Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/228A/1 - June - October 1917 - Part 3

R 39/94
GENERAL GODLEY'S SPEECH TO THE 11th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

near DOULIEU.   15th.  June 1917.

General Cannan, Officers, non-commissioned officers and 

men of the 11th. Infantry Brigade,  I have come down here today

to thank you and to congratulate you on what your Brigade did

in the great battle of MESSINES, which is just over.  Your

Division which was on the right of the line, had a most

difficult and responsible task of swinging round to form the

right flank of the whole army in this battle.  That task was

more difficult than I daresay many of you realise, and it was 

only because of the very thorough training and careful consider

preparation that you were able to do it with such great success.

Every man understood what he had to do and you did it.  This

is the first time that the Brigade has taken part in an

offensive, and it is a very good augury of what the Brigade will

be able to do in the future.  No Brigade has done better.

I think you all of you may be very proud of what you have done,

and to think that in xxxxxx your first battle of this kind you 

acquitted yourselves so well.

 

Many of you, I know, fought in the GALLIPOLI PENINSULA and

on the Somme;    but you may all of you rest assured that the

11th.  Brigade has now proved itself worthy to take its place

beside the very best Brigades which formerly came from Australia.

I wish to take  thank you on behalf of the 2nd. Anzac Corps for

the work you did in the fight, and to tell you how proud I am

to have this Brigade in the Corps.  I know that if we have

further fighting - and of course we shall have - I shall be

able to rely on the Brigade to acquit itself as it has done in 

this battle.

 

20
R46/2
[* Regimental Records.
 18 Bn.  Oct.9.1917 *]
18th Battalion raided an annoying German sniping post

under a practice barrage.  The Germans did not know they were

coming till they had gone 150 yards.  Captured 15 men and

machine gun; Sergt.  who got machine gun was sniped dead coming

back.  The date was Sunday, 6th Oct, at 6.15 a.m. behind

a practice barrage - quite impromptu.  (Our people standing

up /Evening before on parapet had not been sniped.)  Germans tried to cut

the raiders off on the left; about 30 came out, but the 19th

Battalion cut them up.

 

As we were getting back the Germans came up to the place 

our men attacked.  The Germans came up from China Wood.  We

went back at them and killed some.  Germans opened up with

a machine gun on the right flank, which caused most casualties

18th Battn. was relieved on the night of 7/8, and came back

to the Gasometer in Zonnebeke.

 

11.30 a.m. on 7th.  The Germans seemed to have brought up 

more guns, and put up a barrage when we put one up.  Rain

came.  We came in.  Something like Flers - a lot of

incipient ^trench feet - men got about in socks and couldn't get boots

on again.  About 123 evacuated - out of about 350.  The German 

fire was very incessant.  Of course he was expecting an

attack.  Men were on dumps and duckboards under observation -

dumping duckboards and off for all they were worth - 5th Div.

yesterday would do the same - make one wild rush for the last

100 yards and get for all they were worth.  One prisoner

thought that all men with Iron Crosses were shot.

 

The duckboards were up to Tokio, near Zonnebeke Church.

(The Germans brought Zonnebeke Church Tower down on top of

the cooks yesterday.  One of the cooks said it was the first

time he had been to church for 27 years, and then they throw

it down on top of us.)  One ^German artilleryman said "you've got us

beaten.  He wrote to his people:- I'm right up near the

infantry now - next time I'll write from England.

 

18th and 19th were to attack first.  The relief of the 

18th and 19th was hung up till day, 24 hours before the attack - 

they could not be got out by day, so the 17th and 20th

were given the attack. The 17th and 20th jumped off - the

20th for red, 17th for blue.  About 3 hours later the 18th 

and 19th, who had been sent to the front line, were pushed

up.  Dairy Wood had held them up, and both flanks were in

the air.

