Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/227/1 - Folder - Part 6

246.
25th BATTALION:
                                   August 8th (Davies)
                                Mont St. Quentin (Fletcher)
                                                                 (Lennon)
                                 Pozieres                 (Davis)
                                 Beaurevoir            (Davis)
26th BATTALION : (Same)                   (Francis, Cooper,
                                                                                Stapleton)
                                     Lagnicourt            (Stapleton)
28th BATTALION:   (Same)                   (Col. Currie,
                                                                            Capt. Allen,
                                                                             Lieut. Tozer,
                                                                             Lieut. C.A. Walker).
---------------------------------------------------------------
25th BATTALION  - AUGUST 8th.

7th Bde. held from road to railway. 25th Bn was
carrying for all three - picks, shovels, ammunition, bombs,
water, whatever Bns. wanted. No difficulty in finding way.
Diagram - see original document          
Two platoons to each Bn, two to T.M.'s, and two to
M.G.'s; two for liaison between 5th and 7th Bdes.; one as
P. of W. escort. Some reported to units before leaving
Villers Bretonneux; others marched up independently and
formed behind units.
The objective was cast of Marcelcave and La Motte.
About 35 mins. before Zero the Germans put down a
pretty heavy barrage on the J.O.T. Our J.O.T. was ahead
of the old support line - and it was this line he shelled
fortunately. Bn. H.Q. was there. There was a fair amount
of M.G. fire also. It looked as if he had heard them.
Also our M.G.'s were firing to drown noise of tanks, and
this may have stirred them.
About 20 mins, before Zero this eased and ceased 10
mins. before. At zero our fire barrage opened. It was
very misty - they expected that it would give them great
difficulty, but the men simply went towards the Germans and
by good fortune got straight there.
Each Bns. carrying party eventually joined the front
line and gave a certain amount of assiatance in getting
their objectives.
North of Marcelcave, in the houses, one officer, 2/Lt.
Dix, came on a yard with an iron gate and a German officer
standing just inside. He went up to take this officer
prisoner. The German shut the gate and motioned him away,
speaking in German. Dix pointed his revolver at him and
he opened the gate and was taken.
The attack went on without great incident till the
objective was reached. The mist was so heavy that you
 

247.
couldn't see any direct fire by guns - probably Germans
kept their guns on barrage. 28th and 27th Bns. got some
guns.
5th Div. then leapfrogged - mist cleared about 7 a.m.
It was a wonderful sight that morning, after the Xero
from H.Q. to see a bde. of cavalry in mass (if not more)
which came along just north of the railway, crossed the
railway and massed near Card Copse. Also the whole 5th
Div. was advancing in artillery formation and about 100
tanks, mostly whippets, coming up to support the second
leap. Armoured cars and unlimited mechanical and horse
transport were streaming along the road East of Villers
Bretonneux road, and batteries limbering up and galloping
up into action. To crown everything German prisoners
coming back by the score into the middle of all this
astonished.
30 or 40 mins. after Zero there were touring cars
going up the main road - it all looked a certain, confident

success. Within an hour or two balloons, too, were going
forward.
25th Bn. rendezvoused in xxxx 34 B and D. - all were
reorganised and ready in the trenches there by 7.45 a.m.,
carrying jobs finished (they just did the one trip).
They stayed there the night, due north of Marcelcave.
August 9th.- Next day they were told that the line was
East of Harbonnieres and they were to be prepared to attack
at short notice. This was at 11 a.m.
About 11 a.m. Bn, was ordered to go forward and C.O.'s
to meet G.O.C. in W 8 Central, north of Guillancourt.
A little after noon they met and received verbal
orders for an attack that afternoon on Vauvillers and
Framerville and further east. The line then held was the
old French system east of Harbonnieres.
Zero was to be 4.30 p.m.
En. came on under senior O.C., Captain Cross (Major
Page was with xxxxxxxxxx the nucleus), and met C.O. at W8
Central and they lunched there, and moved forward to W10 B.
west of Harbonnieres. Reached there about 3 p.m. - little
shelling. Bde. H.Q. was about 11 A.1.0. in sunken road.
C?O. (Col. Davis) went forward and had a final conference
with G.O.C. He then went back to Bn. and ordered them on,
and went forward to front line and made a reconnaissance.of
J.O.T. East of Harbonnieres they got on a downward slope
(12A and B) and came under shell fire - they also had six
tanks coming up, moving with the Bn. from behind Harbonnieres
and they "drew crabs". They reached the old trench at
4.15 - the J.O. line. Just xxxxx as they were about 200 yds.
short of them a squadron of German planes, about 20 strong,
flew very low (50 to 100 ft.) overhead asll firing as hard as
they could with M.G.'s. This lasted about 5 minutes - the
Bn. had to go on forming up and could do nothing. A Sqdn.
of our own planes came over and engaged them - which made it
a bit heavier till they scattered - bullets everywhere but
loss none or slight (a very remarkable affair). The German
sqdn. had a double triangle mark drawing - see original document as well as their drawing see original document
and was clearly a circus. They got to the trenches about
the time when these planes scattered.
At 4.30 they jumped off in touch with 27th Bn. on left
and 5th Bde. on left of them. 26th and 28th Bns. were in
support to the attack.

