Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/253/1 - 1918 - 1939 - Part 3

Major P.L. Hall DSO MC
Canadian Liaison Officer
with Aust Corps  8/8/18

Address (Oct 1931)
c/o National Trust Coy
St James Street
Montreal Canada

From Cusack

Aug 8

Book in AWM

Die Katastrophe des 8 August
1918  (Schlachten des
Weltkrieges.  Band 36)

By Major von Bose

German Books.
Note "Sanitater" has
several references of
interest for me
when writing
Somme 1916
& 1918 (Aug)
C.E.W.B.

H.N. Vol 6.
13.6.35.
[*This explains why White's proposals
are not with the diaries.*]

Dear D^r. Bean,
In the course of a conversation this
morning General White made a statement which
may interest you.
He said that about a month before he
left the Corps, General Rawlinson visited H.Q.
and informed Gen. Birdwood that Sir Douglas Haig
contemplated carrying out a big offensive, that
plans were to be prepared but, to ensure
secrecy, the proposals were to be written out by
hand, not typed. General White then prepared
proposals which, as far as he can remember,
provided for the employment of the same number of
divisions as were eventually, used.  When Birdy
left the Corps General Rawlinson feared that M^r.
Hughes might endeavour to have the Australians
withdrawn.  To lessen the risk of this & to get
General Monash thoroughly interested in the plans,
General Rawlinson asked induced General Monash
to regard them as his own, but was very
disappointed when General Monash in his book
 

claimed all the credit for having originated the
proposals for the Aug. 8 offensive.!
General White spoke as if his memory
had recently been refreshed by a reference to
his diary.
I expect that in Vol 6 you will have
to determine the authorship of the Aug. 8
plans.  The above may therefore open up a 
fresh line of inquiry.  On the other hand you
may know all this already.
Your sincerely
J Treloar

24 June 1935

My dear White,
Treloar sent me a very interesting note mentioning
a conversation that you lately had with him about
the early plans for an offensive on the Somme in 1918.
I have seen the letters from Aray which were
the occasion for drawing that plan, but have not seen the
answer, and your statement to Treloar, that it was not typed,
furnishes the explanation.
I should be grateful if you would let me know
what the plan was and what happened to it, and, if you
recall anything else about it.  Treloar also tells me that
Rawlinson told you (or someone) that he was anxious, later,
to make Monash as much as possible the father of the 
subsequent plans as he feared that W. M. Hughes might agitate for
the withdrawal of the Australians about that time.  Hughes
did, indeed, take steps about that time to get the Australians
a rest - but I think that the matter hadn't come to a head
before Aug.8. I have some notes on that matter too, but
have not yet collated them.
I trust that you and yours are all well.
With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

538 Collins Street,
Melbourne,
27th June 1935.
My dear Bean,
I have just received your letter of 24th inst.
Unfortunately I have not any records by me and can
only give you information from memory. My mind is however
perfectly clear upon the matters to which I will refer.
Whilst we were at Bertangles, and only a comparatively
short time before we relinquished the Corps, General Rawlinson 
came down to us with Archie Montgomery his chief of Staff and
said he had an important and confidential matter to discuss
with us and wished the utmost privacy. We therefore shut
ourselves in General Birdwood's office and Rawlinson expounded
to us a plan then in the Commander in Chief's mind for a big
offensive as early as conditions would allow. Rawlinson said
we could contemplate five divisions (I think he added we might
have even two more) and that the Canadians would probably be on 
our right. He expounded his own and the C. in C's views as to 
passing one division through another adding that the aim was
the greatest possible penetration and the best possible rearward 
organization to facilitate such penetration. He informed
us further of the artillery and tank support on which we could
rely. He then asked Birdwood to work out in skeleton a plan 
shewing the frontage (broadly this was indicated on the map) we
could take up and the depth of our penetration at various stages.
[* The offensive of
August was over
the same area as
that indicated to us.*]
He instructed us very definitely that our plan was to be in our
own handwriting, that it must not be typed and that no one but
ourselves was to be informed of what had occurred during his
visit. The plan was duly taken up by me to Archie Montgomery
and that was the last I heard of it until I learned of
what the Australian Corps had in contemplation for August 1918.
What I prepared is of no importance however. The
important point is that the plan for the August offensive was 
the Commander in Chief's and Rawlinson's. [*This is beyond question.*]
When John Monash's book came out Montgomery wrote 
to me saying that Rawlinson and he were- what is the right
word? - not annoyed and not offended but perhaps "quite surprised" 
that Monash had asserted that the plan was of his own
 

