Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/228/1 - Folder - Part 3

20.                404

and signallers, who worked straight on -- and Maj.

Matthews stayed on with the Americans.

Many Germans were killed in this fighting and Bn.

took more prisoners than it had casualties.

6th Bde. were the first Australian troops in the

line in France (?) and were the last out of it.

"To Captain Bean.

"Major Matthews, D.S.O. has suggested that I make a note

here bringing your notice that from the beginning

of August to October 1/Col. Wiltshire was commanding

the battalion continually in the front line without a 

second in command and without relief. Major Matthews

was away for this period at the Senior Officers'

School, Aldershot."

(Sd) Eugene Gorman, Lt.

22nd A.I.F."

20th BATTALION - POZIERES.

On July 26th 1916 when 20th Bn. went into Sausage

Gully a message came from Bde. at 5 or 6 p.m. that

they would have to attack that night. They had no time

to see the place. Col. Ralston and McCall (Adjutant)

led the Bns. up and called in at 12th Bn. to H.Q. They

had been told to attack at midnight, between the main

road and the railway, against O.G.1; and if they got

on they were to send a second party through to O.G.2

They knew nothing of the place so they asked Elliott

and he said he would show them. He took them up Copse

Avenue - the Bn. following. In Copse Avenue he stood

on the top and showed McCall and Ralston the Copse and

arranged the flares and where the railway was and pointed;

"If you go in that direction for 400 or 500 yards you

come to the German trenches," he said, "you may find a 

line of our men out a bit ahead of the Copse, but it is

not certain" (or something to that effect).

Ralston and McCall came back to the men of their 2 

Coys. (only 2 Coys. were there) in Copse Avenue. The

men had not bombs. McCall had to find out where a dump

was. He found that there was one at the Quarry. He

came back and took down a party to carry up bombs; when

they were issued it was found  that some were not detonated

-- and so every one had to be looked at. It was now  12 pm.

There zero was at that hour. The artillery was to continue

its ordinary night shooting and then go off O.G.1 at

12 o'clock so as to let the attack get in - and it was

doing this now. Ralston set Bde. and said that

he could not possible do the attack. He wanted it

postponed altogether - if he did it, he could not do it

before 3 a.m. The answer was that it was to be done at

3.

Ralston and McCall then organised the Bn. into 3

attacking Coys. with one carrying wire. They led them

out into position a little E. of Copse. At 3 a.m.

405

21.

the 3 parties moved out, more or less in single file.

They [[xxxxxxcrossed out]] headed towards the German trench.

About 100 yards or more out, there was a tree growing.

Ralston and McCall were with the centre party - 

Ralston took it that this tree would ve a pretty good

mark - recognisable for Bn. H.Q. so they dropped into

a shell hole by it and the Bn. went on past them.

Presently the flares began to increase; then M.Gs.

Then the sound and flash of bombs.  The party got

through the wire -  the other two could not find a gap

(so it is said), and wandered up and down it. The

centre party got in - Harper was hit on the head by a

bomb and lay on the parapet directing operations.

Then the Germans began to bomb down from either flank -

and at last was nothing to be done but for the

party which was in to get out. They did so - and

brought in Harper.

The H.Q. party in the shell hole had all been hit

by now except Ralston - by bits  of shell. A man

presently came running by in the dark calling for Bn.

H.Q. They dragged him in. He said that the attack

was no good - it had failed. Then men were seen

coming back through the dark - and all went back into

Copse Alley. The C.O. went Bde. to report.

McCall and the others did not know if they were in view

of the German at Copse Avenue, so they kept the two Coys.

in Copse Avenue the whole of the march back and thence

into Black Watch Alley where the 19th (? 17) Bn. was 

just coming in and they had to file over the men lying

in the trench - a horrible congestion. So they got

out to Sausage Valley.

Next came the big bomb fight when the whole bombing

platoon went out; then came the attack of 28/29th July

when they had very much the same task as on July 26;

August 4th. When they got in they found no one on their

right at all in O.G.2. O.G.2 was about 20 yards this

side of a tree on the railway line - they only knew it

by some broken wire and a slight depression in the

ground. The 17th was in O.G.1 but not O.G.2 (on the

right of 20th Bn.) Burnell of the engineers this day

won his M.C. by crawling on his belly down O.G.2 from

right of 20th Bn. to Munster Alley. There were not 

Germans in it.

