Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/226/1 - Folder - Part 8

68
198
10 BATTALION -LE VERGUIER.
Neligan states the following drill was adopted by the
10 Bn, Le Verguier.
Organisation of platoons at Le Verguier in sections.
If Platoon A were held up, Platoon B was taught to work
round ahead of it and take its place in the advance - Platoon
A then following where B had been.
Xxx
Diagram. See original document

Note. Page 67 Has been extracted and
filled with "Historical Notes" taken
from Lieut. H.V. Howe. 11^th Bn.
re landing.
AWB. 29.v.20

69.
10 BATTALION  LIHONS.
August 10.
10 Bn followed 9 Bn and centre of Bde. 12 Bn were
supposed to be on the left but were 2000 yds behind.
(9 Bn was to attack and take Crepy Wood and halt at
Augur Wood. They took the wood with the Chimney stack in it
in 2949.9 and thinking it was Crepy Wood stayed there. They
were on the two flanks of Crepy Wood and in the west side of
it -
xxx
Diagram. See original document

and the German was in the wood holding the whole of it very
strongly with M.G.'s, snipers, and even M.G.'s in the trees
and guns in the wood.
We had never been in the wood. 10 Bn put in Major
McCann's Coy. and took the wood - putting people in from the
flanks and mopping up backwards (shooting back at Fritz from
his rear) - very cleverly without many casualties.
(The row of trees in 29B looks very like a wood).
Major McCann got into the wood and Fritz put down a very
strong barrage on Crepy Wood (3 or 4 p.m.) There were 5
officers and 122 men in the Coy at the start and they came
out with 2 officers and 35 men. Lieuts. Younger and Pearce
were killed in the German attack. Lieut. Shepherd was wounded.
There were stab wounds in this attack.
The Germans attacked. McCann organised a party of runners
and all he could lay his hands on - shooting with his revolver,
axxxxxxx and retook one post which had every man dead
in it. Our line at the end of his counterattack was intact
and there were 90 Germans dead - many bayonetted. Fritz then
gassed the woods fiercely - but he apparently gave up the idea
of attacking the wood again.
That Night was quiet but about 11 p.m. Neligan had orders
that he was to attack in conjunction with Hean's Bde at 4 a.m.
to take Auger Wood, the whole of the rest of the high ground
and the N. half of Lihons village. He was to have four tanks.
A barrage was arranged. The tanks, which were to turn up at
4 a.m.,did not turn up till 5. Neligan put in three coys. of
12 Bn. 2 of 10 Bn, and had in reserve one Coy. of 12 Bn and
the one remaining xxxx. platoon of the Coy, which he had put into
McCann's the evening before after the counterattack.
The people on the right were the 5th Bn and were out of
touch; so the 3rd Bde swung to the right and took in the whole
of Lihons and reached the final objective. The 5th (or ?8th
Bn) had got to the right and Neligan going up later met a Coy.
Commander in Lihons village who asked him to hold on to the line
his troops had reached until the 2nd Bde could relieve him.
Neligan said he wou ld do so for a while but he had to move
This was done.
Theere was a fine canteen in Lihons - prunes, gin, etc.
Neligan put 9th Bn (which had been in the old front line
around Crepy Wood) along the Framerville-Lihons road in support
of the Bde. 11 Bn were supposed to come up and link hands
with 10th and 12th in front of Auger Wood - and said they had
done so. A small platoon had done so. But the rest of the
11th Bn had done nothing. There was a big gap in X24 and S15
quite 1500 yds across. There was a German tent hospital in
S19 and the whole place was a maze of trenches - the old French
front line. In the late morning the German (who had shelled
all the morning so that it was impossible to find the xxxxxxxxxx
position of the line) - the 11 Bn had not had their orders -
only one Coy.- the Germans got back into Crepy Wood with about
40 men. There were not many men, that is to say, who reached
the attack
 

