Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/253/1 - 1918 - 1939 - Part 5

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Open to contributions
Accession number:
RCDIG1066690
Difficulty:

Page 1 / 10

18PO then yo (8epoint) 596. after passing the wire the line lay down engaging in a fire- fight with the German posts. Then part of the G2nd worked Forward and outflanked the Germans, and the whele line rushed them, The car— a weak line of machine-oun posts in small bits of trench - was klled, surrendered, or ran awey, and the advance continued. The 7th Bedford at this stage were in touch with the right of the 52nd, and adrancing as quickly. The Garman posts that had been rushed had been formed by two companies of the 112/Sth Guard Grenadier in the attempt to connect the flank of its division (in the wood) with the right of the 77th Reserve Division, which had sming too far to the south in front of Cachy. They were out of touch with it, and wers about to be relieved by the 7th company of the 1115th Foot Guard, whose commander had just visited then and sone back to bring up his plateont. 000 The plateau was still brightly Illuminated by Flares risingnex centinueusly from positions shead, as well as from Wilars-Bretonneur to the left frent and from the woed in the left rear. in Frent of the centre and right the 5and not, about 500 yards beyond the Cermen entrests, another line of posts in shellveraters. Mese troops fied before the attacking line reached them. But after the first attack had passed over the pesition, Captain Fennety’ & conpery, adrancing in the second line, heard a machinessin in action close shead, and bar a bright stream of tracer bullets beins fired into the pacts of the first Lins by a Cerman Machinegun eren, who had been overrimn there. O There they are, beys, Vshented Mentenant Regers, and the Germans, in the posts were rushed and Bndect for M. These pests apparently formed the northern end of the outposteline of the 77th Reserve Division, which had been stopped in the morning west of the Willers-Bretonneuxe-Domart road. 1t had afterwards been routed by the whippet tanks, but at 5 c'clock its reserve regiment, the 332nd I.R., had advanced about 300 yards, across the
idy xled wold of Babiob ronsoget hed vt,335 e Regr hte ageet L,Base aes as v as ied aod A1 0 SAE aew 51 (notts. o Tast Gaxew and M any al goy a bone August 8, 1918 (Continued from page 13) line but also of all reserve divisions. These preparations drew so much attention to the north that King Albert protested officially against an attack being prepared on his front without his being consulted. This was exactly what was wanted, because that rumour immediately spread everywhere. Further south on the front of the First and Third Armies the wireless of the various reserve divisions was erected. A tank battalion near Arras re- hearsed attacks by day. Movement of transport by day was allowed in the First and Third Army areas. Several rumours were spread about as regards the destination of the Canadians; one that they were going to relieve the Australians. On the Fourth Army front the precautions for secrec) were very carefully worked out. One of the most effective was a large coloured poster which was put up in ever) village in the front and back areas early in July, warning all ranks to keep their mouths shut and not discuss future operations, and pointing out to them what they should do if they were unlucky enough to be taken prisoner. A small leafet was also issued which was to be stuck in every man's pay-book, giving the same sort of directions The results were remarkable. Several cases came to light afterwards of men being taken prisoner from whom the Germans were able to find out absolutely nothing. This was ascertained from German intelligence diaries cap- tured during the advance. The men played up extremely well and entered whole heartedly into the spirit of the orders. St No movement of transport eastward was allowed except at night, and acroplanes were up all days watching to see if there was any extraordinary movement visible from the air. The work in the back lines was continued up to the evening of August 7. The Canadians were kept wel back; they did not actually take over the front line till Execffle det two hours before zero, and the Germans had no idea at all that the Canadians were in the neighborhood. Officers going up to reconnoitre were warned to go ap in very small parties and to avoid a not unusual custom of waving maps about when they got to the front line. No general SRLROKNNS registration of new batteries was allowed. One hundred and twenty-eight new batteries came into position, and they were only allowed to register a few rounds on & 1203 certain definite plan which was laid down by the M.G. R.A. of the army. The corps commanders were not allowed to discuss the plan with their divisional com- manders till July 30. There was intense air co-operation. Machines were swooping down and machine-gunning the guns and trans port of the retreating enemy. There was also an intense battle for air supremacy fought during the morning of the 9th. in which I understand at least 70 machines a side took part, with the result that for the time being we had com- plete air supremacy, but we lost a large number of machines. (Continued next page) 133 S 6202E CARSS Te 122 rstso 5 0 NE5 54 ad 2s nearco LI2SA tS FEK, as to Exessttess ad tat bsI.Bb1 aBSA SBnal9 n Bal anoS. 1o5. adogoOt 10 S Tee1 LirgA O
