Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/227/1 - Folder - Part 14

326.
The men were some of them twice wounded - hit a second
time beyond the cemetery, by M.G. fire, as they were going
back wounded.
Sergt. Murray and Boase were both sent on by Fraser for
reward. Sergt. Murray was at the subway in charge of one of
Boase's sections. Murray had been in the post with Boase.
He was hit in the head but carried on - the rest of the men
in the post seemed to have been scuppered. Murray was later
put by Fraser in charge of a post right on top of the subway.
(The bridge was stone and iron railings). Murray was hit, as
he got back, in the groin and was captured xx with Fraser.
 

xxx
327.
BEAUREVOIR 8th AUGUST, MONT ST. QUENTIN.
17th and 19th BATTALIONS.
20th BATTALION - August 8-12th.
JONCOURT
(Col. Sadlier - Lieut. Gill).
17th behind 18th. (as on map).
Orders were verbal. C.O. had to take barrage orders
to Coys. about 10 minutes before Zero. While 17th. holding
round Joncourt Germans put down a very heavy gas concentration
on the village and the valley from 11.30 p.m., Oct. 2, to
4.30 a.m. On Oct. 3 to Etricourt trench. The men had to
have a feed, be withdrawn, and taken to J.O. tape.
6.20 was zero. 8th Notts. and Derbys were on right
and 5 Bdes. of F.A. behind. The barrage was good.
The Beaurevoir line was the first objective. 18th
Bn. on right and 19th on left. 2nd. objective - 17th and
20th were ahead by Pomchaux (see on map). 17th Bn. had
300 rifles.
The Bn, was pulled out while gas was still being
thrown - wearing gas helmets from 11.30 p.m. to J.O. German
counter-barrage was gas - it was very dark, but fine.
Germans wer holding first objective - a traced trench
with two or three pillboxes and strongpoints at intervals.
Bn. got onto tape in first-class order.
On right the first objective was taken well by 18th.
Bn. On left towards road they found that Estrees was not
clear and 18th Bn, was held up. Consequently 17th Bn. were
held up for about 2/ hours. They were lying out in front
of the wire. They had heavy casualties, and the centre coy.
was pretty well wiped out.
C (Capt. Wright)
B (Capt. Ronald) →
D (Capt. Mackenzie)
Ronald was wounded 10 minutes after the show started.
The left Coy. about 2½ hours later worked through
into 27 B. They were held up by M.G. fire from near La
Motte farm and the heights ahead. 20th Bn. eventually got
up the Torrens Canal.
Centre Coy, was so weak that some went with left Coy.
and some with the right. All the officers of B Coy, except
one were hit: Capt. Ronald, Lieut. Pettit, Lieut. Adams.
Lieut. Richmond with his party got through in the end to 27B.
The right Coy, went forward very well and went through
Wiencourt. By an hour after zero they were up in 29A on
the high ground, with a tank, which was put out as soon as
it got onto the high ground. This was the only tank 17 Bn.
had - the others were late and did not take part.
The right Coy, was in touch with 8th Notts and Derbys
on their right.
 

328.
There was a gap between the two parties which were as
marked on the map A and B.
The casualties had been heavy - and barely 200 rifles
were now left.
The 18th Bn. were ordered up from 1st objective to
fill the gap, but this help was slow in arriving. By
midday the gas had begun to take effect. The men had
begun to dribble back blind and sick.
By 4 p.m. there was only a handful of officers and
men in either place.
With party A. Capt. Wright (C Coy.) was the only
officer left.
With B party there were Lieuts. Sams, Tindale and
Richmond. Wright was recalled to take charge of the Bn.
in place of Col. Sadlier, who had been gassed. This left
Sergt. J. M. Young, M.M. in charge of the party on the
left, with only 10 men. They were just in potholes on
the side of the hill - and the B party the same.
This was the situation when Col. Sadlier was
evacuated.
The remnants of the 18th Bn. under Capt. Paine came
up by 6 p.m. and filled in the gap.
24th and 22nd Bn. which had been near Bellicourt went
up through Estrees. Arrangements were made on the phone
about 6 for a jump-off at 6.30.
On 17th Bn. sector the Z3rd Bn. moved through and
dug in about 200 yds. ahead of the advanced position.
The 17th Bn. line then became a support line
At midnight Bn. was withdrawn to Etricourt, where it
dug in.

