Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/253/1 - 1918 - 1939 - Part 4

[*HN
Aug 8 plan*]
538 COLLINS STREET,
MELBOURNE.
3rd July 1935.
Dr. C. E. W. Bean D. Litt.,
Victoria Barracks,
PADDINGTON, N.S.W.
My dear Bean,
I have just received your letter of the 30th
ultimo and think it well to reply to it at once.
The statement you make in your first paragraph
is no doubt literally correct. I cannot give you chapter
and verse but I know it was the opinion of my contempories
that Haig ^first had this offensive in mind and suggested it to Foch.
I think you are right in resolving to refer to
the subject in Vol.5. I would not like anything that you
said to be overthrown by Edmonds.
I am in no doubt whatever of Rawlinson's statement to us respecting the Canadians. Yes, the Canadians
were to go in south of us and the French were to be south of
them. I am definite also on this point.
It may have been Rawlison's Monash's plan to leap-frog
brigades through the forward ones but as a matter of fact at
our meeting Rawlinson asked us to arrange for leap-frogging
division over division.
I am very interested to read what you write
about Lloyd George. I hope that he read Vol.4 but you can
be quite certain he would make no acknowledgment of it.
Yours sincerely,
Brudenell White
I am glad about Norton. Felton our manager
in Sydney speaks vy highly of him. 
BW 

[* Gen. Monash's first note as to the plans *]
COPY.
General Monash's notes. 22/7/18
BAYONVILLERS OFFENSIVE.
Preliminaries.
Relief of C Div. on July 29.
Shortening of front of C Div. - S. of Marrett Wood.
Readjustment of fronts of A, B, & C Div., i.e., A = II
B = III
C = IV
If (?) orders:- pull our IV.
Objectives. N. of Somme must preclude observation on us.
First objective - enemy gun line - artillery penetration.
Second "           - distance - halt for rest - arty up.
Leave minor features for exploitation; - e.g., Somme Valley.
ALLOTMENT OF TROOPS
Allotment of troops to objectives.
(See at end)
Inter-Div. Boundaries.
Artillery.
Depth of penetration for 1st bound.
9,0000xx
8,000^x - say 22 Brigades of Field Artillery.
Mobile Arty - 1st stage - 1 Bgde per Inf. Bde.
Counter-battery frontage -
Engineering.  Pooling of engineers and pioneers - but leave some
to each Div.
NoxxInfantry No Infantry to be added to engineers.
Opening of - main roads
- mule tracks
- Railways - Villers-Bretonneux
Corbie
Preparations.  Hunn - collection of information.
Tanks.  Total available.
Allotment to tasks.
Separate tanks for each objective, i.e., each body of troops.
Tank training - push on.
Div. H.Q.  Ry. cutting dugouts.
Corbie
Cable buries (x) for and forward.
Employment of our Divs. (Shall we have a 5th?)
A & B for distant objectives. 4 Bgds in line.
C & D for nearer      "           more difficult, troops fresher,
4 Bgdes in line.
Reorganisation of C & D and outpost line.
Exploitation by the reserve Brigades of A & B.
Agreements as to halting places - with Corps on flanks - on Corps
boundaries. Our lines within our own territory are our own affair. 

28 

REVEILLE 

January 31, 1932
Liaison Work: Amiens Battle
"Reveille" is pleased to receive a letter from
Major P. L. Hall, D.S.O., M.C., 24th (Victoria
Rifles of Canada) Battalion, who acted as a liaison-

officer between the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade
and the 15th Australian Infantry Brigade during the
opening stages of the great offensive from Villers
Bretonneux in August, 1918.
An Australian officer, Lieut. A.
Davis, of the 57th Bn, acted as
Liaison-Officer, from the Australian
side, with the 24th Canadian
Infantry Battalion, and in his re-
port dated August 10, 1918, spoke
of the great race between those two
battalions to be first to reach their
objective.
In his letter written from 225
St. James Street, West, Montreal,
Major Hall mentions that, with
two runners, he arrived at the
headquarters of the 15th Aust. Inf.
Brigade on the night of August 7. 