(Sepoint) 595. steppage, they had together decided to blow their whistles and charge at it. Their men obeyed the signal, saps were found, and the troops streamed through them. With the shells bursting and Very lights going up (says Corperal Steadmanry, who led a bombing section) it was just like daylight. The machineegun fire was the werst that ever happened on any frent. By sheer luck I found a gap in the wire and led me section through. a breat part of the force had simply to strugele through the abrender the entenstement me constructed apron Lacnton. and each man struggling with the wires tightened them, making it more aurriouit for others. Among the officers Captain Cooke was killed here, and Captain Stubbings (G2nd) and Heutemants Chanter, Reak, Raatha, Fraskf, and Willes (s1eEf wounded. Next day the wire was lined with the dead of the two pattations. the wire ran dasenally, and the line naturally tended to evins paraliel te it. The British heary suns and bombing acropianes, however, and now started fires in Villers- Bretonneus, and these formed a fixed Landmark, by which officers quickly cerrected the direction. A sap which opened between the two frent compenies of the 52nd was filled by a supporting plateon under Lieutenant Hatton? Fer a for minutes Popl. E. Steadman (Ne. 3444, 5ist Bn.). Woed ichinisty of Perth, V.Austay b. Durhan, Rng., 25 Jan. 1886. Tsee Vele VIL. sketch on pe 146e PCapt. J.R.C.B. Chanter, 51st Bn. Conmercial travellery of Bendige, Vic.; b. Moama, N.S.N., 1 Aug. 1888. Witent. C.W. Read, 51st Bn. raughtsman and computer, WeAust. Govt. Survey Deptog of Guildford, WeAustey be 81. Guildferd, 24 April Pzient. H.A. Haslan, 51st Bn. Bank clerky of Katanning, WoAustey b. Rochester, Vic., 8 May 1894. Wlieut. M.A. Fraser, 51st Bn. Accountants of Kalgoorlie, WeAustoy be Braidweod, N.S.N., 21 April 1889. Czjent. A.J. Wilkes, 51st Bn. Anctioneery of 71 OOTD Q'landy b. Cabarlah, Q'land, 8 Aug. 1894. Died, in New Guinea, 1933. Ozient.-Col. N.G. Hatton, M.C., M.M., V.Dej 52nd Bn. Commercial travellery of Teogcomba, Q'landy b. Teowcomba, 10 April 1895.
I1ite 2000 Lfed es hiss) gad wino sarid 5200 hessoo BT 556 Mrs sIgsible tep Sass 1 tss aidter at al 3 noe Miseblve Bad of In t al seIIsd a Two disturbing events took place on August 3 and 6. On August 3 a small Australian post of one sergeant and four men was captured at Hourges, which is on the Roye road east of the Luce. On August 6 the 18th Division 38 was attacked north of the Somme. It was a big attack. and was meant for the Australians, who had never ceased worrying, and the Germans sent down a special attacking ont sorog division, the 27th Wurtemberger, for the purpose. Thirty-two mortars and 96 batteries supported this attack. Unfortunately for the 18th Division, it hit them intsead of the Australians, and the Germans penetrated their line to a depth of 800 yards. They took over 200 prisoners and reached some of the artillery dumps. It was thought The III. Corps was to make an attack north of the Somme that they must discover something, but such was not the quite independent of the Canadian and Australian attack. case. If the prisoners knew anything they gave nothing and it was known would not be ready to attack till the away, and the Germans found out nothing at all. At afternoon. the time it was very disturbing. What actually took place was as follows. The 4th It is not exaggeration to say that at zero on August 8 Canadian Division attacked Le Quesnel at 4 o'clock in the the battle was already won. The surprise was so complete. morning and captured it. The 3rd Canadian Division ther the confidence of the troops was so great, and the forces went through the 4th at 12 o'clock, and reached Bouchoi we had there so superior to the Germans in morale that at 3.30 in the afternoon. On their left the Ist Canadians once the attack was started the result of the battle was commenced their advance at 1 p.m. They reached War- never in doubt. It was only a question of how far we villers and Beaufort by 3.30 and Rouvroy at dusk. Next could go. and that was largely dependent on the endur- to them the 2nd Canadians advanced at 11 a.m. with ance of the troops. both their fanks exposed for two hours or more. They On August 9 the British objectives were Roye, Chaulnes. captured Rosieres and Vrely after some heavy fighting Bray, Dernancourt. This was a deep objective, but if with the 119th German Division, and with the aid of the 207 things were to go as well as they did on August 8 there cavalry reached Mcharicourt that evening. North of the was no reason why we should not have advanced as far railway there was a delay in the arrival of the lst Aus- as this. But a mistake was then made, and I am quite tralian Division. which was brought up from reserve. certain that the first person to admit it would have been The 5th Australians therefore made the initial attack Lord Rawlinson. Our attacks on the 8th were well con against Vauvillers, which they captured at 1 o’'clock. certed and on a wide front. Our attacks on August 9 wer The lst Australians passed through at 1-40 and attacked disjointed. The real reason for this was that the Canadian towards Lihons. They were not able to advance further Corps were allowed to fix the zero hour, whereas, it than half-way up the Lihons Hill. Further north the 2nd ought really to have been fixed by Army Headquarters. aiR o Australians did not capture Framerville till half-past four What actually happened