granatenwerfer, confidently face the expected enemy counter-attack.
(d) It is important to make known to the airmen as early as
possible, the position of the objective reached. For this purpose
the aerial squadron will send infantry planes out at 7.30. The
212th R.I.R. will signal to the airmen by means of ground flares,
white cloths, and white star rockets. The ground flares will be
distributed by Pioneer commander of 4th Gard Divn. The employment
of these to be practised (burning them on the floors of shell holes).
Reports on the new line to be dropped by infantry planes at Divisional H.Q.
The division will immediately transmit the information to
all concerned.
6. Five assault sections will be attached to the 1st Bn., 212th
R.I.R. Three to 3rd Bn., 212th R.I.R. They will report to battalions
concerned on 1/10/17 in the afternoon.
7. 245th M.W. Coy, will go into position to-night and to-morrow
night, so as to be able to bring effective fire to bear on the central
and Southern portions of ZONNEBEKE. Not less than 8 light
M.W.'s of the 5th G.G. Regt, will be detailed for this duty. Direct
communication between 5th G.G. Regt, and 245th M.W. Coy. (45th Res.
Divn.)
A pack animal column will be attached for the transportation of
ammunition.
 

7.10.17 - 4b - No. 33
The 4th Guard M.W. Coy. will be so disposed as to render assistance
in the attack of 3rd Bn., 212th R.IR. For tactical purposes
both M.W. Coys, will be attached to the 4th Guard Artillery
Commander.
8. Special orders will be issued by 4th Guard Artillery Commander
for distribution of targets, ranging, artillery preparation, barrage
fire and ammunition supply, also detailing artillery patrols. It
must be borne in mind, when issuing these orders, that both flank
regiments will assist in the barrage.
9. For the divisional sector, from 4 a.m. 3/10/17 to 4 a.m. 4/10/17
only red rockets bursting into a double star will be used as a call
for barrage. Regiments will assure a supply of these signals for
the front line. Commander, 4th Guard Artillery, will assure that
all batteries are informed of the alteration of signals.
10. Intelligence. Regtl. H.Q., 5th G.G. Regt., will be in the
Battle H.Q. of R.T.K. NORD from midnight 2nd/3rd to midnight 3rd/4th
October in the Gravel Pit 800 m. Southeast of BROODSEINDE. The
Regtl. H.Q. of 212th R.I.R. will be in Battle H.Q. of R.T.K. MlTTE,
on the cross-roads, 1 km. Northeast of Pioneer Park IN DE STER,
from 9 p.m. 2/10/17 to midnight 3rd/4th October.
Wireless communication has not yet been established, but will
be from K.T.K. NORD. K.T.K. MITTE, K.T.K. SUD to R.T.K. MlTT.
Also from K.T.K. NORD to R.T.M. NORD (Gravel Pit). Also from
R.T.K. NORD and R.T.K. MITTE to Regtl. Battle H.Q. MITTE.
Runner posts from K.T.K. NORD, K.T.K. MITTE, K.T.K. SUD to
R.T.K. MITTE. Also from K.T.K. NORD to R.T.K. NORD.
Pigeons will be allotted to: Each Bn. of 212th R.I.R. - 8
birds; 2nd Bn., 211th R.I.R. - 6 birds; Regtl. H.Q., 212th R.I.R.
and 5th G.G. Regt. - each 4 birds: Commander, 4th Gd. Artillery for
the use of artillery patrols - 12 birds.
The cards for prisoners are to be used as much as possible.
11. On the evening of 3rd, the attack troops will be relieved from
the newly won positions by battalions of 4th Guard Divn., and withdrawn
to MOORSLEDE area. The support battalions of 4th Guard Divn.
are then to be brought forward.
12. Ammunition supply andattention to, and care of wounded of the
45th Res. Divn, will be arranged by 5th Guard Inf. Bde.
13. The infantry assault will be accompanied by several battle
squadrons (of aircraft), which will appear above the infantry precisely
at the time of the assault and assist by means of flying in
advance of the assaulting troops, assisting them with their machine-guns.
14. On 1/10/17, 212th R.I.R. and 2nd Bn., 211th R.I.R. will carry
out assault practise on a small scale; and on 2/10/17, combined
practice on a large scale will be carried out.
In the training on forenoon of 2/10/17, exactly the same conditions
will be practised as in the actual attack, i.e., with regard
to ground conditions and command.
Time and place of the practise to be reported to Division as
early as possible. (Sgd) Graf Finkenstein.
Wire from 4th Guard INF. Division, October 2nd, 1917. As the
attack yesterday by the 210th R.I.R. failed on the right flank, the
attack of the 3rd October will not extend Southwards beyond the concrete
position 200 m. North of HAUS KATHE. The line South of this
will remain unchanged. Elements of the 3rd Bn., 212th R.I.R. will
be thus released, will be launched as second attacking wave behind
the 2nd Bn, of the 212th R.I.R. under orders of the C.O., 212th R.I.R.
(Sgd) v. Ludovitz.
Regtl. Order. 5th Foot Guard Regiment, October 2nd.
URGENT Attack, Hohensturm, has been postponed by one day.
-------------
 