Diagram - see original document
 

248.
They advanced through Vauvillers with very little
opposition - got a 77 gun there. The right boundary was
out along the grid running between 8 9 10 and the
                                                                    14 15 16
left boundary 1000 yds. left of this. The objective was
about W.10 B. and D. joining diagonally to SE with 1st
Division. No troops were attacking on the right - to
this day it is not known by Bn. if 1st Division attacked
before or after. They did not attack at the same time,
though Bn. was told that they were going to.
After getting through Vauvillers, in trying to gain
touch with 1st Division, they eased more and more to the
right and actually followed the line of Champagne Alley
(which made right flank boundary) - still unable to get
touch with 1st Division. Rifle and M.G. fire was not
heavy during the attack, but shellfire was moderately
heavy.
On reaching the fork road in 15B, they got a good haul
of prisoners, who put up no fight. There were stables
and light timber and ruberoid buildings there.
They went on into the trenches in 16 Central, which
made the final objective.
The final objective was to have been through 10D
(it wasn't known at the time whether trenches would be
found there - the lines on the map turned out to be very
old French trenches)
During all the advance they were in touch with 27th Bn
on left. But no touch was gained with 1st Division till
about 7 p.m. Then a wounded man of 5th Bn. wandered in.
Then 5th Bn, were found in the trench South of Champagne
Alley in 16C. They said they had been supports but were
now front line. 25th joined 27th about 16 B.2.6. and
27th came right round to the Bde. boundary north of 10
Central.
The casualties were not very heavy - about 30 -
practically all from shell fire. They went through in
artillery formation to the end - and extended into line
just on reaching the final position.
All the tanks with them were put out of action - one in
15 B5.5., another just 200 yds, east of 16 Central - one
had been disabled further back near the xx start. The crew
of the tank which was stopped by broken crank shaft in L5
15 B. Central offered to go on with the Bn. and fight. They
were pretty done with the fumes and so were told to go back.
They had helped to rout Germans out of Champagne Alley. The
other tank was knocked out ahead of our infantry by direct
xxxx hit. The crew were found dead around the tanks with
empty revolvers next morning - all dead. That morning
the 25th Bn. made a further little attack and recaptured it,
They had gone for a M.C. post there and had been blown -
they stayed by their tank and the Germans attacked them at
once - it was all over before anything could be done to
rescue them. There was pretty solid M.G. fire coming from
this Iittle nest of trenches and the tank had gone out to
deal with it. (All down Champagne Alley - a deep, very
wide trench 6ft. deep 8ft. wide, probably an old mule trench-
there was German gear of all sorts. About 250 Germans were g
got out of it - all surrendered freely. They had niches cut
in it with M.G.'s firing to SW and NW. It looked as if they
had left rifles and packs and cleared.
August 10.- The 25th Bn, was ordered to attack this
morning in conformity with an attack by 1st Division on the
right - swinging up the right flank to about 500 yards on
right, pivoting on left in 27th Bns. sector. This was for
8 a.m. The first Division jumped off at 7.45 a.m.
(The night before, in gaining touch with 1st Division,
the Coy
 