was that everyone was so busy North of the Somme the III. Corps did not attack till congratulating everyone else on their share in the victory 530. Owing to the German resistance on the previous that valuable time was lost in preparing for an advance day there was a good deal of confusion, and it was neces- next day. If the Army had fixed the zero hour and had sary to give time for an American regiment, the 131st. continued to press everyone to lose no time I can see of the 33rd American Division, to be brought up. This no reason now why the general advance should not have regiment had to double for the last five minutes to enable been continued at 6 or 7 next morning. it to arrive on the starting line in time for zero, and it As we know now, the probability is if this had been then advanced. headed by its gallant colonel. This done that the German resistance would have broken down American regiment was largely instrumental in the cap- completely and we should have reached the Somme during ture of the Chipilly Spur and the success gained by the the 10th without much opposition. The lesson of this is an III. Corps on August 9., It was supported by the 58th old one, and that is that once you have got your enemy and 12th Divisions. I have no doubt that lives could have been saved and a more satisfactory advance made on on the run you must press on with every available man until exhaustion renders further pursuit impossible. The the 9th if the attacks of the various divisions had been reason why the Canadians were allowed to fix the zero properly co-ordinated; but even as it was a large further hour was that the main attack was to be made by them, advance had been made, and many more prisoners and while the Australians advanced in echelon on their left. suns captured. Tad Bosass bed enclisttad est begiote ear il sroled; end odec Aist LA ETAD elat 30 inef soleE(nd targ 8ETs .on) MenGR.N.T. 31 oad RS CG MooezyLd .LW,net 20 slt e.A.D,5gd LIIX,1981 vist 85,oiv ,verstix dtzok. 153s 45 E F a a te vas It
594. minutes.....The bullets were still thick. I leant forward and put my hand on the boys shoulder...He said he wasn't hit but was just done up. Well, I said, we are all going up in a minute with one of these shells. You are just as safe with the beys.? He nodded and said he believed I was right, and went after them. He was the only boy I saw hesitate that night..A little Teny corporal came stumbling in, weeping like a kid and holding his arm. Pain bad, says No, Sir, he squeaked, this is nothing, but I can't get the boys to go forward.? He had evidently been trying to rally a very young plateen with a bullet in his arm. wounded digger soothed him. Never mind, kid, he said, the beys will hunt Frits without yous kids. some distance ahead of the Cachy Switch was the strong diagonal line of wire criginally constructed for it, and, as this was appreached, the fire became close and deadly. It was evident that the Germans attacking that merning had established their ontresteline on the other side of the wire. Rive or six machineeguns were firing through it, and others from distant pesitions in the southceasty but most deadly by far was a gun away to the left flank where the wire, running towards Villers-Bretenneus, dipped into the hollow south of the torn, and a single German machinegunner was firing from one of the sunken reads that cressed there, directly along the Cachy read and the vire. The Australians nearest to him were the remnant of Sadlier’'s plateon, now under Sergeant Menall! The line was temporarily stepped. The Australlans near by tried first to get round the open on the right of the sun, next round the open on its left. Frentually Serseant (RKE I SKEICH No. 178) Stokes, in his skilful assault upon sun after gun, silenced and captured this mx one also. It had caused dreadful loss along the entanglement; but long before it was stepped the battalions had passed that obstacle. Captain Harburn had found Captain Cooke of the Psst. T.N. Dagnall (Nc. 25297 51st Bn.). Station hands of Geraldton, W.Auste; b. Liverpool, Eng., 25 Dec. 1889. PCapt. C.E.A. Cooke, 51st Bn. Electriciany o Boulder, Wohuste; b. North Fitzrey, Vic., 29 July 1891. Killed in action, 24 April 1918. right company of the Gist, and, to prevent a permanent
2. 3. 6. Coblenz tpr 19th. March, 1925. H.W. My dear Bean, Imas in Cologne on Friday and Saturday on business, and was fortunate enough to find that my visit coincided with a lecture given by Major General Sir Archibald Montgomery, (Rawly's M.G.G.S.), on the Big rush on the 8th. August. The lecture was a mest interesting one, and possibly contained points which are not in the Battle of 100 days, and which may be new and of use to you. Here are those which struck me as being the most interesting: one of the chief reasons which gave Rawlinson the idea of an offensive on this front was the tremendous moral superiority which had been gained by the Australians over the Germans. Rawlinson's original idea was for the British Army to push East from Dernancourt down to about Domart, and for the French to strike upwards towards Montdidier. Foch was against this, and Rawlinson was overruled, though Montgomery says he cannot remember that Foch produced any really decent arguments. (a) Rawlinson learned much from the German Spring Of fensive; (6) Hamel; (c) Mangin’s counter-attack at Villers Cotteret. From (a) he learned that reserves should start moving at the same time as the troops in front