Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/226/1 - Folder - Part 5

37.
Baird found the rest of the Coy. there and came back to Minnow
trench with the rest of Y Coy.
The three platoons were then fixed in Minnow trench-
reorganised. The Germans shelled the trench next morning for an
hour at dawn and it looked as if he were going to counterattack.
In the first two minutes seven men were hit in the trench. These
were from two whizzbang shells which hit the parados and blew back.
No falling back occurred south of the road - where our flank
was; but the British north of the road fell back towards dusk on
the evening of September 18. The British fell back to Rifle
trench which is just west of the sunken road to Ronssoy. Every
hour a patrol was sent across to the Tommies during the night and
a Vickers gun of 1st M.G. Coy. was put there to cover the gap
(under an officer - I think Lieut. Heane). The line was as fixed
on 3rd Bn. sector on morning of 21 September when the minor
operations took place.
1st Bn. relieved Y Coy. Y Coy went to Sugar Post (by three
entrance dugouts). Also X Coy. to Sugar Post. Z Coy. did the
attack on xxxxxxxxx morning of Sept. 21 for 3rd Bn. One Bn. of
2nd Bde. relieved 1st Bn. and they also went forward.
Z Coy. went forward and established two posts as outposts and
a support post about 600 yds. ahead - in the flat in the valley on
the right of the road in 25 B and D. They remained there 9 a.m.
McDonald was in charge of them. He 'phoned to say the Tommies
were falling back on theleft. Baird sent this on to Battn. Baird
came up to the top of the dugout in Sugar Post and two Tommies
came down the trench. They said they weregoing back as Fritz was
attacking. As soon as this happened Baird made the Coy. stand to.
Our posts then came in. It looked as though the Germans must have
attacked on the left. Leggett took hisplatoon up to Minnow Trench
with two Lewis Guns. The Germans were sweeping the place with
machine guns. The platoon got across without casualties. Baird
went over to look at the situation and found that the 3 post of
3rd Bn. had come back to Minnow Trench. The trench was littered
with rifles, ammunition, etc., Lewis Guns - and about 30 Tommies.
The Tommies had fallen back to Rifle Trench. This left our left
post flank 1000 yds. in the air. Z Coy. took up its original
position in triangle Trench and a Vickers gun went over there.
This left things as they were in the morning.
Baird told the Bn. the position and about a quarter of an hour
later the 18-pdrs. put down a good barrage. The Tommies had made
posts in 200 trench and Top trench. The Germans charged them in
overcoats with packs and Tommies could be seen surrendering. Some
Tommies were left out in shell holes and had a hot time under our
barrage. The Germans were moving down at the valley head a good
deal. About two hours later (11p.m.) the men were exceedingly
pleased by seeing the kilts of Scottish troops coming down over the
ridge between our men and Ronssoy. They apparently came in to fill
the gaps and hold. The line remained in Rifle trench. 3rd Bn.
was relieved that night by a Bn. of 2nd Bde.
Hand drawn diagram - see original document
Leggett met Lord and Baird in Hargicourt - and Clark.
Leggett lay up on left of road just to north of Lord and Baird.
Leggett's platoon went forward under the barrage, having to wait
for it at times, towards Valley Post - in the sunken road leading
up the valley towards Carbine Trench; came out of the sunken road
and came under M.G. fire from a M.G. in the copse of a few smashed
scrubs west of Sugar Trench; and were sniping at the guns which
McMillan rushed from across the valley. As soon as those guns
ceased fire the Germans in the whole valley seemed to go for their

38.
lives - the whole seemed to give way (these three isolated men
could be seen going up alone towards where the guns were).
The resistance gave way and Leggett's platoon followed as
fast as it could. They were on the "Buffs" ground.
They finished on the left of the road. When they got almost
to Trollope Trench the Buffs seemed to come over the hill from the
N.N.W. Leggett could see he was off his ground. He had a talk
with a Tommy officer and took his men across the road into the
Triangle trench.