On August 4th the 18th and 20th Bns. were to go in

by Walkers Avenue, not Copse Avenue.

? 7th Bde. by Copse Avenue and Enen Avenue.

? 6th Bde. by centre way.

The 18th Bn. all got to their J.O.T. on time; but

of 20th Bn. only the first Coy. was in when the barrage

fell. The junior officers had simply to lead their

companies straight out over from Walkers trench.

This happened with every brigade).

-----------------

405A.

23rd Bn. - MONT ST. QUENTIN.

----------

21st BATTALION

24th BATTALION:

BEAUREVOIR

MONT ST. QUENTIN

MONTBREHAIN.

(21st and 24th. from almost all the surviving officers

many N.C.O.'s).

406

23rd BATTALION - MONT ST. QUENTIN.

The copse was I.20 B.3.9.  31 August,  "D",  the front

right Coy. of 23rd Bn. occupied Florina trench without

difficulty.                     C/Lt. Addison

                         A/                  B/Lt. Jenkins

        Capt Moss/  

                                  D/Lt. Holland

In the early morning they had to sidestep out of

Florina into Gottlieb and Save trenches if possible - it

was pretty well known that Save was held by Germans. 

Patrols were sent in small hours to Save trench and

Gottlieb to find if Germans were there. They found that

both these trenches were held by Germans. In order to get

in they had to fight the whole way. It was there that

McTear got his V.C. 5th Bde. were further up in Agram or

Gelatz Alleys - 23rd Bn. later passed through a number of

them.

The formation in Save and Gottlieb was to be the same

as in Florina and Prague trenches. If Save could not be

occupied by one Coy. was to go into Kholm trench.

During the night the German apparently had brought

M.G.'s up into positions close to these trenches. The gun

in the copse was only about 100 yds. away firing directly

down the road they had to cross - you could see the flash

of it. It was  just grey dawn - he could see the 23rd Bn.

crossing the road. Zero was 6 on the left. 3rd Div went

over earlier at 5 - and the German barrage dropped then on

the right as well. The Coys. sidestepped between 5 and 6

when it was getting a bit light. D Coy. lost 2 killed and

3 wounded getting across the road - it was not more than

about 12 ft. wide - one man at a time would cross it. B

Coy. had to fight up Gottlieb in order to clear it, and so

you could not carry out the crossing quickly.

It was exactly 6 a.m. when the last man crossed and

entered the J.O.T. Our barrage dropped at that moment.

It was on Mont St. Quentin.

B and D went over the top in line at once. Just in

front of Save trench was a lot of dense barbed wire. This

combined with the intense fire which was coming from Mont

St. Quentin right round to the railway from almost every

direction - these cause the left Coy. and half the right

coy. to work further to the left [[xxxxxcrossed out]] and the rest of the right Coy. to the right. The officers

took it for granted that the whole ground ahead was held

by the Germans and that there were isolated bodies of 5th

Bde. in the trenches ahead of them - Galatz, Agram, and so on.

The casualties were very on the right. Lieut.

Holland lost about 50 per cent of the Coy. in about a quarter

of an hour; entirely from M.G. fire - practically no shelling.

The right advanced until it got so hot that those who were

left got down

A Coy. came up, getting the same fire, and reinforced D

(right half of D). By this time they were about ahead of 

Agram Alley - past a number of 5th Bde. in trenches and were

past the copse on the right.

This was about 6.15. Then they saw 56th (?) Bn. on

their right. They came along on the south side of the 

railway and a few on the north of it. In a few minutes  A Coy.

had lost all its officers as it came up to reinforce it was

really the second line in attack and now they formed the one

line).

407.

Lieut. Clayton , killed; Lieuts. Griffin and Love and Capt. Mose wounded.

Lieut. Holland had started with Lieut. Field (wounded

day before) and Lieut. O'Connell - now with left party -

and Lieut. Gabriel - also on left (both the latter were

wounded on Mont St. Quentin). So Holland was the only

officer now left on the right. Just after A Coy. joined,

some Germans - about 20 - advanced a short distance with

M.G.'s from about the aviation ground (I21.A.5.8). It

was very flat. They were nearer than the huts and they

were stopped by our L.G.'s and rifle fire. When these

Geermans were forced down the line advanced again a short

distance and then was stopped with M.G.'s.

There was very little cover - and practically no

shellholes - the Germans had dug a few potholes in the 

night.