249.
the Coy. Commander of right Coy. Lieut. Auchterlonie
M.C. and Bar, had been killed - the Bn. had arrived about
6 p.m. and he was killed after dark about 10 or 10.30 p.m.
in going out to find first division. He was killed
between 25th Bn and the tank. The burst of M.G. fire
came from the tank and it was later found that the Germans
had occupied the tank as a post. (M.C. at Hamel, Bar on
July 17 - never knew he won the bar. He was the last of
three splendid sons to be killed - only about 23; one
brother was the first officer killed in 25th Bn. and another
in Light Horse - both these in Gallipoli - Gympie men).
In the morning the Bn. bombing officer, Lieut.
MacCulloch, took the right Coy, over to this attack. Col.
Davis went up with him. They met with very heavy M.G.
fire from the start - they started over the top. They were
going for a copse on left front - very heavy with M.G.'s.
MacCulloch only lasted half an hour - the C.O. was showing
him where MacCulloch was to take some men when MacCulloch
was sniped through the lung - he died next day. Davis took
the Coy. on himself. They went in sections - and rushes
of one and two men - the fire was very heavy, very accurate
and very short range. As they had no support, neither
artillery, T.M. nor tanks - it became clear that the loss
would not be worth the small gain; the Coy, on the left had
not got forward at all. They had actually done all that
was necessary for helping the 1st Division by getting this
nest of trenches and the tank, and routing the Germans out
the nest. The Germans had to be fought out of this whole
nest. Lieut. Eather (Int. Officer) and Lieut. Harrison
(L.G. officer) had both gone up knowing that the Coy, was
short of officers. Eather took a L.G. himself and assisted
very largely by working up the trench. They killed a good
many Germans. The rest of the Germans went back, fighting
step by step, due East, as 1st Div. had got well on on the
right. Bn, was within 150 yds. of objective. C.O. sent
back dispositions to Bde. (they had got up about 50 rounds
of Stokes and were going to use it for a barrage in the
afternoon). Bde, ordered them to stand fast where they were
about 150 yds. short of objective - they could see 1st Div.
C.O.'s were sent for to Bde. H.Q. at the Pigeon House,
Harbonnieres.
Brigadier issued verbal orders for another attack next
morning to be carried out by 26th and 28th in conjunction
with 5th Bde.
26th Bn, which had been in Vauvillers till then,
relieved at 1 a.m. on morning of 11th, prior to which 25th
Bn. had xx laid a J.O. tape across the whole front. This
was necessary as there was 100 to 150 yds. between posts.
and it was fairly dark. Their attack was timed for daylight
on 11 August. Eather and 26th Bn. I.O. (Pearson) did this.
When relieved at 1 a.m. on 11 Aug, they moved back to
positions vacated by 26th Bn. in and around Vauvillers, and
stood by to support the attack if required.
The attack succeeded, so 25th were not used.
During the German retaliation the German put a lot of
gas into Vauvillers (very heavy indeed on Framerville). On
night of 11th Aug. 7th Bde, was relieved by 6th Bde. The
details in Vauvillers were in good German dugouts and cellars -
rest in trenches. No gas casualties owing to very strict
precauations and previous experience at Passchaendaele and
Mericourt.
26th and 28th came back into old French line east of
Harbonnieres, and 25th and 27th on the tram line immediately
west of Harbonnieres in 10 D.
(Neither Australian soldiers nor British had left any
trace in the village).
It looked as if 8th Bde, had caught it in front of the
village and had been unable o get ahead and got back into
 

250.
the old Amiens line.
During 9th Aug. it was impossible to know if you were
miles out ahead of others or if they were miles ahead of you
No one knew, at the front.
At Harbonnieres the Cermans were still shelling with
a H.V. gun the balbon which was immediately west of
Harbonnieres and which went up from the middle of the 25th
Bn. camp. Its predecessor had been put down on Aug. 9
(afternoon) by one of our planes after a brave attempt
against the Gorman H.V. gun.. On Aug. 11 Germans were
shelling this balloon with H.V. shrapnel and Lieut. Harrison
was wounded by a xxx pellet in the head.
This made the 3rd O.C. of D Coy. to be hit in 3 days.
Aug. 8. Lieut. Templeman was killed during the advance
by our own barrage.
Aug. 9. Lieut. Adair, wounded near NE of Vauvillers by
shell.
Lieut. Inghram, mortally wounded (and died
later, about the same place, also by a shell.
Bn. went back to Bussy and stayed there till 27th Aug.
Moved up and attacked through 6th Bde. just east of
Herbecourt.
Diagram - see original document
(This order?)