Photograph - see original document

[*Col. Kennedy, V.C.*]
"To all appearances it was a quiet night, with desultory
flares and sufficient firing activity to remind us that there
was a war on. As was to be expected, the atmosphere on
our side was charged with suppressed excitement. It
seemed almost incredible that the Germans could still be
unaware of what we were doing, and the fact that such
was the case showed the efficiency which, at that period of
the war, British arms had attained. It also showed of
what the R.A.F. was capable, in keeping away the enemy
aircraft.
"On arrival at Villers-Bretonneux I had the not-unusual
experience of taking several false turnings and more or
less losing my way before I located the 15th Brigade
Headquarters dugout beyond the town. After reporting
to the Brigadier and meeting the members of his staff, all
of whom received me cordially, there was nothing for me
to do but wait. The quiet continued throughout the night
until 4.20-Zero Hour-when the guns opened their bar-
rage, and Hell broke loose. I stood at the dugout entrance
amid the most deafening noise imaginable, and saw that
unforgettable sight of tanks, infantry, artillery and cav-
alry attacking - the spirit of victory was in the air
already. The thrill it gave is beyond my power of de-
scription. 

"Following shortly behind the attacking forces the
Brigade moved to a new location in the captured terri-
tory. It was here that news was received that the ob-
jective of the 15th Australian Brigade had been gained,
and later word came through that the 5th Canadian
Brigade had been equally successful.
"My duties being thus ended, I reported back to my own
Brigade Headquarters. When I eventually reached my

Battalion, the 24th (Victoria Rifles of Canada), I had
the pleasure of meeting Lt. Davis, an officer attached to
it, from the Australian Battalion operating on its flank.
He appeared to be as much at home in his surroundings
as I had in those which I had just left. An example of
the friendly rivalry and understanding which existed be-
tween our respective troops is illustrated by the following
incident:-
"It was decided, previous to the attack, that it would be a help in
keeping the Australians and Canadians in touch with each other
if a platoon from each of the flanking battalions should operate away from
its own unit, across the railway which formed the boundary line between
them. Lt. Davis, when informed of the plan, felt a little uneasy lest the
Canadians, with whom he had never previously co-operated, should be un-
able to maintain the speed of the advance. Our Colonel assured him the
the 24th Battalion was quite capable of doing so, and suggested that the
two Battalions should race to the final objective. The competition was
keen; each Battalion had its particular obstacles to surmount; the finish
was close; there still seems to be some doubt as to which one got there
first.
"This was typical of the relationship between the
troops of your Commonwealth and of our Dominion. Their
common achievement of success at Amiens, and other
occasions of co-operation in the common cause, will re-
main forever a lasting bond. Ex-soldiers of both coun-
tries have a special reason to feel gratified that our
respective Governments recently brought into being a
trade agreement which gives promise of mutual benefit,
not only in a material way, but also in helping to main-
tain in peace that friendship which existed during the
war."
The report of Lieut. Arthur Davis, 57th Bn., who died
of illness on February 27, 1919, referring to his work as
liaison officer with the 24th Canadian Battalion, says:
"At 5 a.m. (August 8) the Battalion moved into position on south
side of railway, platoons in file, and moved forward. Shelling at this
point was considerable, and a number of casualties were suffered. For
about two hours touch with flanks was rendered difficult on account of
fog. At about 7 a.m. the Green Line was reached and the Battalion was re-
organised. At this point machine gun fire was rather heavy from an enemy
strong point about 600 yards in front of the centre of Battalion sector.
Tanks came up at this point, moved through, and engaged the enemy
strong point successfully, enabling the advance to continue.
"About 800 yards further on a gully with woods was encountered con-
taining both machine guns and artillery. A slight check occurred as this
point, but the leading wave moved forward under covering fire from
flanks and tanks and were able to penetrate the wood. The guns,
machine guns, field and heavies fell into our hands. The village of
Weincourt was reached at about 8.10 a.m. with very slight opposition.
Tanks moved through the village, the Battalion moving round the flanks.
Practically no further resistance was met until after the village of Guilla-
court was passed. The woods east of the village were occupied by machine
guns which gave some trouble, but by this time (about 9.30 a.m.) Whippet
tanks had come up, and working in conjunction with the Mk V tanks,
rendered valuable assistance.
"Progress from this point right up to objective became difficult, as right
flank was unprotected and rifle and machine-gun fire was causing a number
of casualties. Objective was reached at about 1 p.m. The C.O. (Lieut.-
Col. Kennedy, V.C.) spoke in the highest terms of the work done by the
57th Battalion, and was disappointed that it had reached its objective before
his Battalion had done so."
Capt. John Iley Snowball, 57th Bn., who died of wounds
on August 14, 1918, had also made a report under date
August 10, referring to the advance of the flank battalions
of the Canadians and Australians. The enemy infantry,
according to the report had made "a poor show." His
report closed with the question whether in future opera-
tions it would be practicable to send forward with the
advancing infantry trained men in the use of enemy
artillery so that the captured guns could be used against
the enemy. 

