Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/227/1 - Folder - Part 3
217.
8.
52nd BATTALION
MOUQUET FARM
Diagram - see original document
September 3.5.15.
The two left platoons got to t he Farm. Sergt.
Cutts with right platoons was still in touch with them to
about A. There the line split and the left went into the
Farm. (Lt. Taylor was killed as soon as the attack started
2/Lt. Dickson got into the Farm, was shot in the leg and
took a German coming out of a pozzy with a M.G. in the Farm.
He made the German carry the M.G. out, and got back and
was sent to hospital. The two platoons on the left more or
lwaa disappeared - some of them have never been accounted
for at all. The other two platoons got into two shell-
holes infron of the German post at 77 and betwen it and the
rest of 52nd Bn. There were Germans at Z but at the time th
they did not know that there was a post at 77 - No post was
seen at first but later the Germans were seen at about where
it is marked in the sketch. The 51st Bn could be picked
up on the left front digging in. The shell-holes which
Cutts and the two platoons were n were part of an old Trench
very badly blown about that morning.
About 9 a.m. (the Germans being between there and
the 51st) Cutts went across to the Farm - going as fast as
he could - and saw a Company HQrs of 51st Bn there. They
were in the mouth of the dugout. The other end of it was
full of Germans, whom they had shut in. They promised to
send a platoon to connect up with Cutts party. (B Coy -
Major MacPherson was in charge of front line there)
Just after Cuts asked for these the Farm was
very heavily. The platoon did not arrive. It was
Diagram - see original document
shortly after this that the Germans came working in
between 52 and 51 and were clearly getting heavily fired
at from the 51st - the 52nd was also firing at them.
(Cutts had sent out to get touch with the 52nd on the
right but could not get touch with them at any time.
Only about (?) were left in this group at this time.
To start with there had been about 20. (A number of
218.
9.
prisoners had beengot in posts on the right of the farm -
as far as can be remembered-and escorted back, and a
number of men had been wounded. Most of these casualties
were by M.G. fire from the right front.)
Diagram - see original document
The Coy HQrs was at an old cellar entrance to a dugout
at A.
Men were digging a Communication Trench from B to A
(about 2 feet deep then)
The German counter attack got asfar as E. They
were using egg bombs against 51st Bn. They did not get
into the Farm at this time.
The party with Cutts moved back to about F.J. rou
round the edge of the Farm. The small party had haf two more
casualties before they came in and were only about 7 or 8
now.
The 51st Bn at that time was in the Sap B -A
and round 8. There was still an officer in the HQrs at
A. The party with Cutts tacked itself on to their right.
The 51st Bn had at that time was in the Sap B -A
and round 8. There was still officer in the HQrs at A
The party with Cutts tack.
The 51st Bn had a post on the Brick Mound. with a
L.G. The position remained thus - 52 party on right of
this L.G.
Diagram - see original document
219
10.
50th BATTALION
Etinham
August 9th
In the afernoon started to Cerisy and were
there for about an hour, took over from 1st Bn.
That night they had a sort of half circle
around the E and NE of Chipilly. About midnight Major
Fowler with the other Coy Commanders went across to reconnoitre
the ground first - they were told to take some
sergeant with se them and go carefully.
One wounded Germanwas found at the church.
Next morning some Tommies and 10 (?) Londons
were found up near the top of the Chipilly Peninsula - an
Major Loutit was withh them. - he was attached to the
Americans and was going along with Major Morrell to find
out exactly where the Americans were. While 50th Bn was
taking over from 1st Bn they could see the fighting still
going on (between 4 and 5 p.m) through Celestin's Wood
and across the gullies towards Bois de Gressiare.
During the night the Bn was moving across
the and settled about 10 am.
Stayed there that day - not shelled.
That afternoon at 5pm. the C.O. called a
meeting of Coy Commanders. This was at HQrs in the
gully N of Susan Wood.
That afternoon at 5pm. the CO. called a
meeting of the Coy Commanders. This was at HQrs in the
gully N of Susan Wood. The orders were explained.
They had to get back to Coys, explain the to officers
and N?C.Os of Coys - men had to get tea - and move off
by 7.30pm. (Bde did not know what the stunt was to be
they only knew they were to be ready to pull out and go up
N. They thought into rest)/
Leading Coy (C. Coy, Lieut Hodge O.C.) moved
about 7pm.
They halted at the Quarry by Gressaire Wood and
Bn HdQrs was established here for the fight. The O.C.
Coys went out to have a look out from the front of the
Wood. There was only just time to get back and get the
Coy up by 9.30pm.
It was a silent attack. there were to have
been two tanks - Corps were trying to get more but 50th
Bn was warned not to count on them.
