Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/227/1 - Folder - Part 11

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24.
He then came back to the Coy had his Pltn round the
shoulder of the hill. The L. Gunners covered the Copse
and the bombers worked round the reverse slope of the hil
and took some German prisoners; bombed the Bn HQrs dugout
(Sgt price who let this got a D.C.M.) and took a number of
prisoners including 11 German officers and 60 or 70 men.
Meanwhile a L? Gnr from No. 9 Pltn named Rochford 
pushed well forward with his gun and when the Germans
came out of the sunken road he opened fire on them. They
were making for their Bn HQrs. He killed 34 and all day
long our ambulances were carrying back their wounded.
At the same time Gelston's Platoon had contributed 
by working over the crest (by the sunken road) and
down the other side. The Germans therewere thus enclosed,
and 187 prisones wereobtained (including Price's 60)
Just as these prisoners were coming back the 45th
Bn was seen coming up the slope towards Cooker trench in
artillery formation. They moved exactly as on parade through
the German was shelling.
As they passed through C Coy 48th Bn began to dig
in. The fight with the counter-attack was not seen by
C Coy.
 

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1.

12th BRIGADE
Sailly Laurette.
July 8? 1918.
August 8.
13th BATTLION
August 8 - September 18, 1918.
Landing.

11th BATTALION
Landing
The first thing D. Brockman saw was a flare which
went up on the beach. It was like a tow flare or a
bundle of cordite. D. Brockman had looked at his
watch on the way in - 3.45 a.m. The time when they
landed was about 4.20 he thinks. The boats were then
700 to 800 yards out when the flare went up. Almost
immediately machine-gun fire opened. Something went
into the water before they landed - possibly Hotchkiss
shells, and threw up a spray - a number of these were
falling about.
They got rifle and machine-gun fire also while in
the boats. (A Hotchkiss gun was trained by 10th
Battalion, D. Brockman thinks, on Maclagans Hill.
This probably did the shooting. They could not see
the flashes or where the shooting was coming from -
did not notice it anyway.
Beside D. Brockman in the stern of the boat was a
little red headed midshipman. As the fire came on the
boat, the men bent their heads and backs. As the boat
got in the fire grew fiercer. The men bent down and
this kid clambered over the backs of the men revolver
in hand, jumped onto the beach, and ran up across the
beach and into the scrub yelling out in his squeaky
voice : "Come on my lads - come on my lads." (The
two sailors in the boat had been like everyone else in
the bottom of the boat - D. Brockman sitting by the
midshipmite) Then the youngster realised that he had
to go back to his boat and his face dropped.
D. Brockman's boat landed on the point of Ari
Burnu - exactly on the point. The 11th Battalion was
landing opposite this point. Col. Lyell Johnston[*X*]
landed there too. Major D. Brockman was on the
right of the point and Capt. Leane on the left of it.
D. Brockman was the senior man of the whole of the
battleship's party, (towed in to 700 or 800 yards)
The flare would be a little to the South of where 11th
Battalion was heading – probably opposite 10th Battalion.
2 Coys. 9, 2/10, 2/11, right to left.
The boat had rushed across the beach and dropped
their packs in the scrub just off the beach. D. Brockman's
pack was just round the left corner of the hill where
you got shot at (when later you went to get the packs)
from the left.
On the top of the hill, a man named Paddy Reid was
just behind Major D. Brockman. D. Brockman had just
got on the top of the plateau when 3 Turks jumped out
and came for him with fixed bayonets out of the trench