General Montgomery-Massingbird
No one has been more ardent in his admiration of the
Australian soldier and more generous in his praise of
him, than has been General Sir Archibald Montgomery-
Massingberd, formerly Chief of Staff to the Commander
of the Fourth Army (Lord Rawlinson), and since 1931
Adjutant-General of the British Forces.
In a letter written from the War Office, Whitehall, under date June 20,
Sir Archibald, in forwarding copy of a lecture, entitled "August 8th, 1918,"
delivered by him at the Royal Artillery Institute, and published in the
Royal Artillery Journal, says:-
"I have always considered, and I think I was in a good position to
know, that the superiority of morale of the British side on Aug. 8 was due
more to the effort of the Australians during the previous three months on
the Somme front than to anything else.
"The moral superiority they had established over the Germans on this
front was very remarkable and undoubtedly spread to other Corps and
Divisions. I saw a great deal of the Australian divisions in France in
1916-17-18, more especially perhaps during the last eight months of the
war.
"I think what struck me most about them was their individual initiative
which is of such enormous value in war, and which was shown time and
again during the advance in the last 100 days....
"I am sorry to see my friends in the Australian Corps are gradually pass-
ing away, but there are still, I am happy to say, many of them of whom
I still hear news."
[Extracts from General Montgomery-Massingberd's lecture will be pub-
lished in our next issue. The lecture gives impressions of the Battle of
Amiens, and includes detail about the German side which the lecturer had
obtained from German sources.] 

XVII/6
of the commission [*^Slact*] were exclusively confined to enquiring
and making recommendations; and criticisms which were made
on the ground that it had not initiated price-fixing disregarded 

the limited degree of authority which it was capable

of exercising.
The new Fisher Government came to the conclusion that
the commission was not fulfilling the purposes which the
needs of the time required. Mr. Tudor, the Minister for
Trade and Customs, in reply to a member of the House of
Representatives, complained that "they sat for some months

and did nothing,"^{6 9} and the ^acting Minister of Home ^for ?External Affairs, Mr.
Mahon, wrote to Mr. Deakin (October 21st) that "in view of
the information available to the Government through departmental 

channels, Ministers consider that further investigations 

by your Commission are not at present necessary."
After further correspondence, Mr. Mahon informed Mr. Deakin
(November 18th) that "the desire is that the Commission shall
at once terminate." The Commonwealth Gazette of December
5th contained a proclamation notifying that the members of
the commission had resigned on November 20th.^{7 10}
9 6
Parliamentary Debates, LXXVII, p.3632.
10 7
The report of the commission, and the correspondence
between Mr. Deakin and Mr. Mahon, are printed in the
Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, 1914-17, Vol. V, pp.
143-192.
There was doubt in the minds of some members of the
Fisher Government whether the Commonwealth had power to
regulate prices. The Minister for Trade and Customs, in
reply to a member who urged action, said, "In my opinion,
under the Constitution ^as it now stands, we cannot do all that the honourable 

[*Prof Scotts 
says
"Home Affairs"

At this date J.A. Arthur
was Ext. Affairs,
W. O. Archibald Home
Affairs, and Mahon
Asst. Min prob I/c of
Ext. Affairs as he
succeeded Arthur, deceased,
in December.
Look up Quotation*]
[*853*]