hop the bags, the whole offensive thus moving at zero; (6D, everything went like Clockwork at Hamel, and the 8th. August show was all arranged on Hamel Lines, Hamel being regarded as a miniature model attack; from (c) he learned that SURERISE was everything. Montgomery thought that Monash was a little unfair to the 3rd. Corps. They were badly knocked about on the 6th. August, the new Brigade brought in having never seen the ground; their cadres had been filled up largely with boys, and there was a great lack of experienced officers. The ground was undoubtedly very difficult and unsuitable for tanks, and they started the attack without the tanks, which were an hour late. The great anxiety all over the front was Gas, (This was why Abbey Wood was left absolutely empty, as it was the Germans’ favourite gassing ground), and the 3rd Corps was the only one prior to the attack which got a dose. These are Montgomery's excuses for the 3rd. Corps. In Montgomery’s opinion the success of the whole battle was due to three things: Superior morale; Surprise; and Good Organisation. German superiority in numbers on the 8th. August was pretty much the same as on the 2lst. March, but there was a tremendous difference in morale. Mangin’s attack, especially, had caused great depression, not only in the German Army, but also in Germany itself, the people not understanding that if German troops were winning, how the Allies could put up a successful counter-attack. This
2. This opinion reacted again on the Army by correspondence. Montgomery could never understand why the Cavalry could not get any further at Rosieres, Vrely and Varvillers. He knows now, (because 1 told him) it was the 119th. Division which had just come in, and the same reason holds good at Vauvillers and Framerville, where new troops also held up the attack. 8. Montgomery thought Ludendorff's plan of counter- attack to take place on the 10th. was sound, but owing to the speed of our attack and the progress made, he could not use the divisions he had massed to the North and South to strike downwards and upwards on each flank, and had to put them in individually, thus, of course, lessening the driving Force which a massed and organised counter-attack would have had. 90 On the 9th. our attacks were very disjointed, and although progress was made, Rosieres, Vrely, Warvillers and Beaufort being captured, these successes did not bring with them the advantages which had been gained by an organised and united effort. Montgomery is of the opinion that had a general and organised attack been put in earlier on the 9th., we should have undoubtedly broken clean through. (I think you will agree with this: I certainly do). The reasons for the attacks on the 9th. being disjointed and at different hours of the clock are largely psychological: the troops had marched fighting a tremendously long way; they had been very successful, and both troops and staffs, from the highest to the lowets, were inclined to spend a little time in congratulating themselves. As the result of this, the Canadians, Australians, and 3rd. Corps (Americans) all gained their next objectives at different times, and as a matter of Pact, the 3rd. Corps did not get on to theirs until 5.30 p.m., and did so by running the last mile, led gallantly by an American colonel of 60. There is no doubt that this officer’s attack was the backbone of the 3rd. Corps effort on the 9th. I think this is all, and hope that some of the above points are new to you. It was delightful see in montgore again, he was jost the same. Lond had hime for a hurred that with him offe the lectuse - annoy no doubt the generals crondg round nower who this blask cenlian was! Hope you are go shrong, Cheeno Yours wer Et.
August 8th. Conference before the battle. From Gellebrand, (9/1/3 tohen Monash called his great conference before the battle of they 8 he streesed (as he did before Sept 29) that the crax of the operation would be the provision of roads & bridge behind the tragn as they advanced. Fos this purpose he proposed to take all the prociers & cneers & place them under Tooth as coyps trogu. Everyone sat quiet, but fetlebrand, whose training had t instilled into him &t if he had a doubt he ment make it known (in diety to his superior), askett wheter it would not be better to leave the divt. commanders a senal part of their enqineers - say urgent 2 coys of proneers - for immediate taoke. He was rather sharply answered. he hater, when Mr. Expounded plan of joug for the first objie wit - the Ld & Bad devies i waiting there 2(3) hours; & then going on with the 4th & 5tC – Gellibrand asked whether it might not be advisable to provide for the probable case of the Ist objoe bein very easily altaied & th Lod & B Dwes This was, says G, what happined). being fully fit to go on to the later objectivisf. In that case Thouash would have two ficat dions to go on with. This second interruption was very forcibly answered, felly didn't go on with his suggesta which was that, if this happened, the sigaal that the 3od & Zied should go on should be given by 1 firing of 3 salooes by all batteries (an unnistle signal, he thinks
