Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/228/1 - Folder - Part 13

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Diagram - see original 

DERNANCOURT
43rd Battery.
When Germans started the attack the Huns put down
a heavy barrage on the guns. (Col. Waite was then
C.O. Bde - a very fine C.OL) (Col. Spurge now C.O. since
August 8th inclusive).
The 41st and 42nd Bties especially were heavily
barraged all day. 11th Bde. got 160xx ? casualties
and 10th Bde. many also.
The barrage was kept going the whole time - some-
times only 2 men on each gun, officers helping (same
thing once at Paschendaele - 8 men ran 4 guns with 2
officers).
At one period infantry began to come through
towards the guns - but they went back again without
officers on knowing that they were leaving the guns
open - 4 Pioneers probably.

LAGNICOURT.
The batteries were in the habit of salving M.Gs.
off aeroplanes etc. (before they were issued) and
practically every Aust. Bty. had a M.G. but these were
generally at the waggon lines to fire against planes.
Waite always told his men to keep a M.G. on the flank in
case the Germans came over the topz.

 (Capt.. Saunderson, 43rd Bty, Claremont, W.A., would

be usefully referred to for any information as to 4th
 

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19.

Aust. D.A.)

8th BATTALION - BULLECOURT AND PASCHENDAELE
Lieut. P. Lay, 8th Bn. of Bullecourt and Paschendaele was with the mystery expedition to Bagdad and
Baku. Present position unknown.

8th Battalion Landing. (col.Trail).
8th went up from Mudros in Clan MacGillivray.
In front of Anzac transferred to the Ribble - and
from her on to xxx tow boats. Trail was on 2nd boat
of 1st tow and was a M.G.Sergt. (just given his stripe
that day). One shell dropped almost on top of the
boat at the landing - one sailor was killed and 3
Australians wounded and a hole made through the boat.
She began to sink. They had been rowing for a few
minutes by then. The next boat was unloading. Trail's
boat began to unload seeing this, and because she was

half full of water. Trail had to hold his M.G. over
his head. The forts were putting it right on to the
boats on the beach (one shell got into a few just as
they got ashore). Just then the Bacchante was steaming
in to deal with this. The Gaba Tepe guns would have
caused a lot of casualties if the Bacchante hadn't dealt
with it.
On landing on the main beach they dropped all the
gear and went over Brisbane/ point by the Nek (there
was an Indian officer there signalling to the Fleet and
guide at the same time. He motioned them on. They
assembled in Shrapnel Gully on their own and then were
told to move up the Gully. They had assembled on the
back slopes of McCay's Hill.
 Diagram - see original

They moved up to Shell Green. Crossing this
they got heavily shelled from quarter left - possibly
Scrubbly Knoll. Went over the top, and on getting into
 

[

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the wheat crop overbthe top came under rifle fire.
There they saw a lot of Turks. They were coming
round up the Gully running into the crop from S.
There they were told that the right flank was well
ahead. They could see troops going across Pine
Ridge - they were going forwardz xx b8th were told
they were our troops (though there was a doubt about
it). However they were told to support these troops
in the centre. Col. Gertside said this and gave the
order to get on. Col. Field was by T. and Turkish
gun was in action.
Capt. Sargent was killed just before going on in the
edge of the crop, by a shell, and Lt. Barry wounded by
the same shell.
(The gun had knocked a few of the Turks who had come
up the Gully and they cleared). Bn. then crossed
the Gully S. of the wheat crop, saw there some of
these Turks dead, and got on to the reverse slope of
Lone Pine. Turks had 2 guns in action there with
any amount of targets firing at the Turks who had been
coming round the Gullies on the right, in behind the
men who had been seen on Pine Ridge.  The Turkish
shrapnel got on to the two guns again there and made
it too hot to do anything. They were then in little
slits of T. trenches - infantry trench well camouflaged
with trenches - being posts for 5 or 6 men. About 2
Coys. of Bn. and the 2 M.Gs. would be there - ammunition
carriers of the guns would be all lost by then. The
other 2 Coys. remained with Col. Field on the shoreward
edge of the crop, on the crest of the hill. The
reason was that they got a counter-order that it was
not certain if these were our troops on Pine Ridge or
not - so to make sure they kept the two Coys. there.
They got an order that they were not to advance till
further orders - it was well on in the afternoon.
The Turks began to work in on the left - the 3rd Bde.
was on the left and these 2 Coys. of 8th were mixed
Xx Bobwith them and the 3rd Bde. and 8th were getting it xxx
very hot. Capt. Possingham then came out himself and
told them they were too far ahead and must fall back
before dark and takeup a defensive line. This was done
- all moved about 200 yards more right and took up a
defensive line through the crop. The right flank was
just down on the bushes where the Yurkish tents were
and they joined 6th Bn. there. By then there were
scatterings of 7th and 6th and probably 12th Bn. there.
They dug in a bit by dark and had a pretty good line.
The shelling eased a lot at dusk - the 2 guns had
been silenced before 8th left Lone Pine because Turk
was able to get his 2 guns into action again there.
The 5urks, before we came back, were trying all the
time to get into the Gully, and were dominating us by
fire from the right end of Lone Pine Plateau. After
dark the Turks were accumulating in the Gully S. of
the crop. Fortunately they made a lot of noise - singing
out, whistling, trumpets going - they seemed to be
rallying their men and trying to get a lettle enthusiasm
into them. We knew (from 2 scouts out) exactly where
they were. 
This noise carried occurred when a they were rallying their
men. Presently it was as though the band struck up