25th Bn. moved on to east of Flaucourt. Very few
casualties this day. Stayed there till Aug. 30, afternoon.
Then moved across to loft bank of Somme near Clery. Were
stopped just before crossing, and remained in bivouacs on
the canal side and peninsula of Omiecourt, all that night
(to let other Bdes. cross) till afternoon of Aug. 31.
25th Bn. then crossed, on night of Sept. 1/2, at
Omiecourt, and moved round to Galatz and Agram Alleys.
On evening of Sept. 1st the C.O.'s were sent for to
Bde. near Boscourt Cemetery about dark, and verbal orders
issued for an attack at dawn on Sept. 2. Major Page was
a/ in command this time.
Page got back to Bn. about 1 a.m. It was a very
hurried conference at about 3 a.m. - where they made
arrangement for breakfast and the move up to J.O.T.
Diagram - see original document
This was the first they knew of the attack. Breakfast
had been ordered previously - dry bread, cold beef, cold tea
no milk, no sugar.
For 25th Bn. the J.O. was 700 yds. from there. This
had to be done all by 5.30. The leading Coy. reached the
tape at 5.5.a.m. They were all there between 5.10 and 5.15
after great anxiety. The front started on width of 1000
yds. and widened out to 1500 on objective. The Coys. were
 Diagram - see original document

251.
The idea was that each Coy. should have 500 yds. front
eventually, D Coy. feeding into the gap between A and C.
The Coys. were each three platoons. The advanced
Coys. advanced with one platoon extended as a line of
skirmishers over each Coy. frontage. The other two platoons
advanced 75 tards in rear in lines of sections in artillery
formation. Direction was very difficult to maintain on
account of no previous reconnaissance, and the formation of
the hill ahead tended to make the troops to move to the left.
The troops were brought back during the advance onto their
proper front by signal - and ended on their proper objective.
They jumped off from the Bapaume Road just NW of Mont
St. Quentin.
Opposition was first xxx met in the German line of
outposts just east of the Wood - this ran more or less N and
These were overcome without difficulty. 6th Bde, were
passed just east of the wood.
The Germans main line of resistance ran from the point
of Hill 115 and along Brunn Trench. The M.G. fire was
terrific - the heaviest we have met in the war, and
immediately stopped our advancem, about 400/500 yds. from
the German line. It was just about here that Major Page,
who was coming along in front of the reserve Coy. with Bn.
H.Q., was hit. Capt. Cross was hit (O.C. B COY. on left).
A small party of one L.G. section had worked up Lugus
trench and had knocked out a M.G. position in it, a little
east of the junction with Laibach trench (under Sergt.
Anderson - they got it with Lewis Gun). They were right in
now the German main line of resistance. They immediately
fired on and cleared out a post about 50 yds. on the right
which was occupied by about 50 Germans. The X of the trench
just on top of xx Hill 115 was very strong indeed, their
main post containing 17 M.G.'s and 2 T.M's. Owing to the
convex shape of the hill they could not reach with their
fire the position where our party was.
Capt. Fletches - a fearless man - did most splendidly
throughout this fighting. At first it looked hopeless.
Then, when Sergt. Anderson and his party went on so well
everything seemed all to be plain going. Then when the 120
Germans came up and they only had 2 M.G. magazines left, it
looked very black again - then up came the V.G.'s and it
brightened.
Sergt. Anderson and Cpl. Anderson (both Murwillumbah
boys) did their two shows on their own xxxx initiative - one
out in front of the strongpost, the other up the trench.
The Cpl. Anderson who held out in front of the S/P was a
brother of Sergt. Anderson. He said to the small party -
"I know you can't take it, but go on and hang on to them,"
said Fletcher on finding them.
The rest of A Coy. (which had reconnoitred and found out
the position) moved up Lagus trench and gradually worked up
the trench till they were immediately looking down Brunn
trench, where the Germans were holding out very strongly and
causing serious opposition to C Coy.
(A Coy: Capt. Fletcher, Lieut. McLaughlan, Lieut.
Graham; C Coy: Capt. G. Cromey, Lieut. Annat, Lieut. Ross,
Lieut. Izdebski; D Coy.: Capt. Lennon, 2/Lieut. Stuart,
Ward, Norman; B Coy.: Capt. Cross, Pain, Hoge, Cadzow;
Bn. H.Q.: Major Page, Capt. Carroll, Lieut Eather).
They were now in full view of the Germans who were in
this trench and were looking down on them.
When fire was directed on them they began to clear out
in small parties and ceased fire.
At that moment a party of about 120 Germans in column of
fours began to come west towards this point, coming in view
about 500 yards away. Two Vickers Gun teams had just arrived
and this target was shown to them as the ammunition of the
infantry was almost exhausted. The Vickers gun could only
 