70.
the attack, but others were involved, possibly arriving late;
for about a battn was seen moving from near Olympia Wood
(where he had a number of guns including one 8" gun - he had
not been able to get them away: later he tried to and we
sniped the teams).
About midday - about two hours after the first counterattack)
the Germans put in another counterattack with very
heavy artillery support (his planes had been flying very low
so he knew where we were). The second attack did not get
through at all.
These attacks probably told him where our weak spot was.
Neligan was trying to get troops to fill the gap, but they did
not realise that it existed and were slow in moving.
In the afternoon, in the early part, the Germans filtered
troops through down the saps into the hospital - there was
gas but nothing to indicate an attack - we had to keep in gas
helmets nearly all the time.
Neligan was up having a look round. He had a good pozzy
in 23 Central. He had gone up past Crepy Wood towards Auger
Wood (see time in diary) when he noticed shots flying at him
from the rear. They saw a few Boches straight behind them -
between them and Bn H.Q. Neligan went back to Bn H.Q. in 23
Central and sent up the Adjutant (Major Campbell); Perry
O.C. H.Q. Coy. (which is an irregular formation pf Neligan's
in 9 and 10th Bns); and Intelligence Officer. He was still
in touch with the front line in front of Lihons by telephone.
The people on the right in front of Lihons said they were O.K.
The 11th Bn ^H.Q. had heard nothing.
(Newman, who was running 11th Bn, and Mullins, who was
C.0. of 9th Bn, were sent to England (or Australia) shortly
after this battle. Both were out of touch with their Bns
during this fight, apparently).
9th Bn H.Q. had not seen them go through. but they were
not in touch and could say nothing. Neligan put an artillery
barrage down across the front.
By this time Campbell, Perry and I.O. were going forward
to find out what had happened and to send up the reserve Coy.
12 Bn, the remaining platoon of 10th, Bde. Mining Coy., who
were on their way to the front line with loads - and dumped
them - signallers, H.Q. details (only keeping one man on the
phone and one runner). These were to go into an old line of
trench across 23D (about) 298 and D. Very soon word came back
from Perry that there were Germans ahead of them; that barrage
had been put down and apparently stopped more coming through;
that things were not clear; but that undoubtedly the gap on
the right of 11th Bn was the cause of it.
Having heard from right Coy. of 10 Bn (Hurcombe's) that
there was nothing doing there. Neligan took out the two right
platoons bodily, moved them right across the front to their
left - put them into the gap ("to go to the hospital and hold
that, and get in touch with the 11th Bn wherever they were")
and then the remaining platoons on the right were to extend and
fill the gap from which these platoons were taken.
The 11th moved up a Coy. in the end. The Germans must
have crossed (by a sap) the road where 9th Bn were, but the
men were in gas helmets and a bit dopey and did not see them.
The H.Q. were then ordered to mop up. The Germans
realised that the show was up and many got away.
The German was taking a certain number of prisoners, of
whom Cpl. Duncan, D.C.M. (and bar?) was one. There were a
good many Germans. This party of Germans got in between the
remainder of 11 Bn on the way out and the platoon which was
coming in. The incoming platoon spotted this party of Germans
and opened L.G. on them. The party of Germans were nearly
back in their own lines. In the confusion Duncan and his party
escaped from very close to the German trenches back to our lines.
 

71.
Duncan was wounded and one of the others. The Platoon Commr.
sent him back straight to the C.O. Duncan told Neligan the
exact trenches which the German was holding - a cross-shaped,
big strongpost, and said it was full of Germans. We put
everything we had down on this, and if any Germans got out of
it they were lucky.
After this there was no more trouble. 2nd Bn had been
moved up in close support. They were put into the red line.
Neligan was acting as a forward brigadier during this show.
He was given the 12th and the 9th and 11th were told to conform
to what he did.
The relief went off well and C.O. handed Bn to Shaw.
The tanks had not turned up till 5. They were one hour
late. Neligan sent them with Bn runners. two to Lihons to
promenade and patrol Lihons, as men were short. One tank
went out right to the little round Madam Wood; he was a good
tank, went round it and came back: all these tanks were good.
The two which went up to Lihons came back and were sent up
again to promenade till daylight. The tank which went to 
Madam Wood said he shot a number of Germans and probably did a
good deal of good.
The C.O. thinks that this is the best show that 10th Bn
ever did. The I.G. Training quotes the Merris show as the
best done by a Bn in France. But this was most difficult.
There is a big 10 BN graveyard by Crepy Wood (on the west side)
of which the great proportion are officers and N.C.O.'s killed
mostly in the first day's attack - not in the counterattack.
The 10th 11th Bn went in over the top and lost very
heavily. The 10th Bn went in after them and lost only one man
wounded.
xxx
Diagram. See original document

