Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/227/1 - Folder - Part 15

336.
17th Bn. was withdrawn when 24th Bn. went through.
This was much later than dawn - probably about 9 or 10a.m.
24th Bn. came through the trenches up to 17th Bn. position
and went over from there during the morning.
17th Bn. then came back half-way to Florina trench and
Florina support, and into these trenches at dark.
Lieut.s. Small and Richardson, killed (as above).
Lieut. Worthington, wounded in the advance on the lower
slopes by M.G.
Lieut. Mailler was also wounded about the same time by
shell.
Lieut. Flood was wounded in the early stages (M.C.
for this for dash in settling Germans in early stage. He ki
killed about 6 and was hit on the side of the head as he was
going for a big German).
Lieut. Massey, wounded about midday by nosecap of a
shell.
(Small was an original man, a New Guinea man, commissioned
after Posieres; a great favourite and very cheerful by
disposition. It was he who led the counterattack at
Morlancourt; a Sydney man.)
Lieut. Flood M.C. this stunt.
Croft got M.C. at Mont St. Quentin.
Capt. Manifield also got M.C. for this.
It was Sergt. Dolan who was surrounded by Germans on
the top of the hill and broke away.
Major Fussell commanded the 17th Bn. in this.
August 8th- 19th BATTALION.
Col. Bateman took over on 3rd Aug. Bn. C.O.'s were
told on 4th. General Monash's letter was read to Coys. at
5p.m. in the Aubigny system behind Villers Bretonneux.
J.O. line of 19th Bn. was right of 20th. Their
right was on the road. Front about 1200 yds. Went over
with about 280 rifles - i.e. miners, signallers, etc.
7th Bde. on right of 19th. this line was inside our old
line. 24th Bn. held a screen in the Abancourt line
covering the assembly. They had instructions to withdraw
half an hour before Zero.
Hand drawn diagram - see original document.
The assembly was very quiet. Bn. came up round
north of Villers Bretonneux past the big camouflaged H.Q.
and so xx in. They lay inthe open on tapes. The line was
sited back a SW direction in order to conform to the
movement on the right.
There was a very heavy fog. Each battn. had (?6)
tanks on its front - the right number turned up. The 19th
 

337.
Battn. objective was in the trench system 800 yds. west of
Warfusee. The right Coy. under Lieut. Sell got 19 M.G.'s
on its sector in posts along or beside the road, scattered
very irregularly. The Boche could not see and they were
right on him before he could fight. Any fire was wild and
unaimed. The M.G.'s were well sited but the fog quite
prevented them from being of use. There was no trench
system - 2 or 3 M.G.'s and a little dugout for the crew in
a short length of isolated trench.
During the early stage it was exceedingly hard to keep
direction - Coys. got mixed - in some cases the tanks came b
back towards our line completely lost. About 5.30 Lieut.
Satchel, Sig. Offr., who took out a phone, wired that the
was out about 1000 yds. east of Abancourt trench. All M.G.
fire had ceased and the German was doing no xxxxxxxxx
shelling. It looked as if the German were getting away the
guns in the Warfusee Valley - and this turned out so; the
Germans got most of those guns clear by the time we reached
that place.
Diagram - see original document
About 6 a.m. word arrived that both front line Coys.
were on their objective, and 17th Bn. had gone through
followed by 8th Bde.
D Coy. - Sells.
A Coy. - Major Boyden.
At 6.30 Bn. H.Q., which had been in front of the tapes
in a Coy. H.Q., moved forward to a trench on the road just
west of the objective.
Battn. lost 42 altogether. Lieut. Griffiths was killed
near one of the small German posts by the road - he
evidently went straight for the M.G. and was killed about
6ft. from it; his body was almost in the trench.
Major Boyden was wounded in the leg. Receipts were
obtained for over 300 prisoners. 38 M.G.'s and 12 M'werfers
were sent back to the transport lines.
Supply tanks took up bombs and ammunition. As one of
these was returning about 7 a.m. it went up on a land mine
at about 27D.8.7. This burst the caterpillar and it ran
off it. Another tank had struck a mine just south of this
other one, near the road. There were two nests, 6 mines in
a nest - and each nest was surrounded by a couple of strands
of barbed wire. Inside this were in each case 6 things
looking like kerosene tins with 3 or 4 inches sticking above
ground.
Diagram - see original document
One tank had hit each of these and the effect was the same
in each case - the caterpillar rolled off. An R.E. Sergt.
was later on these to keep people off them. In the supply
tank, which was full of Australians and crew, no one was hurt
All scrambled out after a heavy explosion.
Bn. stayed there that night.
AUGUST 9th. - Next day, just before midday, the 19th.
moved to support 17th Bn. in an attack on Framerville.
 