Hist. Notes. Original. exzphanation Notes fram Sir John Monash) to Wilkin and myself on the evening before Aug Sth. The Australians will have four divisions in the attack and one in reserve. The Canadians will have two divisions south of us - they gre at present lying behind three Battalanns of our 13th Bde - one divisionbehind each battalion. We have cavalr ry attache d to us and the Canadians have a similar brigad e attac hed to them and there is cavalry in reserve. I want you to direct your mind to the big salient which we have hereopposite us - Albert-Villers Bretonneux—Montdid- ler-Assenvillers-Noyon-Cer.......(unreadable) We at ack tomorrow with the 3rd and 2nd divisions. The 4th and 5th pass through them. And the lst is in reserve. The 13th Bde has been left in to cover the Canadians and so the ist Bde has been lent to the -4th divn, The French First Army on our right will attack tomorrow and both they and our three Corps will be under Haig for the first day. After that theyewill be (if all goes well) an extens ion of the fight southwards involving other French armies, and the fighting will come under Foch. Zero is to be 4.20. Ist line (green, Cerisy Lamotte Mezieres 2nd Line (Red) Chipilly Morcoutt Guillaucourt Careux exclusive. 3rd Line Cblne Mericourt-harbonnieres Dotted Line (T.e. line to which the cavalry may go if they get through) Caix le Quesnel This is the first days objective including that for the Cavaley corps. The Canadians will have to leapfrog i; the Caval- ry do this. The most th t the Germans can materialise within 24 hours 18 5 divisions. Tithin 48 hours they can materialise 6, that is 6 including the other S. Within 72 hours they can get the number up to 8. Within 96 hours they can bring it to 10. If we deprive him of Chaulnes he will have to detrain at Nesle. If he has to detrain at Peronne or Nasle he will be 24 hours later. Two of his 5 divisions immedittely available are north of the Somme, and 2 have been put into the line in the last two days. Probably therefore, there can be no bug attack by him before 4 day The cavalry will push on to LIHONS on the 9th August if successful. The red line is the neces ary advance of the day. Ie have to get that. The blue line has been decided on as the objective inxxa case the advance is easy. You will see that at the end of the first day the lst divn is still unused, except that the lst sde has been lent to the 4th Divn. The moment the lst Sde moves out the 2nd and 3rd Bdes will move into the Aubigny line (or from 1t7) The lst Divisions use depends on what the Canadians do. he blue line is the old Amiens defence line. All the wire has been taken away by the British during the salvage operations after the Somme. We have seen the Germans practising (7) there. The Australian Corps under my command for this operation has 5 divisions of infantry, 18 brigad s of artillery, 4 battalions of tanks, a battalion of motor machine guns, one regiment of light horse (which I am putting almost entiraly on to traffic control) the cyclist battalion, the Corps flying squadron, There will be 24 other squadrons, 450 planes - some having special tasks. (I think this was for the whole army)
20 In the preliminary stages the Corps area for this attack has been divided into two zones - the divisions working in pairs, 2 in each zone. This is to ensure their working comfortably togethr They have had seven days notice. They have been made mutually re- Sponsible as to boundaries - they have had to settle that amongst themselves 1 told them I wou;d have nothing to do with it. They wokk under the senior divisional commander for the purpose of thes battle preparations. 1 told them 1 was not going to listen to any complaints and not going to entertain any decisions as between the two pairs. This had worked very well and has allowed a mixing up of units as never before. Lou will notice on the map there that the brigades are disposed in an extraordinary tangle - as it may seem to you: 11 10 5 14 15 This is because the battle takes the form of a double leap- Trog. 18 are merely inhabiting that area until after zero. They are 15 clear of all tracks and are living there in order to be able to me move into position a later stage of the attack,-in order that they may not have to g0 too far to reach that position. They are living there for use at a later stage - not in position with reference to the first stage of the battle tt all. The 13th Bde cannot be released because it is camouflage to the Canadians behind it. TThe men who were captured by the ver- mans did not know there were any Canddians in the line) they thought that they were down there to hold the line for a long period themselves, and I hear that this was generally talked of amongst them as a bit of a grievance if anything. Can.Divn Bn) 4th Can.Divn. Can Divn Bn)l3th Bde Can.Divn Bn) The position there at the moment is as above. Tonight our battalions will come out and the Canadians will move in and attack at dawn. ow then, as to the medley of brigades 1 spoke of. After dusk tonight the 11 brugades will begin their approach march by selected routes. The forming up line is dead straight behind our front lineall the way. The 6th and 10th Ed s will be in position in our front line (i.e.in front of the tape line) until 15 minutes before zero. They will then come out of the front line and move back through the four brigades which will be lying out as above. The four brigades will then advance in that order to the first objective. The first objective will be reached, in the north at Zerc plus 1½ hours; in the south at Zero plus 2½ hours. This will Live us more than half the German guns, which are in the Warfusee Velley.( There will be a perticularly heavy concentration of artillery from the moment when this valley i s re

