Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/253/1 - 1918 - 1939 - Part 12
-BATTLE OF AMIENS. - Major Gen. E Tivey
August 8th 1918.
The 8th Australian Infantry Brigade was relieved by the 55th British
Brigade, on the early morning of August 1st, after our successful attack on
Morlancourt Ridge, and moved to the Bois de Mai, Allonville. We had been
continuously in the Line since January 31st, and were looking for a well
earned rest. Doubts on the part of the Brigade Major began to arise when he
had his leave cancelled, and I was summoned to Divisional Headquarters
for a conference. As a result of long experience, the strictest secrecy was
maintained, and even Battalion Commanders were kept in ignorance of the coming
operation. Heads of the different fighting formations, such as Tank
Corps, Artillery and Cavalry began to congregate, and when the Staff Captain
issued an order that red flares, for the purpose of signalling to aeroplanes
were to be dealt out, the usual rumours began to circulate, and there were
many speculations as to where the fight would be, also the zero date. The
task of moving the Brigade Group to the front was made rather difficult by
reason of the fact that no movement of any kind was allowed by day, for fear
of revealing our intentions to the enemy.
Our own balloons kept very careful watch over our Corps back areas,
and any unnecessary traffic by day was reported and immediately stopped.
The moving of a Division of Infantry with its attendant Artillery, Engineers,
Ambulance and Transport was quite enough to congest the very narrow and bad
roads leading to the front, and much care had to be exercised in working out
march tables. Tank Battalions and Heavy Artillery were not very considerate
to infantry on the march, and it was generally advisable to give way to a
section of Tanks when they came lumbering along. The nearer the approach to
the line, the more congested the traffic became. The air was filled with the
powerful hum of the Tank engines, and the squeal of the caterpillar gear.
The Tanks seemed to be everywhere in the semi-darkness. Big and little
fighting tanks, and the heavily laden store tanks, the names of which varied
from "Man Eater" to "Dolly Varden". Throughout the short summer night this
movement of all kinds of engines of war went on, and the further one went forward
towards the battle zone, the more unmanageable the traffic became. The
narrow roads were jammed with a heterogeneous collection of infantry on the march,
horse drawn waggons, artillery, tanks, and heavy artillery drawn by caterpillars.
Riding along the road one felt rather afraid that the traffic would not clear
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before daylight, and so allow the Germans to have a "field-day" with their long
range artillery, but with the approach of morning different units began to
straighten out, and pull off into fields and woods, and any tanks or guns that
had to remain near the the road were well camouflaged, so that with the light
of day they presented a very innocent appearance. The sight of all these
preparations was very inspiring to the men, and the morale of all ranks at this
time was particularly good.
We established Brigade Head Quarters in a dug-out 300 yards north of
Villers Bretonneaux on the night of August 4th, and next morning I held a
conference of Battalion Commanders, C.O's Artillery, Engineers, Cavalry,
Trench Mortars, Tanks, Signals, Ambulance and others of the Brigade Group.
We had a mass of instructions from Divisional Head Quarters, which I discussed
with the various officers, and the Brigade Staff began work in earnest in
preparation for the battle. There was little time for rest, and the accommodation
in the dug-out was very limited owing to the presence of signal personell,
runners, liaison officers and all manner of people who seem to collect
around Brigade Head Quarters before an operation. The enemy shelling was
desultory, but he managed to get two direct hits on our Head Quarters during
the night, and as there was some gas we had to wear masks from time to time.
When morning broke the Intelligence Officer and I set out to reconnoitre the
Brigade "jumping off place" in the front line, and owing to the shell torn
ground and muddy communication trenches, we had a trying time.
Until August 7th the Brigade Staff was working at high pressure, and
numerous conference were held, as I had to be satisfied that every leader knew
what he had to do. On the afternoon of the 7th an incident happened that
might have had a very serious result. About 150 yards from Brigade Head
Quarters 18 store tanks loaded with munitions etc, were parked in an orchard,
and a stray German shell hit one of the tanks; the camouflage caught alight
first, then the petrol, and soon the place became a perfect inferno. Terrific
explosions, and huge pieces of tank were blown into the air like matchwood.