In the first advance, when the 10th Bn went in to support
(9 and 11th, the C.0. moved ahead about (250 yds ahead) with a
small staff and a Lucas lamp on his back. Neligan got a bullet
through his tin hat going up. (In the raid at Fleurbaix he
was hit in the skull and part of his skull was lost and still is.
He had a telephone on the German line and was half conscious
when the buzz of the telephone would recall him. He came back
unrecognisable, and was sent to England and boarded for Australia
when convalescent - but got back in a leave train to France.)
He had a red screen to mean follow on and a yellow one for halt
and take cover. These he worked till he got them to about 200
yds behind the front line - 200 yds W. of Crepy Wood, where the
Bn. halted. 12 Bn did not get their orders - their C.O. was
hit. The 9th and 11th Bns got casualties in the very heavy
M.G. fire. There was not much artillery that day - the
Canadians were attacking away on the right and probably the
Germans did not know what was happening. This first day the
barrage was good (for this stage of the fighting).
-----------------------------------------------------
 

72.
10th BATTALION FROISSY.
During the morning 3 Bde were in Germaine Wood. Neligan
went up to see Col. Stacey - went round his line and they were
still fighting - Stacey had such a tremendous line to hold
that Neligan, without asking Bde., put in two Coys. to hold
part of Stacey's line (1500 yds on the left in Luc Wood).
McCann had a go at Luc Wood. A platoon of lst Bn was in this
too. Neligan's battn, dug in on the west side of the gully
opposite Froissy Beacon about 1 p.m. There was a P. of W.
cage on the top there. A few prisoners were made there.
9th and 12th Bns attacked through the 10th and 4th Bde.
The 11th Bn was involved in it before they knew where they
were. That evening the 3rd Bde was not sure of Olympia Wood.
They had had patrols into Cappy but had not got it; and the
right was bent back.
In the evening General Bennett told Neligan that he wanted
him to see what he could do: Neligan said he would prepare an
attack and see what could be done if the other Bn C.O.'s
could be got to act with him. He got a conference tonight with
Macpherson, 12 Bn.
James,              9 Bn.
Phillips,            11 Bn.
Col. West,        R.H.A.
They decided to leave 9th and 12th in line, get 11th Bn
out and attack at midnight with 10th on left and 11th on right.
They would stick to the high ground and have an indefinite
objective but not get past Dompierrs.
About 11.45 it was raining and Phillips had not got his
Bn clear. G.O.C. rang up and said it was too risky - better
cancel.
So Neligan said he would do it alone at dawn. By dawn
Phillips was clear and he arranged to keep pace on the right.
A Bde. of R.H.A. was to move forward behind. The time was
set for (?) 6 a.m. Neligan decided on a halt line at Bois
Coin du Verger (Chateau Wood), leaving Cappy alone. taking in
the Quarry.
By 7 a.m. they had got Chateau Wood and had patrols working
back through Cappy cleaning it up and the right bent back
through G33 A and C. The 11th Bn were about in M2Cent. A
halt was ordered there. The cookers were ordered up and the
men fed. Neligan moved up a battery of R.H.A. onto the
highest crest on the second-class road which skirts the E.
edge of Olympia Wood, and the third in a gully behind Froissy
Beacon ready to move.
No one was to move before 10 a.m. The men were given an
issue of beer and a good meal.
Bde. was asked to concentrate 9 Bn. in the big dugouts
on the high slope in the river bank near Cappy.
Brigadier turned up during breakfast. Neligan said they
were to exploit alternately filling in the flanks with Vickers
guns. To exploit to the river, ignoring the flats.
The patrols moved at 10. The patrols were to go ahead,
send back a man, and then dribble up the platoon. The 10th
Bn, 200 strong. had a front of 3000 yds. from 33 to the river.
About midday a heavy scrap occurred in 30th October Wood
and in Justice Wood with two Machineguns nests which held out
well. No prisoners were taken (as far as C.O. remembers).
A halt was then called. X C.O. sent for Coy. Commanders to
meet him at Chateau Wood (Coin du Verger). The C.O. tolf them
they were to get to the red from 22 Cent. by that evening; to
do it in their own time but that get it done by 6. Told them
where guns were in case they wanted support, and put in 8
additional Vickers guns. G.O.C. was asked for Light Horse to
go along the river road to Eclusier. At 3 p.m. a patrol of
1 N.C.O. and 3 men (gallopers) moved along the road through
 