338.
Just before Col. Bateman left H.Q west of Warfusee a
message came that 2nd Div. would continue the advance at
11.30 a.m. It was then about 11.15, but they were 2-3
hours march away from the Blue Line. Col. Bateman left
Capt. McMeckin to bring Bn. on, and pushed up to a C.O.'s
conference near Harbonnieres.
The order for attack was then given by Brigadier at
the crucifix in 5 C. NW of Harbonnieres. Zero hour was
given as 4.30 p.m.
20th\     18th\
19th\      17th\
Instructions to 19th were not to enter Framerville
unless 17th Bn. were in difficulties.
They passed through 8th Bde. Instructions to Coys.
were not to get nearer than 500 yds. to Framerville. They
formed artillery formation as they came out of Morcourt
gully. They stayed 500 yds. west of Framerville. At
about 10 p.m. 19th Bn. was ordered back from here to the
Blue line in support to 17th and 18th Bns.
Only 2 casualties this day.
On Aug. 11 there was a further advance, and 19th and
20th took part in this.
The J.O. position was just NE of Framerville. A line
was taped in the Chateau grounds. Zero was 4 a.m. There
was a mist early. There was a barrage. 7th Bde. and
20th Bn. attacked at same time. It was a good thick
barrage but ragged. The German reply was heavies on
Framerville and Vauvillers villages – not heavy on troops.
The 20th Bn. had a difficult job as their flank was open.
But 19th Bn. had no great difficulty - 150 prisoners were
taken. They reached a line not quite so far as the
objective on the east side of the gully, in touch with
7th Bde. The 20th Bn. had a difficult time, but by
midday 19th Bn. linked with them - they were across on the
west side of the gully.
About midday runners from beyond Reincourt Rainecourt-reported
that they were getting sniped from Rainecourt. A party of
17th Bn. was sent up there and got a M.G. and 6 men.
There were about 50 casualties. The German machine
gunners at this time seemed to be working differently.
They would now hang on for a time and then drop back with
their guns instead of hanging on to the finish. It was
concluded by most of the officers facing them that they had
instructions to inflict casualties and retire - typical
rearguard casualties.
Night of Aug. 11.- 19th Bn. was relieved by 22nd. and
24th Bns. The 5th Bde. came back to the Blue Line. Bn.
H.Q. for this attack had been in a cellar in Framerville..
The barrage was practically all heavy artillery..
 

339.
19th BATTALION: MONT ST. QUENTIN.
6th Bde, was holding the line on 28th Aug. Late in
afternoon of 28th Aug. 6th Bde. definitely cleared the
system SE of Frise. The bend of the river to north
greatly increased the frontage. The 5th Bde. took over
the part of North of the grid between
19 20 21 22 to 24 and
25 - 30.
7th Bde. took over to south of this line. The grid E and
W between 13 and 19 squares was the Bn. boundary - 18th
to north of it, 19th to south; each Bn. having thus 1000
yards of front.
20th           18th

