Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/227/1 - Folder - Part 3

217.

8.

52nd BATTALION

MOUQUET FARM

Diagram - see original document

 

September 3.5.15.

The two left platoons got to t he Farm. Sergt.

Cutts with right platoons was still in touch with them to

about A. There the line split and the left went into the

Farm. (Lt. Taylor was killed as soon as the attack started

2/Lt.  Dickson got into the Farm, was shot in the leg and

took a German coming out of a pozzy with a M.G. in the Farm.

He made the German carry the M.G. out, and got back and

was sent to hospital. The two platoons on the left more or

lwaa disappeared - some of them have never been accounted

for at all. The other two platoons got into two shell-

holes infron of the German post at 77 and betwen it and the

rest of 52nd Bn. There were Germans at Z but at the time th

they did not know that there was a post at 77 - No post was

seen at first but later the Germans were seen at about where

it is marked in the sketch. The 51st Bn could be picked

up on the left front digging in. The shell-holes which

Cutts and the two platoons were n were part of an old Trench

very badly blown about that morning.

About 9 a.m. (the Germans being between there and

the 51st) Cutts went across to the Farm - going as fast as

he could - and saw a Company HQrs of 51st Bn there. They

were in the mouth of the dugout. The other end of it was

full of Germans, whom they had shut in. They promised to

send a platoon to connect up with Cutts party. (B Coy -

Major MacPherson was in charge of front line there)

Just after Cuts asked for these the Farm was

very heavily. The platoon did not arrive. It was

Diagram - see original document

shortly after this that the Germans came working in

between 52 and 51 and were clearly getting heavily fired 

at from the 51st - the 52nd was also firing at them.

(Cutts had sent out to get touch with the 52nd on the

right but could not get touch with them at any time.

Only about (?) were left in this group at this time.

To start with there had been about 20. (A number of

218.

9.

prisoners had beengot in posts on the right of the farm -

as far as can be remembered-and escorted back, and a 

number of men had been wounded. Most of these casualties

were by M.G. fire from the right front.)

Diagram - see original document

The Coy HQrs was at an old cellar entrance to a dugout

at A. 

Men were digging a Communication Trench from B to A

(about 2 feet deep then)

The German counter attack got asfar as E. They

were using egg bombs against 51st Bn. They did not get

into the Farm at this time.

The party with Cutts moved back to about F.J. rou

round the edge of the Farm. The small party had haf two more

casualties before they came in and were only about 7 or 8

now.

The 51st Bn at that time was in the Sap B -A

and round 8. There was still an officer in the HQrs at

A. The party with Cutts tacked itself on to their right.

The 51st Bn had at that time was in the Sap B -A

and round 8. There was still officer in the HQrs at A

The party with Cutts tack.

The 51st Bn had a post on the Brick Mound. with a 

L.G. The position remained thus - 52 party on right of

this L.G.

Diagram - see original document

219

10.

50th BATTALION

 

Etinham

 

August 9th

In the afernoon started to Cerisy and were

there for about an hour, took over from 1st Bn.

That night they had a sort of half circle

around the E and NE of Chipilly. About midnight Major

Fowler with the other Coy Commanders went across to reconnoitre

the ground first - they were told to take some

sergeant with se them and go carefully.

One wounded Germanwas found at the church.

Next morning some Tommies and 10 (?) Londons

were found up near the top of the Chipilly Peninsula - an

Major Loutit was withh them. - he was attached to the

Americans and was going along with Major Morrell to find

out exactly where the Americans were. While 50th Bn was

taking over from 1st Bn they could see the fighting still

going on (between 4 and 5 p.m) through Celestin's Wood

and across the gullies towards Bois de Gressiare.

During the night the Bn was moving across

the and settled about 10 am.

Stayed there that day - not shelled.

That afternoon at 5pm. the C.O. called a 

meeting of Coy Commanders. This was at HQrs in the

gully N of Susan Wood.

That afternoon at 5pm. the CO. called a

meeting of the Coy Commanders. This was at HQrs in the

gully N of Susan Wood. The orders were explained.

They had to get back to Coys, explain the to officers

and N?C.Os of Coys - men had to get tea - and move off

by 7.30pm. (Bde did not know what the stunt was to be

they only knew they were to be ready to pull out and go up

N. They thought into rest)/

Leading Coy (C. Coy, Lieut Hodge O.C.) moved

about 7pm.

They halted at the Quarry by Gressaire Wood and

Bn HdQrs was established here for the fight. The O.C.

Coys went out to have a look out from the front of the

Wood. There was only just time to get back and get the

Coy up by 9.30pm.

It was a silent attack. there were to have

been two tanks - Corps were trying to get more but 50th

Bn was warned not to count on them.

