Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/227/1 - Folder - Part 18

366

10.
Meantime a Bn. of 8th Bde. near Nauroy had got
into the same line. The O.C. of C Coy. came up -
saw the position and brought his men up and worked
to the left along the same trench. Of the other 2
Coys. one dug in about the V. shaped road in 4.B
central - The other went back to the tunnel and
remained there in reserve badly knocked about.
C Coy. (Capt. Keys) worked up the Catelet trench
and met the Germans and had a stiff bomb fight with
them.
September 30th. Next xxxx morning a Bn. of 14th Bde.
deployed facing N. and moved laterally up the direction
of the Le Catelet line past 57th Bn.
Later on they had to get into the trench.
[***]
Keys left flank in the trench would be somewhere near
Cabaret Wood Farm.
The 57th stayed where it was - the rest of the Bn.
or part of it coming up on the loft of the Coys. in the
Le Catelet line.
Any attempt made by 57th to get from Le Catelet
line forward was heavily fired at from Cabaret Farm and
the high ground to N. and also from the high ground near
the railway ahead.
On Oct. 1st we attacked from the Le Catelet line.
The right flank sidestepped N. so as to have its right on
the junction of railway and trench at 5.D.4.7. The 
objective was the line from A.22 Central to H.15 Central.
Tanks were present and there was a creeping barrage,
which was perfect. They reached the objective aithout
opposition. Germans fled in disorder. We fired on them
by L.G. from hip and right Coy. alone got about 14 - 18
prisoners. These had taken shelter in deep dugouts in
the road through 6.A. The right Coy. occupied some of
the old trench in G 6.B. (This was a definite defence
system of old trench. Immediately barrage lifted a
fighting patrol wont forward to Folemprise Farm and the
high ground N. of Estrees. They met no opposition, and
took 3 prisoners. After being out about an hour they
were very heavily fired on from the Beaurevour Line and
from Field Guns which had been retiring and now unlimbered
and came into action. The position had been reported -
Germans retiring in disorder - Germans apparently going
back past the Beaurevoir Line but being collected and
brought back to it in small parties. This seemed an xxxx 
opportunity for keeping him going, but at that time it
was against the orders laid down. Layer - the order
came to move forward to the Road from Bank Copse S -
but it was so heavily shelled that it was decided to
withdraw and re-occupy it later after dark. (What had
happened was that the Germans had had time to settle down
in the meanwhile and get themselves organised - our men
also were very tired after the first xx halt and the
excitement which had now abated). 57th Bn. was relieved
that night by 2nd Divn.
                   (Lt. J.S.Cotton in attack on Cabaret Wd. Farm.
Left Coys (Lt. Fleming in attack on Cabaret Wd. Farm.
                  (Lt. Duncan in attack on Cabaret Wd. Farm.
Lt. Cochrane (with Keys - hit on 29th and again
later sometime after getting into Nauroy Line).
 

367
11.
2/Lt. Pitcher wounded at assembly position near
Hargicourt by shell.
There were other officer casualties - about
ll ?officers, 270?0.R.
No trace at all was ever found of the Americans ever
having been beyond the railway. A few goined in from the
tunnel (a L.G. Section) and came up to the Le Catelet Line,
- and Keys also had a few. These were sent back later.
59th and 60th BATTALIONS.
August 8th.
Diagram, see original