------------------------
17th            19th
The Frise trench system was clear about an hour before
dusk. If 6th Bde. could clear these 18th Bn, were to work
along the river and try and get bridgeheads at Feuilleres
and Omiecourt. There was more opposition at Frise than
had been expected, and it was now late on Aug. 28. 18th
Bn. went through and after dark worked through Mereaucourt
Wood and reached the Feuilleres-Herbecourt road by about
midnight. About midnight the Germans blew up the Feuilleres
bridges. This was the position at dawn. At dawn on Aug.
29th 19th Bn pushed up from Eclusier quarry where it had been
during the night, got in touch with the right of 18th Bn.
and moved due east along the plateau towards Somme, 2 Coys.
in front, 1 in support, 1 in reserve. There was no
opposition until they reached the high ground overlooking
the Somme. The German was holding Bazincourt Wood on the
slopes down to the river - here the Bn. came under observation
from the hills behind Peronne. Lieut. Cecil Healy, the
swimmer, was hit here in the leg by a M.G. He got up
and pointed out the position in which this M.G. was firing -
and was hit again through the neck and killed.
The wood had to be cleared of several M.G.'s. It was
clear about midday. The M.G.'s were captured. But it is
thought the gunners swam the river.
The next thing was to force a passage across the Somme.
The only chance was the bridge near the junction of the
Somme with the Canal du Nord. The arrangement was (Coy.
Commanders knew) that if they could get the crossings they
were to rush Mont St. Quentin next day, through Omiecourt
and this southern crossing. They could cross the Somme
canal by a bridge which had been partially destroyed - a
wooden bridge. But on getting across you were faced by
about 500 yds. of marsh. The causeway used by the Germans
(a wooden construction north of the Nord Canal) had been
broken in several places. It was later used by us for wagon
traffic. The Nord Canal bank didn’t exist. The Germans
were in Halle and were pretty quiet - they didn't fire on
our movement by the river.
Next thing was - the engineers had to bridge the marshes
on the night of Aug. 29 to effect a crossing, while another
was arranged at Omiecourt.
17th 19th. --------Halle
18th 20th. -------Omiecourt.
Everyone thought this was going to come off, but by
3 a.m. engineers decided that they couldn't get a crossing
at either place. They brought material down by the roads
to the river, but the further they went the more difficulties
 

340.
there were.
19th Bn, was to cross at 5 a.m. on Aug. 30. The whole
scheme was called off about 4.30 a.m.
17th, 18th and 20th went at once back to. Feuilleres;
19th Bn. had to hold whole Bde. front. 19th Bn. extended
from west side of Somme Canal in 17A.4.9. down to about
24D.9.1.
There were Germans in Omiecourt on 30 Aug. and in east
of Clery also. Germans held Omiecourt bridge.
As 20th Bn. passed through Omicourt bridgehead NE of
Somme the Germans in Omiecourt cleared out. Col. Bateman
on afternoon of 30th Aug., about 3 p.m., sent an officer and
30 men across the bridge over the Somme Canal at 17A.4.9.,
and they worked along the timbered country south of the
Somme and reported Omiecourt clear but the East bank held.
The Germans were out of the marshes SW of the Somme.
(18th Bn. had previously on 29 Aug. effected a crossing at
the same bridge at 17A.4.9., but met opposition in the woods
south of the river).
The engineers undertook to have the Omiecourt bridge fit
for traffic by 3.30 a.m. Col. Bateman did not at this time
(on evening of Aug. 30) know that 19th Bn would be in the
attack. He sent one officer from each Coy. to reconnoitre
the way down to the bridge in 17A.4.9. The Int. Offr.
(Lieut. Armit) had himself reconnoitred (before the patrol
of 19th Bn.) down towards Omiecourt by himself.
(The Germans offered a big reward - Iron Cross, 3 weeks'
leave and money for the blowing up of this bridge, and they
did attempt it - Armit later got the papers).
At 1.30 a.m. on Aug. 31st 19th Bn. C.O. got operation
order by phone for the attack. Typed order arrived at
2.20 a.m. Bn. H.Q. was at the quarry in 15D.3.2. It
looked a pretty hopeless job. Colonel sent message for
Coy. commander to come to him, but 2nd. in commands to get
their coys. moved down at once to the bridge.
The Coy. Commanders got orders for the attack. They
left Bn. H.Q. at 3.30 walking - pitch black.
The information was that 7A and C were clear and that
they had to cross the bridge at Omiecourt and be in assembly
position 7B at 5 a.m.
Barrage was to fall on line roughly Halle, Park Wood
and Pekin trench 5 - 5.30; lift from 5.30 to 6 on anvil wood
Gott mit uns trench, Mont St. Quentin and Feuillacourt; 6 -
6.30 to lift onto Mont St. Quentin wood. It was to stand
there.
20th Bn to take Feuillacourt; 17th Bn. Mont St. Quentin;
19th Bn. to protect flank in Uber Alles and Gott mit Uns
trenches. 18th Bn. in reserve west of Clery.
Bn. crossed bridge and got to assembly position - as
close to bank of river as they could get.
Diagram - see original document
They got into position (D & A) under the big bank and the
other two just inland.  The four Coy. Commanders were the
only ones who knew what the real idea really was. They had
not time to convey it to the platoons, which were scattered.
The commanders of B and D were both hit early in the fight.
They pushed on - getting away about 5 a.m. They got
touch with 17th Bn, and from there on the whole advance
seems to have been at the double. They made pretty well
straight for the objective - the left Coy. of 19th. and right
of 17th Bn. seem to have met in the NE head of Uber Alles
trench. B Coy, was up there, D next to them; A Back along
 

