Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/228A/1 - June - October 1917 - Part 1
AWM38
Official History,
1914-18 War: Records of C E W Bean,
Official Historian.
Diaries and Notebooks
Item Number: 3DRL606/228A/1
Title: Photostats, June - October 1917
Comprise copies of reports, maps and sketches
occurring as attachments to earlier notebooks.
AWM38-3DRL606/228A/1
Notes and records 229
228(a)
No 1 Set
Various reports maps
sketches etc
belonging to Capt Bean.
1st set 228(A)
AWM38 3DRL 606 ITEM 228A [1]
DIARIES AND NOTES OF C.E.W. BEAN
CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914 - 1918
THE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms
of gift to the Australian War Memorial. But, apart from those terms, I wish the
following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every
reader and writer who may use them.
These writings represent only what at the moment of making them is believed to be
true. The diaries were jotted down almost daily with the object of recording what
was then in the writer's mind. Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep;
also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so - but it does not
follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when
discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them.
These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what
their author, at the time of writing, believed. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch
for the accuracy of statements made to him be others and here recorded. But he
did try to ensure such accuracy by consulting, as far as possible, those who had
seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand
evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed
upon him by the second or third day of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that
those who passed on such stories usually themselves believed them to be true. All
second-hand evidence herein should be read with this in mind.
16 Sept., 1946 C.E.W. Bean.
AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL
ACCESS STATUS
OPEN
Diagram - see original document
Copy of German
map showing defences
of Noreuil &
Lagnicourt
(Taken by us on
March 26 1917)
Diagram - see original document
1:10,000 CEW Bean
Map with diaries
of Ap 11, 1917
ECOUST - ST. MEIN EDITION. 1.
Diagram - see original document
Overlay to sheet 57c NW
B
1/2
Central
4
R31/2
Verbal by telephone
1. Talk with Lionel
2. Talk with Forbes & Bateman
3. More with F. & B. ie [[re?ing]] 2.30 to 3.
4. More to Forbes about support only of Car. to pass to Bate
5. Sleep till 4.30 instance with L.H. about 5.30
6. ring up Beugnatre. nix then Vaux. (Brown).
7. Report from Gilchrist. - normal: less disturbances.
8. 4.50. 23" report Bois de Vaux clear.
5.
9. 5.40. 23" report Noreuil reached at 5.30.
[* 5.57
2 small parties
[[Brde?]]another
on our right*]
6. 23 HQ at Vraucourt Copse - 2 Coys reinforcing Coy. at Noriel.
10 6.10 23" report line withdrawn to S of Villers
6.40 " " opposition
11 7 23" report line probably tapped by enemy
12 7.30 23 report line established and ask
for instructions.
13
14
15 8. am 23rd propose to push in at 8.30.
16 8.45. 23" report shelling heavier
17 - " - 21 " the same.
18 9.20}
19 9.25.} 21st & 23rd report against attack further advance
20 9.30 orders to fall back to new position
report accordly to DHQ
5
R 31/2 Gen. Gellibrand's original report
H.Q. 2nd Aust. Division.
The following report on the operations of the
P.O.W. Guard is submitted.
1. A.G. order No 4 was issued ^in accordance
with the general instructions from Divnl HQ. at 9.30
p.m. on the 19th inst
2. In accordance with verbal instructions received
from General Staff of Division shortly after 11pm midnight 19th/20
that the policy has been Corps Comdr desired tt line
Langatte - Noreuil Lagnicourt to be occupied & that
the general issue policy instructions from D.H.Q would
be modified in accordance with a memo to be
received by me during the night 19/20. A.G. order No 5
was issued by - pm
[*presumably
next
day
& therefore
had to
be done
durg night*]
3. A.G. order No 5 was accordingly issued by telephone
to the 21st, 23rd and 25th Battalions by telephone. It was
originally attend intended to move off the infantry
at 3 am 20th so as to facilitate support of the L.H patrols but the time was insufficient to allow
of the necessary concentration being made in time by them.
The general situation and the method of carrying out
the reconnaissance in force by the infantry were
fully discussed with the commanders of the Battalion
on the lines of GI/380 and definite instructions
were given as to the method of breaking off anengagement action and ensuring cooperation
between the 2 columns battalions in so doing.
6
R31/2
4. Movements on the 20th were delayed by the heavy
rain and the outposts line was not cleared till approx
4.30 am. by the 21st Bn and at 3.45 am by 23rd Bn
A still more serious delay took place in the movement
of the 13 LH patrols. This unit had had a spell on the 18th
and in my opinion should have been fit for a hard days
work on the 20th. On my way forward to Vaulx I met
a body of the 13 L.H. this side of Beugnatre atbout 5.25 am.