WOUNDED: Col. Sadlier. His H.Q. was in a big pillbox
at the cast end of Joncourt - it was the only place
where you could have a light, and it was hit six times in
the night. The 18th Bn. H.Q. was a few hundred yards in
the rear on the roadside - the Colonel had reconnoitred the
area very thoroughly and they were the only places possible.
The gas was falling all night; and stumbling about in the
dark, if the show was to go, it was necessary to take off
your gas helmet.
The Bn. consisted of 3 Coys. - B, C, D. - A having been
cut out owing to shortage of numbers.
On H.Q. - Lieut. Haig, Adjt., since died.}
Lieut. McPhee. Int. Off.                             )
Lieut. Masterson, Asst. Int. Offr.             ) were all
Lieut. Dark, L.G. officer                             ) similarly 
Lieut. Blackford, Sig. Offr.                       ) gassed.
C Coy. Lieut. Robertson, wounded in front of the wire
Lieut. Harries, gassed.
Lieut. Nicholson (on liaison with 32nd British
Bde.
B Coy. Capt. Ronald (shell in front of wire, early)
Lieut. Phelps (in front of the wire, also
early).
Lieut. Adam (about same time as Ronald - by a
shell
Captain H. T. Allan (on liaison with British
46th Divn. - gassed).
Captain Mackenzie, gassed
D Coy. Lieut. Pettit, gassed
Lieut. Booth, gassed
Lieut. Moore, gassed
Capt. McLean, gassed
 

329.
A good many of these officers (e.g., Captain Mackenzie
Booth and Moore, were right up at the front at the extreme
point before the gas disabled them. At H.Q. the C.O. was
the last to go at 4 p.m. - none went before midday.
At Joncourt the Bn, was in the front line and could not
be withdrawn. They had to be fed twice (they had no meal
since the night before). They were very wretchedly sick.
Had the Bn. been concentrated just behind the line there
would have been less difficulty in escaping the gas. But
with front-line troops it was impossible in any way to avoid
it - it just had to be stuck. The officers who remained on
duty were all gassed also.
The British on the right were heavily gassed right back
to division.
On Oct. 3rd the 8th Notts and Derbys made a magnificent
attack on right of 5th Bde. The two C.O.'s of the Bn. next
to us were killed.
The 17th Bn, started with a frontage of about 1700 or
1600 yds., lengthening out at the final objective to about
3000 yds.
The tanks, which had been told that it was a 3-hour trip
 up to the start took 13 hours - they had trouble in the
Hindenburg line. 
The barrage hours only arrived at Bn. H.Q. 20 mins.
before Zero.  The barrage was to be six mins. on the first
objective - then lift to the high ground - then shoot on
chosen points.
The British Bns. on the right were very full in strength
and their objectives much smaller than ours.
19th BATTALION:-ESTREES - BEAUREVOIR.
(Col. Bateman).
Had one Coy, on right of road, three on left - went in
with 4 Coys.

xxx Capt Sell \ D
Capt Trennery \ C
Lt Belcher \ B
Capt Hinds \ A
19th Bn. H.Q. was with 20th Bn. H.Q. (Col. Bateman and
Col. Forbes) under the Rowan Road in the trench just west
of Estrees.
4 tanks were allotted - two got ditched at Bellicourt.
The other two were late (probably a quarter of an hour late)
One of the tanks ditched had been allotted to the White
House. On the previous day Lieut. Belcher had reported a
lot of movement near the White Cottage on the road between
the two lines of the Beaurevoir line. The objective of
19th Bn was the Beaurevoir system for 1500 yds. north of
the road. 20th Bn, was to pass through there and 19th Bn.
to follow through 500 yds. in support in rear as support.
 

