Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/227/1 - Folder - Part 4

227
51st BATTALION
NOREUIL
The Bn had found the line just beyond Vrancourt
cemetery - a little beyond the town (I don't know if this
means the little miliyary cemetery in the valley near the
prisoners cage) They had pushed the line more or less
peaceably forward till the right was just ahead of Vrancourt
Copse, and the left up near the Vrancourt Lorgette road on
the hill. There was a crater in the road there, and every
night the Scots on the left, and the Germans, seemed to
take and retake this crater. The Scottish Bns HQrs sent
in one night to say that they had the crater and had taken
the Germans dinner boiligg on a Primus stove. A couple of
hours later it was German again.
When 51st Bn lived up on the tapes to take the
left hand slopes past Noreuil it lay across the hill top
just beyond Vrancourt Copse. Messages came in at once from
the right Coy Commander to say that his men were all mixed
up with the Scots! Presumably a message came from the left
to say the same.  The Scots were to go for Longatte! This
was incomprehensible till it was found that the Scots had
laid their tapes wrong - that put them out as if the attack
were on Noreuil!
Diagram - see original document
The 51st and Scots went on together and struck heavy oppositin
from 3 or 4 M.Gs. at the top of the sunken road between
Noreuil and Longatte. (B) They had several officers and
a number of men killed or wounded in front of this. Then a
youngster named Earle got with a few men into the sunken rd
at A (further on the right) and, working up it. shot the crews
of the guns - and the Bn got ahead. They killed a number of
Germans in this road and also had a bit of fighting at the
village end of it where their right just teuche brushed
past the village.
They went on and occupied a trench east of
Noreuil - beyond the town. It was a good trench and bent
back a bit on the left. They none of them had known of its
existence and therewas some comment in the Bn on their not
having had aeroplane photos before to show them the ground.
They reported being in touch with Scots on the left and 50th
on their right. This was true: but as a matter of fact
they were only odds and ends of Scots and 50th who had come
along on their flanks. Longatte was apparently not taken.
However a M.G. was placed on the sunken road from Noreuil 
to Longatte where it goes into the dip just N of the point
B on the above sketch. And the British (later that day(?) 
took Longatte. (51 and 50th Bns had Hqrs far apart. 
Nowadays we know enough to put them together. They would be 

in the same dugout)

228.
19.
SOMME WINTER
Bulls run dugouts were winding mostly untimbered
galleries - too small for comfort. They used to get 
suffocatingly hot even in midwinter and visible steam used to
execute exude from them in theearly mornings. Men even
slept there without any clothes on owing to the "fug".
45th BATTALION - STORMY TRENCH
Major Howden second in command of 45th Bn who was
a splendid officer advised Hering when the Coys arrived
which were to make a set attack on Stormy Trench that the
men were in no condition to do it. They had been coming
up in the mud and rain and many were lost - they wereout of
spirits. This was about 11 pm. The attack at 12 (for
whichthe artillerywere all ready) was put off - about the
last moment - the artillery officers and others all 
disappointed - and it was done later (? next night) with a
barrage of Stokes mortars up the trench about 300 yards
ahead of the troops and rifle grenades about 60 yards ahead.
Bombing platoons were still in use at this time. They were
done away with before Ypes.
13th BRIGADE -- Etinhem
The reason - which why the Bn went in in the order
laid down was that 51'st had had the hardest time and suffered
the mot casualties at Hangard. The 49th had gone in last
there and was strong and fresh - so had the most difficult job
50th had been diggingthe night before on moving to Thipilly -
they were not so fresh but less knocked about than 51st.
So they got the second job though tired.  The 51st was to be
put in whole but only one Coy was actually committed in order
to have something in hand as there was no other reserve - and
the Coys, held back eventually carried out the second attack.
13th M.G. Coy, was split amongst Bns, and lost
heavily.
228a following 