Lieut. C. J. McDonaldm M.C., X Coy, was shot through the lung
on the road there by a M.G. which was playing down theroad. They
could not get at McDonald for some time. He died later at the
C.C.S. from internal Haemorrhage. Transfusion was tried but the
loss of blood had been too great. (McDonald got his M.C. at
Strazeele on June 20 in an attack on a German trench which was held
against five counterattacks. Higginbotham was killed there.)
Hawkshaw was wounded in the thigh by a M.G. on this road.
In Triangle Trench was found a fine big boiler of hot coffee,
cakes, unopened parcels - the German mail had just arrived and they
had just missed their breakfast.
Officers' casualties:
WOUNDED:
Lieut. C. J. McDonald, M.C., wounded 18th and died of wounds 10
19 Sept.
Lieut. E. Hawkshaw,
Lieut. E. R. Shelley, M.C. - lost an eye.
2/Lieut. S. J. Holman - wounded 18 Sept. X Coy, near end of day.
2/Lieut. Patrick Kinchington, M.M. - wounded in head by bullet at
beginning, 18 September.
Lieut. C. J. Clifton - wounded 19 Sept.
Estimated Germans killed - 60
Captured - 200
(Receipts held for 100)
Guns captured:
4   5.9
3   4.2
1       73
14    77
Of the 77's one was given to each artillery bde covering the front -
5th Bde. A.F.A. and (?)
Casualties - Officer and O.R.
              Killed.  Wounded.
O.R.         13            76
Off.           -               6
STRENGTH.
                  Off.       O.R.    Nucleus.
18 Sept.     17           301       55
23 Sept.     14          232       105
An artillery liaison officer, Lieut. R. A. Ulcog, went over with
Baird from Hargicourt and stayed till 4.30 p.m. making sure where
they were and making out barrage line. He asked where they wanted
the barrage. When he got back he put down the barrage and it came
down exactly where wanted - (a good example).

39.
195
2nd Battn. - POZIERES ("Gibraltar).
7th Battn.  LIHONS - HERLEVILLE.
6th Battn. ("C" Coy.) - LIHONS.
2nd Bn. Pozieres - Gibraltar.
About light Herod, O.C. Coy. 2nd Bn. saw Gibraltar ahead. It
looked dangerous. Patrols had gone out through the village
across the road. He ^sent xxx Lieut. Waterhouse out through the houses
and round the back xxxx of the house to the right with 10 men,
Herod himself with three men ran at it from the front. Waterhouse
reached it from the back. There were found three M.G. mounted -
one looking as shown (these were brought out). Three officers and
30 Germans were found inside - and one sergtz actually holding the
buttons of the gun. They surrendered. 18 pairs of Zeiss
binoculars were found there. 4th Bn. were digging by road. The
guns were later lost in the Battn. H.Q. in the "log-hut dugout".
Hand drawn diagram- see original document

40.
7th Battn. - LINONS.
Aug. 9. On Morning of Aug. 9 the 7th Bn. left O17A (north of Villers
Bretonneux by Fouilloy) at 8.30 a.m.
They marched to main road and across country by a march route
chosen by C.O. to S. outskirts of Bayonvillers - raching there
about 12.30 p.m. Only 10 mins. here - time to park transport and
unship Lewis Guns from waggons. The off again south of road in
battle formation (in artillery formation - this part of country
being shelled) south of Harbonnieres, and assembled for attack
south of Harbonnieres.
There they picked up the tanks and artillery which were to go
forward with them. Two guns were told off to each attacking
battn. (7 and 8th Bns). 7th Bn. had a section of C bty. xxx 189
Army Bde. R.F.A.
Orders for attack had been received on the road - order to go
to Bde. H.Q. came verbally to C.O. - he told Bn. to go to W2C.
Bde H.Q. was near Guillancourt. C.O. there was instructed to
attack with 8th Bn from Green line (which had already been attacked
by 15 Bde. - it was supposed to attack in place of 2nd Bde at
11 a.m.)