330.
There were about 15-320 gas casualties - it was not so
bad as on the right.
Col. Bateman sent xx Lieut. Vickers forward in rear of
second wave with a phone to keep up information as to how
the fight was going. He got in rear of C Coy. and got
touch with the C.O. about 7.30 a.m. He reported that the
attack had gone well, Beaurevoir line clear and 20th Bn. were
passing through 19th. C and D Coys. had gone through, but
A and B wore hold up. They got up to the wire in 27A & C
but it was very thick and not cleared. There they got
very heavy M.G. fire from the White House - the left did
not know that the right was held up, and so it went straight
on. The 18th En. also reported that they had trouble on the
right of the road.
Of the 12 officers who went over 8 were wounded.
Almost all of these were wounded in the first half-hour. D
Coy. on the left lost all its officers and sergts. In
getting through Capt. Sells and Lieut. Hampson were hit by
M.G. Both later died of wounds. (Sells was gassed also,
and died ofpneumonia). And when they came back that night
there was a corporal in charge of the Coy. - the C.S.M. and
all the sergts. had been killed or wounded.
When the source of the trouble was located, General
Martin asked if it would be possible to get all the men
away from that area around the German nest and strafe the
cottage. This shoot was fixed for 11 p.m. The artillery
was arranged for 300 yds. on either side of the road, front
and support line. The two Coys, of 19th were to be ready
to bomb up from either flank when the bombardment ceased.
Tho cottage was heavily shot up - because when the parties
worked round in the front trench practically no opposition
was put up. 18 M.G.'s were got there.
The White Cottage surrendered - 6 officers and 200
prisoners were estimated from this area.
About 8 or 9 a.m. the whippet tanks came up on being
sent for - but as they came out through the village they
were very heavily met and all knocked.
20th Bn. got away up past La Motte Farm making
towards the windmill and Beaurevoir. Col. Forbes then
issued instructions that they were not to go xxxxx  beyond
the canal until the situation was cleared up. The line
finally reached about La Motte Farm.
The 2 Coys. of 19th Bn. which had cleared (with some
of 18th.) the first objective, pushed on to Gill up the gap
between the left of 20th Bn. and right of 17th Bn.
About 4 p.m. 24th and 22nd. moved up past the NE
outskirts of Estrees to the Beaurevoir line N. of the road,
awaiting orders. Eventually, about 5.45 p.m., Col.
Wilshire and Col. James came down to 19th Bn. H.Q. and
arranged the further advance there.
Their Zero hour was 6.30. The two C.O.'s left H.Q.
19th Bn. at 6.5. They got through with few casualties to
the windmill and were in touch with 7th Bde. on left.
19th Bn. went in with about 230 rifles and had about
120 casualties, including 8 out of 12 officers.
19th Bn was relieved that night and came back west of
Estrees. They were standing by for the taking of
xxxxxxxxxxx Montbrehain but were not used.
It was expected that the Beaurevoir line would be fully
dug from the way in which it was wired and the distinctness
of the trenches on air photos.
Not a man was lost in the second attempt - the mopping
up of the trenches. All the casualties were in the first
hour.
The two Coys. of 19th Bn. which pushed through the first
objective went on afterwards to the 20th Bn.'s left and made
a flank along the Torrens Canal. The frontage was very big
and this was why the left did not know of the position on the
right.
 

331.
The whippets were sent up on the strength of the
information sent back that 20th Bn. had gone through on the
left.
A Coy. Capt. Hinds, wounded.
Lieut. Gordon, wounded.
B Coy.  Lieut. Hall.
C Coy. 2 officers. 
died of wounds
D Coy. Capt. Sells (Who was original Bn. M.C.
(Morlançourt; bar Aug. 8, but didn't know it)
2/Lieut. Hampson, died of wounds. M.C. at
Mont St. Quentin and didn't know it).
Lieut. Maclean (since died from illness).
17th BATTALION: SOMME; MONT ST. QUENTIN.
(Lieut. Gill: Lieut. Crofts).
On morning of 29 August 17th Bn. started about 5.30
a.m. from a reserve position at Cappy down the Dompierre
Road following 19th Bn. - to the trench system south of
Frise (2 miles south of it). They then turned NE towards
Mersancourt Wood and halted in the trench system running
south from the centre of the south side of the wood. Here
they came in touch with the rear Coy, of 19th Bn. and got
into artillery formation there.
About 8.30 a.m. rear Coy. of 19th Bn. moved forward
and 17th Bn, started again moving in artillery formation.
They were now about in that day's new ground.
On reaching 21 Central 2 Coys. remained in Wilkind
trench and Guerriers Alley. The two forward Coys, moved
to a position in 22 A. & D. At Wilkind avenue they were
followed by some R.H.A. who came under observation there
from the heights near Mont St. Quentin and were shelled.
The two forward Coys. remained in 22 B and D. They
presently moved into Guerriers Alley. By this time 19th
Bn., with 18th Bn. on left, were fighting the enemy down
the slopes in 23 and in the wood.
17th Bn, was instructed to stay there till further
orders.
The Germans could be seen near east of Halle and East
of Park Wood - horses, etc., moving. Later in the afternoon
- about 6 p.m. - the Battn. Commanders interviewed the
G.O.C. and it was decided to prepare an operation to attack
Mont St. Quentin from this side of the river.
At Midnight G.O.C. Division came to a conference at
19th Bn. H.Q. in the quarry south of Feuilleres - and
definite instructions were issued.
Engineers were sent to Omiecourt to prepare a crossing
there and another at the junction of the canal du Nord and
Somme canal. 18th Bn. was to effect the crossing at
Omiecourt and establish bridgehead guards NE of the river.
Zero was at dawn. At dawn 20th Bn, was to cross at
Omiecourt and attack Mont St. Quentin from NW,
 