238

228a
50th BATTALION - MOUQUET - August 12
When 50th Bn went over on August 12/13, the
Lahore Divisional Artillery put up a splendid barrage.
The whole Bn could be seen by the flames of it - a 
continuous flash of shrapnel bursting al,ost over the men's
foreheads. The relief was a daylight relief and the men
had been pretty depressed - the Germans saw them about
300 yards after they turned into Tom's Cut where the trench
became broken and his artillery came down. In Park Lane
the whole of the 16th Bn was met - they had had a very bad
time - nearly the whole of the 16th and whole of 50th were
both there - and the men were three deep and the trench
hopelessly congested. 16th Bn dribbled out as it got dark-
their officers simply told them where to go back to. -
O'Meara was splendid with their wounded - would not go as
long as there were wounded men there. This he did with
the help of 50th Bn bearers partly. He must have been there
all the next day making many trips.
When the 50th saw the barrage their spirits chang
changed completely. It cheered them and many of them were
almost fascinated with it. The barrage got away from the
Bn - not like a "creeper" of these days. The feeling was
like that of a wall ahead of you - like a protective wall.
You had no idea of getting hit. The man who spoke of
leaning against the barrage was not so much out. They
were convinced when shells began to fall amongst them
later next morning that it was our own guns (landing near
the trees) But it was certainly the German fire from the
two flanks.
Diagram - see original document
 

229.
4lst BATTALION - 8th AUGUST, 1918.
NOTE.- In my notes the details of officers wounded are
wrong
For Lieut. Clark wounded it should be Lieut. R.
Nihill wounded.
29th September: Following wounded:
Lieut. Clark.
2/Lieut. Richardson, gassed,
Lieut. Wiles,
Lieut. Hanley
Lieut. Robinson
Lieut. ........ (as on my list with Notes).
N.B.
4lst. Bn. has never lost a prisoner. If Gordon is
a Queenslander born this is the first V.C. won by a
Queenslander (this is worth verifying).
Two Lieutenants have been awarded D.S.O. in the
field - 2/Lieut. W. A. Fraser and Lieut. H. J. Wiles
(from Mackay, English-born); Fraser from Sydney. They
were both Sergeants in 4lst Bn. and original members, and
were promoted in field.
The other point in history of 4lst Bn. is its success
in front of Sailly le Sec. It is admitted by G.H.Q. and
Army lecturers that these minor successes induced G.H.Q.
to undertake the offensive and attack with the same troops
who were holding the xxx line. (Bn. did about six raids
in seven nights at that time. Analysis of this in diary
with air photos,maps, etc.)
1lth August was the most difficult show Bn, was ever
in, and was also clean and successful. The most trying
period was the day following July 31 - the six days
following it. 

230.
43rd. BATTALION - BOUCHASVESNES.
(From I.O., Oliver, and......)
Bn. had to jump off from road, if possible - i.e.
if held by us. They were told that the 10th Bde. were
practically certain they had it but no definite information
that the whole road was held.
C.O. accordingly ordered Coys. to move to assembly
position - and patrol, and if patrols found road clear to
move up to it.
The Coys. were out in assembly position when the
information was sent out that Zero was changed. The
information (which arrived in the early hours of the
morning) was sent out by runner, but Coys. were hard to
locate and it did not reach any of them.
It was a very dark night. When the attack was made
D Coy. (on right of 4lst Bn.) went well forward - 2/Lieut.
Patterson, M.C., and at least two men actually reached
Scutari trench - the body of Patterson and one man were
later found in the trench - the other man was seen going
up there. The main portion of D Coy. got into Kassa
Trench and the next Coy. on their right - C Coy.- got into
Zimmermann Alley.
A Coy. (on right) starting half an hour before
2nd. Div. struck trouble at Feuillacourt Bridge and sent
a platoon round south of Canal - (?was canal exclusive or
inclusive to 43rd Bn.). It formed a defensive flank
approximately along N. edge of Canal from a little west
of the road to a point opposite the quarries half-way to
Allaines.
B Coy., which had been shelled on its lying-up
position, finding barrage not fall, withdrew to near the
Skub trench.
From L/Cpl. Thompson:
A Coy. within 100 yds, of the starting struck the
Canal du Nord near a very big dug-out and crossed it,
down into it and up the other side. There was no fire at
this moment. They worked along the south of the canal
(the coy. was only about 40 strong - under Lieut. Tucker),
left being on the canal. They were in skirmishing order.
They got to the village., which was a mere tumble of a
few old walls and grass and a few shrubs. As they got
through this they struck opposition from a M.G. which was
on the ramp (which was fairly good) - there was a bridge
of brick and concrete also. This M.G. held them up on
the canal bank but the right was down by the main road
further south. From the right where L/Cpl. Thompson had a
L.G. fire was brought onto this post while another L.G.
fired at it from the ruins. The Germans got down into the
Canal and cleared out. The Coy. then crossed the road
at Feuillacourt.
By this time 2nd Div. had attacked and was coming up.
A Coy. didn't get this barrage, which was very weak.
2nd Div. were hung up west of the road by M.G. fire
from the road embankment south of the village. A Coy.
fired a M.G. straight down along the road and most of the
Germans left - they could be seen lining the back of the
road till then.
When they cleared A Coy. pushed on and got about 80
or 90 yds. east of road clear of the village (which stops
at the road). They then got hung up with M.G. fire from
right, across the gully.