after passing the wire the line lay down engaging in a fire-

fight with the Germans= posts. Then part of the 52nd worked

forward and outflanked the Germans, and the whole line rushed

them. The enemy - a weak line of machine-gun posts in small

bits of trench - was killed, surrendered, or run away, and

the advance continued. The 7th Bedford a this stage were in

touch with the right of the 52nd, and advancing as quickly.

 

(8-point)

The German posts that had been

rushed had been formed by two companies

of the III/5th Guard Grenadier in the 

attempt to connect the flank of its

division (in the wood) with the right

of the 77th Reserve Division, which had

sung too far to the south in front of

Gachy. They were out of touch with it,

and were about to be relieved by the 

7th company of the II/5th Foot Guard,

whose commander had just visited them

and gone back to bring up his platoons. 82

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82

Sec D.

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The platoon was still brightly illuminatedby flares

rising xxxxx continuously from positions ahead, as well as from

Villers- Bretonneux to the left front and from the wood in the

left rear. In front of the centre and right the 52nd met,

about 500 yards beyond the German outposts, another line of

posts in shell-craters. These troops fled before the attacking

line reached them. But after the first attack had passed

over the position, Captain Kennedy's company, advancing in the

second line, heard a machineggun in action close ahead, and 

saw a bright stream of tracer bullets being fired into the

backs of the first line by a German machine -gun crew, who had

been overrun there. "There they are, boys." shouted

Lieutenant Rogers, and the Germans in the posts were rushed

and killed.

 

These posts apparently formed the

northern end of the outpost-line of the

77th Reserve Division, which had been

stopped in the morning west of the 

Villers-Bretonneuxx--Domart road. It 

had afterwards been routed by the

whippet tanks, but at 5 o'clock its

reserve regiment, the 32nd I.R., had 

advanced about 300 yards, across the

 

 

 

August 8, 1918  (Continued from page 13)

line but also of all reserve divisions. These preparations

drew so much attention to the north that King Albert

protested officially against an attack being prepared on

his front without his being consulted. This was exactly

what was wanted, because that rumour immediately

spread everywhere. Further south on the front of the

First and Third Armies the wireless of the various reserve

divisions was erected. A tank battalion near Arras re-

hearsed attacks by day. Movement of transport by day

was allowed in the First and Third Army areas. Several

rumours were spread about as regards the destination of

the Canadians; one that they were going to relieve

the Australians.