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2.
on the top of the plateau. D. Brockman thought he was
done for, when Paddy Reid appeared. He hit the first
Turk over the head with his rifle butt - the second Turk
swerved off and went for him. Paddy bayoneted him, and
apparently could not get the bayonet out - so he dropped
it. The third Turk came at him but he brushed his rifle
aside, and caught hold of the Turk - threw him onto the
ground and kicked him on the head and hilled him. (He
was a very fine looking man - originally an Irishman in
the Dragoon Guards - always in trouble - probably a timber
getter in W.A.)
On the top of Ari Burnu had been a trench in which
there were Turks. They were shooting - Leane and Annear
and MacDonald were lying together in the scrub at the foot
of the hill when Annear was shot through the head and
MacDonald wounded through the shoulder by these Turks.
D. Brockman went up the hill to the right of this Turkish
trench. D. Brockman could see these as he passed, and
there was a quick fight there - the men killed them and
went straight on.
On top of the plateau it was fairly daylight. The
Turks ran down the steep slope into Shrapnel Gully.
Four or five were shot down there as they ran.
D. Brockman tried to give some morphia to one badly
wounded Turk on the plateau. The Turk looked venom at
him and spat it out.
On top of Plugges they reorganised - got the Coys.
separated. Major D. Brockman personally sorted them out
put 9th Bn. on right, 10th in centre and 11th on left.
The job of the covering party was then regarded as done.
They were then being fired at from Walkers Ridge and
McCay's Ridge.
Then the balance of the Bde. arrived behind in good
order. Then MacLagan came up and D. Brockman saw him.
His first order was to dig in where they were on the E.
edge of Plugges Plateau and Maclagans Ridge. They were
already doing this.
From there it looked as if the plateau over Walkers
Ridge was continuous - as a matter of fact Monash Gully
came in. (This was a bit before 6 a.m.) Maclagan's next
order was to go and make good the left over Walkers Ridge
way - it looked as if Baby 700 were the crest of a con-
tinuous ridge.
D. Brockman on getting these orders from Maclagan
decided to send his own and Leane's Coy. on to the left up
towards Baby 700; Denton's and Barnes' Coy. to Quinns and
Courtneys.
Smith's Coy., which he then found there, he ordered to
go in between Denton and Leane - about the Bloody Angle.
It was clear from there that Courtneys and Quinns were
across a valley, but not Baby 700. You could see the
gully ran up to the corner of Walkers Ridge, but it seemed
to end there (of course it really ran far ahead).
Shortly afterwards Major Roberts, 2 in/c 11th Bn.
came up and kept Leane back on Plugges Plateau.
D. Brockman went off to Walkers Ridge (going into the
top of Reserve? Gully (on the seawardside) up again).
As he got on to where Walkers Ridge abuts into Shrapnel [*?*]
Valley he met Lawler's Coy, and Robertson's Coy. Lawler
had laboured up the steep precipitous Reserve Gully - 
D. Brockman sent Robertson's Coy. along the valley with
orders to work straight up to go for the ridge on the top
of it.
Lalor he sent along the top of Walkers Ridge direct
towards the Nek (then unknown); and 2 platoons of his
own (D. Brockman's) Coy. up on to Popes, and 2 on to the
high ground about Steeles (on the right of the valley
to work round to their left and junction with the others 