252.
fire single shots so a burst of L.G. fire was ordered when
the Germans were about 350 yds. away. They broke and
fled leaving a number of wounded men. (This was from the
same point). Attention was again turned to Brunn trench,
and it was seen that the Germans were still running away
in small parties and that C Coy, were enveloping them on
the flat on the left. The Germans had ceased firing
entirely.
C Coy, was then seen advancing, and the rest of the
Germans (about 50) surrendered without opposition.
D Coy. had no oppostunity yet of working in. They
were following up in xxxxxx Lugus Trench.
C Coy. advanced across the open in excellent formation
and followed so closely on the heels of the Germans as they
ran that they did not make a stand in Antigone Alley but
retreated beyond the main road, throwing away many M.G.
packs and other kit. As the road was the objective, C Coy
took up a position in Antigone Alley. A Coy. advanced up
Lugus Trench and turned right down a good system of trenches
which the Germans had been previously occupying. No
Germans were found there but they linked with 26th Bn. near
the corner of Koros Alley. Several German M.G.'s were still
holding out between there and the road, but they were soon
forced to retire by fire being brought onto them. Outposts
were then thrust down all the saps towards the main road and
eventually - during the day - posts were established linking
up with C Coy.
D Coy. following A mingled with 26th Bn. who were too
weak to hold the line at the junction of Koros Alley and
Brunn trench. That important corner was strongly held by
us.
Meanwhile the strong German post on the hill had been
absolutely ignored and word was sent to the T.M.'s in the
rear, who fired a couple of shots onto the position, but a

[*see p.251*]
few men going forward (Cpl. Anderson and four men), xxxxx
who had held on in front of it all the time, found that the
Germans had (as was suspected) left this post. The Germans
took the locks out of their M.G.'s but left all equipment
and all sorts of stores. The Cpl. counted 17 M.G.'s and
2 T.M.'s. The Germans had escaped across Koros Alley
and over the triangle.
The objective was finally reached about 7.30 a.m.
B Coy, had followed closely on C in the advance from
Brunn Trench and joined in with that Coy. in Antigone Alley
The casualties inflicted on the Bn. had been very great.
The posts in the trenches were put in during the
afternoon.
(On map: the small cross represents this afternoon's
posts - in trenches. The cross in circle posts were put
later by the relieving Bn.)
A reconnoitring party sent along to the Rupprecht
Trench crossing - one man creeping ahead saw that just across
the road was a very strongly held German post about one man
to every yard. Our post was established about 75 yards from
the road so as to have a field of fire.
There was a gap between 27th Bn and 25th Bn. Lieut.
Eather with a small party (about 3) reconnoitred the
previously obscure trenches to Athene and Hera Alley, and
found that the Germans were not holding the junctions of
Antigone Alley with these trenches. Some of 28th Bn. were
used in forming posts there - and others on the flank in
Koros (i.e., they were put into the two gaps left after
the attack).
Where the British Bn, was used was in completing
defensive flank from Hera and Athene on the left.
Bn. was relieved on night of 4th.
(Later records show that a special sharpshooting Bn.
had been put in to reinforce this front).
The  M.G. fire here was heavier than on July 28/29 at

Pozieres.
 