231.
They stopped there about 1 hour in shellholes -
didn't see 2nd. Div. go beyond the road.
After that hour A Coy. (about 7 or 8 wounded by then)
got into the canal, in order to get away from the fire from
south. In the canal the Germans had a M.G. firing straight
down the canal from the bend at Allaines. They tried to
work up the canal but the M.G.'s cut off the two or three
men who got along there and they had to stay there.
A Coy. stopped there two hours. All the while there
was a sentry at the corner by the bridge keeping a watch
over the flat.
By that time B Coy. cam up the canal in driblets and
joined. They were there together half an hour.
A Coy. had been trying to get up into Rollin trench
from canal, but M.G.'s at Allaines stopped it. They then
with B Coy, went round by Jesupol trench past Ponsot trench
into Rolin trench, and came down the trench which is in the
side of the hill with the flat in front of it. They
stopped there till.... and then put a section out onto the
crossroad in 3 Central, which was there all night until
next morning's attack. During the night they crossed over
into Boeseler Alley and attacked from there, got into Graz
trench without opposition, and then worked up it to NE.
There they struck opposition and bombed the Germans out.
The Germans (2 Guards Reserve Divn.) fought well with bombs
but were outfought with L.G.'s and bombs - one platoon
worked up Fiume, the rest up Usler trench (where some
Germans were killed).
By about 8-8.30 they had Scutari and Fiume trench. A
big batch of prisoners was got from Usler trench near its
junction with Fiume. When this opposition was struck
L/Cpl. Thompson turned his L.G. down the trench from the
junction of Usler-Zimmermann - and L/Cpl. Weathers jumped
up on the side of the trench where he could see the Germans
went along it 7 or 8 yds. and then threw bombs at them.
They didn't give in at the first go. He got down into the
trench and got some more bombs. The L.G. was turned on
again. Weathers jumped up again in the same place and
hurled some more bombs (the guns had shot at him but missed)
and the Germans gave in. They got out on top and marched
back. There were about 150 of them - 200 were taken by
this Coy. alone.
43rd BATTALION -BRAY-sur-SOMME.
The 43rd Bn. made its approach march about 6 a.m.
22 August and came under very heavy shell fire on the way to
support position, having about 50 casualties.
Lay in support all day. Was then ordered tt to form
a defensive flank for the Australian Corps, N. of Bois de
Tailles - independent of anything that the British were
doing. They moved there evening 22 August. There about
2 hours - and found that the British had already made this.
Flank being secure Bn. was withdrawn to Bois de Gressaine
again.
Night of August 25/26.- During advance in dark, heavy
thunderstorm - men advancing to got touch with the enemy -
firing L.G.'s into dugouts as found them in pitch black. 

232.
43rd BATTALION - SEPTEMBER 29 - OCTOBER 2/3.
(From I.0., Lieut. Oliver).
Bn, was camped near Templeux-Guerard.
Diagram - see original document
43rd was in this position because after passing green
line the front expanded and they were to become left Bn. of
brigade in the front line, going up on the left of 4lst.
They left Templeux at 7 a.m. and advanced in artillery
formation across country north of Hargicourt
Message that 4lst and 44th were held up came back to
Bn. H.Q. about 9.30 and Bn. stopped automatically in support
500 yds. behind 4lst Bn. (one Coy. in trench south of
blown-out tanks, another Coy. in the sunken road south of
Ronssoy).
At 4.50 p.m. Bde. cancelled the advance - and said that
further instructions would be issued. Later came a
preliminary order for 43rd xx to assemble with 42d and 44th
in A27 Central, to attack northwards up the Hindenburg line
towards Bony.
The Bn. at 8.15 moved up into Triangle Trench (whole
Bde. going up as far as it could); later the Coys. went
across near Quennemont Farm and thence into Top Lane. The
night was very very dark - and drizzling. The Bn. tumbled
almost by mistake onto a part of 42nd Bn. in Quennemont Farm -
heard from them that there were others (some 42nd Bn. nearer
Hindenburg Line and 44th Bn. near 27 Central). They got into
Top Lane and getting near the far corner of it near its
junction with the Hindenburg line, ran into a German post.
They did not know where the Germans were - fire was coming
from N and NE and the German was known to be close.
They bombed the Germans out and pushed on to the
junction - pushed down to join 44th, and at same time
established posts facing N and E around the junction.
(In this operation direction was very difficult indeed
to find owing to darkness, drizzle and wire - 42nd found this
also).
Capt. Moran (senior officer present) then decided to try
and push up and clear Germans out of the system towards Bony
(in both trenches).
September xxxxx 30th.- This began at 11.30 next day when 44th
supplied a Coy. in the support trench of the line and 43rd
worked up front trench. 44th Coy. reported at noon that
they could not get on owing to opposition by M.G.'s
artillery and bombs at the junction of Top Lane and the
support line.
At 1 p.m. 43rd Bn. had got to A21B0.2 and was held there.
Two men got out and worked to a position to the SW of BONY
and there sniped the crew of a German T.M. which had been
firing at them from the end of a sap SW of the village. The
gun was stopped (and later captured).
But in the party of 43rd Bn. which had worked up the
trench three officers were wounded and 4 men wounded and 2
men killed. The names of these officers were:-
Lieut. M.K. McDonald,
Lieut. R.W. Scott
Lieut. R. D. Thompson.
The party had to withdraw to the strongpoint near the northern 