altogether only all out of tune. Word was passed down
that they were coming - we couldn't see them - but
stood to at once. The Turks came up in a body at the
bottom of the crop and attacked from the far end of
the crop and right round to the right and left as far
 

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21.
as could be seen by the rifle flashes and poured in
a heavy fire.
At the S. end of the crop the attack was heaviest as,
though steep, it gave a splendid chance of assembling.
They seem to have attacked in one long line, with 2 or
3 waves just at this point, bayonets fixed (we found
next day) and full marching order. We kept up all the
fire that we could, firing as hard as could be done.
Had to go steady with the M.G. as the ammunition supply
wasn't too good. Turksused 15 boxes between the two
guns that night - i.e. 3750 rounds. They had a big
effect. The rifle fire was very straight. There were
a fair number of casualties from the Turkish fire
Zespecially from the crossfire from the right). This
fire seemed especially to be from Pine Ridge - that
eased off when the attack started showing some sort
of co-ordination. There wasbone direct attack a few
hours after dark (about 3 hours). Then desultory
fighting all night. About 2 a.m. before the light
grew they made a similar attack, quite as energetic
as the last one. That didn't get so far as the other,
because they could be seen dimly - they crept up in the
crop which hid them well. This attack was repulsed
in the same way -

Ap. 26th. - By the M.G. there was a lot of movement
about Lone Pine, men dodging in and out of the tea
trees, and occupied the little trenches which 8th Bn.
had been in there - so 8th knew where to fire - these
Turks came up the same Gully.
On night of Ap. 26/27th there was another similar
attack probably stronger in rifle fire - it was terrific
- probably an attack under covering fire. Also M.G.
fire. The fire was from the trenches - not from the
troops coming up - these only fired when they got close
up in the crop. By that time, however, the artillery
had a gun in action on right that flank of 8th Bn. - and that
shattered any attempt - practically firing case shot.
From then on the attacks on the right ceased.
The Turks had dug in on the far side of the Gully - in
the wheat crop, into which we crawled out a good deal,
there were no trenches. This was the position when
2nd Bde. went to Helles. There was by that time one
line of ours dug with C.Ts. to H.Q.

HELLES - 8th BATTALION.

At Helles 8th Bn. formed up in Krithia Creek -
Capt. Posingham (As the Staff man - a fine man - of the
type of Jess) was killed by some over bullet just as
they moved. Went up by Coys. extending as soon as
they got to the xxxx trench were the Indians were.
Half way up this trench they hopped out of it (knowing
they had to go half left) - Gartside was with them
then - made a direct line facing the objective and went
on and passed over the Tommies. Near the objective
2 Coys. were left in support and 2 joined the front
line. They then joined up with 6th Bn. and Bennett
was in command. Gartside was killed there.
 

(N.B. Compare this with Traill's previous account
to me).
 

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22.

8th BATTALION - POZIERES.
Diagram - see original
Coy. Commanders were called to Coulters H.Q. in
artillery dugouts about 8 p.m. and told that they had to
go into Pozieres and establish themselves "as far as
they could." 2 Coys. (A Traill B James to go first;

C (Kirsch) Support; D (Hurry) Reserve. They couldn't
say where they would be, but that was the order.
(P.S. - The bombardment from 5 and was hellish).
They had no map - and were shown no location.
Traill refused to go till he got a definite location.
This was eventually given. The 3rd Bn. was warned
that the 8th would becoming through them and what
Traill's orders were. They were told to form up in
the main street and that they must be there by 9. They
didn't, as a matter of fact, get there till 9.30.
They went: B - A → Traill knew that the Reserve Coys.
were to get into the Wood behind 3rd Bn. - and that
was all they knew - both were to keep touch with 3rd
Bn. They went in overland the whole way, leading up
in small columns of half platoons in single file.
They assembled about the main street - it was recognizable 
then - roofs of houses were still visible. They struck
the main street a little to the right of the church.
They formed up. B Coy. was to be on right and A on left.
Owing to the darkness A Coy. was on the right and B on
left. The German was quite quiet - hardly a flare
going - wouldn't have known there was a soul anywhere.
They pushed forward towards the cemetery. They
halted at the orchard - no Germans met so far - (it was
something like Hamel then but no such a substantial
village). They halted in the orchard till the return
of the scouts who had been thrown out. They reported
that they had no touch with the Boche. So Bn. pushed
 