All the Brigade battle stores went up in smoke, and we had to improvise motor
and horse transport to take the place of the store tanks. Fortunately the
Germans did not realize what had happened, but we spent an anxious night as
everything depended on our attack taking the enemy by surprise. All orders
had been issued; the last of the conferences had been held, and it was just a
matter of waiting until zero hour. The Brigade began to move to its position
of assembly at midnight, the journey was necessarily slow, the troops moving
-3-
in single file along winding communication trenches, until they arrived at the
tape lines which had been laid by the engineers and members of the Brigade Staff.
A few hours before zero we could hear the roar of the tank engines, as they manoeuvered
their way to the vicinity of the front line. Low flying aeroplanes
of the F.E. type were ordered to fly over the front line during this time, so
as to drown the noise of the Tank engines. Zero hour for the attack was at
4.20 a.m. and there was no preliminary bombardment. The quarter of an hour
before zero was perfectly quiet, only an occasional Very light from the German
trenches. Suddenly the roar of a thousand guns rent the air as our barrage
descended on the German lines. The noise was deafening and the number of shells
must have produced a tornado of flying steel.
In the plan of battle the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions were to
advance at zero hour and after they had taken the first objective (Greenline),
the 5th and 4th Australian Divisions were to pass through them and capture the
final objectives (Red and Blue lines). The 15th Brigade on the right and
the 8th on the left, led the 5th Division, with the 14th Brigade in reserve.
The first phase of the attack on the 8th Brigade front was carried out by the
5th Brigade. The Battlefield was enveloped in fog and smoke which enabled
the 8th Brigade to follow in rear of the 5th, without being subjected to the direct
fire of the enemy artillery. The 8th Brigade moved on a two battalion front,
31st Battalion on the right, 30th on the left; each battalion on a two Company
front. A Such Company disposed in lines of two platoons in file, with a screen of
scouts in front. The 32nd Battalion was in support, 450 yards behind disposed
in diamond formation, each Company disposed the same way. The 29th Battalion
was in reserve in similar formation 450 yards in rear of of the 32nd.
As soon as I received a message from the Brigade Signal Officer that
the troops were on the move, I closed our Headquarters at Villers Bretonneaux,
and with the Brigade Major rode in rear of the Infantry to Warfusee Abancourt,
where I left the Brigade Major to establish a new Head Quarters. The fog was
so dense that keeping direction and maintaining control was extremely difficult,
but in spite of this the Battalions arrived at the first objective in splendid
order. At 8.20 a.m. scheduled time, the 8th Brigade passed through the troops
of the 5th Brigade, and carried on the Battle. The Brigade sector included the
famous old Roman road from Amiens to St. Quentin, and when the fog lifted, I
had the privilege of seeing a most wonderful picture of war; a marvellous
achievement of victory. On every side were the infantry and fighting tanks,
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advancing in perfect battle formation. Artillery, Engineers, Cavalry, Armoured
Cars and transport pushing into the heart of the German position, while overhead
aeroplanes were fighting, and the screaming of heavy artillery shell, the chatter
of machine guns, and hum of tank engines all added to this amazing scene.
I spoke to many of our men during the advance, and all were imbued with
the spirit of victory. I noticed particularly the magnificent e'lan of the
advancing infantry, and the sparkling keeness of gunners and drivers of the
artillery. From the cheerful manner of these young Australians, they might
have been going to a picnic, instead of being engaged in one of the most vital
battles of the war. Even wounded men gave me a cheery greeting, and said, "We
are winning."
The 31st Battalion met with fierce opposition from a Battery of German
Field Artillery, and five of our tanks were knocked out before the guns and
crews were captured. Streams of German prisoners were coming in, and
any opposition was quickly overcome, until the leading troops reached the Morcourt
Valley, where the enemy were able to put up a more stubborn resistance. This
valley was covered with trees and undergrowth, and the presence of hidden machine
guns held up the advance, but with theassistance of the remaining tanks and the
supporting field artillery, a company of the 30th Battalion, and a company of
the 32nd, attacked the position with fixed bayonets, and captured 200 prisoners
and a number of machine guns.
At 10.30 a.m. the Red Line was reached, and the exploiting parties
who were being carried in Mark 5 Star Tanks were to pass through and take the
final objective (Blue Line). I happened to be on the Red Line at this time,
and seeing that the Star Tanks had not yet arrived, and were not in sight,
I ordered the 30th and 31st Battalions to advance and capture the final objective.
