Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/228/1 - Folder - Part 17

542
(Major Murray) had to fight from the start. This made them
about 25 mins. behind right in getting away.
The right got into Florina trench - the support Coy
was supposed to get into Prague, but it could not find
the way into it and there was a nasty fire - so both
got into Florina. They got into Florina trench 15 mins.
before Zero, when it was broad daylight.
On left it was Lt.Eastment who bombed up Florina
trench and finally got a gap in the wire and moved the
knife rests.
On right A.Coy (Capt.Evers) led off. B.Coy (under
Capt.Smith) followed about 250 yds after.
A.Coy got well away and were held up with too heavy
belts of strong unbroken wire in front of Johannes trench.
Capt.Smith noticed that they were held up and closed up to
give them support. There was an intense machine gun fire
on and Capt.Smith found that the men couldn't force a passage
through the wire. They were held up for about 30 mins.
This was machine gun fire from the trench and enfilade
from Mt.St.Quentin. Capt.Smith got up to the front Coy.
He told them it would not do to be held up - they had to
get through. The Lewis gunners got up and sprayed their
guns over the wire and Smith and a number of men made a
rush and got through the gap in the wire on the road which
was about the left centre of the Company.
When they got into these strong posts the machine
guns were still boiling there - Smith there found that
A.Coy. had lost all its officers except Lt.Young and took
it from that time under him.
Capt.Evers wounded. 
Lieut.Tofler wounded.
Lieut.Lamerton killed.
Lt.Young was at that moment away on the right flank.
On crossing this trench they found fire coming from
the left flank from another trench N. of the road and
parallel to the road - a S.Westerly continuation of Save
 

543
trench to the road (further continued than shown on the
map). The men lined the road and then at once passed
over it - thus changing direction and facing this
obstacle. There was no wire in front of this trench. Lieut.
W.Smith was wounded in front of this trench - the Coy.
rushed and took the trench and one of the German prisoners
shot Lt.Smith with an automatic revolver in the back.
Smith got in with his garrison and had the garrison bailed
up with their hands up and was shot by a man behind him.
From there they changed direction immediate right to
push through the Quinconce Wood (Anvil Wood).
There was no stiff resistance in this wood. (Currie's
gun was just on the 5th class road on the N.W. side of the
wood at 21A 25.15.
After passing through the wood and getting into the
open they saw Germans running away in front (7.15 a.m.)
and were quite out of touch on the flanks. The Germans saw
them pulling up and he too pulled up and began to rally
about the St.Denis Road and the Sugar Refinery and to come
back at them. Also parties of Germans were still in the
wood and our men were getting shots from the rear. These
Germans were mopped up without much trouble (parties of
men who couldn't get away quick enough.
They then got touch with Major Murray just N. of the
Cemetery in the sandpit N. of the railway back.
They could see that Mt.St.Quentin was still in German
hands and decided that it was unwise to go on further for
the time being.
D.Coy had swung back on the left to link with the
23rd Bn. and linked with A.Coy of 55th Bn. which was put
in to fill the gap. They could not get 23rd at all.
On the right flank on the edge of the cemetery were
a number of open graves dug by the Germans. They consolidated
these. From the time they broke cover from the wood
they were under artillery fire from open sights from guns
on the three wooded hills N.E. of Peronne.
 

544
On the St.Quentin Quinconce Road was a sort of goods
or ordnance yard and a number of huts. E. of this was
a coal dump and about 9 a.m. this coal dump was exploded
by a mine (about I21B4.7) Beside the railway embankment
was a big factory building. 53rd Bn. left patrols
out there as long as they thought safe and withdrew them
after mid-day. There were hundreds of Germans streaming
back over the open to the S.E. corner of Mt.St.Quentin
and into small trenches by the St.Denis Road.
Nothing was done then till 5 p.m. At 5 p.m. another
attack was made.
xxx    Diagram see original document
There was a trench S. of the railway embankment as
shown. C. and D.Coys were worked into this.
They were to attack as shown. A. and B. were to make
a dash and get in close under the ramparts and then work
E. in dead ground of the moat and the railway cuttings.
Both parties went over the top at 5 p.m.
C.Coy got to the second railway line (not shown on
map). They could not move from there owing to machingun
fire from E. end of the ramparts and St.Denis.
Lt.Bevan of A.Coy started with 65 men A, B, and a
platoon of 55. He was E. of the Cemetery when the attack
was ordered. They rushed straight down for the ramparts
with the men. He saw it would be impossible to follow the
moat round as machine gun fire was coming from the
ramparts. The men threw some rough timber across the moat
(the Germans had been making dugouts under theramparts)
- crossed the moat, got on top of the ramparts and followed
them around (some bits of timber reached right across the