Six tanks (2nd Tank Bn), the section of our 2nd M.G. Coy. and
one section artillery were allotted to the Bn.
At 12.15 C.O. rejoined En. south of Bayonvillers. They had
just reached there: he went on with them to south of Harbonnieres.
They assaulted in the sunken roads in Wl7m south of Harbonrs.
Tank, artillery and coy., commanders were called together by C.O.,
Col. Herod, and he explained to them what they had to do. Railway
line was right boundary; grid line E. and W. immediately S. of
Vauvillers was left boundary. 7th Bn was to make good road from
Framerville towards Lihons - S. of Moulin Favre - as a matter of
fact the red line was just xxx short of the road. No exploit-
ation.
At 1.50 they pushed off:
Diagram -see original document
xxxxxx A and B had each a line of scouts across the front.
Tanks 150 yds. behind scouts.
Two line Coyaz 150 yds behind tanks in artillery formation
of sections. The two supporting coys.. followed at 500 yds.
distance in artillery formation of platoons.
Bn H.Q moved between the two support Coys.
Artillery 500 yds in rear of support Coys.
So they moved from the sunken road.
They knew nothing definite of our front line except that
15 Bde were supposed to be on green line; nor anything of enemy's
disposition ahead. So they pushed out as into the blue.
The Germans could not see them till they topped a bit of a
rise in 18 A and C. From there it was perfectly flat till they
reached the up slope quite close to the objective.
When they cleared this rise they came under artillery fire
from two batteries firing direct from the objective - from the
very road.
Six German planes were in the air and stayed 30 minutes - 4
bombs were dropped by them - they caused a few casualties by these
and machineguns. These planes went away in the end - not driven
away.
There was no co-operation with out planes, nor our guns.
From the start onwards nothing was seen of the two guns attached,
and when 7 scouts were sent out xxxx xxxxx xxx for them (as soon
as C.O. saw the guns open) - they could not be found. The 8 guns
could be seen firing, and every man naturally throught they were
firing at him. The moment C.O. got over the first rise he could

41.
see this; but by then the guns could not be found.
There was nothing to be done but go on straight ahead - the
brigadier could not be reached at once for such artillery as he had.
So we had no artillery at all.
The 8 German guns started by concentrating on the tanks. The
left flank tank capsized getting out of the sunken road. This
left 5. The 8th Bn had six tanks. Those of the 8th Bn worked
to the right and 7th Bn. tanks worked right with them. They
cleared gradually right off 7th Bn front. All were knocked before
they got into action on 7 Bn front - they may have reached action on
8th Bn front near Rosieres and were knocked there. (The tanks
were too fast for the infantry and got ahead, lost direction and
got to the right). The tanks were told to zigzag in order to
slow the pace - but the test was really too difficult for tanks -
bright sun; no smoke; no artillerys and at least 8 anti-tank
guns unhindered firing at them.
On reaching the road running due N. and S. between squares
X13 and 14, 7th Bn passed through the troops of the 15 Bde. They
thought they were on the Vauvillers-Rosieres Road, which was the
green line, but they were not. Scanlon was at 13 D 9.5 - he
throught he was at 20 B 7.4.
On reaching the road between 13-14, 7th Bn came under very
heavy M.G. fire from trenches straight ahead in Xl4 B and D (by
road), and enfilade from S. outskirts of Vauvillers. This was
at about 2.20 p.m. Bn took cover. The tanks had all gone.
There was no artillery. C.O. coming up thought 15 Bde was on
green line; yet suddenly a terrific volume of fire opened from
the road where the green line was. Col. Herod saw the men take
cover ahead well and quickly. He ran forward and established
H.Q. in the house at the Crossroad X13D9.5. At 2.40 p.m. H.Q.
settled there. Front line was on the road. Herod got up to the
roof of the barn - he could see through a hole there the ground
in front - the Bn by the road, and the Germans in trenches - old
trenches of French - immediately ahead near the Vauvillers road.