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23.
on and the left was halted on Kay trencha bit short
of the cemetery. (They had passed a little isolated
trench just beyond the orchard - no Germans in it).
Traill couldn't get in touch with the right all and
so dug in with left on K trench (A and B). He found
he still couldn't find anyone on right and the lst
Bde. Post on the left was not enough to rely on -
so he pulled in the right Coy. (B) and got it to dig
in as B...C in a line of posts in the ruins of the
village, except on the left. Just as the right Coy.
was drawn back a terrific fire went up from the centre
front at the position where the right had been -
flares going up constantly. Traill knew these Germans
must be in the open. He guessed that the Germans had
left K trench on our approach and collected in the
open there. He had been over the ground in front
himself with Fay (Lieut. then, now in Flying Corps) and
knew that there was no trench where these Germans were.
This proved right, Traill sent the C.S.M. Norman
up K trench on the right to test it - and he got up a
good 200 yards with a fewmen. Traill then got a block
in at the top of this and established a M.G. post at
the extremity of it at Z. There was no more fire.
Bn. dug in without trouble and were well dug in by day
in fortified shellholes mostly. That was the position
in which the 'plane found them next day.
At 5 a.m. the bombardment opened and continued
all day increasing as the day went on till, about
3 p.m. the word was sent back that the Germans was
attacking from both flanks left and right. The
Germans were coming from J to S but the main attack
was from the cemetery. Traill ordered the right Coy.
forward to take a position straightening the line-
Capt. James of B Coy. had been wounded by then.A Coy.
was also pushed forward in order to get out of the 
bombardment, which was heavy. A lot of casualties were
sustained. The right Coy, was just in action - at
bayonet grips - when Traill was wounded.
Theybdrove this attack back.
(Fay would be able to give further details of the
remainder of this attack). Traill was shooting at
them for some time before hit by a 5.9. He was put
in a cellar - and the cellar was broken in by a shell
when he came to he was covered with bits of the cellar.
Then he was blown up on the stretcher.
In the reconnaissance Traill and Fay got about
300 yards past the cemetery. The runner was sniped -
and killed - but that was the only casualty. The
Germans had apparently drrn ud forming up on the road.
This was very silently done. One single flare went
up as they moved off the road.
Goodwin's reconnaissance was after Traill was hit.

8th BATTALION - PASCHENDAELE.
ist thing: yellow cluster flares all along about
one Bn. frontage.
Then - the heavy bombardment for half an hour.
A lot of men were hit by this - a great number killed.
Then the crash of our bombardment - our people
were out of his; his T.Ms. were playing during this
 

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time.

Our men went up and met the Germans almost at
once - could see them coming in the mist of the
morning.
The men bayoneted most of these.
Then they came on German T.Ms. with crew sitting
behind a hedge.
Traill saw 2, with crew sitting there well in
front.
Then pillboxes in the wood near Retaliation
Farm - all the Germans killed. One ran from the pillbox
naked and was met by a line of bayonets.
They got to the fringe of the wood and were
belted there by the 77s. on the ridge. They attacked
these by working on the flank of them; Traill, Waters,
and 3 men got one of them; they had a M.G. supporting
one of them from the armoured dugout; Traill and party
got up a bit of trench leading up to the road while
our L.Gs. belted them and kept their heads down.
Lay and Hickson worked with a similar party on the left
and took the left gun while Traill and Waters took the
right. There was a whole battery there but the crews
had been killed.
Our parties shot the crews of the guns who
kameraded.
When they worked over the top of the hill they
could see Germans running in all directions - one big
fat old officer who couldn't go too fast - he would
get up and run about 100 yards at a time - everyone
fired at him and eventually he was hit.
We could have gone further that day - but it
would not have been wise - we should have been on an
open slope under observation.
 