 

The barrage was good, but not so good as before.  The

ground was not so sloppy as behind the lines.  On the left

the Germans were just over the ridge in posts entrenched with 

machine guns.  Our barrage had been on him, for many were

killed.  On the left of the railway line was a strong post

with 40 or 50 Germans in amongst a dump of sorts a little

North of the cutting. The Tommies were not up.  "C" Coy.

saw the Germans sniping them from there and came back and

dealt with it, and captured the Germans.  Used for supports

all day, the 20th were ahead further.

 

At Decline Copse railway cutting we were on the left

side of the cutting as well as the right.  We captured 5

machine guns in the cutting beside the Copse and cleared it.

The Germans were getting into us from the right, a block-house

near Decoy Wood.  We were at Decline Copse three

quartersx of an hour. The Germans saw we were very weak, and

attacked from right and left.  Our own men were farther

right - a gap between..  (Decline Copse is on the left of

the cutting whose bank goes into it.)  Our men had to come

back to Defy Crossing, where the first strong point had been,

where 50 were captured.  The 5th Brigade line was just N.W.

of Dairy Wood to Rhine House.  The 6th Brigade, instead of

going through Dairy Wood, went round the North of it after

the 5th Brigade - machine guns were active there.  At 4 p.m.

Capt. Tailor's Coy. of 19th Bn. attacked Dairy Wood from the

north, and established posts on the south and east side of 

it, capturing 15 Germans and 1 machine gun.  The 6th Brigade

were then mixed with the 19th Bn. in post North of the Wood

and a post south of xxx Rhine.

21
R46/2
(2)

A post of the 17th Bn. existed between Assyria and Rhine

House.  Thet got up behind the barrage and were in Assyria

House - a big red house near the crossroads which we take

for Assyria.  They were there all day about 300 yards back

from Assyria - 15 men and Lieut. Allen, 17th Bn..  He managed

to get a message back tox the 20th Bn. near Rhine House

(N.W. of it) to say he would retire at dusk - The Germans

knew where he was. He had just come wjen the Germans came
out, and our barrage came down fair on the spot where his
post had been. He went on the left of the 20th Bn., 18 c 1.7

or possibly on

 

5 waves of Germans were seen to come across in this attack.

North of Assyria a Commissioned Officer., Lt. Lyons,

M.M., was left with some men, and also some at Decline Copse.

The dugouts are on the North side of the cutting near Decline

Copse.  Before then it was an embankment.  The Germansx

were in a trench from xxxxx  xxxxx Defy Crossing southwards beyond the 

road, and this was where a good many machine guns came from.

Many Germans were killed there by our barrage - no resistance.

Our people on the right were caught by German machine guns

from British territory on the left.  Also from Busy Wood,

which caused surprisingly few casualties.

 

The 45th Bn. has a post just S.E. of K in Kerselaarhoek,

North of Defy Crossing.  Germans could be seen in the front

line carrying, plenty of them.  The forming of a defensive

flank by dropping posts (without much warning) was very difficult

to men who were apt to go on.  Allen made the 6th 

Brigade do this (as the 5th Brigade had not) when the 6th

Brigade came through.

 

Fromour old position in 17 c 8.3. we were completely to

enfilade and worry the Germans who were opposite the 6th

Brigade on the right 900 yards aways.

 

R/48

Map - see original document
Becelaere

21 Bn. 22 23 & 24 Bns

 

23
R48/47

COPY;  
SECRET

REPORT ON ATTACK GN BROODSEINDE RIDGE BY 21st BATTALION

3rd,4th, and 5th October 1917.

1. The battalion moved from GORDON AREA at 10.40 p.m. on 3rd Oct. to the

 Assembly Place at D.27. c .9.5  - arriving there and formed up as previously

 arranged. viz. - in mass, sections in file without a casualty at 3J 5

 a. although the Hun was searching the valleys with 4.2 and 5.9 H.E.

 shells.

 When formed up his firing increased considerably - shells mostly. 77m.m.

 and 4.2 howitzers fell all round.  One shell landed amongst us and

 resulted in two casualties, also enemy machine gun fire troublesome at

 2.10 a.m.