5.10.17 - 1b - No. 31
TRANSLATION of captured German document -- Orders for intended
counter-attack on our position at 6 a.m., 4/10/17.
4th Guard Infantry Division   29/9/17
la. No. 2586  SECRET.
PLANS
For the execution of an attack, the objective of which is the
S.W. edge of ZONNEBEKE, the ridge S.E. of ZONNEBEKE, and the Western
edge of MOLENAARELSTHOEK,
1. The objective is noted on accompanying sketch The height
715 is necessarily included, also the ridge stretching thence
Southeastwards. Following advantages will thus be gained:
1. The enemy's direct observation of our position South of
ZONNEBEKE is prevented.
2. He los/es the possibility of cover for massing troops
for an attack.
3. We gain forward interval from the, to us, important observation
posts on the BROODSEINDE - IN de STER ridge.
4. We regain a large portion of ZONNEBEKE.
5. We get observation on the country West of ZONNEBEKE,
6. Our infantry positions will be improved, so that the
front line will no longer be in the marshy ground, but on the presumably
dry ridge.
7. The supports for the front line can be placed on the
Eastern slope of the ridge and close up to the front line.
There is a probability of capturing material and prisoners,
thus strengthening the moral of our troops, and weakening
that of the English.
II. ATTACK TROOPS.
(a) Infantry: The frontage of the attack is about 1,600
metres. Four battalions are considered necessary for this. The
number of necessary assault troops of the Assault Battalion will
be stated, as soon as it can be ascertained how many old concrete
dug-outs still remain within the objective. For the capture of
the Western portion of/ZONNEBEKE, four assault sections would undoubtedly
be required.
(b) The quantity of requisite artillery and ammunition/is
set out in the accompanying scheme of the Divisional Artillery
Commander. The Division concurs with these suggestions.
(c) Minenwerfers. It would be necessary to employ one
M.W. Coy. on each flank of the attack, each with 8 medium T.M.'s
and 8 light T.M.'s of the Infantry Regiments. 100 rounds of
ammunition per T.M. would be necessary.
To expedite the delivery of this ammunition to the
T.M.'s. several columns of pack animals should be attached.
III. DIRECTION OF ATTACK.
The attack must be led by strong flank/^battalions, particularly from
ZONNEBEKE and MOLENAARELSTHOEK. The success of the attack depends
largely on the reconnaissance of our present own and enemy's front
lines by airmen. 

No. 31 - 2b - 5-10-17 
IV. TIME OF ATTACK
On the day following the attack (raid?) of the "Gabain" group
against POLYGON WOOD. Assault 6 a.m.
V. As far as can be judged by the map, it seems desirable to regain
possession of the heights, 500 metres West of ZONNEBEKE; this,
however, depends upon results of a reconnaissance on the spot in
the 20th Divisional sector, and on the result of the proposed
operation.
(Sgd) v. Alt-Stutterheim.
YPRES GROUP
-------------
Attack Orders -- Map 1/10,000
1/10/17.
1. The Assault Group consists of Lower Sector A: Commander Major
SCHLEINITZ, 5th Gd. Gren. Regt.; 1st Bn., 212th R.I.R.
Lower Sector B : Commander Lt-Col. RAVE; 2nd and 3rd Bns.,
212th R.I.R., 5th Foot Guards Regt.
2. Battle Area. Lower Sector A: Right boundary of the objective;
Left - hedge South of ZONNEBEKE Pond running towards point 715.
Lower Sector B: Adjoining left of A. Left boundary - Sunxken
Road East - West in MOLENAARELSTHOEK, North of point 718.
3. For the preparation for, and execution of, the attack, divisional
order la. No. 9625 of 30/9/17 will stand excepting following
amendments:
For 5.a. read: 'The support battalion of the regimental
sectors North NORTH and MITTE will not be relieved, but
will remain in their positions as spare battalions of both
sectors for 5th Guard Inf. Bde. The reserve battalions
of both sectors, after the successful assembly of 212th
R.I.R., will move to the quarters near MOORSLEDE, which up
to the present have been occupied by the 212tM R.I.R.
Detailed arrangements to be made between the three regiments
concerned.
The 2n Bn., 211th R.I.R., is not available as spare battalion,
but the 1st Bn., 5th Foot Guards will take its
place (Support MITTE).
4. Battle Headquarters.
Radowitz attack group: WATERDAMHOEK at H.Q., 5th Foot Guards.
Lower Sector A: Regtl. H.Q. of Sector NORD.
Lower Sector B: Regtl. H.d. of sector MITTE.
5. Orders for the medical services follow on receipt of Brigade
orders.
(Sgd) v. Radowitz.
 