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3.
at the head of the valley. These last two (Rockliffe
and Macfarlane) as a matter of fact stayed out there and
did not junction to the left. Denton's Coy. went to
Quinns as ordered and Barnes out to Courtneys - and two
platoons there and some of Denton's under Crowley got out
ahead there to what was afterwards German Officer's
Trench. Everett 2. in/c of D. Brockman's Coy, was (in
the reorganisation at Plugge's) put by D. Brockman in
charge of a sort of composite company with Sergeants for
platoon commanders – and D. Brockman sent him over at the
same time as he gave orders to Denton to go out in the
same direction as Denton (i.e.. to Quinns). Everett had
Lieut. Selby (a Duntroon boy) with him - and they went
to the place indicated - the points were shwon to them
by pointing across the gully - and there all day Everett,
from a position where he could see, sent back the
exceedingly accurate reports which arrived all day through
Denton to 3rd Bde. Headquarters. Denton was not himself
so far forward by any means and he got the D.S.O.
It was from Walker's (afterwards Russells) that
D. Brockman distributed his Company. They had then
discovered that Monash Valley existed.
The parties then went off as ordered - Lalor up
Walkers, Robertson into the valley and up Popes; Smith
into the Bloody Angle (through the valley). Robertson
worked over Popes and joined with Lalor on the slopes of
Baby 700. D. Brockman then signalled back from Walkers
to Plugge's Plateau and asked him to send another platoon -
which Leane (who got the signal) did. This platoon,
under Lieut. Cook, went with D. Brockman himself through
the valley and up over Popes and thon across the slope
where they joined the parties (by this time they were
mixed parties of all sorts) under Lalor and Robertson.
D. Brockman coming up with Lalor got into a charge
there were some Turks on the hill- Lalor was reorganising
his lot when D. Brockman got/to him. They could see the
sea from there and knew there was no one there - and were
being fired on from one of the ridges on the left.
D. Brockman realised that there was no one in this 1,200
yards below them and the sea. Looking to the right
towards Maidos could be seen quite a number of Turk
entrenchments (possibly on Gun Ridge or Lone Pine).
D. Brockman decided to tell Lalor to stay where he was
and dig in to protect the left flank and Lalor agreed
that this would be the right thing to do. He started
to dig in at once.
D. Brockman then went back over Popes and came upon
Major Kindon and 2 Coys. of 1st Bn. He explained the
situation to them, and asked him to look after the left
flank. Kindon said to his men: "Come on boys, the West
Australian chaps are in difficulties up here - let's
give them a hand." Kindon went up to the top of the
valley with his lot.
D. Brockman went up towards Popes again to rejoin
hid own lot on Baby 700. On the top of Popes he met
some of the men coming back. The men said that they
had gone on (D. Brockman thought under Lalor's orders,
but months afterwards ho heard that /it was on Robertson's
orders - that Lalor did'n't want to go on and Robertson
told him xxxxxx that he was his senior and he would have
to go on.) The men said that when they got on they were
overwhelmed with numbers. There was a heavy fire going
on there then - it was a case of reorganising a line and
D. Brockman got the men to dig in on Popes Hill - and this
was the original and final line on Popes. They were dug
in just on the edge of the crest. This must have been
about 11 a.m.
From there D. Brockman went around the position as

300
4.
far as it concerned him - i.e. to about German Officer's
trench.
There were men all the way round - he could see
Smith's people opposite the end of Popes - then Everett's,
(some of D. Brockman's) then Denton, then Barnes, then
Rockliffe and Macfarlane. On the right of them again
was 10th Bn. - Shaw was there - and Todd of 10th Bn.
Everett's people were out from the edge in a trench of
potholes which they had dug (this was about 50 to 80
yards in and they had a series of potholes back to the
crest. From their position they had a good command
down the slope (where Everett got all the information).
Denton's men were on the crest. A platoon of
Denton's was out with Barnes on the crest under Capt.
Crowley. (Crowley was Denton's 2 in/c). Rockliffe
and Macfarlane also were well out beyond the crest.
D. Brockman had in his mind after dark to link up
Everett, Barnes, Rockliffe, and Macfarlane out where they
had a good commanding view. (Barnes would be about by
German Officer's trench). To get out there you had
either to run or to crawl.
After dusk, when D. Brockman had sent for Barnes
and Crowley - to tell them what he intended to do that
night, Crowley came over to confer with him.
A rumour had come down the line that Indian troops
had landed at Helles and were coming to help us. No
one knew where that rumour came from - but many believed
it. They knew there was a landing down S. (the first
rumour was that the landing had been most successful and
they were marching up to help us). Then this other
rumour came along. Then just as Crowley and D. Brockman
were conferring, close by 2 M.Gs. of 11th Bn. (one under
Sergt. Halahan), there was heard on their right front
(coming down through the gap between where Crowley was
and where Macfarlane and Rockliffe were) a number of men
shouting: "Don't shoot - don't shoot - Indian troop -
Indian troop!" This was perfectly plain. They could
then see men coming in the dusk - certainly hundreds.
Crowley was an Anglo_Indian officer and could talk
Hindustani very well, with a special pass. D. Brockman
didn't believe that these were Indians and sent Crowley
to see. He went off with his runner and in a few
seconds the runner came dashing back to say they were
Turks. Crowley made a dive for Barnes' trench to warn
him. The two M.Gs. and all the rifles opened up as
soon as D. Brockman told them that they were Turks and
the Turks melted.
These Turks came up Wire Gully - (about opposite
where MacLaurin was later killed).
After this - it being now dusk - D. Brockman met
Col. Owen of 3rd Bn. D. Brockman had sent for Crowley
after dusk as it was the only time when communication
could well be carried out. Twice he had tried it - the
first time his Sergt.-Major was hit through the chest
following him out - and was with difficulty got back;
just after they had finished getting him in D. Brockman
saw Capt. Bean of 3rd Bn. hit and fixed up by Brennan.
It was there that he saw old Col. Owen, but that was 2
hours later.
At this time Maj. Bennett came up. He was known
to D. Brockman because he was one of the 2 only Majors
senior to D. Brockman in the A.I.F.  D. Brockman told
him what he was going to do - and probably Bennett, who
disapproved, thought that D. Brockman was going to do it
all the same in spite of himself being in command.
Owen heard that a major was acting in command on
the spot there. He sent for him and told him that he 