& was obliged to order the officer in charge to move forwards
at a faster pace than a walk.
As already reported to the Divnl General Staff no
reports were received and the Squadron took no part
in the action. that I know
5. The method of advance on the night was affected
by the necessity of clearing the Bois de Vaulx where
considerable enemy activity had ^been noticed on during the 19th
The wood was cleared by 2 con 23rd, as a preliminary
to the foward movement in 2 xxxxxx. of 2 Cos each.
The leading Coy in line of platoons in file. mtly patrols on the flank.
The 2nd wave consisted of only / Co as the second CmdgAllotted missed connection after traversing the work moving direct on Lagnicourt & div region
till about 6.30 am (Rossiter).
Capt Pascos company reached the objective
successfully to the N & N.E. & E of Noreuil about 4.05 am [*G⑤*]
but as there were no signs ^at their xxxxxx by 4.30am of the 21st linking up on
the left: ^or the remainder o the 23rd coming up the 23rd co formed at a line ^facing N.W. Noreuil S of the village
Pasco was reinfor with 2 Cos by about 5.30 am ⑥G. When / xx effort was made
with 2 Cos and engaged the enemy in that village
but brought to a standstill from 1000 x to 400x . near MG from first Longatte.
with a defensive flank against Lagnicourt. This
fire position was maintained until 8.30am undone whenthe a frontal attack was pressed made in cooperation with 2
Companies of the 21st on the left owing to the
7
R31/2
Thereafter displayed by the enemy whom I estimated
at 1 Battalion 4 mg in Lagnicourt. 1 Coy & 6 m.g. in
Noreuil and 2 Cos 6 mg in Longatte, no less than
the effective support of the hostile artillery (4 to 6 77mm
ahr 4.2" good observe guns on our front line- 4 to 6 15 cm howitzers on Vauly
and Vrancourt). I ordered the action to be broken off
at 9.15? am and a line to be held about 1000x
S. of the enemy line. This was duly carried out by
1.15 pm the only enemy movement being from Lagnicourt and
was promptly brought to a standstill by our right Bty.
Our forward position were dug in during the afternoon
under intermittent shell fire.
6. The advance on our left having the advantage
of high ground as well as the cover of dawn
moved as a column preceded by an armed guard
until reaching C13C11 where in accordance
with my verbal instructions Longatte was
engaged with ^1 Co whilst the reconnaissance was forced
against Norueil by 1 Co in X[[?]] C13 B72 with a 2nd Co in the left. The left Co had however
[[resli?]] company in 14 Centre & 15 central.as around too far kept too far to to the left before making the charge closing to their right
of direction and suffered considerable losses
from early m.g fire at Longatte & in the centre
in the road between Noreuil & Longatte contours
are incorrect.)
The Left Company established themselves on a
line through 8 central & maintained a fairly
severe sniping action - one party marked a machine
gun. bombed the dug out and brought back the lock
from the Sunk road in C8 A05 (approx). This company
also silenced an enemy MG in Longatte by converging a gun
[* (One Coy 23 Bn mistook rd & got [[?]] nearby Langnicout)*]
8
R31/2
The 2nd Co. from the left was practically a left
flank guard to the 2 Companys cooperating with 23rd
against Noreuil. This company & the next on the right
suffered under the heavy 77 fire and 4.2" fire
(all coming from both flanks).
The 3rd Co. (Sales) established themselves by 7 am parallel to
to Noreuil road and about 700 yds from it atCo with his right at 15 central (the 4th Co (Pearce)
in support in echelon to the right rear. With special
orders to link up with 23rd
These 2 companies moved forward in cooperation
with 23rd attack at 8.30 but were stopped by heavy
mg. fire from a trench in front of the SE face of
Noreuil. The retirement was effected slowly. The
men going back in pairs.
The V.L were brought into action at C 8 D10, C14 Central
against hostile m.g. at Longatte & No of C9 Central
& one in reserve with Bn held) and did good work in
smothering the hostile m.g.
It is estimated that at least 10 probably 20 enemy dead were
killed in the 21st Bn front.
7. Orders for the Artillery placed the 12th Bty on the S.
edge of Longatte - and the approaching 13" Bty in Noreuil and later on
the road from Lagnicourt to that villageDirect - Observation was in our favour and a
number of objectives were engaged by our guns
without direct orders of Reg HQ The initiative displayed by
both batteries was admirable and their fire was
of greatest assistance during the withdrawal.
Especially in dispersing hostile M.G. sent forward to the spur at 17 central
to harrass the 23rds withdrawal.
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