Diagram - see original document
Battalion moved up over the road on to the crest just south of
the wood and skirted the wood on this road. there were
no shells near - only gas falling away in the wood to the
left. At the old front line there were Yanks who wi shed
them all sorts of things as they passed through
Diagram - see original document
220
11.
Before the Yankee line.
The Coys were organised into two platoons each
as above (each - is a section, and is o is Coy Commander.
Lt. Hodges with four scouts was-ahead and runner was ahead
of C Coy.
Just before starting, permissionwas obtained to
block right up so that the last Coys would miss any barrage.
This happened - what shelling there was went over. It was
very dark and the four Companies went close up.
Before starting off they could hear the tanks -
hear the enquiries around the corner and the wood by the
Bray-Corore Rd. The Ger,an dod not wake up. 50th Bn/
tanks did not turn up at all - this was not unexpected.
One M.G. fired at them from the first cross road.
He cleared out. The Bn and the scouts went on, Then from
beyond the road ahead there went up a German flare. The
flare went clean over the Bn and fell behind the last Coy.
It looked like a Bde steadily moving. This flare was followed
at once by M.G. fire from about a dozen guns in the
German line of posts (5 posts of about 20 to 25 yards e ach)
a few hundred yards E of the road. Flares began to go up
thickly and the fire was pretty heavy.
Some of the leading Coy got down in the sunken
road - the rest of Bn lay down ahead - It looked a pretty
difficult position Then the 49th was heard firing away
on the left and bombs going - and the 50th Bn went on over the
top and the Germans ran. They left some sof their M.Gs.
After crossing this road there was no opposition
till a couple of flares were fired near the head and of the
reentrant.
But these Germans scuttled back. Lt. Hodges
Coy had extended at the sunken road but the others were still
in a rtillery formation.
As they got up to the Bray Etinham road the
ground bee a number of divergent trails used by transport -
These were a first surprise as the direction had seemed simple
on the map. But no air phot had been seen. It made the
direction very difficult to decide as the track was the only
guide. The tracks on the map were wrong l there should
have been a road crossing but the track really curved gently
in to the road leading to the crucifix. Lieut. Hodge presently
realised that he was on the wrong road - too far to
the left. No cross road was there. He sent back a message
while Bn halted and lay down. Major Fowler came up and presently
all the Coy Commanders and most of the officers were up
there with their maps and compasses and electric torches.
The maps also were wrong with a lot of hospital huts marked
(which were not there)
HdQrs went along the road towards the Crucifix
and Capt. Beresford towards the gully. Beresford picked up
Lt Fearnside or some of his men in the gully. This gave
them their direction. (The 49th Bn also had taken a markline
of double telegraph poles.) which led them considerably
too far right (Lt. Cutts) However, both these errors we
were soon mended. After half an hour's wait 50th Bn moved
off to take up its position near the sunken road southern
reentrant.
Lt Hodges Coy was just lying out, sorting themselves
to dig in on the edge of the gully 1 when there was a call
from ahead "Who are you?" It was in good English and the men
thought it was a Tommy, or else the Americans (who had shouted
that they would come on with them) Someone shouted back -
"Australians here, don't shoot" - they were standing up. The
voice came back - "All right 1 Come on Australia" and then a
221
12.
gun only 30 yards or so ahead opened on them. These
men still thought it was a Tommy and started cursing him.
"50th Battalion Australians " they said. He answered
again "Come on Australians" and put in another burst.
Then our chaps took a tumble. They got down and someone
threw a bomb at him. He ran and left his gun. There
was high grass there where he was - he got away. From
his position his gun was just swept the slope where our
men were, like a glacis. He must have had our men fair
against the sky and seen them long before in the flares.
In this burst Lt. Bills was killed with several
M.G bullets through the head. Almost all the men hit
that night were hit through the head. - the men were most
hit by these grazing bullets as they lay down. About 13
or 14 casualties here.
Major Fowler reported the Bn on its objective -
and 13th or 14 casualties 1 this was about midnight.
The 50th Bn w as then dug in as shown on my map
a line of posts - B.C finally dug a continuous line.
They could get splendid observation from their right down
the gully to Bray. In their centre they had not such good observation
- the cliff side here consists of a steep series
of bumps or benches. Their right was on the highest ground
from there the hill xxxxx sloped down to a quarry on the hill
top with a hedge along the N edge of it.
The contact plane came over and they lit
their flares about 7 am. Then a German plane came over
with a red nose - very cheeky - must have been armour
plated for our infantry.hit back at him with everything
they had in the way of a L.G. The German could be seen
leaning over and waving his arm. (The trenches were
shallow for the ground was tough limestone, especially
on the right) The plane was over from half an hour
to an hour. About an hour to 1½ hours later the German
artillery began. It bagan to get the range at once.
It was very heavy indeed. The Germans had a gun NE of
Prozart (behind 9 central) It enfiladed the right
entirely. This enfiladed Hodes Coy especially.
