Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/228A/1 - June - October 1917 - Part 3
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GENERAL GODLEY'S SPEECH TO THE 11th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.
near DOULIEU. 15th. June 1917.
General Cannan, Officers, non-commissioned officers and
men of the 11th. Infantry Brigade, I have come down here today
to thank you and to congratulate you on what your Brigade did
in the great battle of MESSINES, which is just over. Your
Division which was on the right of the line, had a most
difficult and responsible task of swinging round to form the
right flank of the whole army in this battle. That task was
more difficult than I daresay many of you realise, and it was
only because of the very thorough training and careful consider
preparation that you were able to do it with such great success.
Every man understood what he had to do and you did it. This
is the first time that the Brigade has taken part in an
offensive, and it is a very good augury of what the Brigade will
be able to do in the future. No Brigade has done better.
I think you all of you may be very proud of what you have done,
and to think that in xxxxxx your first battle of this kind you
acquitted yourselves so well.
Many of you, I know, fought in the GALLIPOLI PENINSULA and
on the Somme; but you may all of you rest assured that the
11th. Brigade has now proved itself worthy to take its place
beside the very best Brigades which formerly came from Australia.
I wish to take thank you on behalf of the 2nd. Anzac Corps for
the work you did in the fight, and to tell you how proud I am
to have this Brigade in the Corps. I know that if we have
further fighting - and of course we shall have - I shall be
able to rely on the Brigade to acquit itself as it has done in
this battle.
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[* Regimental Records.
18 Bn. Oct.9.1917 *]
18th Battalion raided an annoying German sniping post
under a practice barrage. The Germans did not know they were
coming till they had gone 150 yards. Captured 15 men and
machine gun; Sergt. who got machine gun was sniped dead coming
back. The date was Sunday, 6th Oct, at 6.15 a.m. behind
a practice barrage - quite impromptu. (Our people standing
up /Evening before on parapet had not been sniped.) Germans tried to cut
the raiders off on the left; about 30 came out, but the 19th
Battalion cut them up.
As we were getting back the Germans came up to the place
our men attacked. The Germans came up from China Wood. We
went back at them and killed some. Germans opened up with
a machine gun on the right flank, which caused most casualties
18th Battn. was relieved on the night of 7/8, and came back
to the Gasometer in Zonnebeke.
11.30 a.m. on 7th. The Germans seemed to have brought up
more guns, and put up a barrage when we put one up. Rain
came. We came in. Something like Flers - a lot of
incipient ^trench feet - men got about in socks and couldn't get boots
on again. About 123 evacuated - out of about 350. The German
fire was very incessant. Of course he was expecting an
attack. Men were on dumps and duckboards under observation -
dumping duckboards and off for all they were worth - 5th Div.
yesterday would do the same - make one wild rush for the last
100 yards and get for all they were worth. One prisoner
thought that all men with Iron Crosses were shot.
The duckboards were up to Tokio, near Zonnebeke Church.
(The Germans brought Zonnebeke Church Tower down on top of
the cooks yesterday. One of the cooks said it was the first
time he had been to church for 27 years, and then they throw
it down on top of us.) One ^German artilleryman said "you've got us
beaten. He wrote to his people:- I'm right up near the
infantry now - next time I'll write from England.
18th and 19th were to attack first. The relief of the
18th and 19th was hung up till day, 24 hours before the attack -
they could not be got out by day, so the 17th and 20th
were given the attack. The 17th and 20th jumped off - the
20th for red, 17th for blue. About 3 hours later the 18th
and 19th, who had been sent to the front line, were pushed
up. Dairy Wood had held them up, and both flanks were in
the air.
The barrage was good, but not so good as before. The
ground was not so sloppy as behind the lines. On the left
the Germans were just over the ridge in posts entrenched with
machine guns. Our barrage had been on him, for many were
killed. On the left of the railway line was a strong post
with 40 or 50 Germans in amongst a dump of sorts a little
North of the cutting. The Tommies were not up. "C" Coy.
saw the Germans sniping them from there and came back and
dealt with it, and captured the Germans. Used for supports
all day, the 20th were ahead further.
At Decline Copse railway cutting we were on the left
side of the cutting as well as the right. We captured 5
machine guns in the cutting beside the Copse and cleared it.
The Germans were getting into us from the right, a block-house
near Decoy Wood. We were at Decline Copse three
quartersx of an hour. The Germans saw we were very weak, and
attacked from right and left. Our own men were farther
right - a gap between.. (Decline Copse is on the left of
the cutting whose bank goes into it.) Our men had to come
back to Defy Crossing, where the first strong point had been,
where 50 were captured. The 5th Brigade line was just N.W.
of Dairy Wood to Rhine House. The 6th Brigade, instead of
going through Dairy Wood, went round the North of it after
the 5th Brigade - machine guns were active there. At 4 p.m.