 

2. Battalion moved to Jumping Off Tape and formed up as arranged and every 

thing O.K. as 5.20 a.m.

 

3. Established Bn Hqrs at BRICK KILN at D.27.b.9.0. at 5.25 a.m.

Enemy put down a heavy barrage on Jumping Off Tape.

At Zero 6 a.m. our barrage opened and his immediately reduced to a few

5.9 shells.

Our men moved forward after the barrage in close formation until they

got past the enemy barrage line.  On account of the heavy straffing

previous to Zero the Battalion was much disorganised and had lost all

Signalling gear except one 'phone and coil of wire which were at Bn.

Hqrs.

 

4. Shortly after Zero wounded and prisoners came in to the R.A.P. which was

established in the BRICK KILN, the latter were made used of to the fullest

extent as stretcher bearers. Practically all the wounded were the result

of his pre-Zero bombardment up to about 6.30 a.m.

 

5. From my position in the Brick Kiln, as soon as it became light enough, 

I was able to observe all movement of our troops from below DOCILE 

TRENCH to the Crest of the Ridge.

At 6.20 a.m. a message was sent to Brigade that out casualties were

approximately 10% and that everything seemed to be going O.K.

At 7.10 a.m. to Brigade that the 1st Division could be plainly seen on

the Ridge firing at the enemy from a standing position also that the

6th Brigade were digging in on the RED LINE.

 

6. At 7.20 a.m. our men also went through our barrage on to the crest and

commenced firing at the retiring enemy and also used captured M.G.s

against him.  These men came back through the barrage and took up their

correct position and then followed it at the appointed time.

There was much congestion around the pill boxes and these were immediately

straffed by the enemy on the first objective being carried.

7.50 a.m. a message was repeated to Bde which was sent me from two

Coy Commanders that "Resistance slight: Casualties light: am on the forward

slope of the BROODSEINDE RIDGE:  Prisoners surrendering easily."

9.35 a.m.  Bn Hqrs moved to a pill box near the Cemetery.

10.15 a.m. Message maps arrived from C.C.Coys, and showed them in

position of BLUE Line also they reported in close touch on Right Flank

with 24th Bn and our Left overlapping and 50 yards in front of the 

Unit on our left, 26th Bn.

On the position being queried by Brigade it was confirmed by Priority

Message at 12.45 p.m.  

7. Situation messages were sent to Bde at 3.50 p.m. and 6.15 p.m.

At 7 p.m. in reply to B.M.86 the following was sent to Brigade -

"Situation report from front line timed 4 p.m. states 'Local counter

attack appeared to form at D.23.d.4.8. but nothing developed'. No further

news to hand. Casualties to Officers - 3 Killed, 7 Wounded. Other Ranks,

about 60 [[?]]   Approximate strength in line 200 rifles."

 

24
R48/47

8. At 7 p.m. a carrying party of 18th Bn. arrived with 40 tins water, 20
boxes S.A.A. and 16 boxes of grenades.
At 8.15 p.m. ((a shell)) landed in Bn. Hqrs, killing 2 Other Ranks, and wounding
4. set fire to the boxes S.A.A., and holed 23 tins of water stacked

 in Hqrs.

 

9. Capt. F. Sale M.C. sent for water, S.A.A., and a Stokes Gun.

The two former were sent up and arrangements were made to get the

 assistance of the 24th Bn Stokes Gun Section.

 

10. At 9.45 p.m. Bn Hqrs shifted to DEKNOET FARM.

Message from line - "All O.K. Casualties since arrival in line 5%.  Material 
captured, 1 Anti-Tank Gun, Several M.G.s., 1 Wireless Set (this should have

been 1 Telephone Set)".

At 11.30 p.m. message from line "One Officer killed, 2 wounded, leaving 3
Officers in line.", so the Signalling Officer was sent up to assist.