There was another batter shooting direct from just behind
La Neuville. There were also guns behind or on Froissy
Beacon. There were field guns ahead. The Germans could
see the white parapets on the green hill- we had tried to
vamouflage these with grass (a mustard crop) but of course
he could see.
Hodges had eight men killed. Capt. Bereseford's
Coy had two posts completely blown out - one shell fell
into the shell hole where two L.Gns and their gun were,
Maj. Fowler's Coy had a shell into one post of 9 men and
N.C.O. - 4 were killed, and 3 wounded by a 4.2 No shells
were wasted - all seemed to fall on the trench. The
stretcher-bearers did very heavy work - and practically all
those in two of the Coys were hit.
The snipers in the gullies were also very active.
They fired from behind the banks and there were M.Gs there.
One officer of Fowler's coy, Lt. Wills, hearing a man calling
who had been hit, jumped out on the parapet - his batman
who followed him everywhere jumped out at once and was hit
straight through the head immediately.
This day the Germans were seen coming down the
road from Suzanne - most of them came down the road into
the village. They were out of range here. Our men tried
to snipe them at an open space near the church where they
crossed - with extreme sights - but it was too far. The
Artillery were called for and they landed a shell fair in
the road after the first big lot had passed.
222
13.
At one time a motor car had come up along this
road, dropped an officer at some trenches near the top,
turned round, waited 1 and about 10 minutes later took him
away again/
The Germans had probably cleared out during the
silent attack of the night before. The authorities at the
back knew would probably know very little of it till their
plane came over next day. They probably thought our
objective was Bray and had cleared out and this morning they
were ordering their garrison back. Those whom 50th Bn
saw were clearly making for the NW edge of the village.
The Germans who were shot down here were there on the next
day (Aug 12) after the 51st had made its attack.
That day the Germans dug in on foot of the
Peninsula/ On this night (11/12) 3rd Division took Mericourt.
On the next night 12/13 Lt. Livesey (about the same
as 51st Bn - 1 am.) took the fighting patrol down the S.gully.
Two parties followed -one under Lt. Billing, to form the
pivot for 51 Bn - a liaison post between 50 and 51. Lt.
MacBude was to dig in a post down the slope by the road,
with Livesey's party covering him, in order to block traffic
along the road entirely.
At the same time a fighting patrol of Maj Fowler's
Coy went down the Northern Gully under Cpl. Mengereen (D.C.M.
for this) He was, if possible, to place a post at the mouth
of this gully too.
Livesey got down all right- and the centre
platoon of Fowler's Coy was going to push xxxx out and dig
in on top of the promoncory between the two gullies/ They
could not dig in there because of four German M.Gs half way
down the slope firing up at them - and they on the skyline.
Ly. Craven was wounded trying to do this and 2 killed and some
wounded/ They took up a position across the Arc instead.
The Germans worked down south into the southern gully and
attacked Livesey down there and from the road below. Both
parties put these Germans down at 150 to 200. MacBridge
got a M.G. and a T.M. and Livesey 16 prisoners (he had 15
men) and 2 M.Gs. He fought his way back - brought in his 2
guns and the 16 prisoners. Cpl Mengerson stayed down there
tillthe morning i n the N. Gully. He could see the guns above
firing at our people up the slope. He tried with his men
several times to het at these guns but he could not get his bombs
up at them. He was very yong young but would not come in till
he had a message form Maj. Fowler who brought him in when he
heard that Livesey failed.
This clearly frightened the Germans away during
the balance of the night (as often happens)
On the morning of Aug. 14th a heavy stray (a am.
till 6 am.) was put on to the Quarry.
On next night (Aug.13/14) Livesey went out again
this time taking no kit but bare rifles and a lot of bombs
including phosphorous bombs- and from the top of the south
lips of the south gully two Stokes Mortars fired into the
bank (this had been too steep for the artillery to get its
shelles into) The Stokes fired about 47 rounds yards in one minute.
Livesey then rushed along and threw bombs into the dugouts
as he passed - but the Germans had already gone and the posts
were put out across the road.
The Americans would not take it over when they
relieved 50th Bn (and the Coy of 49th) on the night of 14/15
It was too solitary. The Americans had had no rations.
One platoon came to relieve a Coy of ours, they
had struck a gas barrage at Etinham. The Germans put down a
really heavy barrage at 3 am and the Americans lost a
number of men.
Out 50th Bn was 300 strong and one Coy of Americans
was to relieve it. This Coy turned up 100 strong. The
223
14.
relieving Company Commander only arrive at midnight to
reconnoitre his front - By 2 am. only three platoons were
in when a message came from an American NCO on the phone
a few hundreds yards away from the Germans. He said
"One platoon of ours is here, and he does not know whom he
has to relieve. All your men are out!" The O.C. didn't
have a map. Major Fowler took him all round, where he
put his guns and his strength - and placed his guns for
him. When Fowler got back he sent off his two last platoons
and a few signallers and offered to stay. But the American
though he knew nothing, would not allow of this.