TELEPHONE, VICTORIA 9400.
ADJUTANT GENERAL TO THE FORCES
[*W Cusack*]
DICTATED.
[[?]]
NSW. BRANCH
22 JUL 1932
RECEIVED.
WAR OFFICE,
WHITEHALL,
LONDON,S.W.I.
20th June, 1932.
Dear Sir,
I have received your letter of the 15th April. I am sure you
will realize that it is very difficult for me to write a fresh
story about August 8th, especially as I am rather busy in my
present appointment. I am, however, sending you a short account
of the Battle of Amiens which was published by the Royal Artillery
Journal in April, 1929. It gives you a brief resumė of what
happened with certain detail about the German side which I got
from German sources. I have obtained permission from the R.A.
Journal for you to publish this article or any extracts from it
you like, subject, of course, to your acknowledging its source.
If you have read the book I published in 1920 "The Story of
the Fourth Army" you will know that I have always realized the
large part the Australian Forces took in this victory. I have
always considered, and I think I was in a good position to know,
that the superiority of morale on the British side on the 8th
August was due more to the effort of the Australians during the
previous three months on the Somme front than to anything else.
The moral superiority they had established over the Germans on this
front was very remarkable and undoubtedly spread to other Corps
/and 

and Divisions. As you probably know, I saw a great deal of the
Australian Corps in France in 1916-17-18, more especially, perhaps,
during the last eight months of the War from March to November, 1918.
I think what struck me most about them was their individual initiative
which is of such enormous value in war and which was shown time and
again during the advance in the last 100 days.
I am sorry to see that my friends in the Australian Corps are
gradually passing away, but there are still, I am happy to say, many
of them of whom I still hear news.
I hope this will be in time for you, but to make sure I am
sending it by Air Mail.
Yours faithfully,
A A Montgomery-Massingberd
General.
R.D. Hadfield, Esq.,
Secretary Returned Sailors & Soldiers'
Imperial League of Australia,
Wingello House,
Angel Place,
Sydney, Australia. 

Diagram - see original document
SKETCH 3 A.
GERMAN SITUATION
Aug.6^th. 1918.

*(Excluding . 4 dismounted Cavalry &
1 Austrian Div.)

Diagram - see original document
Sketch 3 B
Map showing EMPLOYMENT OF
GERMAN RESERVES on 8^th, 9^th & 10^th Aug 1918.

September 1, 1932 

REVEILLE 

13
August 8, 1918
(By General Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd*)

Diagram - see original document

Late Lord Rawlinson
WHEN considering the Battle of
Amiens it is important not to take
it out of its setting. We have to remem-
ber, first of all, that it took place at the
end of fours years of very hard fighting,
and whereas in 1914 the Germans had 72
divisions and 11 cavalry divisions on the
Western Front, and the Allies—British,
Belgian and French- 78 Divisions and 8
cavalry divisions, those numbers had grown
by August, 1918, to about 200 divisions on
each side.
The battle of Amiens was really the be-
ginning of the final round. The armies on
both sides, or a considerable part of them,
had taken part in the bitter fighting of 1914 and 1915;
they had been decimated at Verdun and the Somme in
1916, and at Passchendaele, Arras and Champagne in
1917; and, finally, a large part of them had been through
the big German advance of March and April, 1918, with
the result that both sides were approaching exhaustion,
and it was mainly a question of which side could stay the
longest.
The attack of August 8 differed from the German attack
on March 21, 1918, in several particulars. On March 21,
40 German divisions attacked the Fifth Army, which con-
sisted of 14 divisions and 3 cavalry divisions, and the
Fifth Army, during the next week or so, was only rein-
forced by one division-the 8th. So it was 40 German
divisions attacking 15 British. On the British side, to
start with, only 11 divisions attacked, 4 Canadian, 4 Aus-
tralian, and 3 of the III. Corps, backed up by 3 cavalry
divisions—a total of 11 infantry divisions and 3 cavalry
divisions. They attacked the Second German Army, which
consisted of 15 divisions, two of which were opposite
the French XXXI. Corps. That German army was rein-
forced during the next three days by another 12 divisions,
while the Fourth Army was reinforced by 3 divisions,
so that the Fourth Army and 14 infantry and 3 cavalry
divisions during those four days' fighting engaged alto-
gether 25 German divisions and destroyed a good many
of them.
The two main factors of our success on August 8 were
undoubtedly surprise and superiority of morale. August 8
is an example of what degree of secrecy can be obtained
if proper steps are taken and every detail is worked out,
and of the thorough staff work which it required to collect
such a large number of men, horses, guns and material
on a front of about 22,000 yards without the Germans
having the slightest idea that such a force had been col-
lected there. It was done solely by paying due attention
to secrecy and by really efficient administrative staff work.
It was the administrative arrangements on August 8 that
made that victory possible probably more than anything
else.
There has been a certain amount written as to who
originated the idea of this attack, but the idea came to
several people at approximately the same time. On July
12 Marshal Foch wrote to Lord Haig, and told him he
wanted to free the Bruay Mines. On July 16, directly
after the German attack on both sides of Rheims had
failed, Lord Rawlinson saw Lord Haig personally, and
put before him verbally a proposal for an attack on the
Amiens front, because he felt that the German morale
in front of the Fourth Army was very poor and the de-
fences weak. Lord Haig's inclinations were undoubtedly