At 1 a.m. got in touch with 24th Bn re. some assistance from their Stokes

Section, but they did not know its whereabouts.

 

11.  At 3.30 a.m.  B.M.104 from Bde asking for information and stating no news

received for 12 hours.

Replied to at 3.50 a.m. as follows - "QUINCE established on BLUE LINE.
Since arriving there casualties have been light, and, except for active

sniping, the situation has been fairly quiet.  Local counter attack was

reported to be assembling but did not develop. S.O.S. has not been sent

up on our front yet.  Casualties to Officers heavier than previously

thought - Two more wounded through the night, leaving three in the line.

Sig. Officer has been sent up, making four: Capt. Sale, Capt. Sandford,

Lieut. Clarke, 2/ Lt. Holt. Sale reports everything O.K."

"Situation reports have been sent every hour by your runner returning

wired to your forward station, and by walking wounded."

"Bn Hqrs now with QUIET. Situation satisfactory.  Strength 4 Officers and
about 200 rifles in the line.  They are well dug in and trench is continuous."

 

12. 4 a.m. "Situation satisfactory" was sent to Bde.  The day was quiet and 
there was very little artillery activity, though his aeroplanes were

up continuously, and flying low over our front and sometimes firing

into the front trench.

At 5.40 p.m. a Lewis Gun Post was established about 150 yards in front

of our right centre.  The crew were a bit 'windy', as they had had a bad 
time, having been twice buried previously, and when at dusk an enemy

patrol attempted to outflank them, they came back to the front line
after a small 'scrap'.
The enemy sniping was practically nil till about 6 p.m. when we sent 

 out two patrols, then it livened up so much that the patrols could not

 continue: it was mostly M.G. fire from the right front and DAISY WOOD.

 

13. At about 7 p.m. the S.O.S. was sent up on our right, and afterwards on

on the left.  At the same time the enemy put down a heavy barrage on our

front and support lines until 7.30 p.m.

At 8 p.m. a message was sent to QUAIL by an Artillery Lamp that the

situation was quiet and satisfactory, and same was sent to Bde forward
Station by Runner.

 

14. The Bn was relieved by the 18th at 11.25 p.m.

21 Officers and 576 Other Ranks went into action on the 4th Oct. and

casualties   -       Officers           Other Ranks.
Killed                         7                           24

Wounded                 7                         202    (D. of w.  2 Other Ranks.)

Missing                      -                            33

Officers Killed:-  Capt. J.W. Pearce M.C., Lieut. D Black, Lieut. F.B. Collins,

              Lieut. F. Rigby, Lieut. J.S.T. Rigby, 2/Lieut. H.W. Harper, 2/Lieut. T.F. Heraud
Officers Wounded:- Lieuts. W.McConnachie, S.H. Chapman, G.A. Edamnson,

              B. Besemeres, J.A. McDonald, 2/Lieuts. W.G. Seales, and T.W. Eales.

 

25
R48/47  1704
15. REPORT ON VARIOUS ITEMS ON ATTACK ON 3rd, 4th, & 5th Oct. 1917.
(a)  ROUTE IN - It is very necessary that Infantry should have a well 

defined route, quite apart from a wheeled or mule track - otherwise

blocks will be unavailable and a unit soon loses its organisation.
(b) The time to move in from GORDON AREA to the point of assembly,

viz - 5½ hours, was too long: we had 1¾ hours wait on WESTHOEK.
(c) The method and formation adopted at both the point of Assembly

     and J.O.T. were satisfactory and quite sound.

(d) Zero time was right.
(e) BARRAGE - The rate was good, but the near line was very ill-defined

and it was impossible to keep in a line behind it.  It was very thin

and at one time the men went through it up to the crest and turned

Hun M.G.s on the retiring enemy.  The men then came back to their

appointed place in the rear of the RED LINE and waited for the barrage

to lift.

At times Coy Commanders could not tell the place it was intended
to be at, and would see a salvo of shells fall, and move up near

the place only to have a salvo fall in rear of them.