Holland saw it was impossible to pass over the open

(no one would survive), so he passed word along from man 

to man to try and reach the huts at the aerodrome by

working round to the right. 14th Bde. were fighting in

the woods at this time. Lieut Holland with a couple of

runners and about 6 men reached the huts and found a

number of 14th  Bde. men and officers scattered amongst

them. They were there moving from hut to hut for shelter

and trying to find out what the position was.

From there Lieut. Holland could see a party of our men

on the south side of Mont St. Quentin. M.G. fire was still

coming from the NW and SE corner of the Mount. So the

Germans still held it. Holland sent a message back to Bn.

from there.

The men on St. Quentin could be seen moving from the

left apparently along a trench to the right at the edge of

the village and then back again. Holland with his six men

tried to get across to Mont St. Quentin.

(The  men swung a gun round from 21 B. 1. 5. and fired 

it straight up the road to the right of the village - and 

they must have fired 40 or 50 shells).

They tried to get across about the road by Uber Alles

Trench. Two of the six men were wounded and it could not

be done.

Just about when the gun started to fire the Germans

turned artillery onto the huts of the aerodrome and what

seemed to be T.M.'s from the sugar factory. He was trying

to blow out the 77 for one thing. The men stuck to it and

went on firing with the shells all round them. The German

was setting to work systematically to destroy the cover.

It was now....(?)

A mine went up on the road near Uber Alles Trench about

the cross roads in I.5.B.3.1.

Holland saw they could do nothing by going across the

open and knew that there were a number of odd men still

behind in shelter where the advance had left them; so he

went back south of the railway collecting odd men on the way

and got about 30 men and 2 L.G.'s. Got back to Gottlieb,

rang up Bn. from there, and found that a second attack was 

being made on Mont St. Quentin at 1 p.m. That was C & B,

and part of D was there, and they were supported by 21 Bn.

Holland moved up Galatz Alley with this party and got

[[xxxxcrossed out]] wounded with shrapnel just at the start.

He put C.S.M. Bertough in charge and gave him instructions

to report to Lieut. Addison of C Coy. to take part in the

second attack.

He was then taken to the dressing station by a couple of

runners.

The attack on the mount was successful and this party

of D & A Coys. was in it.

D went in about 75 strong and had 39 or 40 casualties.

408.

A Coy. lost about the same.

It was drizzling softly most of the time. The M.G.

fire was the most intense Holland had ever heard in war.

The Germans mostly died at their guns in the early fighting -

every M.G. seemed to have its crew around it.

--------------

24TH BATTALION: MONT ST. QUENTIN.

24th Bn. crossed the river behind 23rd and followed

them down by the river bend: 

D - C →

B - A →

They were in artillery formation after crossing north

of Clery.

Two Coys. got into the big bank above the  river. The

other two got into the trenches near the bend while waiting

for news of 23rd, and 23rd was put in to mop up what 5th Bde.

had left behind between Mont St. Quentin and the river. The

6th Bde. thought it was going into a support position.

The bank was reached about 11 a.m. (They were not to

cross the bridge before 8.30 a.m.)

They waited for orders there. Lieut. Ingram went

forward and made a reconnaisance at Brasso Redoubt - with

his platoon. They knew at this time that 23rd had bumped

trouble more than was expected.

While waiting in the bank (and while the Germans were

shelling the bridge from Omiecourt), [[xxxxcrosed out]], where the engineers were working, they had a conference of Coy. Commanders when it was settled that 2 Coys. would go by the Ravine up the

right arm of Brasso and 2 by the trench up the left arm of

Brasso Redoubt.

They were to get to Gottlieb trench if possible (when 

they got to the head of Brasso). Failing that they were to

make some sort of position at the head of Brasso Redoubt.

About 4 p.m. they went to the Ravine; were there ½-hr.

while Coy. Commanders had a look at the ground - at this

stage 24th Bn. was really supporting 23rd, which was

exploiting the right).

About 5 p.m. they moved ( as above) up the two arms

of Brasso Redoubt. D Coy. (the left) got into Gottlieb

all right without casualties and so did the right; but

as each was getting in the Germans put w shells into the

trench and a number of men were killed and wounded. This

was intermittent shooting by 5.9's fair into the trench,

and this lasted till 10.20. In this time the Bn. had

lost about 30 men - and the 5th Bde. chiefly of 18th Bn.

2 officers were killed by this shelling; Lieut. E.M.