73.
20 A and B from Cappy and came back along the river road - at
an easy pace as if nothing were there. They did this -
the Germans had during the day got across the lock gates at
Cappy (very early) and later at Eclusier. The Germans had a
good many guns near Dompierre firing direct. Our artillery
was put onto them, and put down shrapnel - (though 176 rounds
per gun is the full amount for a moving battery and they had
not got all of this there). Later heavies were put on the
guns.
Battn at 6 a.m. ended with a standing patrol in Salmon
Wood; cleared the Virgin Wood and Nameless Wood and had
patrols there; bent back thence to about M 3 Central (where
11 Bn right flank would be - either there or further right.
Dompierre was recognised as being too tough a place for a
tired Bde. to take).
The 9th Bn was moved into the quarry at Cappy. 12th Bn
was still in hand in Bde. reserve near Froissy Beacon. The
exploitation was over 4000 yds. on a front of 5000 to 6000
with two Battns. The B 10th Bn came out 250 strong, having
lost men in Luc Wood but very few in the later part of the
operations.
The front North of the river was about 5000 yds. behind.
The Bn. had no casualties coming out to Germaine Wood.
The Germans put some 5.9's into Mericourt siding as they
passed it but no casualties.
----------------------------
10 BATTALION: LE VERGUIER - VILLERET.
Started at Jeancourt on hop-off line.
Attack started 5.20 but 10 Bn had been put to bed early the
night before in an old German hospital of Nissen huts in a xx
cutting overlooking Jeancourt, right in the line. It was too
close for the German to shell it. At 5 a.m. they had a good
meal and a rum issue. The attack was by
↑         ↑
11        12
to first objective, taking in the whole of Grand Priel Wood to
dig in in front of it.
↑         ↑
9        10
Second phase as above with an exploitation line right on the
lip of the steep slope looking down to the Canal. 4th Bde. on
right, 1st Bde. on left.
They got no shelling at all in the huts except one which
landed in a hut and killed the M.O. and wounded a few others.
Lieut. White had a leg blown off. Capt. Young, M.O., killed
(he was to go forward).
The Bn. went up along the high ground on the right slope
of the Fervacque Farm Ridge - in heavy fog and smoke - from the
jump they took the formation shown on the plan on page 68 of
this diary, lines of sections in file.
xxx
Diagram. See original document
 

74.
They got through 12 Bn before 12 Bn knew and under the barrage
in the Grand Priel Valley. There was a false crest knuckle
in the valley on the left. Right of Bn was at the Chateau
in Grand Priel Wood, behind the barrage. There had been a
few casualties at the start but none otherwise.
12 Bn at this time rang up Bde. to say that 10 xxx Battn
had not arrived - they had not seen them.
While waiting under the barrage a few M.G. casualties
occurred from M.G.'s in Harrod's Stores. (This was the small
quarry we stopped at on our way up. It was originally one of
our dumps in 1917 - the liaison officer had been there then).
As 10 BN was lying under the barrage they could see these
Germans with three M.G.'s at Harrod's Stores - and had Lewis
and Vickers guns onto them.
When the barrage lifted things went all right till they
reached the road past Harrod's stores, Prieles Road. The
trenches by the road on the left held up the left Coy. (there
were a number of 77's there - they had been fired that day but
had stopped).
The right Coy. got through Cottage Copse and to the line
of trench on the top of the hill by Holly Post and Goat Post.
They had to stop and get the other men out.
Lieut. Bennett worked round through a gap in the wire
near Holly Post and got behind the Germans. He shot off
three or four No. 1 xxxx German gunners. Our men began to
follow him up. The Germans surrendered and they got 100
prisoners, 12 M.G. and four or five 77's. (These were big
deep trenches).
The barrage had gone ahead a bit but they caught it up
on the red line just before it petered out. On the red line
they got in touch with Capt. Mackay of 14th Bn about Lamb Post
or Ewe Post - (there was an artillery loop set behind there).
The trench where the Germans were on the E. end of
Buisson Ridge was higher and tuned the whole of our position
ip with M.G. Fire. (The big 5.9 gun was near a quarry at
about 14A3.2. There was a battery of 4.2's in the quarry
also).
When the 10th Bn got into the old British front line this
fire stopped it from moving. They got every available Lewis
and Vickers gun and swept the ridge ahead: and the 14th guns
too and 9th also. While they were doing it the left Coy.
got down the road in the 9th Bn. area - 9th Bn working with
them - and got into the German system by the quarry and the
big gun, 10 Bn going right and 9th Bn left. There was not
much bombing - chiefly picking up prisoners on M.G.'s at
various points. 9th Bn occupied a trench above the Quarry
a post cut in on the highest point. (Lieut. Myers had a post
in the spoil bank of the quarry with a wonderful view). 9th
Bn had to bend their left back to lst Bde who were on their
red line.
10th Bn got the front line of the German outpost line.
As the prisoners from the front Hindenburg line were sent back
the other Coys, of 10th Bn. had stopped shooting and gone right
over the top to the Hindenburg line. The wire was tremendously
thick. The barrage ceased on the red line and the wire was
tremendously thick. They had to get through gaps or struggle
through or use wirecutters.
Then they reorganised and came up the saps and into the
second line behind Buisson Gaulaine. There were some of the
14th Bn on the right.
Lieut. Perry put a post out by the end of the C.T.  N.E. of
Buisson Gaulaine at the end of the double bank. Another on the
W. edge of Pearl Wood - another about 2/3rds. of the way down
Drew Lane S. of Haute Bruyere, and we occupied the trench just
E. of and overlooking Haute Bruyere. This was well beyond the
exploitation objective. The (9th Bn bent back on the left and
 