Capt. Tailor's Coy. of 19th Bn. attacked Dairy Wood from the
north, and established posts on the south and east side of
it, capturing 15 Germans and 1 machine gun. The 6th Brigade
were then mixed with the 19th Bn. in post North of the Wood
and a post south of xxx Rhine.
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(2)
A post of the 17th Bn. existed between Assyria and Rhine
House. Thet got up behind the barrage and were in Assyria
House - a big red house near the crossroads which we take
for Assyria. They were there all day about 300 yards back
from Assyria - 15 men and Lieut. Allen, 17th Bn.. He managed
to get a message back tox the 20th Bn. near Rhine House
(N.W. of it) to say he would retire at dusk - The Germans
knew where he was. He had just come wjen the Germans came
out, and our barrage came down fair on the spot where his
post had been. He went on the left of the 20th Bn., 18 c 1.7
or possibly on
5 waves of Germans were seen to come across in this attack.
North of Assyria a Commissioned Officer., Lt. Lyons,
M.M., was left with some men, and also some at Decline Copse.
The dugouts are on the North side of the cutting near Decline
Copse. Before then it was an embankment. The Germansx
were in a trench from xxxxx xxxxx Defy Crossing southwards beyond the
road, and this was where a good many machine guns came from.
Many Germans were killed there by our barrage - no resistance.
Our people on the right were caught by German machine guns
from British territory on the left. Also from Busy Wood,
which caused surprisingly few casualties.
The 45th Bn. has a post just S.E. of K in Kerselaarhoek,
North of Defy Crossing. Germans could be seen in the front
line carrying, plenty of them. The forming of a defensive
flank by dropping posts (without much warning) was very difficult
to men who were apt to go on. Allen made the 6th
Brigade do this (as the 5th Brigade had not) when the 6th
Brigade came through.
Fromour old position in 17 c 8.3. we were completely to
enfilade and worry the Germans who were opposite the 6th
Brigade on the right 900 yards aways.
R/48
Map - see original document
Becelaere
21 Bn. 22 23 & 24 Bns
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COPY;
SECRET
REPORT ON ATTACK GN BROODSEINDE RIDGE BY 21st BATTALION
3rd,4th, and 5th October 1917.
1. The battalion moved from GORDON AREA at 10.40 p.m. on 3rd Oct. to the
Assembly Place at D.27. c .9.5 - arriving there and formed up as previously
arranged. viz. - in mass, sections in file without a casualty at 3J 5
a. although the Hun was searching the valleys with 4.2 and 5.9 H.E.
shells.
When formed up his firing increased considerably - shells mostly. 77m.m.
and 4.2 howitzers fell all round. One shell landed amongst us and
resulted in two casualties, also enemy machine gun fire troublesome at
2.10 a.m.
2. Battalion moved to Jumping Off Tape and formed up as arranged and every
thing O.K. as 5.20 a.m.
3. Established Bn Hqrs at BRICK KILN at D.27.b.9.0. at 5.25 a.m.
Enemy put down a heavy barrage on Jumping Off Tape.
At Zero 6 a.m. our barrage opened and his immediately reduced to a few
5.9 shells.
Our men moved forward after the barrage in close formation until they
got past the enemy barrage line. On account of the heavy straffing
previous to Zero the Battalion was much disorganised and had lost all
Signalling gear except one 'phone and coil of wire which were at Bn.
Hqrs.
4. Shortly after Zero wounded and prisoners came in to the R.A.P. which was
established in the BRICK KILN, the latter were made used of to the fullest
extent as stretcher bearers. Practically all the wounded were the result
of his pre-Zero bombardment up to about 6.30 a.m.
5. From my position in the Brick Kiln, as soon as it became light enough,
I was able to observe all movement of our troops from below DOCILE
TRENCH to the Crest of the Ridge.
At 6.20 a.m. a message was sent to Brigade that out casualties were
approximately 10% and that everything seemed to be going O.K.
At 7.10 a.m. to Brigade that the 1st Division could be plainly seen on
the Ridge firing at the enemy from a standing position also that the
6th Brigade were digging in on the RED LINE.
6. At 7.20 a.m. our men also went through our barrage on to the crest and
commenced firing at the retiring enemy and also used captured M.G.s
against him. These men came back through the barrage and took up their
correct position and then followed it at the appointed time.