59th was in position lying out when the tanks came up.
There was a lot of shouting about 20 before zero - you
couldn't hear the exhaust but the shouting. This
brought down the German barrage - light stuff 4.2 and
77s - but it didn't fall on 59th. 57th got a bit of it
but not 60th. At hop off fog and smoke was very thick;
when 59th and 60th started thu 1 hour after zero they
were to advance in 1000 yards bounds so as to get through
green line at Zero 4. Compass was the only guide.
Result was that they dribbled through and reached the
valley in rear of the green line with about ½-hour to
xx spare. This was badly needed for re-organisation.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Every Coy, was on the right direction - the compass
brought them through. They were completely re-organised .
in the little ravine short of Bayonvillers. All were in
 their proper frontage before Bns. moved off. Thetanks
were on the right flank refilling from their supply tanks -
they came on across the flank and went straight on.
While Bn, was waiting an old R.E. 8 came over and a
whole circus of Fritzes suddenly loomed out of the clouds
at him. They came at him - our chap came circling down
shooting all the way with one Fritz diving at him. The
Lewis guns of all our troops opened as soon as ever they
could see clear of our man - and Fritz was driven off.
59th Bn. had had no casualties till then.
60th Bn. had the railway to guide them (which made
it easier. They too re-organised).
As soon as they cleared the green line over the crest
on which it lay, they came at once under the direct fire
of a battery of whizzbang guns. Two of the first shells
each got a L.G. and crew. A couple of tanks manoeuvred
to out-flank them. One or two of our xxx]L.G. teams got
fire on to the gun crews. Those who were not hit ran to
their dugouts and were captured later. This Battery was
in trees ∧ immediately xxx S.W. of Bayonvillers.
Later on field gun was found between the roads in
10.A.3.7 - the horses were in the limber but had been shot.
58th Bn. tackled Bayonvillers - 59th skirted it without any
xxxxxxx trouble. There was M.G, fire from isolated posts
but the tanks in every case dealt with them - going straight
over the positions. The gun last mentioned knocked out
one of the tanks by cutting the tractor with a direct hit.
 

368
12.
This was the first that Col. Scanlan saw knocked out.
The 4 first guns didn't get any of the tanks.
The 59th Bn. went through Harbonnieres - one Coy.
through and the other 2 round - the Bn. hung out a flag
on the church (which is now in Australian War Museum)..
At that time this was the furthest easterly advance.
There were a few M.Gs. in Harbonnieres. The tanks went
through with a party of moppers-up - tanks blazing into
every house They got a few M.Gs. in the town.
When they got through the town the 59th Bn. began to
get heavy M.G. fire from the Amiens line on their left
front.T he cavalry picked up Bde. about 9.D and then
massed and went out just N. of the railway.
The 59th came E. of tho town and got into the Amiens
Line N. of Harbonnieres Railway Station. Just behind the
station the Germans had a post. We did not get this.
The line swung off back along the railway which runs S.
of Harbonnieres and joined with 57th Bn. there. The
Germans in the pause had come back to the sapling copse
near Harbonnieres Station - if the Bn. had been ordered to
these trenches in the first place it could easily have done
so. 59th Bn. reached its objective ¾-hour before time.
Harbonnieres was still supposed to be under heavy long
range fire of our own guns, but nothing seemed to be falling
there.
Later in the afernoon Gen. Elliott came up, and
ordered a further advance. A tank was found in the streets
of Harbonnieres with the crew asleep. It was arranged for
it to go out S. along the railway line andthen E. along the
light railway track up to the Harbonnieres Station. But
when he got to the trenches he developed engine troubles
and came back.
After dark another attempt was made but the M.G. nests
at Harbonnieres Station and about 18.B.2.2 and the Amiens
Line stopped this and posts were only established a little
closer to the Amiens Line.
August 9th. At 20 minutes before the Canadian zero orders
were received from Brigade that 1st Aust. Divn, was late,
and that l5th Bde. would conform to Canadian advance and 

protect theirleft flank. 58th and 60th wereto leapfrog 

59th and 57th. That was all the orders that were obtained.
In order to confer with Col. Donehy, Col. Scanlan had to
get across from his H.Q. S.W. of Harbonnieres to Denehy's
in about 17.C Central, in a terrace bank. There was a
lively barrage on across this space. Scanlan then
established an advanced H.Q. about 12.D.7.8. He there
found that 58th Bn, was still in the line held up the whole
way along. Theyhhad no tanks nor artillery preparation
and the M.G. fire held them. They moved soon after and
Col. Scanlan took 59th out in support of them. It was
not known that 8th Bdo. had to attack - nor any objective -
So. Col. Scanlan laid down a provisional objective for 58th
and 59th - a little in advance of the Vanvillers Rosieres
Road. It was here that 1st Divn. overtook them with their
tanks and passed through.
At first they were held up at Harbonnieres by the
railway station post. The Germans fought a first rate
M.G. scrap - they fought their M.G. till their guns
opened and thon withdrew their M.C. as fast as they could.
It was then that our advance opened. The German 77 barrage
was light and didn'5 keep our people back.
The 6Oth had started before the 58th - they were held
up by a few M.G. which they overcame by manoeuvre.
The 60th were approximately in touch to 58th Bn. between
railway and road.
The green line was thus taken and was handed over to
1st Divn. when it came through.