75.
and the 14th Bn on the right including Big and Little Bill
Woods. 15 Central was full of guns, and there were guns
just about the east of Gaulaine.
Perry had a patrol sent out to the road towards 15 Cent.
which was full of dugouts, and Lieut. Allison went down
Drew Lane next morning and picked up a few prisoners. The
country beyond was full of guns, but the policy was not to go
beyond the top slopes of the hill as this would have meant
being blown out immediately. The flanks also were not up.
From then on the men had the time of their lives. The
roads from Nauroy to Bellicourt and the trenches along the
canal were being thronged with troops, engineers working on
bridges, transport, all working in daylight. Our men were
sniping heavily. Two batteries were connected with the front
by private lines and whenever any movement occurred these
batteries were put onto them.
The little X trench in 21A.1.5 held out for a long time.
10 Bn were trying to help 4th Div. on right, trying to get the
14th Bn Coy, in, when two men of the 10th Bn were cut off in
the sap of the support line nearest to this X trench. Some
Germans g nipped across and got them prisoners.
The 18-pdrs, were put onto this trench. A couple of
batteries were put onto it from the gully N.E. of Priel Wood
SSW. S.W. of Caution Dugouts - and these with a 4.5 battery
were turned on and blew the German out of the X trench - he
leaked out of it.
Bn. H.Q. was now in Harrod's stores. Capt. Perry (who
got M.C. here) was O.C. front line and Col. Neligan O.C.
attacking troops. Perry was wounded by a shell at Jeancourt
before reaching the hop-off line, but remained on duty.
In Haute Bruyere we got two men with a light M.G. who had
carried their guns back right from Jeancourt to there, fighting.
The next day the German were easy to capture between there
and the canal because the German authorities did not know where
their own line was and had not fed them. They were coming in
constantly. The Germans had a constant transport on the road
E. of the canal and our guns were constantly onto them. They
must have lost heavily.
The German planes were flying low - slatey black planes
xxxx with no markings. The German was continually shooting
at the 5.9 gun and nearly caught Neligan going round there.
The Bde, must have got 50 guns this day - they were never all
counted, and a tremendous lot of machineguns.
The Brigadier of the right Bde. of 74th Division had been
in this line before and knew all the difficulties, and
anticipated very heavy opposition from this or that dugout.
This rather frightened his bde. and probably affected the ideas
of those on his flank. Mackay was made very anxious and
probably the Brigadier on the left was also. They none of them
expected to get beyond the brown line. (Mackay told me that
he was more anxious about this fight than any other this year).
10 Bn only went in with three Coys. averaging about 85 and
was very optimistic. The 10 Bn went in as three Coys. of 3
platoons each and a skeleton H.Q. Raised maps were built by
cutting the contours and each Digger was told what he had to
meet. A big map was also raised and also a practice stunt
about 6 a,m, on similar ground the morning before.
From where 10 Bn got to you could see the Canal, and the
water in it, and the people in the roads at Bellicourt, which
were crowded with traffic. These were soon registered and
numbered, and as soon as a block occurred there the Germans were
shelled. This fight was nothing like so heavy as Lihons - the
chief difficulty was the heavy going owing to the rain overnight.
10 Bn. lost about 8 officers - 5 wounded and 2 killed.
They only went in with 12 officers in the Coys. (3 Coys.).
The heaviest casualties were from M.G.'s which caught them from
Harrods Stores
 