On the further side of the BROODSEINDE - BECELAIRE Road the ground

 is in quite good order and shows little signs of artillery fire.

(f) WIRE. On the Hun side of the ridge the wire was not cut: it was only

skeleton wire, but was in good order and had to be cut by hand.

(g) The smoke line was not defined, and only in some places could it

be of use to the front troops.

(h) The training given to the troops was on the correct lines and the

enveloping tactics by platoons under cover of their Lewis Gun

proved very successful in dealing with 'pill boxes.'   Also firing the

Lewis Gun from the hip proved a very effective way of dealing

with enemy M.G.s and small parties in shell holes, and for retiring

groups of Huns.

(i) A general line formed by linking shell holes - the whole well

zig zagged - seems to be a very satisfactory line.

(j) MORALE.  The prisoners morale was in some cases very low, while others

appeared indifferent.  it was the usual thing for Huns to shoot

until within 50 yards, then they threw up their hands.

(k) GENERAL.  The 35 minutes preceeding Zero, during which our troops

had to take all the Hun could give, greatly disorganised the Bn and

was responsible in a great measure for any loss of direction or

congestion.  All the signalling gear except one phone and one reel

of wire were destroyed on the J.C.T.

The communications were again poor.  Lamp signal on to WESTHOEK should

have been quite a simple matter and there was no sound reason why 

messages could not be acknowledged from WESTOEK.  To give an instance

instance a 21st Bn Signaller salved and repaired an Artillery Lucas
Lamp, set it by compass for KIT KAT, and sent an important, though

short, message, through three times slowly when a Red Flare was xx

fired from KIT KAT.  All that was required was an R.D. by a lamp or

torch and it would have saved the signaller exposing himself for

at least 10 minutes in a very unhealthy spot, and also he would

have had the satisfaction of knowing that he had got his message

 through.

Communication from the line to Bn Hqrs was by runner and was quite

satisfactory.  But from reports and queries the messages did not

appear to go satisfactorily from the Bde forward Station to the

rear.

Use was made of prisoners as Stretcher Bearers and thus saved a 

large number of our men, though two parties who went to get more

 stretchers were all killed or wounded, and on account of the intensity

of the Hun barrage prior to Zero it was some time before the

Regtl. S.B.s were able to get going properly as there was an

abnormal number of stretcher cases.

An enemy with good morale and courage would have inflicted far

greater casualties on us from the ridge forward, as the ground had

not the appearance of having been straffed, shell holes were few

           

               

26

R48/47 

- 4 -.

and far between, the ground was quite firm, and grass growing, the wire xx

was intact, and the main roads in good order.

(1) AIRCRAFT  :- Except for the day of the stunt, when no enemy planes were

about, enemy aircraft seemed to do just what they liked, and were continually

flying low up and down our lines, and in a few cases dropped

small bombs and fired their M.G.s into our trenches.
Had our anti aircraft M.G.s been issued with tracer bullets some better

results may have been expected obtained.  Later in the day as a result of

our reconnaisance our line began to get shelled.

(m) Troops that do an attack should be relieved within 48 hours and should 

be given a bath and 48 hours rest being again sent in,

otherwise the sucvess of the second stunt in undoubtedly endangered.

 

                                                             (Signed.)  B. Duggan, Lieut. - Colonel,

                                                                      Commanding 21st Battalion.

 

27
R48/47

 

x x COPY.                    SECRET.

 

REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 21ST BATTALION A.I.F.

BROODSEINDE SECTOR - Oct. 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th.

 Oct. 7th.    Battalion moved from KIT KAT at 3.40 p.m. to relieve part of 20th

Battalion in support.  In consequence of an S.O.S. from our line,

enemy shelling was extremely active and our progress much impede d

Relief complete 7.35 p.m.  Casualties 1 O.R. Killed. 2 O.R. Wounded.