This was done before the Germans could organize any resistance, and our men
occupied and consolidated the Blue Line, and prepared for a counter attack.
The left flank of the Australian Corps was exposed on the north bank of
the Somme owing to the failure of the advance of the 3rd British Corps, and the
enemy shelling from this direction during the afternoon was fairly heavy. The
1st British Cavalry Brigade passed through our sector, and very gallantly tried
to exploit the success, but the German machine guns took a heavy toll of men and
horses. They rounded up many prisoners, but could not advance against the
machine gun positions. Just after the final objective was taken a messenger asked
me if I would see the Tank officers, who were in the Morcourt valley. These
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gallant boys paraded, asking for orders, as they were just about exhausted
after their strenuous efforts, both before and after during the battle. Their
faces and uniforms were black with grime, and in some cases spattered with
blood. Some of the boys were almost hysterical and unfit for further duty.
I warmly congratulated them and the tank crews on their splendid work, which
saved the lives of so many of our men, and as some of the tanks were damaged,
and most of them required overhauling, I sent them back for a rest. I
established Brigade Head Quarters just behind the Red Line, and was trying to
estimate the number of prisoners and amount of war material we had captured
when an observation balloon officer came to me breathless with excitement,
and asked me if he could put up his balloon, as it was his greatest chance in
the war. I pointed out that we were seven miles in the German lines, and
the enemy were just in front. However, his motor lorries with the balloon
had arrived so I let him put it up at his own risk. As soon as the balloon
was up and the two observers busy taking notes, two of our own aeroplanes
came along, and promptly shot their tracer bullets into the balloon fabric,
and the two observers jumped out with their parachutes. The balloon burst
into flames, and I heard some of our men making wagers as to which observer
would reach the ground first, and the O.C. Balloon Section was with me on the
verge of tears.
Looking to our left we could see that the Germans were miles in our
rear, but we were determined to hold the ground that we had won, and by nightfall
the AustralianCorps was consolidated in depth, and the front line troops
were well dug in. On the following morning we received orders that the 8th
Brigade was to advance the line to the east of Vauvillers, and that the first
Australian Division was to come in on our right. Zero hour was 11 a.m. and
the 1st Division did not arrive in time, so the 8th Brigade had to advance with
and exposed right flank. The 29th Battalion was on the right and suffered
severely from machine guns on the exposed flank. The 15th Brigade were was pushed
into the gap, between the 8th Brigade and the Canadians, and the objectives were
gained. A company of the 29th under Lieut. Captain Clayton Davis very gallantly
attacked and captured Vauvillers, taking 150 prisoners, and a number of machine
guns. The 29th Battalion lost four five splendid young officers killed in this
engagement, and the wounded included the C.O. Colonel J. McArthur, who was shot
through the neck. Our captures for the two days were 981 prisoners, 22 guns
including the 11.8 Railway gun, 86 machine guns, and a vast amount of war material.
-6
The Brigade was withdrawn from the line on August 10th, and went back
to the Aubigny Line for a rest. All ranks were very tired, but proud of their
success.
HN
9/8/18
45 WESTBROOK STREET
EAST KEW.
9th October 1930.
Major J. MacArthur
To, Captain .C.E.W.BEAN.
Dear Sir.
SUBJECT. 29th BATTALION. A.I.F.
General, Tivey has requested me to write you
in connection with the action of the 29th Bn in the capture of
VAUVILLERS on the 9/8/18, he is a little concerned that there may
be an error creep into the official history, as has occured in the
case of Sir, John ,Monnish's book in which the 15th Brigade has
been given the creditt of this.
The facts are that the 29th Bn had gone through
the village at least two hours prior to,the 58th Battalion having
come up, (I had issued orders that the Coy on the right was to push
right through and establish positions on the far side, and that no
one was to remain in the village, when the 58th came up later they
at the time did not know that the 29th had already gone through and
sent back a report that they had captured it, having gone to the
Post Office and amongst other things collected a bag with Iron
Corsses, General Tivey heard that the 58th had made this claim, and
having been advised over 2½ hours earlier that a Bn of the 8th Bde
had already reported the matter, he at once got in touch with General
Hobbs,& Elliot. and explained the position, General Tivey and myself
received letters from General Elliot, forwardingg congratulations and
explaining that a mistake had been made.