341.
Rothwell trench and Agram Alley, and C in Galatz Alley. The
Coys. wore well mixed up, but this was the place of the Coy.
H.Q.
They found Germans strong in the aviation ground, and a
whizzbang gun was firing point-blank from there. The
casualties were light in getting there - the trouble was in
hanging on. If Gott mit Uns trench was occupied it can
only have been the head of it.
H.Q. moved across through Feuilleres for the quarry west
of Clery. It was then about 5 a.m.
The Germans clearly thought that the attack was from
the river, for his artillery pasted the whole slope where
the 19th Bn. had been. It was not till later that he pasted
the western slope.
Prisoners were coming down in droves after dawn - first
lot about 6 a.m.
6.30. - Bn. H.Q. came up through village to near 20th
Bn., 7A.5.0. A message had come that 20th Bn. was on
objective (later in day they were driven back) in touch with
17th, who wore in touch with 19th
About 9 a.m. Capt. Ronald, 17th Bn., came down to 19th
Bn. H.Q. He said the position was pretty anxious at the
front. The line was thinly Held, Germans were trying to
get in between 17th and 20th Bns. and were trying to work
round flank of 19th Bn.
Col. Bateman went to Col. Forbes close by and tried to
get touch with Bde. - lines were all down.
18th Bn. was then under orders to push through 19th Bn.
and link up Mont St. Quentin and St. Denis and cut off
Peronne. Forbes and Bateman decided that it was best to
hold onto what they had got. They saw Major Robertson,
18th Bn., and arranged with him to send 2 Coys. to support
line between 17th and 20th. They let Bde. know as soon as
possible. This action was confirmed.
There was nothing at the back between 9 a.m. and 2 p.m.
If Germans had attacked in strength it was very critical.
As it was they hung on. 7 6th Bde. and 14th Bde. came
through early in afternoon around the river bend.
About 4 p.m. the river bend was alive with troops in the
trenches and the big bank - pouring in from midday to 4 p.m.
The 19th were being sniped in the trenches from Mont
St. Quentin all day. Word was received that 6th Bde, was
relieving next morning. 23rd. Bn. went through 19th Bn.;
24th through 17th Bn.
During the night the Germans had worked back and
occupied Florina trench. 23rd Bn. went through and was held
up by fire from Anvil Wood.
19th Bn. had been instructed by C.O. not to leave their
trenches on the flank till the position was secure ahead.
6th Bde. made a second attack about 2 p.m. under heavy
barrage on Mont St. Quentin wood. This succeeded.
19th Bn, was then brought back to Florina trench. H.Q.
moved up there and they were in reserve.
Lieuts. Napper and Plummer were both killed neae the wall
at the head of Uber Alles trench.
Capt. McMeskin and Lieut. Pearce wounded.
19th Bn. lost 120 men here.

342.
19th BATTALION:
8 and 11th August.
M.C.'s.
Capt. McMeekin

Capt. Sell (bar) - d. of w.
Lieut. Hughes,
Lieut. Fleming,
Lieut. Satchell,
Lieut. Gordon,
Lieut. Pearce
Lieut. Plummer (killed at Mont St. Quentin)
St. Quentin, 31 August.
Lieut. Hempson (d. of w.)
           Seaborn
           Hall
           Armit
           Hinds
October 3rd.
Lieut. Hayes,
            Fitzroy
            Vickers
On October 12th - 19th Bn. was broken up at Vignacourt:
A Coy. to 17th; B Coy. to 18th; D Coy. to 20th; C platoon
to each.
 