As our people went out down came the barrage.
This was probably counter-preparation - every morning about
3 am. it came down very heavily.
The American only had 4 L.Gs with him there -
and one gun only had 3 magazines 1 one of them with its
teamwas blown up before the relief was complete. They must
have had 40 or 50 casualties that morning. The Coy Commander
was in a complete whirl - but a fine chap.
Diagram - see original document
224
15.
13th BRIGADE - ETINHEM
On August 10, General Herring was sent for to
see general Monash personally - the car took Herring down
to Division by 11.30am/ It came as a bit of a surprise
that the attack was to be that night. - the 50th was tired
and Herring would have liked the next night much better.
However General Monash said it must be done that night.
Herring wanted the tanks up and the attack
started before it was too dark - at the same time he di dnot
want the tanks seem. So 9.30pm was the time he chose.
There was just time to get the Bns there by then and so he
agreed to dot the attack at that hour.
The C.O. of the Tank Bn. was sent up by Division
to Bde HQrs - and got there about 4 pm. He said "I don't
know if I can do it" His tanks had had a very heavy time at
Gressaire Wood. He would try to get four tanks up but
could only guarantee two. He was told all he need to do was
to move up and down the Bray road a couple of time and fire
grape shot down it - it being night he did not want to get
off the road - tanks are very blind - but it was a well
dedined road.
That night when the tanks came up Arrol told them
to go down the road straight ahead and come back - they
were fine chaps - just wanted to know whatwas wanted. They
did this and when they came back and asked Arrol what he
wanted them to do. he told them they had done it already
and thay were very surprised and pleased - and went off
home.
July 31/Aug/8
When General McLagen saw General Herring and told
him what was wanted of B Bde and that the attack was going
to be made, Herring said that he would do it but what if
they were raided. Macklagen said they did not want any men
lost - Herring said that he could not guarantee that a great
front could be held without men being captured.
Herring gave orders that there were to be nothing
less than platoons together so disposed that at least a
platoon would be involved in any action.
The original arrangement was that 13th Bde was to
support 4rh Div. in the attack of Aug. 9th. Herring was to
hold part of the French line till Aug 5. On Aug 5/6 it
would relieve the whole 4th Div. including a portion which the
4rh Bde had taken over on Aug 4 from the 2nd Div so as to
reach 600 yards further up to the railway line (to be the
boundary between the two Corps) This meant 8000 yards of
front with 1500 fighting men. The 13th Bde was to hold this
for the night of the 5/6th and to be relieved on night of 6/7th
by Canadians who would hold the line till night of 7.8th
when they would attack at dawn.
When the raid took place, Gen. Rawlinson decided
that the Canadians could not be placed in the line until the
last night - as if the Germans identified first Australians
and then the Canadians, they would smell a rat. The Australians
being identified ,ade this necessary. Herring It was
accordingly told by Maclagen that he wassorry he would have to
ask 13th Bde to stay there another night. Herring said
that two nights were no worse than one - that of course he
could not guarantee against a heavy raid of 100 men (the long
225
16.
line was still held by platoon units and not less - if
split, they must be able to support each other)
herring was quite sure he would be raided -
the difference in helmets and manners m de this certain.
This involved leaving 13th Bde out of the first
attack and splitting 1st Div. by attacking 1st Bde to 4th
division.
The actual face of the raid certainly helped
out plans rather than hindered them. The German examination
of our prisoners (afterwards captured amongst his
papers) proved this.
The 51st Bn men told the Germans that they had
been doing no special training for an attack. As a matter
of fact they had been training with the tanks - the officers
and NCO's of 51st Bn had - and the whole of 50th and
59th officers, NCO's and men - and the men of the 51st Bn
although not so trained themselves must have known this.
226.
17.
50th BATTALION
SOYECOURT
When east of Soyecourt Col. Salisbury wanted
to get some information about the Ger,ans in a wood and fin
how it was held. Hawker, a brother of the Flying Corps
V.C. was as officer platoon officer and was sent in charge
of a patrol. He came was working out in the dark when
theyran on a party of Germans who were a post evidently.
Expecting a relief, they shouted "Are you the
----th?" in German. Hawker spoke German and he shouted
back that they were - and then ordered his men to open fire
About then another party of Germans - the real relief - came
up behind them and cut them off and they had to fight their
way back. Next day the 50yh Bn attacked on the strength
of this information and were very successful.
This transcription item is now locked to you for editing. To release the lock either Save your changes or Cancel.
This lock will be automatically released after 60 minutes of inactivity.