 

369
13.
59th followed because 58th had an open flank on the
left.
The Canadians advanced very well - they had tanks
with them.
August 9th. - Artillery Liaison Officer with 59th Bn.
was hit by a bullet while waiting for attack to start.
(Lt. Jones).
August 8th. - Lt.Stewart - By one of the 77 shells which
wiped out L.G. team (severely).
Lt. Stevenson - I.O. sent forward as liaison with 2nd
Div. wounded by M.G.
Lt.Mankey -          )
Capt.Southwall - ) by M.G. fire from many directions soon
Lt.Fincher -           ) after arrival East of Harbonnieres.
 

August 9th. - Lt. Dunkley blown up but remained on duty.
 

59th and 60th - Peronne. 8th Bde. followed Germans
to Canal - the 4 Bns. abreast, 59th on left - extreme
right on E.W. road, while 59th Bn. H.Q. was at the Y
fork W. of Barleux Col. Scanlon was summoned to confer
eith the G.O.C. Gen. Elliottaway out in front without a
digger in front of them. This was to arrange an attack
on the Germans across the Somme by crossing the Somme .
The meeting was in Syntax Trench in 31 D or B - everyone
on the parapet using glasses and maps.
The 15th Bde, was to relieve 8th Bde. next day to
force a crossing at Boie(?) Haplincourt. The relief
began just before dark. Leading Coy. of 59th was in
touch with 8th Bde. Bn. and whole Bn. was on move, when
it had to be recalled as the the move was cancelled.
August 30th. About 3 a.m. Col. Scanlon was sent to the
same H.Q. where he got further orders dictated by Bde.
I.O. whereby 7th Bde, was to force a crossing near
Peronne, and 15th Bde, was to leapfrog xxxxxxxx through
them. They had to move at 6 (?) a.m. and be in position
by 7.30 (?) a.m. ready to leapfrog.
7th Bde. found that the crossing was impossible;
but 59th Bn. moved to 8 A (?) Varna Trench (?) and sat
down there for the day. They had orders to relieve
7th Bde. that night, and during afternoon they reconnoitred
They relieved partof 28th and partof 26th (night of 30/31).
Nothing happened except that 59th Bn. pushed down
posts to command the crossings in
(1) the old fortifications near Bristol Bridge.
(2) the Railway crossing.
On morning of Sept. 1st Brigade after personal
reconnaissance ordered the attack on Flamicourt. 2 Coys.
of 59th and whole of 58th were to go down to the river
bank and to cross in the manner shown on the following
page.
Diagram- see original document
 

370
14.
Lieut. Pentreath took 5 or 6 scouts down. They got over
the foot-bridge, back to the railway, then worked along
the bank. The railway bank gave them some cover/up to
the bend. But as they came round the bend a M.G. saw
them and Pentreath was wounded in the leg and 2 men hit.
As a result of this reconnaissance it was realised
that the attempt was impossible and it was cancelled.
That night Bn. was withdrawn to its original
position - the Coy, was left in posts on E. side of the
Canal from wooden Bridge to Railway.
September 2nd. At 4 a.m. C.0s. were called to Bde. H.Q.
and orders given for an attack on Peronne by 14th Bde.
and 2nd Aust. Div. - 15th Bde. to leapfrog 14th Bde. when
they reached their objective, change direction right,
and attack up the Flamicourt - Le Wesnil Spur. The wooden
bridge had been completed by the engineers. 58th Bn.
was to mop up Peronne after 14th Bde. 59th and 60th to
move through it after 14th Bde. The attack (zero) was
at 6 a.m. Bns.were scattered.
The Bridge at 33.A.9.9. was a mass of blown up
girders. They simply had to scramble across it. By
the time they reached Peronne (about 10 to 6) the Germans
were shelling W.end of it and our people the E.end
(barrage being at 5.30 a.m.)
They went up with Col. Scanlon at head as shown on
my map to the Railway towards St. Denis, N. of Peronne.
There they were getting reverse fire from the top of
Mont St. Quentin (East of the 2nd Divn) and found remnants
of 14th Bde. held up by very heavy fire from St. Denis.
Col. Scanlon had the artillery liaison officer
(Lt. Sharp M.C.) with him and 4 orderlies, all hit with
M.G. bullets from the rear. Situation was reported to
Bde; and Bn. dug in. The 60th followed and formed near
the Aerodrome (?). They stayed here all day - the shellfire 