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5.
had arrived and was in command. (Before this D. Brockman
had seen Major Bennett, 3rd Bn. and had put the plan up to
him, but Bennett did'n't approve. He said he had not
seen it. He evidently told Owen, and Owen sent for the
Major. The Major was D. Brockman).  D. Brockman put
his intentions up to Owen. Owen said that he had not
seen the place, and he would not send the men out to do
this until he had reconnoitred it for himself. He told
D. Brockman that nothing was to be done with the men
under D. Brockman by D. Brockman, and that he was in
command and D. Brockman would carry out the orders he gave.
D. Brockman was very keen on getting the line forward at
that time. He realised that their present position was
militarily absurd and that they must get, the observation
if possible. He had grabbed a Coy. of 16th Bn. to help.
When Bennett took over he took these men from him.
Bennett clearly thought that D. Brockman would go on with
his plans, and got Owen to stop him.
The chance for a reconnaissance had gone. It was
only possible when D. Brockman did it - nothing was done
that night to got the line out. D. Brockman stayed there
the night and next day gathered up some stragglers from
the Gully, many of 14th Bn, and sent them up Popes Hill
way and went up there himself and met Pope there.
(Lamb would be about at Courtney's Post. He was very
excited and sending a lot of messages).
D. Brockman picked up Darnell (then with Darnell, who
was one of Barnes' Coy. - he was with one of the platoons
on the crest which D. Brockman was going to push out) and
went up to Popes with him. D. Brockman lost his water-
bottle, which Capt. Macgregor, doctor of 16th Bn, had
filled for him at the bottom of the hill - and sat down
half way up the hill. There he was sniped at from Walkers -
but stayed till he found a dead sapper and got his water
bottle. On the top of the hill the Sergt.-Major of 13th
Bn. told him to join a ration party - "Come on m'lad -
we're all tired etc." taking him for a private by that
time. Everyone was covered with thorns and with torn
clothes. D. Brockman attributes his not getting hit to
his having always been on the move.
On Monday night D. Brockman heard that Robertson and
Col. Johnston had been killed. He knew of Leane's
Company up there, so he went up there to get in/c. He
went up to Plugge's and found Leane fuming. This was dawn
on Tuesday. The C.O. was in a part of the original trench
which Leane had started to dig the first morning. (Peck
(the adjutant) had got forward the first morning as soon as
he realised that the C.O. was not moving further forward).
At this time on Tuesday morning there was a lot of firing
from the left, Walkers Ridge way, and the "overs" were
pretty thick. Johnston ordered D. Brockman to stay there,
but he slipped away to whore Everett's lot had been and
there met Major Kindon (further left by 150 yards from
where Capt. Bean was hit the first day). He left Kindon
there and went back to Popes and stayed there till they
came down.
Lieut. Cook was killed in the advance and retirement
on the first day. Cook and Morgan on the first day had
stayed where they had been told to by D. Brockman. When
the advanced line came back their people were organised;
they stopped them there. Then Cook was killed and Morgan
badly wounded. The Sergeant carried Morgan in himself
and got a D.C.M. for this. This Sergeant brought them
back as far as Popes.
[*Ayling- if so the 
men didnt think much

of him*]

After xxx 11th Bn. took over from 8th Bn. G.O.C. 