343.
xxxxx 5th BRIGADE: AUGUST 8th.
Before 5th Bde. started the tank authorities decided
to bring up their supply tanks to the orchard NE of Villers
Bretonneux where an anti-tank gun was. Lieut. Little
(Bde. transport officer) 5th Bde.) when he heard it told
Bde. and protested - and at once made arrangements for pack
transport, as the place was so obvious and known to be
strafed. About 3 p.m. Aug. 3 the Germans put a shell into
these tanks - the third hit one and they began to burn.
Opinions differ as to whether the tanks had been seen. Once
it burnt the Germans began to shell the place heavily. An
Australian artillery supply tank was there with some details
camped by, and two sergts. in attempting to dowse the
flames with extinguishers were blown up by the explosion of
the destructive charges in the tanks (to blow them up) and
the Stokes mortar bombs. Lieut. Griffiths, Tank Corps,
got one tank out though burning and with the next tank
blazing, and two others got away. 17 were burnt. Griffith's
tank (5th Bde. supply) was blown up next day by a mine in
returning to do a second trip for the 7th Bde. This was
the tank Col. Bateman, 19th Bn., saw go up.
One of a tank crew was blown clear through the door
out of a tank - dead. The tanks burnt till dusk and looked
as if they must give the secret away.
20th BATTALION - AUGUST 8th.
(Col. Forbes, Capt. Portman, Lieut. Cameron).
Came up from Aubigny line up Pioneer switch and led out
onto J.O. line behind front line, held by 6th Bde., who
withdrew two hours xxxxx before Zero. No difficulty in
finding the way as 5th Bde. knew country well. it was very
dark. The fog came down about half and hour before Zero and
was so thick that you could lose even the runner who was
with you.
Diagram - see original document
 

344.
The Germans seemed mostly to be in the strongpoint 500
to 1000 yds. south of Tailloux Wood. There were a few
Germans in potholes in front. We found that work had been
going on on an unfinished fire trench south from Tailloux
Wood - the tape was still there.
The Germans were actually met first in some trenches
about 150 yards ahead of the junction of Aileen trench.
In the next sunken road our artillery had been heavy - the
Germans had cleared out of the banks in that road into the
crop behind it - and were hopping up there wounded when the
Bn. got along. The tanks came up along the road to the
left - their officers arrived just as the Bn. moved off,
and said that they would send the tanks along in that
direction - the tanks on the left came up just after Bn.
had its objective - along this road. When they pushed
through the objective with a Bn. of 4th Div., which lost
its way. When 20th Bn. got into the objective there were
a number of Germans in a strongpoint ahead the existence of
which was known to the officers beforehand. It was a
collection of strongpoints which had been very heavily
strafed. There were a great number of potholes about and
almost everyone had been hit. As soon as left of Bn. got
in Sergt. Sparkes of C Coy. went out straight away and
scouted all around the strongpoint and came back to say
that it was heavily held by the Germans. There had been
a number of Germans in the objective also - but these had
already been taken. This S/P was firing pretty heavily -
it had about 6 M.G.'s in action. Just as Capt. Portman
and his Coy. were going out against it Sparkes came in with
his information. Portman was about 100yds. out. He sent
Sparkes and Lieut. Thomas around the left. They worked
around the Germans. As soon as they were within 20 yds.
the Germans surrendered. It was at this time the 4th
Div. Bn. was going through. The tank there was the supply
tank - she was probably mined - she was heeled over in a
shellhole - she had come out of the re-entrant at the south
end of the wood. About 65 Germans were in that strongpoint.
Out of the whole collection of strongpoints about 150
Germans were got, and about 150 out of the trench south of
it - say 250 in all. It was a good line - but it looked as
if they relied on the strongpoint till long after the
attack.
By this time the right of 20th Bn. was ahead in
Warfusee. They were not sure of their objective in the
mists. When 18th Bn. went through they went with them. A
number of Germans were on the top by the road at 29 B.2.7.
and there was a fight there in old gun positions - the
Germans fought well. When advance got to the next steep
valley, there the 20 under Portman became certain they had
gone too far - and came back to proper position. 5th Div.
(8th Bde.) had passed through and things were going well.
There were guns in the Warfusee Valley - that was where they
were first met with. They were dug in on the crest of the
gully. Some of the sights were brought back - trails of
these guns were laid on timber. The angles of fire were
very wide indeed - and the floor of the gunpit boarded.
2/Lieut. Mackenzie was hit at the start by a M.G.
bullet.
Lieut. Elkington was hit in taking a M.G. position in
the objective - working down the trench - he was hit by a
potato masher.
The fog had been too thick when the S/P was taken for
them more than just see the tank about 100 yds. away.
20th Bn. stayed there for the day. That evening some
huge bursts occurred just near the main road at Warfusee
at quarter-hour intervals. They were taken for mines at
first, but turned out to be huge shells. The first three
 