76.
GALLIPOLI.
THE ARMISTICE: START OF NEGOTIATIONS.
Major Anderson, Bde. Major 3rd Bde., was Orderly Officer
to General Walker at this time. He says that after the May
19th attack there remained a small trench full of wounded
Turks out in front of 3rd Bn. Old Col. Owen had an interpreter
sent up to ask these men to come in but they did not. The next
day (?May 21) Owen on his own responsibility had a Red Cross
flag put up over our parapet. The Turks at first shot it
down. But as it continued up there a number of Red Crescent
(? or white) flags appeared over the Turk parapet - the Turks
may have thought we wanted to surrender. Two men - doctors
then appeared out of the Turkish trench (?German officer's
Trench). Walker was up there. He decided to go out and
meet them - and did so at once, Anderson going with xxxx him.
They met the Turks who were medical men - one spoke French very
well, so well that Walker or Anderson asked if he were French,
which annoyed him very much. Walker gave them cigarettes and
they gave Walker and Anderson pencils in exchange.
---------------------
12th BATTALION: TASMANIA POST & LEANE'S TRENCH.
After Tasmania Post was built it had a field of fire of
about 30 yds. mostly in the wheatfield. It was a badly sited
trench because the Turks could always get up the gully (Z)
unseen. Also the high wheat and scrub made the field of fire
very obscure.
xxx Diagram. See original document

Rafferty wanted to burn the wheat off very much earlier so as
to clear the view but they would not allow him. Finally,
after Tasmania Post was built, this was ordered. Rafferty was
told to throw out tow flares and burn the wheat, but this was
an impossible idea. He therefore went out with Sergt. Paddy
Weighill and crawled to the N.E. angle of the crop and set fire
to it and then came back practically through the fire. The
Turks opened up - but they got into an advanced peephole post
and slid down feet foremost, Rafferty going last. As Rafferty
slid down a big man scrambled out past him: this was Weighill.
He had noticed some Turkish cricket ball bombs unexploded lying
out on the edge of the fire (some were exploding in the fire).
He went right out 40 yds. through a heavy rifle fire and came
back with one of these bombs - he wanted to have a look at it.
It was at this time that (after the fire) there was
first discovered a couple of small trenches running in from the
gully edge:
xxxx Diagram. See original document
 

77.
Original front line was dug at A in first week. On May 19
Turks were right up to this line - got within 7 yards
without being seen (they were thick on the ridge xxxxxxxx
opposite also, later Tasmania Post).
After May 19 the underground line was dug to observe
into the termination of the gully (in the wheatfield) and
to act as a surprise trench in case of further attack.
The Turks could not still come up onto Tasmania Post
ridge. In order to deny this to him (xxxx he could put
down covering fire from there for an attack up the gully in
front of our original front line) - it was decided to go out
onto Tasmania Post ridge.
xxx Diagram. See original document

There was a question whether to go to the extreme edge of the
ridge or keep on the crest with 30 yds. field of fire.
xxx Diagram. See original document

Rafferty wanted to have the trench at 2. It was argued
against this that the trench would be seen and blown out
and could not fire down the gully. The Rafferty suggested
having the main trench at 1 but battle posts dug forward at
2 to warn the main trench. Rafferty himself had been out
into the second gully with its very steep slope and donga or
creek at the bottom. A company of Turks could come up there
at a time without being seen. Indeed at Q (see p. 76) was
the position where the Turks had been thick during attack of
May 19.
The engineers went out and took bearings; and when the
site of the post was decided Lieut. Rafferty went out and
broke three trees and tied some white tape on another, showing
the points of the trench site. The engineers next day took
sights of these broken trees (which were, as directed, on the
ridge running along the crest). The charts were drawn up on
these observations; and the next night Rafferty, Clogstoun,
Storey (Sergt. of engineers now Pioneers), Cuthbertson (engrs.
3rd Field Coy. draughtsman) and two others, with tapes went
out an measured the site. The following night again a big
covering party under Rafferty was sent out to near the edge of
the cliff and the work was begun on the support trench of
Tasmania Post first - (C). This night Rafferty took his C.O.
(Margetts) down to see the waterhole used by the Turks in the
gully. There was no interruption except spasmodic fire from
the Turks, who may or may not have known they were out there.
The trench was begun; and the digging party returned
before dawn - out again the next night and so on. About
(?) a week later it was occupied. This was on the reverse
side of the clope and easily covered. When this was occupied
the Bn. sapped out and then T'd so as to make the fire trench D.
It was after this trench was built that Rafferty went out
to burn the scrub. There had always been a bit of a scoop in
the bank (at F) of the steep gully, which Rafferty knew of.
But after Tasmania Post forward line was built he noticed one
night that a shallow riflepit had been dug leading in from it
at about G under a fir tree from which a sniper used to shoot
up towards Silt Spur.
(one night when Rafferty had taken out