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6.

came along the half dug trenches.  According to the wretched
map Turkey Knoll, Silt Spur and the other fingers were
all one plateau - it was known as the 400 Plateau. (The
Turks could then be seen on Turkey Knoll. There was a
system of trenches dug before the landing at Turkey Knoll).
Bridges wanted to occupy Plateau 400. It clearly at the
S. end was not held by the Turks and he wanted to oust them.
D. Brockman had previously been out to the second finger
and knew that it was not all one plateau but that deep
gullies were in between.
Bridges wanted his trench dug 150 yards out so as to
make a Redan there (it would clear the Turks from Turkey
Knoll also). He came along one day and finding D. Brockman
in the trench told him to have the trench made. Gen.
Maclagan had turned up meantime, and Col. Johnston.
Bridges said an engineer would be needed to mark the place
out. Capt. Bage (the S. Polar man - with David and
Shackleton?) was walking up the trench and Bridges saw him.
"Here's the man," he said, and told Bage that he was to
go out with D. Brockman and site this trench. They were
to peg it out. That night D. Brockman was to go out with
100 men, dig it and occupy it. Later a communication
trench would be made to the line in rear.
Bridges saw them in the morning. At 3 pm they went
out - got on to the top of the ridge - and there D. Brockman
left the covering party under Selby. Then D. Brockman,
Bage and 2 sapper youngsters went on crawling lo w
through the scrub to do the actual pegging.
Immediately in front of our trenches was a dip, working
up to a crest. Then a dip. It was on the face of this
second dip that the trench was to be sited. D. Brockman
had the Southern end of the bit of cord - Bage was on the
North of it. They had finished the S face and Bage was
hammering in his peg (they had crawled out) with a lump
of stone when the Turks opened fire from the direction of
Lone Pine. There must have been 5 M.Gs. and some rifles.
Bage was hit first in the arm, then in the leg, then in
the head (which killed him). He was brought in that
night.
That trench was never dug. They got out eventually
by tunnelling through into the first valley in three places
(D. Brockman two, Leane one towards Turkey Knoll). Then
a trench was built into the reverse slope of Silt Spur.
Then they tunnelled through that again and broke out into
a front line.
Just then 11th Bn. handed over to 10th Bn .D. Brock-
man came out and was hit by shrapnel in Reserve. This was
about the middle of July.
At Pozieres - the system of attack by 16th Bn. on
the semicircular trench which the 15th Bn. tried to take
the previous night with the Suffolks was Drake Brockman's
idea. Gen Cox had laid it down that it was to be taken
by an assault W. of the road, as before. D. Brockman
had seen the British lying there and he told Brand he
would take it from the flank by the diagonal movement which
was adopted.
April 11th-at Bullecourt.  It was Black who decided
to go on when the tanks were not at the wire - "Come on
boys - bugger the tanks." He was, till then, at the rear
of his Company, led them from there onward. He got them
into the first trench and then to the second through the
wire. He stayed to watch them through the wire and as 

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7.
the last went through ho said to his runner - "Tell them
the first objective is gained." That runner came to
H.Q. to D. Brockman but Black was killed as the message
was given. Murray was his bosom friend. When he heard
Black was killed he wouldn't be satisfied till ge got
out and went over and saw him himself, lying there.
Black said to D. Brockman as he went out to this attack:
"Well good-bye Colonel, I mayn't come back, but we'll
get the Hindenburg Line."

12th Brigade August 8th from Gen. Leane.