345. or four were near the road. The 5th or 6th - about dusk -
fell right near the silhouetted traffic by the road. It
killed two German prisoners who were coming down in a German
waggon, and the two Tommies beside them in charge of the
waggon, and cleared the traffic on a space of road - perhaps
50 yards. Only about six shells were fired. They came
from NE (Somme Valley direction).
(Above authorities: Capt. Elliott & Lieut. Sharp).
On August 9th.-About 11 a.m. orders were received to
attack at 11 a.m. The J.O. line was 8000 yds. away. The
Bn. was sent on under Capt. Portman, while C.O. Col.
Forbes, rode to the crucifix NW of Harbonnieres. The
instructions for attack were there given but not the time.
The Bn. came up in artillery formation. East of La
Motte as they came under fire they crossed the road and
passed north of Bayonvillers.
On the tramline west of Morcourt Valley and Ashwell
Wood they got their orders from C.O.
About 2 a.m. they crossed the gully which was under
heavy shellfire - the decided to go straight ahead and got
through without a casualty - and came just behind Blue Line
and lay down in artillery formation. Bn. started to deploy
and a number of German planes came over very low. Germans
were shelling the blue line then. When the attacking
troops (16th Bn. moved out of the Blue Line 20th Bn. moved
into it. Stayed there till night of -9th and took over
the line from 18th Bn. on morning of Aug. 10. The line
was then short of the factory - about 80 yds. short of it.
At this time back at the dump on the other side of the road
were 45th Bn. who were not attacking.
In regard to this flank, on afternoon of 9th, when 18th
Bn. went ahead, Capt. Portman went out and had a look at the
dump from the south side of the road. While Portman was
looking at the dump (where he did so much of his work later)
he saw xxx a pair of legs sticking out of a stack of wood
there. He thought - "Hm! That must be one of our people!"
It was an old English Major of artillery who had gone out
there to have a look for some guns which he was searching
for (to shoot at, I suppose).
Portman then saw that the flank was quite open as 45th
Bn. wore back behind the bomb and 5.9 dump. He reported to
Major xxxxxxxxx Robinson, who told him to put in his Coy.
to defend the flank.
Portman brought up 2 platoons into the dump which was a
huge collection of timber stacks, and very good cover. He
gave instructions to Lieut. Holmes to take out a platoon
to about 25 D.7.9 and another at 26 C.7.9. to watch the
flank. Holmes had to crawl out on his own and reconnoitre
the position. He took his platoons out, also crawling,
under M.G. fire from Proyart, and they dug in there.
That night Portman went up to push the western of these
posts out towards Proyart. They reconnoitred the ground
out there. Portman went back to 45th Bn. and saw Col.
Johnson to tell him of the move of his posts, and he then
heard that 45th Bn. had orders to push out that night.
Holmes, Sergt. Clark and Capt. Portman then guided them up
to the advanced post of the 20th and showed where the road
corner was. But when 45th Bn. got up there they came under
M.G. fire, so they swung back their flank to where the post
was and thence to the road about 150 yds. in rear of left
flank of 20th Bn. The posts of 20th Bn. then withdrew to
the Blue Line.
That afternoon 3 M.G.'s were firing from Proyart. By
next day about 10 could be seen.
(On the afternoon of the 10th Aug. 3 motor lorries and
a box car came tooling along the road towards Proyart from
the Blue line. They got within 500 yds. of Proyart when
the dust began to be knocked up all around them. The