On the Fourth Army front the precautions for secrecy

were very carefully worked out.  One of the most effective

was a large coloured poster which was put up in every

village in the front and back areas early in July, warning

all ranks to keep their mouths shut and not discuss future

operations, and pointing out to them what they should do

if they were unlucky enough to be taken prisoner A

small leaflet was also issued which was to be stuck in

every man's pay-book, giving the same sort of  directions.

The results were remarkable. Several cases came to light

afterwards of men being taken prisoner from whom the

Germans were able to find out absolutely nothing. This

was ascertained from German intelligence diaries cap-

tured during the advance. The men played up extremely

well and entered whole-heartedly into the spirit of the

orders.

No movement of transport eastward was allowed except

at night, and aeroplanes were up allays watching to see

if there was any extraordinary movement visible from

the air. The work in the back lines was continued up to

the evening of August 7. The Canadians were kept well

back; they did not actually take over the front line till

two hours before zero, and the Germans had no idea at

all that the Canadians were in the neighborhood. Officers

going up to reconnoitre were warned to go up in very

small parties and to avoid a not unusual custom of waving

maps about when they got to the front line. No general

registration of new batteries was allowed. One hundred

and twenty-eight new batteries came into position, and

they were only allowed to register a few rounds on a 

certain definite plan which was laid down by the M.G,

R.A. of the army. The corps commanders were not

allowed to discuss the plan with their divisional com-

manders till July 30.

There was intense air co-operation. Machines were

swooping down and machine-gunning the guns and trans-

port of the retreating enemy. There was also an intense

battle for air supremacy fought during the morning of the

9th. in which I understand at least 70 machines a side took

part, with the result that for the time being we had com-

plete air supremacy, b we lost a large number of 

machines.                            (Continued next page)

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995.

stoppage, they had together decided to blow their whistles

and charge at it. Their men obeyed the signal, gaps were

found, and the troops streamed through them.

 

(8-point)   With the shells bursting and Very lights going up (says

Corporal Steadman74, who led  a bombing section) it was just

like daylight. The machine-gun fire was the worst that ever

happened on any front. By sheer luck I found a gap in the

wire and led me section through.

 

A great part of the forces had simply to struggle through

the strands, the entanglement was constructed "apron fashion",75 25

and each man struggling with the wire tightened them, making

it more difficult for others. Among the officers Captain

Cooke was killed here, and Captain Stubbings (52nd) and

Lieutenants Chanter76, Reed77, Haslam78, Fraser79, and Wilkes80, (51st) were 

wounded. Next day the wire was lined with the dead of the

two battalions.

The wire ran diagonally, and the line naturally tended

to swing parallel to it. The British Army guns and bombing

aeroplanes, however, had now started fires in Villers-

Bretonneux, and these formed a fixed landmark,by which officers

quickly corrected the direction. A gap which opened between

the two front companies of the 52nd was filled by a supporting

platoon under xxxx Lieutenant Hutton.81  For a few minutes

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74 Cpl. E. Steadman (No. 3444, 51st Bn.). Wood machinist; of

Perth, W.Aust., b. Durham, Eng., 25 June. 1886.

75  See Vol. III. sketch on p. 146

76 Capt. J.R.G.E. Chanter, 51st Bn. Commercial traveller; of 

Bendigo, Vic., b Moana, N.S.W.  1 Aug. 1888.

77  Lieut. G.W. Reed, 51st Bn. Draughtsman and computer,

W.Aust., Govt. Survey Dept.; of Guildford, W.Aust.; b.

Guildford, 24 April 1881

78 Lieut. H.A. Haslam, 51st Bn. Bank clerk; of Katanning,

W.Aust., b. Rochester, Vic., 8 May 1894

79 Lieut. M.A. Fraser, 51st Bn. Accountant; of Kalgoorlie,

W.Aust.;b. Braidwood, N.S.W., 21 April 1889.

80 Lieut A.J. Wilkes, 51st Bn. Auctioneer; of Tingoora,

Q'land; b. Gabarlah, Q'land, 8 Aug. 1894. Died in New

Guinea, 1933.

81Lieut-Col. N.G. Hatton, M.G., M.M., V.D.; 52nd Bn.

Commercial traveller; Toowoomba, Q'land; b. Toowoomba,

10 April 1895. 

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