 

545
moat like telegraph poles - about 25ft). B. pushed down
the ramparts for about 200 yds. He struck inland to 28A20.95
and pushed across and struck 54th Battalion's post facing
a big brick wall (probably facing Flarnicourt and the
station). He got in touch there with Capt.Downing and
Colonel Marshall. He said that the 5 p.m. attack had broken
down but that the Bn. was in the railway cuttings in front
of their Jumping off line.
Bevan recrossed the moat at the same place with his
men - it was now dusk - and pushed forward as far as he
could to a ditch about 22C4.7 but could not get any further.
He sent patrols forward ( had 12 men left) and tried to get
touch with the rest of Bn. He could not get touch with
Lt.Scott - 14 M.G. Coy - was scouting around and met Bevan
and told him that the rest of 53rd Bn. were back in the
position from which they started at 5 p.m. Bevan sent a
runner giving his position and strength and was withdrawn
at 1 a.m. as there was to be a new barrage next day.
Another party (D.Coy.under Lt.Waite) got into the sugar
factory into the big cement troughs; others got into the
broken ground by the railway cuttings with fork there S. of
factory. Waite got these into the factory. They came back
about 3.30 a.m. They heard Currie's shouts after them.
(Currie and 2 others also captured a machine gun just after
getting through the cemetery near the railway line).
Crank's and Weather Coy's gun was up between the
brickworks and the wood amongst the huts.
Currie's gun was taken by him in the first rush on
Quinconce Wood. This gun was blazing over open sights. C.
rushed it and sprayed the crew with his Lewis gun. He got his
machine gun (at the head of the sap running along the railway)
in thesame style.
All night Stretcherbearers were out collecting wood in
nomansland and ammunition being got forward.Lt.Davies was
killed digging in in the morning out by the Cemetery (C.Coy)
 

546
C. Lt.Eastment was wounded in after attack.
D. Capt.Lindsaywounded in 5 p.m. attack.
Lieut. Onslow killed during first consolidation near
the brickworks.
Lieut.Dent wounded in 5 p.m. attack.
H.Qrs.
Lieut.Shearwood killed by shell fire going to 23rd Bn.
Hdqtrs. about Zero hour.
i.e. 4 Killed, 6 wounded.
Battalion went in about 400 strong (?)
About 236 casualties other ranks.

-----
(None now missing).
53rd Battalion,BELLICOURT,Colonel CHEESEMAN.
 

            ⇒      ⇒

xxx   ___ ___ ___ ___
          56.  53.  55.  54.
On night of 29th, 23rd Battalion was resting about
Hervilly. They were told to settle for the night.
At 2 a.m. word came for C.OS conference at Colonel
Cheeseman's Headquarters. 53rd was supposed to be the last
to attack on account of heavy casualties at Peronne. At
3 a.m. General walked in and said "You will attack at
6 a.m." He gave a plan.
The 55th Bn. offered to guide 53rd to 15th Brigade
Headquarters where guides would take them to the Jumping
off line. These guides didn't materialise, so Adjutant
was sent on to find out what was the matter. He was informed
that no-one knew the way. Colonel had to take Bn.
then himself across country and found that the reference
given by Sigs. for 15th Brigade Headquarters was also an
error - 300 yds.out. 