At first Herod thought - "This is covering fire from troops
on green line" Then as bullets whistled he realised it was the
Germans. The troops were just ahead of the road in any old
cover - the tendency was to work to the right. There was to be
no advance on the left of the 7th Bn. Here was an exposed flank
which would keep on getting worse. Therefore Herod decided to
throw in C Coy. to provide a defensive flank on the left.
C Coy. came into action from nearer to the railway. Capt.
Kitchen was badly wounded (he subsequently died) in the fire which
followed the movement of this Coy., but his Coy. did splendidly.
The left front Coy. gave them covering fire which kept German heads
down so that Kitchen's Coy. got up with comparatively few casualtie
(a fine example of the use of covering fire).
The Germans left the left front of 7th Bn on this move and
retired N.E. towards X9 Central - working up trenches - C.O. could
see them - they had probably very few casualties. This allowed
the left Coy. (C) to get further forward. They got into old
trenches in 15A (beyond the Arbre Isole). This was at 3.30 p.m.
The centre Coy. (original left front coy.) now pushed forward
(after C coy. had gone ahead and was facing north) - but came
under heavy fire from the copse in X15C.
It took nearly an hour before the Germans began to dribble
out of this copse and the centre coy. was able to rush it, getting
one heavy M.G. and 3 light and 15 prisoners. This was a parade
ground movement. They engaged from the front. One platoon
sneaked south by section rushes - another did the same northwards.
Then they rushed it together from three sides. But a lot of good
men were knocked out - including Lieut. Harris, a very promising
young officer who had been with the Bn. in Gallipoli, who was
killed. Harris, with the rightplatoon, was getting ahead very
fast - the C.O. remarked it to hisbrother, the Adjutant, who was
watching by his side. The the C.O. saw him fall - he was hit xxx
through the leg, but bled to death. It was just as they rose for
the assault that he was hit. This platoon rose first - the
others saw it (as happens) and got up at the same time. (The 

32  42. 
Germans could be seen before this getting away with some of their
M.G.). It was a very strong position.
About the same time the right Coy. took the cross roads in
20B with two heavy T.M. and 16 men, a number of hospital orderlies -
these were not in action. They got well ahead.
(At the S. corner of this little wood Herod put a cemetery,
where about 47 men were buried and a memorial raised.)
Harris himself was carried back by stretcherbearers and buried
at Bayonvillers.
It was now about 4 p.m. The guns on the road were still 
firing and beyond range (3000 yds. away). The right Coy. had
taken the hospital in X21 C or D and at 3.35 p.m. reached the road
bend at X28A 1.9 S.E. of the hospital and past the cross roads.
They had little opposition - nothing like the left.
There was only onelarge scale map per Coy. The Lihons road
was leading the right Coy. always further south. They were already
700 yds, south of their boundary, and 8th Bn had swerved right also.
This meant gaps and scanty troops on the left. The left had also
lost heavily. The whole afternoon was a continual drone of M.G.'s
and the eight guns were still shooting. The guns were strong in a
line of old gun positions about 400 yds due east of the road
crossing east of the hospital. The right Coy. was in front of
this. It had already used all rifle grenades and the only ground
over which the usual outflanking movements could be made was very
open - the Germans were in trenches.
C.O. therefore ordered up D Coy. - from about 20 Central - he
could see the Coy. in difficulties. At 4 p.m. D Coy. joined B.
Lieut. Fowler commanded D and took over the remnants of C B.
(Capt. O'Connor, commander of B, had been knocked early in the
action before reaching the hospital). By using rifle grenades
they got into the old gunpits. Fowler got his rifle
grenadiers together in a good position - got in a volley and the
Coy. rushed the gunpits under it (using rifle grenades almost as
barrage). They took 3 M.G. and 20 prisoners here.
The Germans retired along trenches and we followed him along
the same trenches by bombing. At 4.35 they had reached in this
way (working up trenches for the first time) cross roads in X22B1.4.