was as heavy as anything at Polygon - the Germans
having complete and close observation.
That night orders came for 59th Bn. to relieve 55th
and 56th; 60th Bn. was in support to 59th. Both under
Col. Scanlon. The 60th with 2 Coys. leapfrogged that
night and advanced the line towards St. Denis and established
posts. By this time 58th Bn. had the battlements,
and 58th pushed out posts that night towards the railway
E. of Peronne.
September 3/4th. One Bn. of 8th Bde, was to relieve
whole of 59th Bn. with one Coy. On relief the 59th had
to move a Coy. way back near to Barleux. Just as the
relief of 59th Bn. was complete, the relief order was cancelled.
6Oth Bn. had not been relieved and remained in
their positions. The last of the men got back at 3.30
am. At 5.30 a.m. C.0. received orders to take the whole
Bn. forward again to a position in close support of 57th
Bn. They moved up tothe earthworks in 33.B.5.1 and
stayed there till 3 p.m. Then, owing to the advance of
57th Bn, it was considered advisable for 59th again to
more to the battlements in I.22.D. On night of 4/5th
Bde, was relieved and went into bivouacs in O.2.B.
60th Bn. on the day of the relief pushed their patrols
 

371
15.
to Darmstadt Trench and East of it. Lieut. Malcolm
Kirkham killed on the railway bank near St. Denis by
a shell on first day of arriving there (Sept.2.)
Lieut. Pinkerton was wounded in the same place and
R.O.D. (Sept. 2).

59th (& old 60th) Battalions.
BELLICOURT.
Had moved out in column of route at 6.45 after a
hot breakfast from West of Templeux Le Guerard in
L.7.C. Moved from there in Column of Route by an
overland track E of Templeux to Cross Roads in 28.C.
95.20 then due E. towards Malakoff Farm to the J.O.T.
On moving E. they deployed into artillery formation,
lines of platoons, H.Q. leading.
They came under M.G. fire before C.O. was satisfied
that they were on the J.O.T. It came from the direction
of Malakoff Farm.
It was a very foggy morning - artificial fog was put
down and this made it hard to see - there was very little
wind and the smoke made a ground fog.
They did not suspect anything wrong atthis time.
They put it down to bad mopping up on the part of the
Yanks. Leading Coy, came under this and some artillery
fire and suffered severe casualties.
As they got near Malakoff Farm they got M.G. fire
from beyond it (it seemed like Malakoff Farm at first).
The leading Coys. Commander, Capt. Hornby, had been
killed by a burst (there were several guns) and all the
officers except one had been wounded. The C.O. swung
them round to act as flank guard while rest of Bn. went
through - and meantime he seeing a big mark 5 star tank
knocking about a little further back, went down to it
and got the officer in charge of it to help - and came
up in the tanknhimself to show it the way. C.O. took
it to head of Column and then got out - tank went on and
toured round - C Coy. under Lieut. Buckinghame working
independently.
Shotting was coming from left flank - and it
stopped when tank went out. (A Bde. Major of some other
Bde. got into the tank for a similar job - the tank
ended up at Quennemont Farm and went off).
The C.O. led Bn. down in the bottom of the valley
after this for protection.
C Coy. which had been swing round before C.O. went
for tank/worked out towards Quennemont Farm. When
C.O. saw them coming back with 40 prisoners he for the
first time realised that the Americans must have had a
crash and things were wrong.
(C Coy, was under young Buckinghame).
Bn. got over the top of the hill and into the Hindenburg 

Line at the Lamp Station (where the left dealt with
a M.G. post). The right entered the trenches about
A.27.C.5.9.
On getting here the fog had lifted a bit and the
Germans could be clearly seen in the Catelet Line just
W. and N.W. of Cabaret Farm. You could see about 100
of them. The C.O. sent A Coy. under Capt. Dickson down
the C.T. (with the zig-zag bend in it) into the Hindenburg 

support line.D Coy, went over the open just N.
of it (Capt. Neale M.C., O.C. of D Coy. had been killed

b
 

372
16.
by shell fire in the advance and this Coy, was under xx
Lieut. Parr) and getting into the trenches there established 