12th Bde. had been in old front line. As soon as
3rd Div. moved through, 12th Bde. moved on in rear of
the green line. The barrage was clear of the 14th Bde.
which had Warfusee Road on its right
The German shelling was very scattered and light -
our heavies must have disorganised his guns. But the
fog was so thicj that (with the smoke) it prevented them
seeing 3 yards ahead. Yet they had to move through
Accroche Wood without getting lost and over the broken
ground. The I.O. and a party went on in rear of the
3rd Div. - and laid tapes - then they returned to their
Bns. But soon after the start the sun got up and gave
them their direction. They then knew they were right.
Before the lift of the barrage from the green line they
were in place.
45 ↑ 46

48
The 48th Bn. was to attack with parties (Vickers
gunners, Lewis gunners and teams, Trench Mortars) in
tanks; one Mark 5 Star tank failed to reach the start.
In the other cases the parties went on with the tanks
(in a few cases only in them - orders were against it as
it was too hot - Leane ordered that they should not go
in (tanks) and most of the parties moved beside the tanks.
The Mark 5 Star tanks were not a success and the parties
had eventually to go on without them.
Soon after leaving the green line they met Germans
about the gun positions - both artillery and infantry.
They held up the 45th Bn. for a while firing direct at
the tanks. 46th Bn. however got ahead on the right and
helped 45th Bn. forward.
The Red line came through the Harbonnieres Morcourt
Valley. It was very well held; and from the opposite
side the German batteries were firing direct. In that
valley was a battery of 6-in. guns which had only
arrived the night before from Lille - they had no
ammunition. We captured the officers and guns and most
of the men.
Our troops worked through this valley by using the
cover but lost more heavily here than elsewhere. They
found 60 transport horses - light horses - here. The 
mail cart was just getting away. They were clearing
out on to the E. top of the gully near Amy Wood when
the horse was shot and we got the mails and packages.
There were two canteens in the valley and all sorts of
stores.
This fight across the gully brought them to the E.
crest where the Redline was – on the right just E. of
Hope Wood. The 48th Bn. at once moved through them. 

304

8.
(The batteries attached to the 12th Bde. eventually finished
E. of Caroline Wood, and were there very soon after the 45th
Bn. had got the place. They followed the advance very
close). 
The 48th Bn. got forward with some M.G. enfilade fire
from the left. The greater part of the artillery fire the
whole of the first two days (until the 2nd afternoon) came
from Malard Wood direction, and Chipilly Spur. This was on
the left rear of the attack. At Jean Wood the Bde. H.Q.
was getting direct fire from the exact left flank.
(In Beryl Wood (where there was a well) Gen. Leane
wgeb up there about 2.30 on August 8th, was pinned in the
valley by 8-inch fire, and 5.9 fire for 2 hours - he and
Varley had to keep as close as they could in a hole in the
bank - whizzbang fire mostly came from Progart.
This valley and the valley in which (at 24C.95.90) 48th
Bn. H.Q. were, were heavily shelled all day and next day
24.D.30.50 was 45th Bn. H.Q. These H.Q. were simply in
huts and not shellproof. At this spot one of our Australian
planes fell, catching fire after a fight at 4 p.m. on Aug. 9th.
The 48th Bn. on reaching the valley (24 Central Valley)
found it strongly held. It was a series of huts and holes in
the ground - a camping area - and the Germans put up a fair
fight there. Two Mark 5 Tanks appear to have reached this
point. They cleaned this out - and on the right where the
opposite was not so stiff and the Germans cleared they got
on quickly to the Blue line at 19 and 25; on the left they
had a pretty stiff fight in 13 C. The 16th Bn. had had
some heavy fighting before and their left flank was swung
back S. of Mericourt. 16th Bn. were not in the fighting at
13 A - the opposition on the left had dragged them that way.
48th Bn. took the trenches in 13 C. by a stiff fight. D Coy.
of 48th Bn. was held up here near the Wood but Capt. Twining
worked round with a party around on the N. and cleared this.
The men were attacking there through a field of manure heaps.
'Some of the fields were cultivated and there was a big camp
in Progart).
This night after dark fighting patrols went out to
Progart 750 yards ahead and reported that the Germans were
holding it tightly with M.Gs. Other patrols worked through
into the Engineers' Dump at La Flaque. The Germans had
M.Gs. and snipers there.
The line for August 8th was on the old French line.
The 13th Bn. (relieved by 1st Bde.) moved up and took over
left of ground occupied by 48th Bn. up to 4th Bde. Boundary;
and 45th Bn. took over right of 12th Bde. from main road to
Hospital in R.19.C. On right was at first 32nd Bn. (then
29th?) August 9th - stayed there. But on night 9/10th they
advanced again and swinging right more forwardthan left from
R.19 Central to Road Junction at La Flaque in 26 D. A huge
Engineer Dump was captured there by 45th Bn.
There was only M.G. opposition in making this advance -
no one killed - a fair number wounded.
(On the night of 8th August Leane wanted to take Progart
and it could have been done. But the flank was so far back
that it was not allowed by Div. On night of August 9th
Leane wanted to do it again, but was not allowed to attack
it. He accordingly tried xx with fighting patrols to work
round it - this not being an attack. But they found the
road junction and houses held with M.Gs. and could not get
through this night. The position was of course very different
then. The German all the same was well organised N. of the
rivers and would have made this difficult.
We were now within 500 yards of Proyart and had patrols
all night out to the town. They met no German patrols
(In 6 weeks run in front of Hamel the 12th Bde. couldn't
get a German patrol - they only met one in that time.
 