It may be interesting to give a brief summary of
what took place, (am not sure what the official report contained as
unfortunately I had been one of the 12 Officers wounded in this
action, these having been lost killed and wounded 12 in about 10,min)
At 7,30 a.m. on the morning of the 9th, I received
a Telephone message to go to Bde for a conference, and reached there
a little after 8 a.m. we waited some considerable time for one of the
British Imperial Artillery Brigadiers to come along, but however he
did not get along, it was a little after 9 a.m. when we commenced, the
conference, I was informed that my Bn would carry out the attack, and
received permission to send a warning to my Coy Cmdrs to be prepared
and meet me at 10 a.m. we were still waiting for the Artillery Officer
,the Brig remarked on my concern, and gave me permission to write my
Orders, which I did, these were dispatched by a Light Horse man, but
I had a doubt about him delivering the goods, which proved correct
as they did not reach the Coy Cmdrs till toolate. I had to go back
3000 yds pick up my command move 1200 yds to our right front move
through the 57th Bn, and to a position on the right oft the 31st,
There was also allotted 5 tanks, (which were knocked out. 3 prior to
reaching the jump off, and the other 2 just in front of it.
Zero hour was 11 a.m. and we did not get to our position in time the
barrage as it was having been put down by one Brigade instead of twoxxxxxxx On moving up the 58th Bn were halted in groups on the left
of Harbonniers, the C.O. asked me to give him some particulars of my
orders as he was a bit uncertain of his position etc, he had to move
to the right of the town and this took some time and was the cause
of his delay in getting forward.
My Bn acttacked with 3 Coys, and one in Reserve, we came under
very heavy M.G. & Rifle Fire, also artillery, and suffered many
casualties, but gained our objectives, and held same although our
right flank was in the air for 2½ hours. Capt, Davis. D.S.O. was in
command of "A" Coy who captured VAUVILLERS, was badly wounded, and
although he fainted from loss of blood, he stuck to his post, and
made a reconnaissance of the front and forwarded the position back
through Bn to Bde, V. C's have been given for less than this Officer
did, the 3 Attacking Coys lost all their officers except one each.
I understand that General Tivey is writing up this action.
There is also another action of the 29th that I am not
HN Beumetz
23/3/17
Btz Maj. MacArthur 29 Bn
(2)
I am not sure that they have received the credit that was due.
On the 20/3/17 the 29th & 30th Bns were attached to
General Elliott ,15th Bde, and were ordered to relieve the Bns
on the Advanced Guard, or Outpost, the 29th on the right xand 30th onleft of Bapaume, Road, and 30th on left. the former Bn relieved the
60th in the vicinity of Lebirquie, this Bn had been trying to get
Beaumetz during the afternoon,but owing to the position of two nests
of M.G.'s one on the right of the village and one on the left near
the Bapaume Rd. they were unable to do so and on relieving them, there
was some difficulty in locating the posts, however they were relieved
between 3.25 & 4.20.a.m. On the 21st At this time I was acting as 2nd
I/C,and in view of the fact that Colonel Clerk of the 30th had been
placed in command of the Out Post, Col, Purser, did not go forward, and
I was sent forward with three Coys, 275 men, the C.O. remained with the
Reserve Coy at Deleaux Farm 2½ miles in rear.
The 30th Bn took up a position on Morchie Rd, with an advanced L.G.
post near the Junction in the vicinity of a Sugar Mill.
Just before daybreak on the morning of the 21st, I sent forward a
Section towards Beaumetz , and they were able to get in, and reported
same, I then sent forward a Platoon, but these were unable to enter
owing to M.G. fire from the positions already described. I then ordered
Capt Bennett of "B" Coy to move up a sunken road on the right of the
Village and attack the guns there ,this was successful, as the guns
had to withdraw. "A" Coy under Capt Booth was then orderd to take
the village which was done, by using a high mound which protected
them from the guns on the Bapaume Rd. The German trenches were about
300 yds in front of the village.