There was much congestion around the pill boxes and these were immediately
straffed by the enemy on the first objective being carried.
7.50 a.m. a message was repeated to Bde which was sent me from two
Coy Commanders that "Resistance slight: Casualties light: am on the forward
slope of the BROODSEINDE RIDGE: Prisoners surrendering easily."
9.35 a.m. Bn Hqrs moved to a pill box near the Cemetery.
10.15 a.m. Message maps arrived from C.C.Coys, and showed them in
position of BLUE Line also they reported in close touch on Right Flank
with 24th Bn and our Left overlapping and 50 yards in front of the
Unit on our left, 26th Bn.
On the position being queried by Brigade it was confirmed by Priority
Message at 12.45 p.m.
7. Situation messages were sent to Bde at 3.50 p.m. and 6.15 p.m.
At 7 p.m. in reply to B.M.86 the following was sent to Brigade -
"Situation report from front line timed 4 p.m. states 'Local counter
attack appeared to form at D.23.d.4.8. but nothing developed'. No further
news to hand. Casualties to Officers - 3 Killed, 7 Wounded. Other Ranks,
about 60 [[?]] Approximate strength in line 200 rifles."
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8. At 7 p.m. a carrying party of 18th Bn. arrived with 40 tins water, 20
boxes S.A.A. and 16 boxes of grenades.
At 8.15 p.m. ((a shell)) landed in Bn. Hqrs, killing 2 Other Ranks, and wounding
4. set fire to the boxes S.A.A., and holed 23 tins of water stacked
in Hqrs.
9. Capt. F. Sale M.C. sent for water, S.A.A., and a Stokes Gun.
The two former were sent up and arrangements were made to get the
assistance of the 24th Bn Stokes Gun Section.
10. At 9.45 p.m. Bn Hqrs shifted to DEKNOET FARM.
Message from line - "All O.K. Casualties since arrival in line 5%. Material
captured, 1 Anti-Tank Gun, Several M.G.s., 1 Wireless Set (this should have
been 1 Telephone Set)".
At 11.30 p.m. message from line "One Officer killed, 2 wounded, leaving 3
Officers in line.", so the Signalling Officer was sent up to assist.
At 1 a.m. got in touch with 24th Bn re. some assistance from their Stokes
Section, but they did not know its whereabouts.
11. At 3.30 a.m. B.M.104 from Bde asking for information and stating no news
received for 12 hours.
Replied to at 3.50 a.m. as follows - "QUINCE established on BLUE LINE.
Since arriving there casualties have been light, and, except for active
sniping, the situation has been fairly quiet. Local counter attack was
reported to be assembling but did not develop. S.O.S. has not been sent
up on our front yet. Casualties to Officers heavier than previously
thought - Two more wounded through the night, leaving three in the line.
Sig. Officer has been sent up, making four: Capt. Sale, Capt. Sandford,
Lieut. Clarke, 2/ Lt. Holt. Sale reports everything O.K."
"Situation reports have been sent every hour by your runner returning
wired to your forward station, and by walking wounded."
"Bn Hqrs now with QUIET. Situation satisfactory. Strength 4 Officers and
about 200 rifles in the line. They are well dug in and trench is continuous."
12. 4 a.m. "Situation satisfactory" was sent to Bde. The day was quiet and
there was very little artillery activity, though his aeroplanes were
up continuously, and flying low over our front and sometimes firing
into the front trench.
At 5.40 p.m. a Lewis Gun Post was established about 150 yards in front
of our right centre. The crew were a bit 'windy', as they had had a bad
time, having been twice buried previously, and when at dusk an enemy
patrol attempted to outflank them, they came back to the front line
after a small 'scrap'.
The enemy sniping was practically nil till about 6 p.m. when we sent
out two patrols, then it livened up so much that the patrols could not
continue: it was mostly M.G. fire from the right front and DAISY WOOD.
13. At about 7 p.m. the S.O.S. was sent up on our right, and afterwards on
on the left. At the same time the enemy put down a heavy barrage on our
front and support lines until 7.30 p.m.
At 8 p.m. a message was sent to QUAIL by an Artillery Lamp that the
situation was quiet and satisfactory, and same was sent to Bde forward
Station by Runner.
14. The Bn was relieved by the 18th at 11.25 p.m.
21 Officers and 576 Other Ranks went into action on the 4th Oct. and
casualties - Officers Other Ranks.
Killed 7 24
Wounded 7 202 (D. of w. 2 Other Ranks.)