Martin (B Coy.) and Lieut. C.J.R. Newton (A Coy.). At

this time the Coys. were more or less mixed. Before

midnight they were pretty well straightened out.

D\ Lt. Stuart

 C\ Capt. Bowden

   B\ Lt. Baldock.

     A\ Lt. [[Gow?]]

 

409

The right of A Coy. was south of the railway crossing

in Gottlieb trench right on the road from Halle

. When

A Coy. got there the 23rd Bn. were in Save trench. Lieut.

Short was there and they had started to give in. Later

they moved out. For some time there was no one in the 

trench; they didn't tell Lieut. Gow they were moving - he

had told them  that 24th would be occupying it. After 23rd

Bn. had left it post from A Coy. was put in there. Most

of the men were kept in Gottlieb. (It was not expected

by the C.O.'s that 5th Bde. would be in Gottlieb trench -

and when the 24th moved in and came under this shellfire

it looked as if things would be pretty serious with the

congestion there).

The 24th Bn. posts were put in Save trench before

midnight after rations came up. It was in this direction

that the 18th Bn. ration party went out into the Boche lines

by an error. The posts in Save trench were in a few holes

C.T. junction at 14B.4.5.

No Germans were struck on the right by Lieut. Gow's

Coy. During the day a couple of Germans had been seen

running from a trench some way on their right front.

Word came that 18th Bn. party had been robbed of their 

rations. Lieut. Smythe sent out a party which went 200 or

300 yds. to the right to find the Germans whom the ration

party had run into and to get touch with the 23rd Bn. - it

looked to Bn. H.Q. at this time (with this party getting

involved with the Germans)  as though 23rd Bn.  was involved

with the Germans, and as if they would have all they could

do in cleaning up instead of attacking next day.

No on e else in 24th Bn. that night came in touch 

with the Germans. (The 2nd shell which fell in Gottlieb

where the men were four deep certainly got 25 men). Gow

had gone up to Save trench to get 23rd Bn. to give them

more room. The 18th Bn. only had one officer in the part

of Gottlieb which 24th got into and he had gone up into

Save trench. In left of Gottlieb was Major MacDonald,

20th Bn.,who warned them that a number of his men had been

left in Feuillacourt.

About midnight came by a runner a warning order that

24th Bn. would have to attack in the morning. Detailed

orders came about 3 or 3.30. Zero was to be 6 a.m.

Nothing was known at the time about the position ahead.

There was a rumour that some 5th Bde. elements were ahead.

A patrol of Baldock's about 11.30 went out and along Save

trench where they found a handful of 17th Bn. No Germans

were ahead there.

On the left Major MacDonald was uncertain if he were

not in Oder trench - but it was ascertained by Lieut.

Stuart and others that the trench was really Gottlieb

(Oder trench was smashed to bits and almost unrecognisable).

The 5th Bde. men knew that there was a Coy. of theris

out ahead of them somewhere - they pointed over the top and

said - "There is a Coy. of ours out there," but they didn't

know where.

On the left they knew there was no one ahead except

5 Bde. wounded in the village of Feuillacourt. At H.Q.

it was thought a few 5th Bde. men in Elsa, but it was not

known for certain.

The men in Elsa trench had no communication during the

night - no party moved up or down Galatz trench. (There

were some 7th L.T.M. men in Agram Alley). (Capt. Ingram

had shown LIeut. Baldock in the afternoon the direction of

the head of Ube Alles and Cott mit Uns trenches, and said

he thought a Coy. of 17th Bn. was in there).

The start was at 6 - D Coy. started at 6.5 a.m. About

5.30 (a little before 5.30) the Germans had opened with

410.

barrage and M.G. fire.

Under the original orders the 24th Bn. was to take the

village and the 23rd Bn. to attack towards Peronne. Col.

James and Col. Brazenor sent urgent appeals to General

Robertson, and he came up himself - Division go down on

him for leaving his Bde. Robertson from the quarry could

see that the 23rd Bn. was involved and that it was far more

than a one=battn. show to take Mont St. Quentin -- the

objective was Haute Allaines and the village of Feuillacourt

--the objective was Haute Allaines. When Robertson came up

the Bn. was very anxious indeed at the prospect - and his

arrival was most welcome. A message came for him there

that he was needed at a conference (which was held at his

Bde. H.Q.) and he had to hurry back there. At 11 p.m. they

were still waiting to know if the orders would be modified

or if they would have to carry our the original attack.