The position now held was, "A" Coy in Baumetz, "B" Coy in front of
Velue Wood "C" Coy on right at Bertincourt, with my H.Q. at
Lebucquiere, The 30th Bn on the Morchies Rd, 1100 yds to the left
rear, I think that the 29th can claim to having held the longest
line, having 275 men on 5,800 yds with both flanks in the air, as
the 30th although requested would not come forward. and the Imperial
troops were back towards Le Transloy, we had no artillery forward
of Bapaume, on the Night 21/22 we were relieved of the village of
Bertincourt, by a detchment of Yeomanry and a Coy of the Devons.
We assisted by two Engineer Officers who came along to see what the
they could do ,dug strong posts in front of Baumetz.
On the morning of 23rd the enemy strongly attacked the
village, moving down the Bapaume Rd, and on the Right and completly
surounded it, Capt, Booth with 56 men held it, and Lieut, Harrisson,
led a detachment of N.S.W. Light Horsmen that had joined up the Bn
on the previous night, and proceeded to clear the village, he came
through the village, on to the Lebucquire side and about 40 of the
enemy had collected on a small knoll, (the one that helped us to
take the village) he charges at the head of his men, and the morning
air bore out the yells," You bloody bastards" repeated over and
over, like a pent up flood, I saw this tall officer holding a rifle
& bayonet dive it downward into three different ones, the dreadful
yells and fierce attack drove the Germans from the knoll, who fell
back onanother large Coy coming from the Bapaume Rd, these in turn
fell back, and the 30th Bn at the same time came forward a little
and opened up with all their V.G. L.G.'s & rifles, at the same
time Capt,Bennett, and of "A" Coy & Capt Dalton of "C" attacked from
[*the] of old friend the sunken Rd on the right the enemy on this side
were driven back and the whole attack was driven off, the 30th
advanced along the Bapaume Rd, and found a few Germans in two or
three houses near the road. The enemy captured their L.G. which was
in the advanced post at the sugar mill, 1000 yds to our right rear,
we had the pleasure of recapturing this again and handing it back
for which I hold a receipt. We had secured all our ground by 5 a.m.
There were many of the enemy killed, prisoners and valuable maps
captured, It was found that we had been attacked by 5 Coys of special
storm troops, who were cavalry and had been training for 3 months
prior to, they were well set up men, but had the wind up before they
commenced the attack, not caringv in love with the idea of attacking
the Australians, we had this from prisoners.
The C.O. came forward with the Reserve Coy from Deleaux Farm
75 men and arrived at 7.a.m. but went back shortly afterwards. I then
sent this Coy forward to secure the railway and sunken road, which
gave a distinct advantage.
advantage.
(3)
TR
I along with my Orderly made a reconnaitre reconrance of the front
line during the forenoon, and on reaching the village of Bertincourt
could not find any of the Yeomanry or Devons, but eventually came
accross an Officer with a Patrol, who informed that they had received
orders during the night to fall back towards Le Transloy, they had
not advised me, so that I found both my flanks very much in the air.
On the Bapaume Rd, between us and the 30th I could only place and
officer with a L.G.& 8 men to protect me on this flank, and as will
be seen there remained nothing on my right, it became necessary for
to send a Platoon from Velue Wood to hold the village on the right.
Capt Boots was killed shortly after the situation was
cleared up whilst reporting to me on the telephone, he was a gallant
officer, as was also Lieut, Harrison who although wounded twice
refused to go back till I sould send him a relief.
All ranks behaved with the greatest courage, and in view
of the long line held, it was impossible to obtain any rest for the
three days and nights that we held this position, we had to suffer
shelling from the enemy and could not reply, although a Major of
Artillery came forward one evening, and promised to bring a gun up
which he did and placed a few shells into the M.G. position on the
Bapaume Rd. we thought a lot of that Gunner Major.
It will be seen waht what a risk was taken in following
up the Germans in 1917.
I believe that the Brigadier of the 15th sent up two
Bns about 10 a.m. on the 23rd, but I did not see them, I am thankful
to state that we did not require them.
The C.O. Outpost did not come forward to see how we were
getting on, some of his Staff did after the fight was over.
I could relate many stories in connection with this
action.
We were relieved on the night 23/24 the 57 Bn taking
over Beaumetz, and next day another Bn took over the right portion
of the line. The Germans again attacked the village and obtained a
lodgment in the right corner ,and held there for some time but were
eventually driven out.