This helped the centre Coy. The enemy in the old trenches E.N.E.
of this in front of the centre Coy., being almost cut off, ran over
the top and the 7th Bn shot 50 and captured 30 and a number got
away.
All Coys. then pushed forward on this break occurring for the
red line. By 5.5 the right flank was at X29 A.1.9. and a post was
established at X23c5.1 in an old trench near a small tree clump,
and two or three posts between there and X17c.1.3. They were now
on the red line to the right.
For the first rime we were now able to snipe at the batteries
which had been firing on the advance. The Germans were thick in
a copse in 23A immediately in front of our posts (100 to 150 yds.
away - in a trench running N. and S.) Probably they were trying
to keep us off the guns. The left Coy. was still getting it from
Germans in X9 and 10 where a lot of movement could be seen. The
C.O. ordered the left Coy. to make forward to the xxxx red line,
keeping a platoon always to cover their left flank. By about 6
p.m. they reached a line (and established two posts) on the N.E.
face of a small rise in X16B a little west of the road. This was
the red line.
At 6.30 p.m. the Germans counterattacked the centre about
the N. of the cross road in 17C with about 100 men, but were easily
dealt with by Lewis Guns. At one time under cover of M.G. fire
the Germans tried to get away the gunsin X23 but the horses were
shot down and the guns were left. This was before dark. Before
dark touch was obtained with 8th Bn.
 

43.
One Coy. of 5th Bn, was called on to form a defensive flank
as the Germans could be seen moving all the time in the ground
north of the red line. This Coy. of 5th Bn was sent forward to
form a flank back towards Vauvillers. Their left got a little
too far forward and Lieut. Morrison was captured-(his brother was
killed later - probably next day)- the Germans being in behind
the Coy. But the 25th Bn came through about 8.45. The flank
of 25 Bn only got touch with the flank on the sunken road, which
kept the 5 Bn Coy. in position till nearly dawn - it had to
attack next day.
Hand drawn diagram- see original
Since leaving at 8.30 a.m. the men had only the food they
(x All rations are still being officially
carried with them. (xx All rations are still being officially
argued over because of the iron rations being eaten that day).
About 10 or 10.30 p.m. the men got a hot meal (on wheels almost
to the front line).
10 Aug. At 5 a.m. one Coy, was taken from the right flank and placed
on the left to allow 5 Bn Coy. to withdraw. The morning was
fine with light mist. 3rd Bde passed through at 8 a.m. to take
Blue Line.
On Aug.9 each man took in 220 yds rounds and 48 hours
rations. Four ammunition mules were sent up (moving behind their
Coys. - one mule getting into the trenches which were very big.
They all reached the red line. One mule was hit near the tendon
behind the hock but only lightly. 
Ambulances were sent up to Battn. H.Q. by 8 p.m. and the
wounded were cleared at 2 a.m.
There were captured:
100 prisoners (about):
4 trench mortars,
32 grenatenwerfers
4 heavy M.G.
13 light M.G.
C.C.S. and equipment.
The guns out on the road had to be left to the 3rd Bde.
They were still there next morning. (They were 77's).
Officer casualties.
Killed - Lieut. Harris; Lieut. Poole; Lieut. Scott; Lieut. R. B.
Purbrick; Lieut. J. Caddy, D.C.M., M.M. (private in the original
Battn.; Lieut. Ross; Lieut. Hamblet (wife's address - 19,
Station Road, Wallasey, Cheshire, Eng.), an ideal officer, very
cool in action and calculating. He was wounded in the head
while leading hisplatoon of D Coy. (the last in). He was put on
stretcher (at 4 p.m.) and stretcher party was fired on and
Hamblet shot through heart. He was a mother to his men. Buried
at W23A3.8.
Wounded(8):
                           (Capt. Phillips (lost a leg in hospital),
       4                  (Capt. Kitchen (died later),
Company         (Capt. O'Connor,
Commanders (Capt. Fowler,
(Lieut. Smedley (died of wounds)m
Lieut. Russell,
Lieut. Whalley,
Lieut. Taverner. 