547
Colonel had no time to correct this and so took them straight
across as best he could to the start line - a vile night -
dark, slippery, drizzling. All these things so delayed the
march that when they reached 9 4A 2.4 Zero had arrived and
the barrage fell. When this barrage, what there was of it,
started, the Germans woke up and started machine gun fire
and Artillery fire.
C.O. decided, as they could not get further, to string
Bn. out E. and W. through the trench line through G.3B,
G4A and B, and go forward from there in artilleryformation
and deploy at the start line. This worked satisfactorily and
they were only 15 minutes late; 55th Battalion were to support
53rd Battalion.
Our own heavy gun barrage at the last moment was cut
out owing to the American higher command saying xx their
people were still in the line. A few guns of light calibre
were allowed to fire and they just woke the Germans.
Directly 53rd Bn. passed the start they got very heavy
machine gun fire from Cabaret Wood Farm and the tunnel -
and that fire was supplemented by field guns over open sights.
The Germans made a determined stand at A29C 5.4 near the
Camp signal station. 2 Field guns were taken there. As soon
as Bn. got out of the Jumping off communication trench they
had to get into the Cabelet trench and bomb along as the
fire was so hot.
For German counter-attack up trench with bombs see
narrative. Lieut.Ralph's exploit with 3 men to right of Le
Catelet line about 300 yds. across open to settle a machine
gun in some dug-outs there was after this during further
bombing advance.
Centre and left of Bn. was on tunnel making its way N.
right in Catelet line.
Lieut. Hills who got D.S.O. for his work on the tunnel
and throughout was on the tunnel - but was forced by German
counter-attack at 10 a.m. eventually into the Le Catelet Line.
 

548
Hill did the best work here - Ralph's was a fine
incident.
The terrace at A22 central was very heavily held with
machine guns.
Killed. Capt.Jhonson,M.C. during German counter-attack
up the Le Catelet system.
Capt.Wilson,M.C.   "      "
Lieut.Althouse, at 6 a.m. first shell fire killed
him on the Jumping off line in his first battle.
Lieut.Ralph M.M. (on return from his raid).
Wounded. Lieut.Thompson wounded in Le Catelet line.
Lieut. Stinson, M.C. during early bombing attack
up Le Catelet system.
Lieut.Potts, very early after the start - slightly.
At 28 Central the communication trench was held by the
Germans - two of the 77s were captured there at 28C.85.90.
Rest of this battle is fully given in narrative.
 

549
485.
38th BATTALION: SEPTEMBER 29.
(Col. Lord).
34th BATTALION.
Villers Bretonneux
Hangard
Morlancourt
Aug. 8
Bray
Clery
Bony.
36th BATTALION.
Villers Bretonneux.
4lst BATTALION
Cateau Wood, Aug. 11.
---------------
4lst BATTALION: CATEAU WOOD, Aug. 11 (Lt. McGibbon).
When success signals went up, McGibbon, I.O., who had
been watching from an O.P. at north end of our old position
in the trenches went straight on down the captured system
yo find out what he could.   As he made his way north
along the system, which was fairly wide, he saw no one at
all - not one many anywhere.  As a matter of fact our
people were in the trenches on the left and right of this
strip - facing outwards - but they had no time to worry
about what was in between. After going a short distance
McGibbon suddenly came on figures - whom he took for our
men - on one side of him in the dark. He went across to
them at once and found they were Germans - I think he shot
one. They surrendered to him. He went on with his
revolver out and presently, where the trenches narrowed in,
met our men - on both sides. They told him there were
Germans further on. The trench system ended at a steep
scrubby bank down to the river - there was a road at the
top of it (I think). Standing there with Lieut. Bell and
Lieut. Hanley he could chear Germans digging into the
bottom of the bank below. The three then went down the
bank - McGibbon having a bomb, intending to throw it
amongst the Boche at the foot. They had scrambled down
the bank through some wire amongst the bushes and McGibbon
had taken the pin out of the bomb and was just going to
heave it down to give the German something to go on with,
when he heard someone move over his left shoulder, and there
was a party of men above them on their left up the hill.
He threw the bomb there instead. German bombs followed in
the scrub and the three officers had a bomb fight with the
Germans. It was merry for a moment with revolvers and
bombs. Then the Germans who remained put up their hands
and the three officers marched them up the hill bank to our
men.

xxx Diagram, see original document
 

550
486.
38th BATTALION.
(Col. Lord).
AUGUST 31.- It was about 10 a.m. when the right of
10th Bde. - 38th Bn. - which was hanging rather behind the
right of 40th Bn. (and was difficult to move) was got up to
Inferno and Moravu (?) trenches owing to Col. Lord's message
to Capt. Peters that 40th Bn. were much more advanced and
the necessity of support of the right. 38th had been so
done that the men would not or could not move from Red line.
They had been on Red line mostly. Peters' attitude was that
the advance of 10th Bde. depended (by his instructions) on
that of 2nd Div., and that until they got a direct order
from Bde. and instructions that 2nd. Div. were up, they were
not intended to push on beyond the Red line. Lord overrode
this.