 

Oct. 8th.   Brigade Order for the attack received 3.25 a.m.  Orders for BN to

support 23rd Bn cancelled verbally by B.M. at 11 a.m. and Bc ordered

to take half of frontage allotted 23rd Bn and attack at Zero.

This was confirmed by an addendum Order received at 8.15 p.m.

[* R48/47 *]

Oct. 9th.  Battalion moved to J.O.T. in excellent order and reported in position

and O.K. at 4.15 a.m.  Casualties moving up - 1 Officer killed, 

2 Officers and 8 Other Ranks wounded.

Barrage opened punctually but all accounts prove it to have been

light and ineffective, enemy snipers and M.G.s remaining in action

over the whole area.  Attack was satisfactorily launched well on

time and troops came almost immediately under heavy and accurate

enemy fire.  All Officers became casualties early in the operation

and formations became considerably disorganised.

The 24th Bn on Right was held up at WEST edge of DAISY WOOD, a

portion of our right flank remaining with them.

Owing to accurate enemy fire very few messages came through, and

practically the only means of communication was a line to a

forward post run conjointly by 21st and 24th Bns under the supervision

of the Signal Officer of the latter unit.  This line was

most admirably maintained under most adverse circumstances and

proved simply invaluable.

Reports from this centre and the Bn Observers showed the attack

held up on our flank on reaching the line of the Woods but progressing

under the greatest difficulties on our front by bounds from 

hole to hole.  The ground was very heavy and cover infrequent.

The left flank party under Sgt BOWLER progressed in touch with

some elements of the 23rd Bn and moving South of DAISY WOOD

finally dug in at approximately D.24. a.1.9.  The centre under Sgts

WEIS and WARREN finally reached the knoll near the final objective

and dug in on a line ((D.24.a.2.5 - D.24. a 1.7. with both flanks

completely in the air and under heavy fire from BUSY WOOD where

the Boone was extremely active.  The party of 28th B allotted to ((us?))

was ordered forward at 8.15 a.m. to establish in a position between

the two Woods and assist the cleaning up from the flanks.

No further reports were received from this party but Bn observers

reported them moving forward to position.

Bn Commanders in conference 8.45 a.m. decided that as there was

practically nothing in rear, Bde be requested to place a Bn in the

original front line in case of emergency.

A patrol sent out to clear up the position reported at noon some

elements of the Bn on a rough line from D.23.b.0.5. to D.23.b.4.6.

At 3.40 a.m. orders re relief by 49th Bn were received and C. O.s

consultation decided on line to be handed over.

 

Oct. 10th.  At 1 a.m. relief was complete and the Companies 49th Bn well dug

in on line D.23. a. 5.7. to D.23.a. 1.3.

Bn was withdrawn and slowly collected in old support line.

At 12.40 p.m. orders confirming previous verbal orders were received

to form a composite Bn under acting C.O. 21st Bn.

At 7 p.m. on the C.O. 49th bn expressing his agreement, to Bn were

withdrawn and ordered back to YPRES.

A small number of prisoners, perhaps 10 in all, were taken and sent

to the rear.

Enemy continually presented good targets which were freely [[?]]

of by our snipers and Lewis Gunners, who inflicted upwards of 100

 

28
R 48/47 
-2-

 

casualties - the estimate of course being only approximate.

Enemy stretcher parties were continually at work particularly in

the vicinity of BUSY WOOD.  There is little doubt also that enemy

was considerably disorganised and knew little of the position.

Hostile shelling was very heavy on original front and support

lines and in vicinity of DEKNOET and ZONNEBEKE LAKE.

Enemy aircraft was exceedingly active and seemed to have control.

Our aircraft, though often up in large numbers, did not seem to

prevent their operations in any way.

Tracks to the rear were very bad, and the crossing over ZONNEBEKE

CREEK is nothing short of a menace to communications.

Stretcher bearers, who worked nobly throughout, were often

exhausted after a single trip.

(Signed.) Henry A. Crowther.

Major.

October 11th 1917.