233.
end of the sunken road, where a block was put in. 44th.
Bn put in a block level with this (300 yds. north of Top
Lane).
OCTOBER lst.- Next day at 4 a.m. 44th Bn. was withdrawn
and 43rd took over the line in both trenches and connected
with 42nd in the space E of the support line (in
prolongation of Top Lane).
At 8 a.m. it was noticed that there was no M.G.
sniping from Bony and thereabouts - and the Germans were
seen going out of it in ones and twos. Patrols pushed
forward towards the village, which was entered at 9 a.m.
One Coy. 42nd Bn. moved down the tunnel embankment and
joined up on right.
The 33rd Bn. of 9th Bde. had been put into Top Lane
on Sept. 30 and was to support 43rd if the fight up the
Hindenburg line went along well. They were not used,
though under shellfire.
(The early stages of this battle are a matter of Coy.
or advanced Bn. H.Q. initiative entirely).
In Bony got touch with 10th Bde., who came down from
north. 33rd. came in on left of Bony up to the Canal.
Diagram - see original document
At 2.50 p.m. on October lst the above operation was
ordered. This began at 5 p.m. This was done by pushing 
out patrols and following them up with the line. There
was no barrage - the idea was that the German was clearing
out.
The advance had gone up to about the Green Line (the
difficulty being fire from the North, by Le Catelet, etc.),
when it was countermanded and the troops ordered to hold the
Green Line as an outpost line. 33rd. and 42nd did this.
Though the 43rd was in Bony first, 10th Bde. report
got through first.
They were relieved by English troops.
What saved the xxxxxx  position on night of Aug. 29
was the preparatory order to take up a position in 27 Cent.
as assembly position. This was received at 11.20 p.m.
All Bns. acted on this.
The detailed operation order was not received till much
later and the senior officers on the spot did not receive it
in time - it was difficult for runners to find the Coys, - 
there was a long way to go. The result was that senior
officers of Bns. in the Hindenburg line came to their own
decisions (based on the warning order), and the attack was
carried on on the lines decided by them. They got the
detailed order before the attack began - but it was too late
to act on a changed plan, and the attack was carried out by
those on the spot. A barrage had been planned - and there
was great anxiety lest 44th Bn. might get too far forward
and get into the barrage not knowing of it. The only way
to get messages out was by runner - lamp was no good for
sending forward an order; and wires could not be used from
Bn. forward. 