305

9.   
Finally Leane told 48th Bn. that they must that night get a
patrol or raid the Germans next night. They went right up
to his wire andcaught a German who came out to urinate in a
shell hole just outside his trench. This was July 1 or 2nd
when identification was needed. A number of Germans ran
out when this German shouted. But our people sent him back
to one man while the rest covered the retreat.
On August 8th, 48th Bn. was on the Blue line at 12.10 a.m.
digging in. They were not shelled so much there - the
trenches were good and most of the shelling was in the valleys
in rear.
On August 9th the patrols went out about 7? and the rest
of the troops went up about 8.
This finished the advance of 12th Bde. They were
relieved a couple of night later (10/12?) (The 3rd Divn.
marched in in pretty close formation N. of the main road over
the flat plateau. The Germans saw it as it was before dusk.
The Germans that night bombed from 8 p.m. to dawn, all night
long. He would drop a flare and then bomb. He killed the
horses of Gen. Leane and others on Bde. H.Q., and wounded the
grooms at Jean Wood. Padre Devine saved the life of one of
the grooms, getting him carried in and tying him up and staying
upwith him all night putting hot fomentations on him - he is
still alive - Devine got a M.C.)
This was the same night that 10th Bde. did its attack
up the Proyart Road - the bombing was the worst that Leane
ever saw.
(One feature of August 8th was the large number of
prisoners taken - over 900 - by the 12th Bde; and about 30 to
40 field guns including 3/8-in. in Jean Wood, (and the 6-in.
guns which we saw in Grace Wood)
N.B. On July 8? 12th Bde, went out up the N. of Somme Valley,
and crossed the gully from in front of Sailly Sec and advanced
to the very outskirts of Sailly Laurette; at the same time
they cut off the corner that still remained N.E. of Hamel
to the Somme. This was done in 2 stunts. Special patrols
went out the night of July 7th to reconnoitre and find how
the ground was held both N and S of Somme. On S. they found
one post - but E. of this it seemed to be strongly held; on
N. of Somme they struck German trenches 60 yards E. of our
own, strongly wired. Leane decided as soon as it was dark
to send out a covering party and dig in on the line. The
German post was not occupied apparently this night though
flares went up in front. Three hours later on the N. side
a barrage was put down; 48th Bn. took all objectives, killed
a number of Germans, and took 35 prisoners including some
officers. They then had touch with the 5th Divn. at the
Cross Roads on the left N. of the Somme.
By doing the affair in two halves Gen. Leane was able to
get all his gun fire concentrated on to the N. side of the
Somme - the guns covering the brigade front were then made more
useful. The barrage this night extended from Albert to in
front of U/B (about). The men on the right of the Somme
were dug in before the retaliation came; but there were a
number of casualties on the N. of the Somme.

After August 8th the 12th Bde. went down to Lihons and
relieved 1st Bde. Came up on night of 13/14th? and went in
some nights later (15/16th) There in line over a week.