44.
Two days later:
Kelley    )
Grant     )Killed on Aug. 11 by a shell in the
Somers )support area.
In the fight at Lihons itself on Aug. 11 no officers were
lost.
Anderson
Wisewould (M.C. in this)
Smith, Coy. Commander (M.C. in this)
all came through.
At Lihons 7 Bn had 1½ Coys. attached to 8 Bn. under Lieut.
Smith (M.C.). Get this from 8th Bn. This was on Aug. 11 when
Lihons was taken.
The 9th August was the anniversary of 7th Bn's fight in
Lone Pine.
0th Bn.
HERLEVILLE. Mxx 7th Bn. was in support. The Battn got through the 4.a.m.
Barrage and wormed through it -only one shell hit a party of whom
four were killed.
Bn had to mop up part of St Martin's Wood after 5th Bn. had
gone through! They had some losses from Germans firing M.G.'s
in the wood which they mopped up. Lieut. Pxxxx Pearcey did well
(D and A Coys.) It was 7 p.m. before the last sniper was caught.
3 officers and 65 O.R. were got in mopping up - this one sniper
sniped all day. They stumbled on him between 6 and 7 p.m. A
light railway ran through the N.W. corner of the wood. This man
was in a snug position near the line in the very thick growth and
was sniping at a bend of the line some distance away. He would
not fire at men moving close to him.
100 men were gassed on morning of Aug. 25 in the N.E. corner
of the wood and the gully near it.
On the night of Aug. 1 25/26 5th Bn was relieved by 7th Bn.
in line and posts established in the rain some way forward for
5th Bn Divn. to push from.
A Battn. of 8th Bde relieved them (30th Bn).
4 Officers and 133 men were lost in this.
(2 officers and 88 men of these were gassed). 

45.
6th BATTN. - LIHONS. ("C" Coy.)
Aug. 9. On Aug. 9 6th Bn. was in support to 8th Bn. Started 8 a.m.
Came from behind Villers Bretonneux -220 rounds and 2 days'
rations. Villers Bretonneux Road to Warfusee, then S. E.
Artillery formation of platoons between Marcelcave and Lamotte.
Near Wiencourt on to road again - on road to Gillaucourt
(2 p.m.) in platoons at intervals. Heard definitely there that
C Coy. to be reserve to 6th Bn. which was to support 8th Bn. in
an immediate attack. Objective - line through X23 A and C. Col.
Ulrich came along on horse - said you will be reserve Coy. to
support Bn to 8th Bn. Objective - he put it on the map through
23 A and C, 29 A and C, F5A and C.
At W 15 B 5.7 they broke into artillery formation of
platoons with right on railway line - Coy. covered nearly 1000 yds.
Between Harbonnieres and railway line came under light 5.9
shelling and broke into artillery formation of halfplatoons.
(Coy. commander would do this on hisown judgment). No casualties
Here met fire of a 77 Battery firing over open
till Wl9 and 20. Here met fire of 77 Battey firing over open
sights from the crest near Crepy Wood. You could see the flash
and then had to wait for the shells.
Our own artillery was silent. The tanks were all knocked
out by these guns by this time. Some of them wereburning,
ammunition goingoff, etc , This would be just about S. of
Vauvillers - tanks everywhere. It was butchery for the tanks.
Some men were wounded. A shell missed the Coy. Commander by a
foot (Capt. Stobie).
After crossing the Rosieres-Vauvillers Road they came under
light M.G. fire and it became clear that the attack was held up
ahead. This was about 3.30 p.m. To this point the advance had
been without a halt. Battnz. went straight on.
About 4 p.m. Stobie took up position in reserve in four posts
in old grass-grown trenches a little ahead of the Vauvillers-
Rosieres Road. There were also newly-dug German ammuniation
pits (uncovered still). These would hold about six men.