touch with 44th Bn.
Both these Coys, came under M.G. and minenwerfer
fire from 3 directions, front, left flank, and left rear.
B Coy. under Capt. Roberts, less one platoon
occupied bits of trench closely supporting Capt. Dickson.
Oneplatoon of B Coy. under Lt. Chambers was kept in
the main Hindenburg line with H.Q. with a platoon of 44th
Bn, remnants of a platoon of 4lst and bits of 108th
American Regt.
Lt. Chambers put in xxxxxx a bomb stop at about
27.A.5.8.
About noon the German bombed along the main line
where H.Q. were, rushed the bomb stop, and broke through.
He was driven back by a counter-attack, the men using
German bombs, and our bomb stop was put in 50 yards further
N. The Germans made a second attempt but this time they
were repulsed without reaching the block by bombs and L.G.
At 1.30 Col. Clark C.0. 44th Bn., established a joint
H.Q. with Col. Scanlon. At 4.30 p.m. Lt. Buckinghame
reported personally that he, with 12 men, the remains of
his Coy., were holding posts in Top Lane. There were
4 V. guns of 3rd M.G. Bn. in Quennemont Farm and 2 in
Top Lane. This gave us our defensive flank. German
artillery was in action in Dirk Valley.
There was still a pocket of Germans at the Junction
of Top Lane and Hindenburg Line. C.O. 44th Bn. was
arranging to deal with it.
44th Bn. had a Coy. also in the C.T. (towards the
Tunnel and 28 Central).
That evening 59th Bn. was ordered to move to a
position in the Hindenburg Line immediately S.E. of
Mont Olympus.
September 30th. 59th moved to S. of Bellicourt (trenches
in 10 A) near the "boiling down works." It was intended
that they should attack the same day to attack the Lamp
Signal Stn. in 6.D. Col. Scanlon had fixed zero for 3.30.
He discovered that 29th Bn. H.Q. that they were under
orders to do the same thing with zero at 4 p.m. These
orders were then cancelled by telephone. (15th Bde, was
not in touch with Divn, at this time).
At 10 p.m. they were called to Bde. (W. of Bellicourt)
where orders were given for an attack at down by the Bde.
in conjunction with an operation on the right (54th and
56th) and left (57th and 58th).
On October Ist. they moved out at 5 a.m. and formed in
rear of Nauroy Catelet Line. The attack was covered by
a creeping barrage and supported by tanks and the objective 

was reached with very little opposition. When they
attempted to exploit the success and push on the Germans
put down a very heavy artillery shoot and checked any
further attempt to advance. By nightfall they had made
good the line of the Gouy Estrees Road, which was handed
over to 2 Divn. Relieved that night.
Capt. C.S. Roberts - just after leaving C.O. at noon 29th.
Capt. Neale - died of wounds
Capt. Hornby - killed.
2/Lt. Parr - died of wounds (he was hit by one of our own
60-pdr. shells on xxxxxxxxxx morning of Oct. 1st in
last advance.

2/Lt. Curtin - gassed.
 

Lt. A.J.Tacker died of wounds (with Hornby).
 

373
17.
Wounded:
W.W.Leggott by shell fire near Malakoff.
H.E.Buckinghame about noon - hung on till 4 p.m. and
reported.
G.B. Bower by shell fire near Malakoff.
2/Lt. L.H.Parker with Hornby.
Lt. R.W.Marshall with Hornby.
Lt. C.H.Ashman.
Hornby was hit by a shell near Malakoff Farm early.

Lieut. Doyle A.F.A. Artillery Liaison Officer wounded.
(Chambers was in charge of bombing when this was going on
near 59th Bn. H.Q.)
186 O.R. killed and wounded.
 