[[?]] OCT 1917  [[?]]
Orders for the Hőhensturm Attack
-------------
1. The Hohensturm attack will take place at 6 am
Oct 3 according to Divl Orders of Sep 30 "preparation for the
attack.
2. Sectors of Attack RIR 212 1st Bn NORTH flank:
SW [[exit]] of Zonnebeke - 200 m N.W. of the church
SOUTH flank From the north [[?]] boundary of
the 5 GFG (300 m S.E. of Zonnebeke Lake) to hill 715
RIR 212 2^[[?]]Bn Northern flank. Contact with 1st Bn. 212 RIR
South flank From the S.^regimental boundary of the 5GFG in the
direction of the most N.W. house in Molenaarelsthoek
RIR 212 3rdBn. North flank Contact with 2ndBn 212 RIR
South flank Haus [[Kathe]].
3. Position of Battle H.Q.
KTK 1Bn 212 RIR at RTK North (5th^[[?]])
KTK 2"  "   "  "  KTK 5th G FG
KTK 3"  "   "  "  KTK 93 RIR
The O.C. 5th fd [[?]] will remain in his present Battle HQ([[?]])
 The O.C. 212 RIR will [[?]] RTK centre.
4. The following change^alterations of orders to Inf, from Divl orders 30/Sept
(Ia9625)
Para 4. Distribution of orders to Inf. from [[?]] Oct 2/3
to midnight OCT 3/4 - as follows

FOR WOUNDED OFFICERS AND N.C.Os. AND OTHERS
RETURNING FROM THE FIHING LINE DURING AN
ATTACK.
Any information concerning the enemy and his defences etc.,
which you may have found out during the attack in which you were
wounded, would be of the greatest value to those who have to carry
on the attack.
Will you please answer as many of the following questions
as you can :-
1. What is your unit ?.
Where were you when you got wounded ?.
At what time ?.
2. What portion of the German
line were you attacking ?.
3. How far do you think our men got ?.
On which side of the crest were they ?.
4. In what sort of strength were the
Germans holding their trenches ?.
5. What Regiment and Battalion did
they belong to ?.
6. Was there much rifle fire
or chiefly machine guns ?.
7. Did you spot any machine gun
positions ?. Where ?.
8. State of German trenches ?.
How deep ?.
Any bombing blocks ?.
9. Dug-outs - deep ?.
Number and positions ?.
In what direction do the
entrances face ?.
10. Any wire ?.
11. What colour rockets did they
send up when you attacked ?.
12. Was our preliminary
bombardment good ?.
13. Did the Germans put
up much of a barrage ?.
14. When did it start ?.
15. Any isolated enemy strong posts ?.
16. Any other information which
you think would be of use -
Lessons of the attack - what
you yourself would not do again, etc ?. 
++++++++++++

2
Hand drawn diagram - see original document 

Para 5a Readiness: read,
The 3 Bns 212 RIR will stand to - rested & fed - in
fighting kit ([[?]] light pistols - ammunition - [[?]]
sheets - 4 iron [[?]] - 2 field [[?]])
The 1st Bn 212 RIR with 5"Sturm [[Grúppe]]" of 4th Sturm Bn
The 3rd Bn 212 RIR " 3 " " " " "
close behind the front battle line in their sector
The 1st Bn 5 GFG will similarly stand at the disposal
of the C.O. 212 RIR, S of Broodseinde, as he was aware.
Trench Bns of the Regts of the 4th G Div will remain
in position during the attack forming an [[emergency]] garrison
Support Bns will remain in their positions (with the