332.
17h Bn, was to cross at the junction and attack Mont
St. Quentin from SW. Everything was prepared for this.
The engineers were sent down. They reported, after making
every effort, that it was absolutely impossible to erect
suitable bridges.
About half an hour before Zero word was received that
the operation was cancelled and that all Bns. except 19th
Bn. would move back and take up positions in the trench
system west of Mereaucourt. Wood. 19th Bn. was to remain
near Ormiecourt and defend that locality.
This move back was completed by 8 a.m. The Bn. had
had no rest that night. They had not been shelled while
in waiting position. On arriving in position a conference
of Bn. C.O.'s was ordered xxx at Bde. H.Q. south of Frise.
17th Bn.: Orders were received to cross the river at
Feuilleres; and on crossing it Bn, was to get into
artillery formation and move practically along the north
bank of the river towards Clery, following 20th Bn.
It was understood at this time that Clery was clear
of the Germans. There was just time to inform O.C's
Coys. Bn. started at ll a.m., crossed the river, after a
hot meal, moved along the north bank, and, on reaching the
NW corner of the village, found that 20th Bn. had come in
contact with the enemy. Just before reaching Clery the
Bn. had to move up into the Neck which the road and the
railway make there. Here it ran onto the tail of 20th Bn.
halted - as they had hit on the Germans at the northern end
of the village.
There was nothing to do except for 17th Bn. to get
into the trenches just north of the embankment - Odoe (?)
Alley. The Bn. H.Q. was established in the embankment
just west of Clery with 20th Bn. H.Q. beside it. Major
Fussell, O.C.) conferred with Col. Forbes. There was a
lot of shellfire, and this end of the village was heavily
shelled. The German seemed to be moving a great deal down
the two old opposing front line systems - and each Bn. had
artillery liaison officers with them. Information was
sent to Bde. by phone.
About 4 p.m. instructions were received from Bde. to
make an extra effort to push forward; 20th Bn. moved a
little and took a few prisoners east of the village. But
no definite move could be made owing to the maze of
trenches east of the village.
3rd Div. was holding the high ground north of Clery -
they were also said to be holding Berlingott trench.
The shelling in Clery was heavy. Our shelling was
heavier still on the Germans - it was retaliation apparently.
Artillery all round was very active.
About 9 p.m., after constant interchange of information
by phone, etc.. with Bde., information came that a conference
was being held by Division which would probably result in a
definite decision on the moethod of attack on Mont St. Quentin
They knew that they were going for Mont St. Quentin somehow.
At about midnight an operation order was issued by
telephone. A great number of artillery brigades were cooperating.
17th Bn. was to move forward by 5 a.m., which was
to be zero, to positions in I.7. B & D (in the old Germang
front and xrx support line system). They were to be there by
5 a.m. (It was apparently known also by Division that it
would mean fighting). About 12.30 a.m. a conference of Coy.
Commanders was held and they were given first verbal
instructions as to what was to be done; and at about 3 a.m.
a written operation order was issued by Coy. Commanders -
there was no time to send a written order from Bde. but it
was dictated through phone. A rum ration arrived about then
and was much appreciated by everyone.
 