253.
xxx
25th Bn. came back on night of 4/5th Sept to
Mereaucourt Wood and moved on 5th to Eclusier. Stayed there
till Sept. 27th.
At 6.30 p.m. started by road for area east of Peronne
arriving 1 a.m. 28th September. On next night 28/29th.
Bn. marches to Templeux la Fosse, arriving about 9.30 p.m.
On morning of Oct. 1, Bn. marched to Hargicourt, arriving
midday. There was no accommodation of any sort for the men.
As it was probable they were going to move again that night
no preparation was made. Just before dark the men began to
make bivvies. About 5.30 p.m. C.O.'s were sent for to Bde.
in some quarries near Hargicourt, and verbal orders given to
march to NE of Nauroy, - 25th Bn being the most advanced Bn.
and immediately behind front line - part of the area was in
Nomansland.
They started at 8.30 p.m. and they had a long tiring
march through densely black, drizzling night, along filthy
roads by the black road (not the plank road) which was quite
indistinguishable - practically it didn’t exist. This
brought them through Bellicourt to NE of Nauroy in G.6.B.
Arrived there about 1.30 a.m.or 2 a.m. Owing to the filthy
condition of the road and dense black night it was most
difficult to find the way over this Hindenburg line country.
(The only thing which showed the road was the congestion of
traffic, horses bogged, limbers overturned).
On afternoon of Oct 2nd, C.O.'s were sent for again to
Bde., kust west of Bellicourt in Pillbox in Hindenburg line
and verbal instructions given for an attack next morning.
These were followed by written orders late that night.
On night of Oct. 2/3 Bn. relieved 20th Bn. in the sunken
road (Estrees to Gouy) NE of Follemprise Farm. They attacked
at dawn on Oct. 3.
In this road there was some gas shelling, but nothing
very heavy. Follemprise Farm was shelled all the time, so
a detour was made round it by those who passed it, and they
passed in perfect safety.
25th Bn. had the first objective on nearly the whole
Bde. front. It included the Beaurevoir line. The line
here was found to be very good, with good pillboxes and fire-
step behind them and very thick wire. The attack, (which was
a peculiar one, planned so because they did not know if an
attack were being made on the left - it was only found just
before Zero that the left would attack) went very well to the
Beaurevoir line.
The 27th Bn, was to make a flank in this way:
Diagram - see original document
They were late. 25th Bn. had to mop up a copse in 27th Bn.
area - just a few rifle shots came from it, but
there was no real resistance.
The barrage was good to this point (Beaurevoir line).
At that line a good deal of resistance was met. Here two of
the tanks, which were late at the J.O.T., caught them up.
Shortly after the attack, as the 25th Bn. were about
approaching the Beaurevoir line, the C.O. and Adjutant,
standing together at the J.O. line, saw a number of men with
their rifles at the port and bayonets fixed come over the
knuckle of the 27th Bn.'s ground and xxxx straight up the hill
towards them. It was a Tommy Coy., or else a battalion,
under a poor kid of an officer, a lieutenant, which had
lost direction and was coming in the wrong direction (A-B).
 

254.
They thought that this might be a British unit being
relieved, but the boy said he was attacking. The Adjutant
swore at him and he began to cry. They said he might use
his eyes; and pointed to our line. He then began to form
his Coy. up in mass facing the right direction and the
Germans shelled them - they went off towards the Torrens).
Back at Eclusier had come word that 25th Bn. was to be
broken up. This was delayed until after this attack. Col.
Davis saw G.O.C. and told him that it was the unanimous
wish of the Bn. to go into the next fight and have the
hardest job to do. There would either be no Bn. to break
up or they would have made a record which made it impossible
to break them up. The men fought in this action perhaps
better than they ever fought, and the results were
astonishing.
(The 25th. Bn. never actually disobeyed the order to
break up, as 21st Bn. did (?), though it would have done so.
The men were probably determined to stand by their fellows
in 21st Bn. (Some officers of 21st En., so Col. Forbes
tells me, addressed a meeting of 19th Bn., but the officers
of 19th Bn. were all loyal). Anyway, when the report
spread, the 25th Bn. paraded before its Colonel (Davis)
The Regtl. Sergt.-Major took charge of it and brought the
parade to attention - it was a most ceremonial occasion.
The C.O. got them around him and had a talk to them. He