Position was stable here till about 9 p.m. as 8th Bn seemed
unable to advance and it was reported that they had dug in.
No. 10 platoon of C Coy. was thrown into an advance with D
Coy. on left fron of Bn. There was a little quarry in front of
a small wood (probably the one in 28B). The Germans on the woods
on the hillcrest could be seen alternately reinforcing whichever
part of their line was attacked moving from Arbre Coin du Bois
to the Wood in F5B and vice versa. They seemed to be here in
quantities.
At 8 p.m. Stobie went across to the Canadians whose front
line posts were only level with his line on the S. side of the
railway - just ahead of Rosieres. He could not get them to
advance through there was no opposition ahead and the right flank
of 8th Bn was dangerously open.
At 9.30 p.m. a change of position was begun - C Coy. moving
up and forming a support line with B Coy. to its right. No. 10
platoon did not return till 4.30 a.m. Aug. 10, when the line ran
approximately X27D 8.9 - to X28A 5.5. This was an old C.T.
where we found reserve Coy. 8th. Bn on Aug. 11. The front line
at this time was about 600 yds. ahead in an old line of trenches
about parallel where we found support Coy. 8th Bn Aug. 11.
Hand drawn diagram-see original
During the night D and A Coys. came back from the front line
where they had been helping 8th Bn. They formed a support line
very close behind C and B ready for the morning operations. C
Coys. casualties so far were three killed 5 wounded. Night
absolutely quiet on both sides

33 48.
Early in morning touch was gained with 5 Bn. on left. A
fairly heavy fog appeared at daybreak but cleared up after a few
hours - everyone was praying for this fog to stay.
At 7.30 a.m. preparations for the attack (which had been
arranged early in the night) were complete. When barrage opened
at 7.45 a.m. B and C Coys moved out. They went straight into
extended order, opening as they went. They soon established
a perfect line. Formation of C Coy, was one wave of two lines
with four platoons in line on a frontage of 300 yds., 50 yds.
between lines. Coy. H.Q. was in second line strengthening it.
Four Lewis guns in first line, 5 in second. (2 to each platoon
and 1 to Coy. H.Q. ) (Our Coys. often had over   xxxxxxxxxx their
own number of Lewis guns).
Hand drawn diagram - see original
Riflemen were almost all in front line with one Lewis gun
team per platoon. Other Lewis gun team and Coy. H.Q. in 2nd
line.
B Co. was in same formation.
D Coy. 200 yds in rear in somewhat similar formation.
There was no shelling and only odd bullets at first while
crossing the open flat. At Zero minus 2 mins. (2 mins. to 8)
they passed through postsoccupied by 8th Bn and almost at once
an intense M.G. fire opened. The right flank was 700 yds. in the
air, on railway line. Fire came from front and both sides.
Hand drawn diagram - see original
At X28D5.0. the first German post was half way up slope, in
a trench in the open, was quickly silenced by Lewis Gun from hip
(Pte. Osborne got M.M. for this). So far the advance was going
straight on. From this post M.G. fire doubled and casualties
became heavy. Two officers, Lieut. Neil McLachlan, M.C.,
(Passchandaele) was killed, and 2/Lieut. Hitchcock, M.C., D.C.M.
(D.C.M. Gallipoli, M.C. Merris) badly wounded. The Bn. began
advancing by short rushes with supporting fire (they do it
automatically - their sole object to shut up what is coming from
ahead - a splendid example of the fire-fight) to within 100 yds.
of the edge of the wood on the crest (wood in F5B).
Hand drawn diagram - see original
Here the advance was definitely held up by m,g, fire from
all sides - worse from right flank. The barrage had been good at
first but now was very thin - 10 shells a minute perhaps on the
whole wood, nothing like enough to keep down fire. They were in
touch with 5 Bn on left and B Coy. on right.
The position was as in the above sketch. The Germans had
a great fire superiority. C Coy in the open taking what little
cover existed was in a dangerous position of inferiority owing to
heavy casualties. D Coy. just reaching German post first taken