59th and 60th BATTALIONS.
Turner and Facey.
On 4th September there was patrol work in Flamicourt.
Bde. relief this night. 59th and 60th were to move to the
rear. 57th then found that Germans were retiring.
Orders for 59th and 60th to withdraw were not cancelled as
they should have been.  59th and one Coy. 60th had already
moved when Eliott rang up to try and stop them from 57th
Bn. H.Q.
Next morning 4 a.m. 59th Bn. was ordered to reinforce.
B Coy. paraded (Capt. MacDonald) refused to move. They
said they were utterly done up. The other Coys. went
(to Peronne) and officers of B Coy.; but B Coy. stayed.
G.O.C. wont to see them (Elliott). He said he realised
that the men were being worked to death. He had been
the first man in his Bde. to take a patrol into Peronne.
But it was better to keep on working till they couldn't
stand rather than let the Cormans dig in on those hills.
On Sept. 24th Elliott had beon told of the Hindenburg
Canal attack at a meeting of Brigadiers. 54th Bn, was to
have been dissolved this morning - there was some trouble - 
men refusing to be dissolved.
On Sept. 25th evening came orders for break up of
60th. G.O.C. sent for Major Kerr (60th) Capt. (temp.
Major) Smith 59th and told them that there was to be a
composite Bn. made A and B Coys (60th) and C and D (59th)
to be 59th Bn.
On 26th G.O.C. ordered combined parade. Found that
60th were ready to obey their own officers, but not 59th.
 - mild form of meeting. They were addressed by G.O.C.
 

374
18.
and at end marched past under Scanlon who had returned
(C.O. 59th).
27th Sept. Delegates from 37th and 54th Bns. were last
night in lines. They told 60th Bn. that they were
successful in their own case. 60th men xxxxx might be.
G.O.C. saw the mend and told them it was only
temporary - they would be demobilised afterwards. He
told them that any man who refused to march would be disarmed 

and placed under guard. That he would not command
men who had lost their respect for him and refused to
obey his orders. When the time came for the march off
there was not trouble. They wore their own colours.
One grievance was that they did not see why they
should be picked out - they had no stain; whereas 59th
had refused duty.
G.O.C. said you are being disbanded without a stain;
no one could say it was because of misconduct. Whereas
if I disbanded 59th because a few men with a genuine
grievance paraded to me, it would be a stigma attaching
to Bn. for ever.
The men said they did not mind going into the line,
some of the older men were almost in tears - said it was
like deserting the dead. They pointed out that after
Fromelles and on the Somme they were weaker than they
then were. They had never given upa yard of ground to
Fritz - they were weaker and yet they advanced. (Of
course so they would this time). But Elliott though
he saw that the move was not necessary in 15th or 8th
Bdes, saw that an order/ coming from higher authority
must be obeyed or the force was done.
G.O.C. had a guard of nucleus under the Staff Captain
standing by and would have had the men disarmed and put
under guard and then resigned.
 

375

1 - 
46th Battalion, August 8th-
September 18th.

46th Battalion.
Spent night before in old system W of Vaire Wood.
Fog was thickening when 46th Battalion moved at Zero
plus 60. They moved by platoons along the road, closing up
by Companys as the fog became thicker. It had been
intended to cut early off to the left on a compass bearing
to Brigade assembly position near Tailloux Wood. But as
fog was so thick the road was kept as a guide to near Warfusee
Abancourt when the trench was followed which leads N. to
Tailloux Wood. As B Coy. got half way up this trench they
heard firing through the fog ahead. Presently Germans were
seen in the trenches at 22 D 9 5 - 9.1 and a few of them
were shot. A tank had reached this place, about 30 yards from
the Huns, and had broken down. The 3rd Division had not been
seen by these Germans.
On the same road that 46th Battalion followed, in the
old No Mans Land lay a mine. The officer leading a tank
(of the 12 which went along the Div. Boundary) saw it and
took his tank round it. But the next tank didn't see so
far ahead as its predecessor, and ran over it (it looked
like a boxlid) and it blew up.
The 46th and a party of 32nd Battalion mopped up these
Germans (possibly 20).
Battalion got into its assembling position E. of
Tailloux Woods with rest of Brigade. By time they moved off
the fog had lifted.
Some of the tanks on account of the fog had decided to
make their own way to the J. Off position and were ahead there
when Battalion arrived. The others were at Tailloux assembling
place.
From there these tanks moved on right flank of the
Battalion when it moved.
From there to the J.O. position S.W. of Hazel Wood,
Battalion struck no Germans. The third Division had got on
well. Only 2 wounded men or so came back and the spirits
of the Battalion were very high. They reached the J.O.
position marching by plus in Arty. formation. On the J.O.
position in 19 B & D the Battalion moved with 6 tanks.
 

Diagram- see original document

There were also 12 tanks on the right flank between
4 7& 5 Divisions.
Battalion moved diagonally to strike the main road just
west of Richmond Gully.
The 46 Battalion came on a dug out about 300 yards ahead