told them that the 25th Bn. had always had a great record
for doing what it was told to do; that it had to be done -
it was necessary; and they could not hope to get up
against the people of Britain with success. The whole
A.I.F. was only a fleabite compared with the British Army,
The War Office had ordered this - and the order has got to
be carried out.
They said: "Look, Colonel, the 25th from the first
has been built on esprit de corps. We have been taught
that the regiment is everything, and you have often told
us that we must sacrifice everything for the honour of
the regt. Wo have always obeyed you - and we always will
obey you in everything else. But we cannot obey you in
this just for that reason - we would sacrifice anything
for the Battalion."
The break-up was postponed, fortunately. Davis
wanted it done then, if it at all, and urged in on Wisdom.
It was done later without any stir at all. Davis xxxx on
Aug. 10 told the men (who asked him) that it was already
done (they didn't have to move at all or shift billets).
They turned up on the next parade - and the thing was
over.)
They had to advance 1200-1500 yds. down a bare slope
with the slightest protection - no more than a few small
bushes over ground visible to the Germans the whole way.
The Germans were holding a very strong and strongly-wired
line (around the quarry the wire was tremendous), with
pillboxes, and 60 M.G.'s wore taken on 25 Bns. front.
On reaching the wire in some parts of the Coys. could
not get through it. On the left Sergt. Sievwright crawled
under the wire about 50 yds. from a strong German post.
He rushed along the parapet of the trench and the whole
garrison of 52 Germans and 7 M.G.'s surrendered to this one
M.C.O. (The Coy, was making a frontal attack and the L.G.
would be going, and this assisted him). These Germans
must have had so many defeats that as soon as they saw our
line start they must have given up in spirit. Otherwise
the attack was impossible. Our barrage was not as heavy by
many times as it has often been, and cannot account for it.
  

255.
They had to take three lines of good trenches and isolated
pillboxes echeloned besides. A German officer, who was
taken there, said to Col. Davis: "You Australians are all
bluff. You have no troops at all." We had less than 300
bayonets in the attack, and with the loss of about 80 men,
25th Bn. took between 600 and 700 Germans and killed about
200; took 60 M.G.'s and a few T.M.'s; also pigeons (later
eaten as pie in rest billets), and several bicycles and a
piano from a dugout.
After the tanks caught up they made a couple of lanes
through the wire - these helped Bn. to get through. The
whole hold-up on this line would not be more than 10 or 15
minutes. In the Lormissel Farm was a big ammunition dump
after we took it we steered clear of it, as it was
consistently shelled and the dump blown up by a shellburst.
The 20th Bn. could be seen on the right during the
advance as far as Torrens Canal.
At the Beaurevoir Line 26th Bn., which followed through,
went out towards the final objective. Later, when they came
back to the ditch, 25th Bn. sent C Coy. (Capt. McSkimming:
up to reinforce them.
The Bn. consisted of three Coys. The other two were
used to form a defensive flank on the right - part down the
ditch west of Kukri Valley, and part in the second Beaurevoir
line NE of Mushroom Quarry.
Diagram - see original document
C Coy, was in ditch with xx 26th Bn. about 3ft. 6in.
deep - pretty good trench.
A Coy.'s ditch was very shallow - they had to dig in.
D Coy. had a good trench.
Word came that 5th Bde, was going on to conform to
present line of 7th Bde, at 4.30 p.m. and the barrage came
down, but no attack. The attack took place at 6.30, when
they came up.
25th Bn. was relieved about 1-2 a.m. by 7th British Bde.
The men had marched 18 kilos. and were in full marching order
with packs up. They had no knowledge of whether they were
to attack the following morning or not. They did attack
at 6 a.m.(?), but the message giving Bn. Commander his
orders for the attack (much less his zero hour) did not pass
through his Bde. forward station until 10 minutes before
zero and he was 20 minutes away. (c.f. 9th Oct. the year
before - these other Manchesters - same Bn. had been
relieved by 25th Bn. and had been to Italy since).
25th Bn. then moved back to position occupied before
relieving 20th Bn. (trenches behind Folemprise).
Stayed there from early morning of Oct. 4th to about
2 a.m. morning of 5th Oct. They were to have been relieved
by some Americans, but these never turned up. (A guide went
to meet them and bring them up, and had got them some
distance when an American runner caught them up and diverted
them (planes were dropping bombs around very close)
Finally 25th Bn. received orders to move back without
relief to Hargicourt. This was dons without incident.
Oct. 7. Bn, marched to Roisel and entrained at 3.15 p.m
to Amiens, which was reached late at night.
Oct. 7/8., Marched by night from Amiens to Berteaucourt
about 15 miles, arriving there 5 a.m. 8th October.
On October 11th word was received that 25th. This was to be
amalgamated with 26th Bn, as from 12th October.