Missing - 33
Officers Killed:- Capt. J.W. Pearce M.C., Lieut. D Black, Lieut. F.B. Collins,
Lieut. F. Rigby, Lieut. J.S.T. Rigby, 2/Lieut. H.W. Harper, 2/Lieut. T.F. Heraud
Officers Wounded:- Lieuts. W.McConnachie, S.H. Chapman, G.A. Edamnson,
B. Besemeres, J.A. McDonald, 2/Lieuts. W.G. Seales, and T.W. Eales.
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15. REPORT ON VARIOUS ITEMS ON ATTACK ON 3rd, 4th, & 5th Oct. 1917.
(a) ROUTE IN - It is very necessary that Infantry should have a well
defined route, quite apart from a wheeled or mule track - otherwise
blocks will be unavailable and a unit soon loses its organisation.
(b) The time to move in from GORDON AREA to the point of assembly,
viz - 5½ hours, was too long: we had 1¾ hours wait on WESTHOEK.
(c) The method and formation adopted at both the point of Assembly
and J.O.T. were satisfactory and quite sound.
(d) Zero time was right.
(e) BARRAGE - The rate was good, but the near line was very ill-defined
and it was impossible to keep in a line behind it. It was very thin
and at one time the men went through it up to the crest and turned
Hun M.G.s on the retiring enemy. The men then came back to their
appointed place in the rear of the RED LINE and waited for the barrage
to lift.
At times Coy Commanders could not tell the place it was intended
to be at, and would see a salvo of shells fall, and move up near
the place only to have a salvo fall in rear of them.
On the further side of the BROODSEINDE - BECELAIRE Road the ground
is in quite good order and shows little signs of artillery fire.
(f) WIRE. On the Hun side of the ridge the wire was not cut: it was only
skeleton wire, but was in good order and had to be cut by hand.
(g) The smoke line was not defined, and only in some places could it
be of use to the front troops.
(h) The training given to the troops was on the correct lines and the
enveloping tactics by platoons under cover of their Lewis Gun
proved very successful in dealing with 'pill boxes.' Also firing the
Lewis Gun from the hip proved a very effective way of dealing
with enemy M.G.s and small parties in shell holes, and for retiring
groups of Huns.
(i) A general line formed by linking shell holes - the whole well
zig zagged - seems to be a very satisfactory line.
(j) MORALE. The prisoners morale was in some cases very low, while others
appeared indifferent. it was the usual thing for Huns to shoot
until within 50 yards, then they threw up their hands.
(k) GENERAL. The 35 minutes preceeding Zero, during which our troops
had to take all the Hun could give, greatly disorganised the Bn and
was responsible in a great measure for any loss of direction or
congestion. All the signalling gear except one phone and one reel
of wire were destroyed on the J.C.T.
The communications were again poor. Lamp signal on to WESTHOEK should
have been quite a simple matter and there was no sound reason why
messages could not be acknowledged from WESTOEK. To give an instance
instance a 21st Bn Signaller salved and repaired an Artillery Lucas
Lamp, set it by compass for KIT KAT, and sent an important, though
short, message, through three times slowly when a Red Flare was xx
fired from KIT KAT. All that was required was an R.D. by a lamp or
torch and it would have saved the signaller exposing himself for
at least 10 minutes in a very unhealthy spot, and also he would
have had the satisfaction of knowing that he had got his message
through.
Communication from the line to Bn Hqrs was by runner and was quite
satisfactory. But from reports and queries the messages did not
appear to go satisfactorily from the Bde forward Station to the
rear.
Use was made of prisoners as Stretcher Bearers and thus saved a
large number of our men, though two parties who went to get more
stretchers were all killed or wounded, and on account of the intensity
of the Hun barrage prior to Zero it was some time before the
Regtl. S.B.s were able to get going properly as there was an
abnormal number of stretcher cases.
An enemy with good morale and courage would have inflicted far
greater casualties on us from the ridge forward, as the ground had
not the appearance of having been straffed, shell holes were few
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and far between, the ground was quite firm, and grass growing, the wire xx
was intact, and the main roads in good order.
(1) AIRCRAFT :- Except for the day of the stunt, when no enemy planes were
about, enemy aircraft seemed to do just what they liked, and were continually
flying low up and down our lines, and in a few cases dropped
small bombs and fired their M.G.s into our trenches.
Had our anti aircraft M.G.s been issued with tracer bullets some better
results may have been expected obtained. Later in the day as a result of
our reconnaisance our line began to get shelled.
(m) Troops that do an attack should be relieved within 48 hours and should
be given a bath and 48 hours rest being again sent in,
otherwise the sucvess of the second stunt in undoubtedly endangered.