Diagram - see original document

Battalion moved up over the road on to the crest just south of 

the wood and skirted the wood on this road. there were

no shells near - only gas falling away in the wood to the

left. At the old front line there were Yanks who wi shed

them all sorts of things as they passed through

Diagram - see original document

220

11.

Before the Yankee line.

The Coys were organised into two platoons each

as above (each - is a section, and is o is Coy Commander.

Lt. Hodges with four scouts was-ahead and runner was ahead

of C Coy.

Just before starting, permissionwas obtained to

block right up so that the last Coys would miss any barrage.

This happened - what shelling there was went over. It was

very dark and the four Companies went close up.

Before starting off they could hear the tanks -

hear the enquiries around the corner and the wood by the

Bray-Corore Rd. The Ger,an dod not wake up. 50th Bn/

tanks did not turn up at all - this was not unexpected.

One M.G. fired at them from the first cross road.

He cleared out. The Bn and the scouts went on, Then from

beyond the road ahead there went up a German flare. The

flare went clean over the Bn and fell behind the last Coy.

It looked like a Bde steadily moving. This flare was followed 

at once by M.G. fire from about a dozen guns in the

German line of posts (5 posts of about 20 to 25 yards e ach)

a few hundred yards E of the road. Flares began to go up

thickly and the fire was pretty heavy.

Some of the leading Coy got down in the sunken 

road - the rest of Bn lay down ahead - It looked a pretty

difficult position Then the 49th was heard firing away

on the left and bombs going - and the 50th Bn went on over the

top and the Germans ran. They left some sof their M.Gs.

After crossing this road there was no opposition

till a couple of flares were fired near the head and of the 

reentrant.

But these Germans scuttled back. Lt. Hodges

Coy had extended at the sunken road but the others were still

in a rtillery formation. 

As they got up to the Bray Etinham road the

ground bee a number of divergent trails used by transport - 

These were a first surprise as the direction had seemed simple

on the map. But no air phot had been seen. It made the

direction very difficult to decide as the track was the only

guide. The tracks on the map were wrong l there should

have been a road crossing but the track really curved gently

in to the road leading to the crucifix. Lieut. Hodge presently

realised that he was on the wrong road - too far to

the left. No cross road was there. He sent back a message

while Bn halted and lay down. Major Fowler came up and presently 

all the Coy Commanders and most of the officers were up

there with their maps and compasses and electric torches.

The maps also were wrong with a lot of hospital huts marked

(which were not there)

HdQrs went along the road towards the Crucifix 

and Capt. Beresford towards the gully. Beresford picked up

Lt Fearnside or some of his men in the gully. This gave

them their direction. (The 49th Bn also had taken a markline

of double telegraph poles.) which led them considerably

too far right (Lt. Cutts) However, both these errors we

were soon mended. After half an hour's wait 50th Bn moved

off to take up its position near the sunken road southern

reentrant.

Lt Hodges Coy was just lying out, sorting themselves

to dig in on the edge of the gully 1 when there was a call

from ahead "Who are you?" It was  in good English and the men

thought it was a Tommy, or else the Americans (who had shouted

that they would come on with them) Someone shouted back -

"Australians here, don't shoot" - they were standing up.  The

voice came back - "All right 1 Come on Australia" and then a 

221

12.

gun only 30 yards or so ahead opened on them. These

men still thought it was a Tommy and started cursing him.

"50th Battalion Australians " they said. He answered

again "Come on Australians" and put in another burst.

Then our chaps took a tumble. They got down and someone

threw a bomb at him. He ran and left his gun. There

was high grass there where he was - he got away. From

his position his gun was just swept the slope where our

men were, like a glacis. He must have had our men fair

against the sky and seen them long before in the flares.

In this burst Lt. Bills was killed with several 

M.G bullets through the head. Almost all the men hit

that night were hit through the head. - the men were most

hit by these grazing bullets as they lay down. About 13

or 14 casualties here.

Major Fowler reported the Bn on its objective -

and 13th or 14 casualties 1 this was about midnight.

The 50th Bn w as then dug in as shown on my map

a line of posts - B.C finally dug a continuous line.

They could get splendid observation from their right down

the gully to Bray. In their centre they had not such good observation

- the cliff side here consists of a steep series

of bumps or benches. Their right was on the highest ground

from there the hill xxxxx sloped down to a quarry on the hill

top with a hedge along the N edge of it.

The contact plane came over and they lit

their flares about 7 am. Then a German plane came over

with a red nose - very cheeky - must have been armour

plated for our infantry.hit back at him with everything

they had in the way of a L.G. The German could be seen

leaning over and waving his arm. (The trenches were

shallow for the ground was tough limestone, especially

on the right) The plane was over from half an hour

to an hour. About an hour to 1½ hours later the German

artillery began. It bagan to get the range at once.