333.
There was still shelling, but after dark it had
eased a lot.
About 3 a.m. the C.O. visited all the Coy. Commanders
in their new positions
They had reached these without much trouble and had
taken about 20 prisoners.
The problem was this: At 5 a.m. the Bn. was to move
off from the J.O. line with two Coys. in front and two
in support. That meant (to reach this exact position)
moving east from east end of village for about 500 yds.
then swinging south practically wheeling on the bend of
the river; then wheeling left again and facing Mont.
St. Quentin straight on.
Bn. started about 2 a.m. (?). It filed through
Eleu Alley.
___   ___   ___   ___   
C        B       A     D    →
Thus - in single file.
The front line east of Clery was at this time held
by 20th Bn. which had bumped into Germans there in the
afternoon and had cleared the trenches east of the village
for about 500 yds.
20th Bn. were to be on left of 17th. in this attack,
and had moved out of these trenches by the time 17th Bn.
moved through them.
The Coys, of 17th Bn, were to reach their hopping-off
position - the exact method of getting there had to be a
matter for each Coy. Commander - and it had been decided by
arrangement between them that they would do this by a lot
of bluff. If they met any Germans they had arranged to
make a lot of noise and rush at them - and bluff them.
The prisoners taken during the earlier hours had been
of 80th. I.R. (?).
In working down the trenches beyond those that the
20th Bn. had reached, 17th Bn. came upon parties of Germans.
Even the end, B, Coy., which was in front of C at the end
of the procession, met a couple of Germans in part of this
maze. B Coy, was then making down the road above the
steep Somme Bank round the river bend. The forward Coys.
who met some German posts were fired on but they came on
them suddenly in the dense pitch darkness and made use of
the bluff they had decided on.
They led out round near Freckles Wood and then faced
east. The river was to be their guide.
B Coy. came to about 13 Central when dawn broke and
the barrage descended. on Mont St. Quentin. They broke out
into artillery formation:
B|    A|
C |   D|  →
The barrage came down near the village and the whole
lot went straight for the village. They were extended now.
Everyone could see Mont St. Quentin standing up and it was
simply a case of getting for it as fast as possible.
When D and A were passing Park Wood, A Coy. Commandr.
Capt. Allen, noticed that D Coy, was getting trouble from
Park Wood; and he decided that it was too big to leave
unguarded. Orders were to leave mopping up till later
and simply go for Mont St. Quentin and get there - but this
opposition on the right seemed pretty dangerous. Capt.
Allen accordingly led off to the right through the wood
and took a great many M.G.'s. The enemy ran for their
lives from the wood - but a number were captured there.
 

334.
Probably they did not realise how small the attack was.
It was daylight now and the attack simply depended on its
swiftness and determination. This Coy. lost very few
here. The casualties of all Coys. were very light up to
the village. The Germans whom Bn. was now meeting were
the Alexander Regt. of the Guards who had come into the
line that night. They seemed to be simply overcome by the
pace of the attack and made very little opposition. (H.T.
Allan had seen M.G. fire coming from that wood but when he
got near the guns they ran, leaving their guns).
Allan worked through the wood quickly and then followed
through on the right roar of the attack to Gott mit Uns
trench.
Tho rest of the Bn. was practically in one line as it
swept on towards the village - the fire was coming from the
village; the trenches between Mont St. Quentin and the
canal did not seem to be occupied.
The canal - which had been feared as a serious obstacle
turned out to be dry and not an obstacle. The wire in
I.15.A & C. was very thick - old German wire, concertina
and other, very thick indeed, and the slope had become very
steep. The pace was a fast walk - some had to trot.
They lay up for a breather in a trench a little way
south of the junction of Agram Alley and the Mont St. Quentin
Feuillact. road. They waited there a few minutes. Then
(?on someone blowing a whistle) they started off again. From
there it was a rush.
The Germans were in Elsa trench. They fired a few shots
and most of them cleared into the rubble and ruin of houses
behind. A number were killed in or about Elsa trench. From
there it became a scramble of different parties routing
Germans who were in holes and corners in the ruins with
M.G. positions scattered through them.
The orders were to get a footing at the village and
make as much ground on the hill as they could. Numbers of
parties got into the village - there was fighting going on
in the village. Capt. Manifields party (D Coy.) went
through the right portion of the village. The NE xxxx
edge of the village was being shelled by our own artillery.
Shortly after our troops reached the village the Germans
shelled it also. When C Coy. got forward - it was
originally right rear - it worked mainly in the centre.
By about 6.30 the troops were up in the village.
Lieut. Croft, for example, with his men got up the
Aziecourt Road on the N. of slope into the quarry. As
parties found that they were isolated and disconnected
they gradually formed their line on the edges of the
village where Elsa trench gave them a line. Shortly
after (?) A Coy. got into Gott mit Uns and Uber Alley
trenches (?) ) - (more probably they mistook Agram Alley
for these) - and 19th Bn. (who came up to form a defensive
flank) were mingled in with the others near the objective.
The left of Bn. was exactly opposite the opening of Elsa
trench onto the road - across the road. At 10 a.m. Lieut.
Small, O.C. C. Coy., and Lieut. Richardson (one of his
officers) brought the remnants of C Coy. along Elsa
trench and then led them out across the road and down s
short distance of trench in the direction of 9 Central.
They found there was nothing there - 20th might have been
there, but naturally in a fight like this all battalions
would be intermixed on the objective - finding that flank
completely in the air they turned back; and as Small and
Richardson were walking up the road they were hit by a
minenwerfer bomb and both killed.
These German minnies were heavies - some way beyond
the wood probably. (not in the quarry, because a party of
our own people under Lieut. Croft had been there when our
barrage shifted them - about 12 Germans were captured or
 