(Signed.) B. Duggan, Lieut. - Colonel,
Commanding 21st Battalion.
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x x COPY. SECRET.
REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 21ST BATTALION A.I.F.
BROODSEINDE SECTOR - Oct. 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th.
Oct. 7th. Battalion moved from KIT KAT at 3.40 p.m. to relieve part of 20th
Battalion in support. In consequence of an S.O.S. from our line,
enemy shelling was extremely active and our progress much impede d
Relief complete 7.35 p.m. Casualties 1 O.R. Killed. 2 O.R. Wounded.
Oct. 8th. Brigade Order for the attack received 3.25 a.m. Orders for BN to
support 23rd Bn cancelled verbally by B.M. at 11 a.m. and Bc ordered
to take half of frontage allotted 23rd Bn and attack at Zero.
This was confirmed by an addendum Order received at 8.15 p.m.
[* R48/47 *]
Oct. 9th. Battalion moved to J.O.T. in excellent order and reported in position
and O.K. at 4.15 a.m. Casualties moving up - 1 Officer killed,
2 Officers and 8 Other Ranks wounded.
Barrage opened punctually but all accounts prove it to have been
light and ineffective, enemy snipers and M.G.s remaining in action
over the whole area. Attack was satisfactorily launched well on
time and troops came almost immediately under heavy and accurate
enemy fire. All Officers became casualties early in the operation
and formations became considerably disorganised.
The 24th Bn on Right was held up at WEST edge of DAISY WOOD, a
portion of our right flank remaining with them.
Owing to accurate enemy fire very few messages came through, and
practically the only means of communication was a line to a
forward post run conjointly by 21st and 24th Bns under the supervision
of the Signal Officer of the latter unit. This line was
most admirably maintained under most adverse circumstances and
proved simply invaluable.
Reports from this centre and the Bn Observers showed the attack
held up on our flank on reaching the line of the Woods but progressing
under the greatest difficulties on our front by bounds from
hole to hole. The ground was very heavy and cover infrequent.
The left flank party under Sgt BOWLER progressed in touch with
some elements of the 23rd Bn and moving South of DAISY WOOD
finally dug in at approximately D.24. a.1.9. The centre under Sgts
WEIS and WARREN finally reached the knoll near the final objective
and dug in on a line ((D.24.a.2.5 - D.24. a 1.7. with both flanks
completely in the air and under heavy fire from BUSY WOOD where
the Boone was extremely active. The party of 28th B allotted to ((us?))
was ordered forward at 8.15 a.m. to establish in a position between
the two Woods and assist the cleaning up from the flanks.
No further reports were received from this party but Bn observers
reported them moving forward to position.
Bn Commanders in conference 8.45 a.m. decided that as there was
practically nothing in rear, Bde be requested to place a Bn in the
original front line in case of emergency.
A patrol sent out to clear up the position reported at noon some
elements of the Bn on a rough line from D.23.b.0.5. to D.23.b.4.6.
At 3.40 a.m. orders re relief by 49th Bn were received and C. O.s
consultation decided on line to be handed over.
Oct. 10th. At 1 a.m. relief was complete and the Companies 49th Bn well dug
in on line D.23. a. 5.7. to D.23.a. 1.3.
Bn was withdrawn and slowly collected in old support line.
At 12.40 p.m. orders confirming previous verbal orders were received
to form a composite Bn under acting C.O. 21st Bn.
At 7 p.m. on the C.O. 49th bn expressing his agreement, to Bn were
withdrawn and ordered back to YPRES.
A small number of prisoners, perhaps 10 in all, were taken and sent
to the rear.
Enemy continually presented good targets which were freely [[?]]
of by our snipers and Lewis Gunners, who inflicted upwards of 100
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casualties - the estimate of course being only approximate.
Enemy stretcher parties were continually at work particularly in
the vicinity of BUSY WOOD. There is little doubt also that enemy
was considerably disorganised and knew little of the position.
Hostile shelling was very heavy on original front and support
lines and in vicinity of DEKNOET and ZONNEBEKE LAKE.
Enemy aircraft was exceedingly active and seemed to have control.
Our aircraft, though often up in large numbers, did not seem to
prevent their operations in any way.
Tracks to the rear were very bad, and the crossing over ZONNEBEKE
CREEK is nothing short of a menace to communications.
Stretcher bearers, who worked nobly throughout, were often
exhausted after a single trip.
(Signed.) Henry A. Crowther.
Major.
October 11th 1917.
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