234.
44th BATTALION - BOUCHAVESNES.
(From Lieut. Piper, Mackenzie, Bites, xxxxxxd Maddeford
and others.  The Adjutant s story is sometimes corrected
by the others.
44th Bn, was in support in Clery Gully, along the
banks about 30B Central.
42nd Bn. were to make and advance across the main
Bapaume Road south of Bouchavesnes. One Coy. of 44th Bn.
(D Coy. under Lieut. Capt. Foxworthy) was attached to them
as they had a Coy. also lent to 9th Bde. (33rd. Bn.).
at 5.30 a.m. D Coy. left Bn. They passed Red Wood
and came under heavy artillery fire (on some unknown or
mistaken target), got through without casualties. One
platoon was previously sent as liaison with the Tommies
and got lost. As Coy. got up and caught sight of the old
trees along the road and came under heavy M.G. fire (Zero
was about 5.30 a.m.).
They thought this was indirect fire as the ground was
supposed to be clear. They deployed from artillery
formation and moved on to Quarry Farm (which is no more than
old trenches in bushes).
About 120 yds. short of it Capt. Foxworthy saw a German
ahead throw back his arms to throw a stick grenade. This
was the first idea they had that the Germans were there. It
was very foggy. They opened L.G. fire from the left
section and started to envelop with the right, - men ordered
to do this - extending further. As they went on about 4
men were knocked, and a few rifle grenades were fired onto
the M.G., which could not be seen, on the extreme NW corner
of the farm. The Germans closed fire under the grenades.
They rushed him and when we were about 20 yds. off they put
up their hands. At the NW corner there were (in the first
party) about 32 Germans (we had^x 24 all told) and 2 M.G.'s.
[*^xin Captain Foxworthy's party*]

Then they started to mop up the farm where there were dugouts.
There were other M.G.'s on the SW side, and as our people
mopped up some revolver shots were exchanged, but these
Germans were all taken within ¾ or ½-hour. There were 81
in all and 8 M.G.'s. There were Kaiserin Augusta Regt.
there. Of the first 32 at least 20 came out wearing Red
Cross armbands. The place was a strongpoint. 
They cleared the place up and found about 6 of 42nd.
Bn. there (probably from left flank of 42nd which may have
swung south) in a dugout on the south of the farm.
D Coy. consolidated there facing NE. They had been at
the farm about 25 minutes when the right flank of the British
passed about 50 yds. north of the farm. They were advancing
as the right flank of the advance - an hour behind the
barrage. Daylight was now increasing, and as they came down
the east slope of the hill (farm was on a knoll on the crest)
they came under M.G. fire and rifle fire. Could not say how
far they got.
The 42nd Bn. was just a bit in advance on the right.
Their left flank might have been about C.21.c.8.8.
The other platoon came up then. (No necessity to
mention its being lost).
44th. Bn. D Coy, was relieved that night, Sept. 1/2
by English troops of 74th Division. 

235.
44th BATTALION - SEPTEMBER 29th.
xxx
Diagram - see original document
Left Templeux at 7.30 in artillery formation: across
country in heavy fog.
D Capt. Bremner (wounded) C Capt. Fowler (wounded)
B Capt. Lewis (wounded) A Capt. Hunt (wounded)
They were making straight for Green line, a good
distance north of Cabaret Wood Farm. During the advance
they came to our own artillery positions and came into a
fairly heavy gas. All Coys. had reconnoitred as far as
the line held by the Americans on Aug. 28. (They didn't
mention whether this agreed with the line given officially)
Owing to the heavy fog the Coys. lost touch on the way up.
They had to pass the Brown line at 9 a.m. and it had been
decided to make a halt there to get touch and direction.
They passed the tape just in rear of it - there were
wounded Americans near Malakoff Farm. 44th Bn. was to pass
between Malakoff Wood and Qunnemont Farm.
As soon as they left the sugar factory (there hadn't been
any halt) they noticed M.G. fire coming from Quennemont Farm.
They pushed straight on - there was heavy artillery fire of
an area shoot nature (5.9) - and as Coys. got up towards
broken surface just west of Hindenburg outpost line they
began to suffer from this M.G. fire from Quennemont Farm.
C Coy. which was on the left, suffered pretty heavily (the
Americans also had). Capt. Fowler was hit there and Lieut.
MacDermott (C Coy.) killed. As 4lst Bn. came up the
Germans started to retire from Quennemont Farm (59th. must
have struck it later). A and B got into the Hindenburg
outpost line at once south of Malakoff Wood.
Diagram - see original document
C Coy. was in artillery formation. The M.G's which
caused the casualties were firing from the direction of Bony.
They could not see these guns - they were further than Top
Lane because some of the sections got up in the land and there
was nothing there. The M.G.'s probably included some of
those which were tunnelled into his wire. MacDermott was
killed at the bottom of the valley in A25 - this was where
they all caught it at once. Fowler was in the centre of the
Coy. They got under cover for about 15 minutes, sparking
bullets on the wire.
Sections of C Coy. got into Top Lane - the greater part
got into the Hindenburg line south of it.
Meantime H.Q. came ahead of the Bn, as far as Malakoff
Wood and established there for half an hour the xxxx H.Q.
previously decided on. From the sugar refinery on they were
under artillery fire and, as they went on, under M.G. fire.