It was very heavy indeed. The Germans had a gun NE of

Prozart (behind 9 central) It enfiladed the right

entirely. This enfiladed Hodes Coy especially.

There was another batter shooting direct from just behind

La Neuville. There were also guns behind or on Froissy

Beacon. There were field guns ahead. The Germans could

see the white parapets on the green hill- we had tried to

vamouflage these with grass (a mustard crop) but of course

he could see.

Hodges had eight men killed. Capt. Bereseford's

Coy had two posts completely blown out - one shell fell

into the shell hole where two L.Gns and their gun were,

Maj. Fowler's Coy had a shell into one post of 9 men and

N.C.O. - 4 were killed, and 3 wounded by a 4.2 No shells

were wasted - all seemed to fall on the trench. The

stretcher-bearers did very heavy work - and practically all

those in two of the Coys were hit.

The snipers in the gullies were also very active.

They fired from behind the banks and there were M.Gs there.

One officer of Fowler's coy, Lt. Wills, hearing a man calling

who had been hit, jumped out on the parapet - his batman

who followed him everywhere jumped out at once and was hit

straight through the head immediately.

This day the Germans were seen coming down the

road from Suzanne - most of them came down the road into

the village. They were out of range here. Our men tried

to snipe them at an open space near the church where they

crossed - with extreme sights - but it was too far. The 

Artillery were called for and they landed a shell fair in

the road after the first big lot had passed.

222

13.

At one time a motor car had come up along this

road, dropped an officer at some trenches near the top,

turned round, waited 1 and about 10 minutes later took him 

away again/

The Germans had probably cleared out during the 

silent attack of the night before. The authorities at the

back knew would probably know very little of it till their

plane came over next day. They probably thought our

objective was Bray and had cleared out and this morning they

were ordering their garrison back. Those whom 50th Bn

saw were clearly making for the NW edge of the village.

The Germans who were shot down here were there on the next

day (Aug 12) after the 51st had made its attack.

That day the Germans dug in on foot of the

Peninsula/ On this night (11/12) 3rd Division took Mericourt.

On the next night 12/13 Lt. Livesey (about the same

as 51st Bn - 1 am.) took the fighting patrol down the S.gully.

Two parties followed -one under Lt. Billing, to form the

pivot for 51 Bn - a liaison post between 50 and 51. Lt.

MacBude was to dig in a post down the slope by the road,

with Livesey's party covering him, in order to block traffic

along the road entirely.

At the same time a fighting patrol of Maj Fowler's

Coy went down the Northern Gully under Cpl. Mengereen (D.C.M.

for this) He was, if possible, to place a post at the mouth

of this gully too.

Livesey got down all right- and the centre

platoon of Fowler's Coy was going to push xxxx out and dig

in on top of the promoncory between the two gullies/ They

could not dig in there because of four German M.Gs half way

down the slope firing up at them - and they on the skyline.

Ly. Craven was wounded trying to do this and 2 killed and some

wounded/ They took up a position across the Arc instead.

The Germans worked down south into the southern gully and

attacked Livesey down there and from the road below. Both

parties put these Germans down at 150 to 200. MacBridge

got a M.G. and a T.M. and Livesey 16 prisoners (he had 15

men) and 2 M.Gs. He fought his way back - brought in his 2

guns and the 16 prisoners. Cpl Mengerson stayed down there

tillthe morning i n the N. Gully. He could see the guns above

firing at our people up the slope.  He tried with his men

several times to het at these guns but he could not get his bombs

up at them. He was very yong young but would not come in till

he had a message form Maj. Fowler who brought him in when he

heard that Livesey failed.

This clearly frightened the Germans away during

the balance of the night (as often happens)

On the morning of Aug. 14th a heavy stray (a am.

till 6 am.) was put on to the Quarry.

On next night (Aug.13/14) Livesey went out again

this time taking no kit but bare rifles and a lot of bombs

including phosphorous bombs- and from the top of the south

lips of the south gully two Stokes Mortars fired into the

bank (this had been too steep for the artillery to get its

shelles into) The Stokes fired about 47 rounds yards in one minute.

Livesey then rushed along and threw bombs into the dugouts

as he passed - but the Germans had already gone and the posts

were put out across the road.

The Americans would not take it over when they

relieved 50th Bn (and the Coy of 49th) on the night of 14/15

It was too solitary. The Americans had had no rations.

One platoon came to relieve a Coy of ours, they

had struck a gas barrage at Etinham. The Germans put down a 

really heavy barrage at 3 am and the Americans lost a

number of men.