I have forwarded this owing to the statements that
have been made that my true reports as sent back had not been
received and that another unit desired to claim that they had cleared
the situation. The story that I have set out is the situation from
the man on the spot. This is many years after, but as I have explained
my late Brigadier, General Tivey has asked me to get in touch with
you and as he expressed it I owe it to the fine fellows who formed
the 29th Battalion, who am afraid have never said quite enough, and I
know that you will blaim me, for holding back information.
Trusting that you will give the above your
consideration and if not ^too late, adjust anything that is not correct.
At certain periods our War Diary was not to clear,
information not extended.
Thanking you in anticipation.
Yours sincerely.
John McArthur
Ex, Commanding 29th Battalion.
Now by grace an Hon Major.
J McArthur
Reveille Aug 1936
REVE
THE VICTORY OF
AUGUST 8,1918
(By P. F. Lucas, MC, 32nd
Battalion, AIF.).
Of all the battles fought in France by the AI.F, it can
be said, without fear of contradiction, that the one that
stood out as the greatest and most spectacular was the
action of August 8, 1918. Following but a few months
after the great German success of March 21, it not only
showed the world that the German Army was not the
invincible machine that many people thought it to be, but
opened the run of victories which ended in throwing the
enemy from his well-nigh impregnable Hindenburg Line,
and helped materially to place the final victory with the
Allies.
From the time when the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions
moved down to the Somme at the end of March and earl
April, 1918, a spirit of aggression pervaded the whole
Australian corps. Apart from the brilliant successes of
Villers-Bretonneux and Hamel, small stunts were being
carried out the whole time; a raid here, a few hundred
yards snatched away there, Monument Wood, Morlancourt
Ridge, the Mound, and other little bits, all fell to the
Diggers. Fritz was jumpy. Raids not only brought back
prisoners, but inflicted casualties where they could least
be spared.
My battalion moved up on August 5 from rest billets
or, rather, from wheat fields near Amiens, in which we
had been camped. We had previously been billetted in a
convent on the outskirts of the city, but, as the Boche
persistently shelled the place with long-range guns, we
had moved to a safer zone.
Although the abnormal amount of traffic on the roads
at night had caused comment, it was not realised by us
that a large-scale stunt was projected, until our CO.
Lieut-Col C S. Davies, called the officers together on
the morning of the 6th and gave us an outline of the plan.
As my special job would be the guiding of the battalion
during the advance, I was instructed to walk thirty yards
ahead of the leading company, from which the others
would take their direction. That afternoon a few of us
went forward to the crest in front of Villers-Bretonneux
and had a look at the country over which we were to
advance, and while there I took a compass bearing on a
cemetery on the outskirts of Warfusse-Abancourt. How
useful this was afterwards to be, I little realised at the
time.
On the 7th it rained. At another meeting with the
C.O., final instructions and maps were issued, but, if I
remember correctly "zero” hour (fixed for 42.0 a.m.)
was not given out until late that night.
Sometime during the evening there was a great commotion
around Villers-Bretonneux. It afterwards transpired
that a lucky shell from Fritz had landed in the centre of
the 28 supply tanks parked in an orchard on the north
side of the town, with the result that one of them, which
was loaded with petrol, immediately burst into flames.
As soon as Fritz saw this, he made this point the objective
for all his available guns, and, by the time he had finished.
5 tanks were destroyed. Prisoners taken next day stated
[[*th*]] at when the blaze was seen it was thought to be an
ammunition dump on fire. No one on the enemy side,
apparently, thought of tanks.
The 32nd Battalion moved forward to its jumping-off
at 2 a.m. and then began the most nerve-trying time
of the whole stunt— the wait for zero hour. Everything
possible had been done to ensure success, but one kept on
thinking, "Is there anything forgotten?" Few of us who
stood in that trench, noting the growing mist, will ever
forget the suspense. Slowly the minutes passed. At
last, twenty minutes past four.
The roar of the opening barrage was so great that when
I shouted to my sergeant (A. I. Densley, afterwards
lieutenant) who was standing next to me, he could not
hear a word. The mist by this time was so thick that one
could not see more than ten yards ahead. It was then
I thanked myself for the compass bearing I had taken
the day before, for I was thus able simply to walk ahead
with the compass in my hand. Densley got three or four
men from the company, and we linked up.