in the same direction. He had had his eye
on the Amiens front, too, and the result
of that conversation on July 16—all these
dates fit in very well—was that he wrote
to Foch on July 17, saying that he did not
like the Bruay plan at all, and that he
wished to attack on the Amiens front, se-
cure the junction between the British and
French for good and all, and clear the rail-
ways.
On July 16 he had told Lord Rawlinson
to carry on with his preparations, and on
the 17th Lord Rawlinson sent up to G.H.Q.
a detailed plan of attack. That, excepting
in one important particular, was the attack
which was actually carried out, and the important particu-
lar is an interesting one, because with all due deference
to Marshal Foch I still feel convinced that the original
plan would have been even more effective than the plan
that was actually carried out. Lord Rawlinson's plan was
that the attack from Amiens should take place between
Moreuil in the south, and Morlancourt in the north, and
should be entirely British; and his reasons for this are
clear. One was that four years of experience had shown
that an attack by two allied armies was not nearly so
easy to keep secret as one carried out by a single army,
whether British or French. That was his chief reason.
The second was that strategically he considered that
it would be much better for the French to collect all the
available reserves they could further east and strike in
from the south, from the direction of Montdidier, as soon
as the British attack had shaken the German defence.
This they actually did on August 10, but by that time
the first shock of surprise was over, and German reserves
had arrived. Lord Rawlinson's plan would have compelled
the Germans to face both ways on the 8th, and would
have been more effective than the purely frontal attack
that actually took place.
That the German morale was very low we had dis-
covered chiefly through the enterprise and dash of the
Australian attacks during May and June, finishing up
with a surprise attack at Hamel on July 4, in which
six Australian battalions advanced on a 6000 yards front,
assisted by 60 tanks, and took 1500 prisoners at a cost of
1000 casualties. The British divisions were at a decided
disadvantage; they had difficult ground to advance over;
they were all divisions which had been fighting in the
March retreat; they had lost many of their best officers
and had been filled up with 19-year-old boys, and although
they had come on very well indeed and were improving
every day, they were not, of course, of the same high
standard at that time as the Australians or the thousand-
strong Canadian battalions. But a remarkable fact about
the morale in the British divisions is that out of all the
divisions, British and Dominion, that took part in the
battle of Amiens there were two (18th and 32nd) that
went through the whole fighting up to and inclusive of
November 4, which was the last battle that the Fourth
Army fought. Those divisions at the end of an that
fighting and on the top of what they had undergone be-
fore in March and April, were by November 4 probably
the equal of any Dominion troops.
Many steps were taken to "mystify and mislead" the
Germans. Two Canadian battalions were put in at differ-
ent parts of the front near Kemmel on the Ypres front and
prepared for an attack on Kemmel Hill, which had been
lost by the French in April, 1918. Casualty clearing sta-
tions and aerodromes were established in that area, and
wireless was erected there not only of the divisions in the
(Continued on page 32) 

* Chief of Staff to the 4th Army Commander (Lord Rawlinson) in a lecture
delivered at the Royal Artillery Institute, and reprinted from the Royal
Artillery Journal.