509
14th BRIGADE, August 31st.
General STUART.
Brigade crossed not at Orniecourt (which was too
hot) bridge broken by shelling all day, but at Buscourt.
Crossing finished by 8 p.m. and Battalions hear Clery (not
in squares originally intended as shelling was very hot
indeed).
At this time the idea was for 14th Brigade to follow
up 2 Divisions attack - push thro' to Doingt etc. and (as
Elliott couldn't cross the Somme) to cover Elliott's troops
crossing Somme S. of Peronne (if cover needed). Peronne
ignored at this time.
Aug. 31st. At 9 p.m. Conference was called at 6th
Brigade Headquarters near Herbecourt (?) G.S.O. I (Borwick)
2nd Divn, was present. It lasted till midnight.
At the conference Peronne and Mount St.Quentin were
to be made separate fights - Peronne given to 14th Brigade
(which until then had been vaguely intended for Doingt),Mt.
St. Quentin to 6th Brigade.
Zero for 2nd Division was fixed at 6 a.m. as it was
necessary to get 53 and 54 into position.
Objectives for the day were for 53rd Bn. "N. & S.
line between I 23 & I 24" (for exploitation). With Arty.shoot
(area shoot) to Darmstadt trench. For 54th Battalion: Peronne
(to far E. edge of it); 56th Battalion, when 53 and 54 had
gone on, were to turn S. past E. of Peronne and take the high
ground in 135 & 05 (S. of Peronne) while right flank refused
towards river.
Marshall (54th Bn.) was to make good Flarnicourt
across the causeway and other crossings.

Part of this plan was carried out.
At 11 p.m. messages began to arrive from 2nd Divn.
 

510
from 5th Divl. Artillery and other sources that Australian
troops were moving about in streets of Mt.St.Quentin. Brigadier
was ordered to push on. Battalions said 2nd Division was
not in St.Quentin, but assurances from rear were quite emphatic
that they were, and the order had to be given in spite of
Battalion Commander's fears.
This attack was made at 1 p.m.; at 12.15 Brigadier
gave the order to attack at 1 p.m.; at 12.50 information came
from 5th Div. that 2nd Div. (6th Brigade) was to attack at
1.30. This was his first definite information that 2nd Divn.
were not where they said they were; Brigadier tried to stop
14th Brigade attack but it was too late.
(1 P.M. attack by 53rd got on some distance but
had to come back after dark). 2 Companies of 55 were already
with Colonel Cheeseman (53rd) for use if necessary. These two
were involved on the flank of this attack as no-one was there).
56th Battn. and (2 Companies) 55th were still in
hand. 56th was ordered by Brigadier to relieve 54th in N.
part of Peronne till night and take remainder of Peronne at
dawn. (This was cancelled on later orders).
Sept 1/2. There was a conference at Headquarters
of 8th Brigade, at 9.30 p.m. This conference drew up plan
for a new attack. Divisional Commander,C.R.A., Brigadiers
14th and 8th Brigades, and one of staff of 7th Brigade.
The plan for the attack was again drawn up as modified
on the same objective (line between 123 and 24 for exploitation
14th 

Brigade was to do this.
One Battalion was also to mop up N.E. corner of
Peronne.
15th Brigade was to attempt the Somme crossing again.
14th Brigade was to try and mop Flarnicourt. Same
Brigade was to make high ground S. of Peronne (not to take
Doingt this time) by moving behind troops who had passed
Peronne and swing E. of the town and S.
15th Brigade if it crossed was to take a front
on the high ground facing E. on to the Cologne River.
l4th Brigadier allocated this work as follows:-
RIA
 

511
56th for main attack (with 7th Brigade on left).
55th (less 2 Coys.) to follow it, swing S. and
seize high ground.
54th to complete mopping up of Peronne and assist
as far as possible with Flarnicourt (which the Germans would
have evacuated).
53rd and 2 Companies 55th much tried out, as reserve.
(These items were sent by Telephone to Legge B.M.
and by him to Battalions (except Marshall) which were on the
telephone.
After this conference had broken up at 12.40.
Elliott arrived later after Stewart and Tivey had
gone (at 2.30 a.m.) and made it clear to his Brigade 

couldn't 

cross Somme where intended. Plan was then changed so that
58th should move into Peronne at Zero X 30 and attack ramparts
at far end assisting 54th Bn.
59th and 60th to follow 56th (and 2 Companies 55th)
and then move S. and attack the same ridge as 2 Company of
55th Battalion.
57th Battalion was (if possible and opportunity
offering) to cross the Somme by footbridges.
These instructions never reached Brigadier 14th
Brigade. First he knew of it was when he got message from
Colonel Marshall saying the 58th Battalion had some contrary
instructions and was apparently supporting him. (Battalion
had been told to support Marshall and Marshall knew nothing
about this; neither did Brigadier).
Zero was fixed this day at 6 a.m. for both 7th
Brigade and 14th Brigade. This was agreed to at Conference and
telephoned by Brigadier to 14th Brigade from the conference.
(? The British apparently had a zero at 5 or 5.30 am.
and the 2nd Division may have had to alter theirs later to
5.30 a.m. But this was never reported to 14th Brigade nor
15th Brigade who had to move through Peronne under very
heavy reply brought down by the 5.30 zero further N.)