SEPTEMBER 29.- (Col. Lord). An American Captain came
back to Col. Lord at 10 or 11 a.m. He said he was glad to
see Col. Lord. He had been having a bad time - had got
30 or 40 men together and some ammunition, - 3 or 4 tins
of it - probably about 300 rounds. Col. Lord said he
could give them a box - 300 rounds - would it be much good?
The American said that would be first-rate.
Another American officer came along. His question was
ammunition. "Do you think if I send over there will be
any ammunition in the tanks there (by Duncan Wood)". Col.
gave him a box.
Another officer said - "We are here to learn - but this
is too expensive. I can't understand why a lot of us
people are not attached to your people - but this is too
expensive."
Another officer, asked by Col. Lord, saud "they hadn't
been further than Grub Lane. He didn't know if any had got
further - he didn't think so."
Col. Lord reported to Bde, that the Americans didn't xx
seem to have got further than Gillemont system. But Bde.
said Corps had quite definitely that the Americans were on
the Green line - flares had been seen there.
(Tanks and artillery were to have been picked up at Grub
trench).
In this difficult situation there was no flurry - no
excitement.
Paddy Boden was a little bit of a chap, about 5ft. 6,
who had been a C.S.M. whom the R.S.M. could absolutely rely
on.  He had no sense of fear at all. A champion at boxing.
He got his commission for bravery at Passchendaele - had just
got it before this show. He had been 5 times wounded.

38th Bn. (Col. Hurry) on Aug. 31, east of Clery took
over 200 prisoners, 12-13 M.G.'s and 3 T.M.'s, so that
despite the miscarriage of this attack they effected
something.

551
487.
34th BATTALION: VILLERS BRETONNEUX
(Lieut. Bennett).
Bn. got down to Heilly March 26 27th. Took up the old
French Amiens line at 3-4 p.m. In it 3 or 4 hours and then
pitched off about 9 - 10 p.m. to Bonnay. Arrived early
morning. Rested there and looked over the new positions
on the big ridge.
Evening, 29th March, moved to Cachy.
Aug. 30. - the Hangard Wood counterattack - A Coy.
attacked, B & C supported - didn't come in to it. A Coy.
with the 33rd. 2/Lieut. Parkes killed by M.G. fire -
wounded, got onto stretcher, hit again. Tommies relieved
early 31st March. Bn. moved to Cachy again. 1, 2 and 3rd
April in Bois de l'Abbe, digging trenches and wiring.
April 4. About 6 a.m. Germans bombarded wood heavily.
Bn. shifted out into NW of the wood - and then was starting
in to a different part of the wood to get away from shell
fire (in the rear part of the wood) when orders came to
move up to support Villers Bretonneux.
Bn. moved down through the wood across the main road
through the tunnel and up onto the sunken Villers Bretonneux-
Fouilloy Road. In that road they were right among the guns
and the shellfire became heavy. About noon they got there -
one Coy. was behind each of the various banks - road and
field banks. Stayed there till dusk. There Col. Martin,
Major Wheeler, 2nd in command, and Lieut. Farleigh, were
wounded by one shell about 2 or 3 p.m.
Companies moved forward and to left onto the Fouilloy
Road to escape the shellfire. Major Fry came up from rear
H.Q. to take charge.
Just before dusk they moved up through the village,
C & D leading, A & B behind - along the Fouilloy Road into
the village and then to left xx out along the main road to
the first lot of aeroplane hangars.
xxx Diagram - see original document
About noon Major Fry heard of the seriousness of affairs
(he had been against his will sent back to Blangy-Tronville).
The Q.M. came back to bring him up and he got up about 3 p.m.
At that time the Bn. had just been ordered to lie behind
the road through 22 & 29. The cavalry general had previously
asked Fry to go in on their left as the Tommy infantry had
all gone and he was very thin and afraid for the guns on
the Fouilloy Road - that the Germans might get them.