About 1 a.m. the alteration came. The four Bn. C.O.'s

were all together in a joint H.Q, This was by direct order

from 6thBde. which was not relaxed next day.

At 6 a.m. the barrage was a concentration on certain

distant areas. The right of the 24th Bn. at the jump off

was where the railway line crossed the trench. They had

gone 200 or 300 yds. before they could see where 23rd Bn.

was - it was a heavy drizzling rain and it was hard to see

them. The 23rd Bn. came in touch about 450 yds.  ahead, just

as they reached the barbed wire short of the north end of

Galatz-Agram Alley. There was practically no opposition till

they got through Elsa trench.

In Elsa trench were some of 5th Bde. They went right

through Elsa Trench on the far left of it (with 23rd Bn.

on right) and began to get opposition then from Varna

trench, from the Cemetery, and from the village. This

opposition was heavy M.G. and rifle fire. On this part 

they saw no Germans till then crossed the road. As they

crossed the road they saw the first Germans - they were

manning Varna trench. There were snipers behind the trees

in the village and there were M.G. positions through the

village. They cleared Varna trench and killed or captured

all the Germans in that part of it. They got 50 yds.

ahead of the cemetery. There Lieut. McCarthy sent word up

to Lieut. Sedgwick to say that23rd Bn. was held up by the 

copse on the right of the village. The left flank was

held up also. Sedgwick was then working up the trench

beyond the cemetery. They withdrew and came down into

Varna trench.

The Germans worked down into the village and got

a M.G. into position above Varna trench which enfiladed

the trench. This made it necessary for Sedgwick to 

withdraw into the sunken road which runs north from Varna

trench and east of Feuillacourt. Sedgwick's left was then

about as far down as the light railway (towards 9 cent.)

There was a very big quarry on the NW corner of the

cemetery. About 30 Germans had been got out of this in 

the attack). Sedgwick stayed there till ge got further

orders for the attack at 1.30. Lieut. Jenkins (23rd Bn.)

came round about 9 a.m. and Capt. Bowden, Gow, Jenkins,

and Sedgwick, had a talk over the position and Sedgwick went

down to ring up Col. James and let him know the position.

A heavy barrage was put on the village.

-----------

The left in the meantime started from Gottlieb about

6.5. The barrage was on Feuillacourt and was to be there

for 20 minutes.

No opposition was met on the left - the later waves

struck [[xxxxcrossed out]] some there a little later and from the right) till they got into the village. Here a M.G. was firing

from the bridge across the canal where there must have been

411.

(3rd Div. was supposed to be already on this flank - 

otherwise 24th Bn. C.O. would have worked Bn. through the

Canal and left the village behind - but it was expected 

there would be no opposition in the village or from the left).

Cpl . Cook was told to keep this post quiet with L.G.

so that the Coy. could get on. They pushed through to

the Tortille River and got held up again there by a M.G.

position on the bridge across the river (awooden trestle bridge)

Cpl. Cook engaged ithis also and put it out of action - he

was with Lieut. Whitear all the time. From then on it

was impossible to advance in formation owing to M.G. fire

and snipers. So they advanced by ones and twos from

shellhole to shellhole till they reached the northern

portion of the same bank along which Sedgwick's position

finally was. [[xxxxxcrossed out]] Enfilade fire was coming from the

left all the time. The M.G. fire was coming from the

Quarry and the Mount and Plevna trench. When the right

flank came back onto the sunken road (from Varna trench)

this fire became heavy and kept them pretty well glued

to the bank.

As they could not get forward or back, they started

to  make a defensive position of it.

The Germans at this time were certainly as far as the

high groundin 27 Cent. A few 3rd Div. men were seen on

the 27 Hill making down towards the trenches in the valley

(Soutari trench). They had not got this trench before

24th Bn made its afternoon attack.

There was a nest of M.G.'s about the junction of Fiume

and Soutari trenches which was firing all that day and all

the next night, and guns from Haute Allaines.

They were still in this position at 1 p.m. They knew

nothing of [[xxxcrossed out]] the attack at this time. There was no barrage on this left front and no orders reached them.

Baldock started with B Coy. behind D Coy. from

Gottlieb. As they got to the village a gun at the cross-

roads which had been passed over by first wave (in a dugout

or something) got up and held the whole of the portion of

the supports which was facing the village.