Out 50th Bn was 300 strong and one Coy of Americans

was to relieve it. This Coy turned up 100 strong. The

223

14.

relieving Company Commander only arrive at midnight to

reconnoitre his front - By 2 am. only three platoons were

in when a message came from an American NCO on the phone

a few hundreds yards away from the Germans. He said

"One platoon of ours is here, and he does not know whom he 

has to relieve. All your men are out!" The O.C. didn't

have a map. Major Fowler took him all round, where he

put his guns and his strength - and placed his guns for

him. When Fowler got back he sent off his two last platoons

and a few signallers and offered to stay. But the American

though he knew nothing, would not allow of this.

As our people went out down came the barrage.

This was probably counter-preparation - every morning about

3 am. it came down very heavily.

The American only had 4 L.Gs with him there -

and one gun only had 3 magazines 1 one of them with its

teamwas blown up before the relief was complete. They must

have had 40 or 50 casualties that morning. The Coy Commander

was in a complete whirl - but a fine chap.

Diagram - see original document

224

15.

13th BRIGADE - ETINHEM

On August 10, General Herring was sent for to

see general Monash personally - the car took Herring down

to Division by 11.30am/ It came as a bit of a surprise

that the attack was to be that night. - the 50th was tired

and Herring would have liked the next night much better.

However General Monash said it must be done that night.

Herring wanted the tanks up and the attack

started before it was too dark - at the same time he di dnot

want the tanks seem. So 9.30pm was the time he chose.

There was just time to get the Bns there by then and so he

agreed to dot the attack at that hour.

The C.O. of the Tank Bn. was sent up by Division

to Bde HQrs - and got there about 4 pm. He said "I don't

know if I can do it" His tanks had had a very heavy time at

Gressaire Wood. He would try to get four tanks up but

could only guarantee two. He was told all he need to do was

to move up and down the Bray road a couple of time and fire

grape shot down it - it being night he did not want to get

off the road - tanks are very blind - but it was a well

dedined road. 

That night when the tanks came up Arrol told them

to go down the road straight ahead and come back - they

were fine chaps - just wanted to know whatwas wanted. They

did this and when they came back and asked Arrol what he

wanted them to do. he told them they had done it already

and thay were very surprised and pleased - and went off

home.

 

July 31/Aug/8

When General McLagen saw General Herring and told

him what was wanted of B Bde and that the attack was going

to be made, Herring said that he would do it but what if

they were raided. Macklagen said they did not want any men

lost - Herring said that he could not guarantee that a great

front could be held without men being captured.

Herring gave orders that there were to be nothing

less than platoons together so disposed that at least a

platoon would be involved in any action.

The original arrangement was that 13th Bde was to 

support 4rh Div. in the attack of Aug. 9th. Herring was to

hold part of the French line till Aug 5. On Aug 5/6 it

would relieve the whole 4th Div. including a portion which the

4rh Bde had taken over on Aug 4 from the 2nd Div so as to

reach 600 yards further up to the railway line (to be the

boundary between the two Corps) This meant 8000 yards of

front with 1500 fighting men. The 13th Bde was to hold this

for the night of the 5/6th and to be relieved on night of 6/7th

by Canadians who would hold the line till night of 7.8th

when they would attack at dawn.

When the raid took place, Gen. Rawlinson decided

that the Canadians could not be placed in the line until the

last night - as if the Germans identified first Australians

and then the Canadians, they would smell a rat. The Australians

being identified ,ade this necessary. Herring It was 

accordingly told by Maclagen that he wassorry he would have to

ask 13th Bde to stay there another night. Herring said

that two nights were no worse than one - that of course he

could not guarantee against a heavy raid of 100 men (the long

 

225

16.

line was still held by platoon units and not less - if

split, they must be able to support each other)

herring was quite sure he would be raided -

the difference in helmets and manners  m de this certain.

This involved leaving 13th Bde out of the first

attack and splitting 1st Div. by attacking 1st Bde to 4th

division.

The actual face of the raid certainly helped

out plans rather than hindered them. The German examination

of our prisoners (afterwards captured amongst his

papers) proved this.

The 51st Bn men told the Germans that they had

been doing no special training for an attack. As a matter

of fact they had been training with the tanks - the officers

and NCO's of 51st Bn had - and the whole of 50th and

59th officers, NCO's and men - and the men of the 51st Bn

although not so trained themselves must have known this.

 

226.

17.

50th BATTALION

SOYECOURT

When east of Soyecourt Col. Salisbury wanted

to get some information about the Ger,ans in a wood and fin

how it was held. Hawker, a brother of the Flying Corps

V.C. was as officer platoon officer and was sent in charge

of a patrol. He came was working out in the dark when

theyran on a party of Germans who were a post evidently.

Expecting a relief, they shouted "Are you the

----th?" in German. Hawker spoke German and he shouted

back that they were - and then ordered his men to open fire

About then another party of Germans - the real relief - came

up behind them and cut them off and they had to fight their

way back. Next day the 50yh Bn attacked on the strength

of this information and were very successful.