2.
devising and had been suggested by him to Army. Montgomery
and I carried on a correspondence for some time on this subject
the effect upon me of it being that Montgomery was
practically confessing that Rawlinson encouraged Monash to
believe he was conceiving and making it clear, that at the time
they were deadly anxious not to do anything which might offend
the Australian Corps or antagonize Monash, or Hughes who at
that time was a cloud on the horizon on the subject of the
employment of Australian troops.
The point of real interest to me is not John
Monash's view - for which I think he had some justification
and I am sure he wrote sincerely - but in fact, of which
I am sure, that credit has always been given wrongly to Foch
for the August offensive plan whereas it was Haig who really
conceived it and prepared for it.
If there is anything else in which I can help you 
I hope you will let me know
My very best wishes go to you,
Yours sincerely,
Brudenell White
Dr. C. E. W. Bean D.Litt.
"Clifton",
Ortona Road,
LINDFIELD, N.S.W.
 

H.N.30 June 1935
My dear White,
your letter is most interesting, but before I
ask you as to the one or two points on which I should like
to be certain I should mention that the records that I have
seen render it practically certain that Haig, when he proposed
that offensive, was acting under a directive from Foch.
Haig saw Foch on receipt of this instruction, and the
main lines of the joint offensive were agreed upon at a 
conference between them on April 8.
I haven't had time to work out the chain of
events carefully yet, but I think we now have all the
material. I did not mean to tackle the subject until the last
volume; but I think I shall have to cover refer to it in Vol. V to the
extent of making it clear to any careful reader that we know
that Monash did not devise the August offensive, though of
course he was responsible for many of the details in the
plan for his own Corps. Otherwise it may be assumed that we
contend that the plan was an Australian one, and, if Edmonds
publishes an account of the matter before I do, it might
appear that we had to be set right by a statement from the
old country. It would be much better for the statement to
come from us - even if it is only in a footnote in the volume
dealing with April 1918. 
Now as to what you tell me. In the first place
it was news to me that under the plan projected in your time
the Canadians were to be brought down, and it is very important.
I had thought that this was John Monash's stipulation -
I am under the impression that he once told us so, and that
I have it so in my diary. I take it you are sure of this - it really is
a vital point.
Secondly, it is interesting to know that the aim
of the suggested offensive was the greatest possible penetration.
When the project was put to Monash the aim was either
to reach Chaulnes Junction, or to command it with artillery.
Third, what you say about Rawlinson insisting on
"the best possible rearward organisation to facilitate such
penetration" suggests that he probably put the same requirement
to Monash. The method of passing the leapfrogging
brigades through the forward ones (or rather the way in which
they were disposed before the move forward) was I believe
 

2
of Monash's own devising, and struck me at the time as being
the most original detail in his plan.
When Rawlinson said you could think in terms of five
divisions he was, of course, speaking of the Australian
Corps. The Corps was then north and south of the Somme,
and so I suppose that you would have played the role that 
was subsequently played by III Corps north of the Somme, as
well as by Aust. Corps. Possibly the two extra divisions
were for that purpose. I suppose the Canadians were to come
in south of you and the French south of them. Do you remember?
I have been constantly asked about this offensive and 
who was responsible for it, but I have always refused to
say anything because until one had all the threads in one's
hand one really did not know. Even now I am not confident
enough to make a sure statement. But I think that I will
give the indication mentioned above. 
Edmonds has been most helpful, and I feel sure that I
have been able to help him also. When Lloyd George referred
to him about Passchendaele he told him that he ought to
read our Volume IV. Edmonds wrote to me that Lt.G. evidently
did not take his advice. As a matter of fact he did, and
bought a volume of Australia House, which he used pretty
largely (at least, I am sure from internal evidence that he
did so); but he has fenced or tried to fence our points, and
of course he doesn't acknowledge it.
Yours sincerely,