When they got to the road they found a few odd men who

said that there were about a dozen out in front but the

didn't know where - and Baldock and his party could [[xxxxcrossed out]] not see them from the road even with glasses. B got his crowd

reorganised and went over as far as the creek. From there

they went on from shellhole to shellhole to the bank under

which (from the creek) they could see a handful of men.

(The creek was only a trickle).

In coming from the creek to the bank they all were

stopped by very deadly fire except Baldock and a couple of

runners and 2 or 3 L.G.'s which got up on the bank. They

occupied big shellholes 50 or 60 yds. behind the bank

waiting for the opposition on the hill to be finished.

From there they jumped up - and gradually went on by

driblets to the bank.

As they went through (the first wave) the Germans went

into the dugouts on this road -most of them got up and walked

back to our lines -dropping their arms. There must have

been 20 of them. (Probably [[xxxx crossed out]] M.G. was one of them). They could have given the 8 or 9 men [[xxxx crossed out]] and officers ahead a lot of trouble.

These Germans put up no fight, but are not recorded

as arriving back.

Afternoon attack:  About 1 p.m. Lieut. Sedgwick got

orders from H.Q. (with 20 O.R. then) to bomb up Varna trench

and continue up the trench north of the village and clear

all the trenches in the sector immediately NE of Mont St.

Quentin.

Barrages went down at 1.30 and Gow and party started

412.

A Coy. 21st Bn. (under Capt. Sullivan) was on right

to clear the village. Sedgwick worked along Varna trench.

Half-way along it was blown in and a German M.G. in the 

cemetery was firing on them as they crossed this bit. They

put 4 rifle grenades into him and the M.G. didn't trouble

them again.

They moved forward and got just beyond the cemetery when

4 German snipers were found behind a block. They bombed

these, killing 2 wounding 2. 100yds. further was a 

German M.G. post - gun and crew were captured. They saw

us coming and threw up their hands - the only post which

didn't fight. [[xxx crossed out]] On the crest of the mound where the

trench joins the several trenches which junction there to

the right was a German post of about 8. They opened with

stick bombs as party came up the trench. They never hit 

anyone. 2 L.M.G. and one heavy were in this same post.

Party had to rush them - only about three got away. This 

party of Germans was using its bombs only. Sedgwick worked

half-right down the trench then, clearing them right through.

About 10c.1.2. was a strong post of 2 light and 2 heavy M.G.

This was rushed by Sergt. Johnson and 3 men of 24th. and a

sergt. and 3 men of 21st, capturing the guns until all the

crew was killed. After clearing these they took up their

position in the trench which circles the NE of Mont. St. Q.

Sedgwick, Sergt. Johnson and 3 O.R. arrived there- all the

rest were wounded or killed. The 21st on their right

(A Coy.) were in that part of the trench about the same time

as 24th got there.

Another bombing party under Lieut. Smythe and Lieut.

Courtney, 2 N.C.O.'s and 20 men followed Sedgwick at 200 yds.

These were organised about 1 p.m. as soon as the orders came 

They followed to the S.P. by the mound and continued on to the

left at the Y junction there, and got into Plevna trench.

About 50 Germans had gone down there. They killed about

10 and got about 30 prisoners and were eventually linked

up with the left of 24th Bn. which got into the same

trench.

In the quarry by the cemetery, which was just below

the trench, there were about 50 prisoners taken. (C Coy.

of 21st Bn. was involved in this).

On the left the first that was known of the attack

was seeing the parties of 2 men each were sent out from the

left to reconnoitre Plevna trench.

Cpl. Dart, D.C.M. M.M., was on the left. They got

into Plevna about half-way down the hill and worked left

down the trench towards Tortille. They met a party of

40 Germans or so coming down and Cpl. Dart shot one and took

5, including an officer, and the rest must have gone back 

to Tortille.

There was a Coy. of 21st Bn. in this trench at the

time. They had been near the quarry and in the trenches

round about the NE corner of the mount. These prisoners

were handed over to them.

D Coy. (Stuart) left in ones and twos, and a bombing

party (Lts. Whitear and Book) went at the same time; jumped

into Plevna and moved up to the left. B Coy. (Baldock)

formed up and followed them. After getting into Plevna

D Coy. 21st Bn. sent in about 20 men as a bombing party

under Lieut. Cope to bomb to the right in Tortille; and

B and D of24th Bn. added a party which was to bomb to

the left.