335.
the edge of the quarry, including a map-drawing section
with a lot of maps). The Germans followed down this trench
opposite Elsa trench. The left party was on the road bank
about 10 yards further south, and was finally bombed into
Elsa trench where the left rested. This would probably be
about 11 a.m.
Bn. H.Q. knew about 9 a.m. by runners and by wounded
men that they had got into the village, but the situation
up there was not definite. No one at the start thought
there was a ghost of a chance. When the vast numbers of
prisoners came trooping down it was almost incredible -
the Bn. had so few men that it seemed impossible they could
have collected them. Bde. got 79 guns actually carried out
afterwards (Park Wood was simply populated by machinegunners)
The Alexander Regt. had just relieved or it would scarcely
have allowed a man to get across the slopes north of Halle
Wood. The Germans cannot have known how small our attacking
force was.
About 11.30 the position in the village was still a bit
indefinite at H.Q. But about this time the German artillery
began to lay down a heavy strafe, especially on the western
edge of the village and on the road. It was then that the
casualties of Bn. really became numerous. This shelling
went on all day.  At the early stages German M.H. fire came
from Johannes trench into Uber Alles and Gott mit Uns trench
L$ 1000 yds. in front of them.
A wire was sent to Bde. asking for artillery onto this
trench far behind our front line.
There were isolated local counterattacks - 6 or 7.  The
Germans dribbled down to the road and into the ruins and got
M.G.'s set up there firing very close.
Our artillery was very close up - 4/6-in. howitzers
being on the road close behind Brags Alley in 12A.9.9. where
17th Bn. H.Q. was. There were very quickly field artillery
in front of this H.Q. in 1 c. and 7 A. The main part of
the German barrage in the early stages came down on the east
edge of Clery and the Somme bank east of the bend - that
made it clear where he expected us. All day the shelling
with 5.9's and 4.2's was heavy there, 12 B & D.
The counterattacks did not move the line at all from
where it was. There were no reserves in xxx the Brigade.
During the earlier half of the day the left of 17th linked
up with 20th Bn. just below the bend of the road .The line
may generally be said to have been in the nearest trenches
to the main road. Towards evening the shelling eased.
It probably covered attempts at counterattack.
Knowing how unsafe the situation was, bombs, ammunition
and machine gunners (Vickers and Lewis) were sent up.
18th Bn. had been in reserve. They moved up just
before dusk into trenches in support of 17th Bn. (probably
in Galatz and Agram Alley).
There the line remained until the next day.
A meal (curry included) was sent up after dark - and rum.
SEPTEMBER 1st. Between 9 and 10 the 6th Bde. went
through.
On left in St Quentin were Capt. Manifield, Lieut.
Fitzallen, D. Coy., Lieut. Massey (hit by a whizzbang there),
Lieut. Adam, Lieut. Nicholson, Lieut. Croft.
On right were Capt. Allen, Lieut. Phelps, Lieut.
Robertson.
Lieut. McPhee was Int. Offr.
(Lieut. Napper, 19th. Bn. was killed near Croft, and
Hampson also was there on left - since killed).