Crossing our front line, we literally fell into what had
been the German front line, quite empty except for dead
Germans. During the whole of our advance to Warfusee,
we encountered only three live enemy; two offering fight
were promptly killed, the third being sent back a prisoner.
This reflected great credit upon the attacking battalion-
I think it was the 19th, of the 5th Brigade- for the
thoroughness in which they had "mopped up" under such
foggy conditions.
I was beginning to feel a little doubtful of my position
when I heard a voice out of the fog say, "Look out, you'll
be walking into the wall of the b_______y cemetery in a
minute." The welcome advice came from a wounded
Digger, who was sitting against the gatepost of the cemetery,
and waiting for the fog to lift before he commenced
his walk back to the aid-post.
As we drew near to Warfusee the mist began to clear,
and in a very short while the sun broke through, and there
developed a glorious summer morning. In a small gully
we found the C.O., the adjutant (Lieut. F. Hardy), and
the M.O. (Capt. E. W. B. Woods, now of Hay). In the
fog they had stumbled upon the main Amiens road, and,
following it, had arrived at Warfusee with the attacking
battalion. It was just in front of this gully that we
were to pass through the 5th Brigade on the so-called
"green" line, and continue the advance.
While resting in the gully we witnessed one of the most
exciting air scraps I ever saw. A German airman, flying
very low, came over and turned his machine-gun on us.
Although fully a thousand men were sheltering here, I
did not hear of one being hit. Just as he turned to give
us another burst, one of our 'planes suddenly attacked
him. Round and round they dew just above our heads, so
low, in fact, that we could see the German pilots
moustache. All the while they were pumping lead into each
other, until finally the British 'plane appeared to be hit,
and staggered away over the top of the ridge. By this
time other British machines were making to join the
dog-fight, so off Fritz flew towards his own lines.
The time (9 a.m.) had now arrived for us to move
forward to the "red line" 5000 yards ahead. If this
advance proved successful, we were to push forward
another 1000-1500 yards, to the "blue" line.
Preceded by tanks, we crossed the main road, and met
our first opposition from a German held gun shooting over
open sights from the wooded corner of the Amiens-Bayon-villers
road. Lewis gun and ride fire eventually proved
too hot for the crew, who nevertheless fought their gun
bravely, so they Iimbered up and galloped of down the
road, and, I think, got safely away. We could not help
admiring their courage, and I, for one, hope they got
safely through the war.
We were at this time still crossing a flat plain over
which the German advance of the previous March had
swept without much evidence of material damage. Apart
from some posts strengthened with a certain amount of
wire, there was no opposition in the way of a rapid
advance. The machine-gun fire, when it became evident,
was quickly squashed out by the tanks, which simply
ploughed the offending guns into the ground. About 600
yards beyond the Amiens road, we surrounded and
captured a pill-box containing some twenty Germans, mostly
boys of 17 or 18 years of age, under a big red-headed
sergeant, who ran out with his hands up.
Sending these prisoners to the rear, we continued our
advance to the Morcourt Valey, which lay right across
our path. We had been warned to expect trouble here,
and, as we moved forward, rifle and machine-gun fire
broke out. Just then a tank came along. Pointing out
the trouble to its commander, we lay down while it went
forward to the edge of the valley, which was well wooded.
As soon as the tank reached this position, we moved
forward and took the place with a rush. It was full of
rest huts, and transport on the point of moving off. The
German officer-in-charge was shot in the final rush, and
149 prisoners were taken. The advent of the tank apparently
demoralised them, for there seemed to be no reason
why the transport at least should not have escaped; but
all the prisoners seemed quite happy in their situation,
their only worry being to exchange their heavy helmets for
the light, round cloth cap they wore out of the line. This
they were allowed to do. I felt rather sorry for one
chap who had his leave pass for home in his pocket. In
the wood was also a canteen, well stocked with things a
soldier covets, such as cigars and champagne.
We now moved forward to the "red" line, and, finding
no opposition here, on to the "blue” line, which was
reached at about 11.20 am. Since our start that morning
we had made a total advance of 9000 yards. The 31st
Battalion, on our right, had an equally successful
advance, and to it fell the honour of capturing the
great railway gun, which, after standing for some time in
Sydney, is now in Canberra. It was reported at the time
that a British 'plane had flown over and blown up the
railway line on which the gun could have escaped.
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